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• Thesis Abstract
The Making of the Market: Oligopolistic Business in Britain 1945 - c.1960
The theory of the firm and transaction cost analysis provide the starting point 
of this institutional study of business co-operation in the aftermath of World War 
Two. It is suggested that the market is an institution which is subject to the visible 
hand of business. The aim of business in this process is to control information flows 
and reduce uncertainty.
Utilising business history case studies, of the oil industry through the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., the electrical engineering industry through General Electric 
Co. and the grocery retailing trade through J.Sainsbury, the hypothesis that the firm 
aims to create market governance procedures in order to alter the structure of the 
market is tested.
The study finds that inter-firm co-operation is central to understanding the 
development of markets and that co-operation is a dynamic process, which 
responds to changes in market conditions and government competition policy. The 
growth of government as a consumer is considered to be a significant factor affecting 
the development of co-operative agreements between firms. The study also finds that 
collusion and co-operation between firms, leading to a reduction of competitive 
pressures, was central to the development of organisational capabilities in the oil and 
grocery retailing industries, but hindered the emergence of organisational capabilities 
within the electrical engineering industry. Finally, the study finds that the 
internalisation of market transactions occurs when market governance procedures 
break down and competition becomes intense.
The study concludes that firms are not primarily transaction cost minimisers 
but are maximisers of market power. It is suggested that the maximising of market 
power is the rationale behind the creation of organisational capabilities and the 
development of the division of labour under conditions of supervision and 
discipline.
2
• Contents Page
Thesis Abstract 2
Contents Page 3
List of Tables 4
List of Figures 5
List of Abbreviations 6
Aknowledgements 7
1 Contextualisation, Institutions and Markets in Economic History:
firms make history but not in circumstances of their own choosing. 8
2 The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 1945-54: Successful market
governance 70
3 The General Electric Company 1945-65: Failure in market governance 147
4 J. Sainsbury 1945-64 : Challenging market governance 237
5 Governing the Market: Towards a market governance theory of the 313
firm
Appendix One
A Sectoral analysis of government expenditure using Input-Ouput
tables 351
Appendix Two
Alternative Estimates of Real Gross Profits for the Anglo Iranian Oil
Co. 358
Appendix Three
Text of letter from Geoffrey Lloyd, Minister for Fuel and Power to
Boards of all US owned oil companies operating in Britain 360
Appendix Four
Alternative Estimates of Real Gross Profits for AEI, English Electric
and GEC 361
Appendix Five
Reports from Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee into the German 
electrical engineering industry 362
Bibliography 363
3
• List of Tables Page
1.1 Public Sector Purchases of Goods and Services from 
Manufacturing Industry as a Proportion of Domestic Output in
1948 and 1963 63
1.2 Public Sector Orders as a Percentage of Total Domestic Output
1948-63 65
2.1 Estimated Anglo Iranian Oil Company Crude Oil Requirements
1950-54 113
2.2 Estimated Anglo Iranian Crude Oil Production by Region 1950-54 113
2.3 Estimated Iranian Crude Oil Availability 1950-53 113
2.4 Estimated Refinery Capacity 1950-54 114
2.5 Estimated Fuel Oil Price Index 1954-61 140
3.1 Growth of the Electrical Engineering Industry 1935-1968 161
3.2 Percentage of Exports of Steam and Water Turbines, Generators,
Generating Sets, Motors and Transformers from Eight Principal 
Manufacturing Countries of the World 168
3.3 GEC Sales and the Influence of Overseas Markets 174
3.4 Local Participating Percentages of 1948 Lamp Agreement 189
3.5 GEC The allocation of Resources and Contribution to Turnover by
Product Divisions 228
4.1 Total Number and Percentage of Grocers and Provision Stores by
Form of Organisation 249
4.2 Concentration within the Grocery Provision Trade by Turnover at
Current Prices  ^ 249
4.3 Concentration in Greater London by Number of Grocers and
Provision Stores by Form of Organisation 252
4.4 Concentration within the Grocery Provision Trade in Greater
London by Turnover 1950-71 252
A1.1 Input-Output representation of Public Sector Purchases from
Private Industry in 1948 355
A 1.2 Input-Output representation of Public Sector Purchases from
Private Industry in 1963 356
4
• List of Figures Page
2.1 Log of Inland Consumption of Petroleum Products 77
2.2 Log of Petrol and Fuel Oil Consumption 78
2.3 Crude Oil Prices 1921-66 (US $/barrel) 104
2.4 AIOC Real Gross Profits £m (1952 prices) 106
2.5 Index of AIOC Real Gross Profits per ton of Crude Oil
(1950=100) 107
2.6 Real Crude Oil Prices 1945-65 (US $/barrel) 143
2.7 UK Petrol Prices 1921-66 (exclusive of tax) 143
2.8 Real UK Petrol Prices (1975 prices) 144
3.1 AEI, English Electric and GEC Real Gross Profit (1952
prices) 176
3.2 Percentage of Electrical Engineering Companies Funding
derived from share issues 1949-70 213
3.3 Electrical Engineering Dividend Payments as a Percentage
of Total gross Trading Profits 1949-70 213
3.4 GEC and AEI Gross Profits as a Percentage of Annual
Sales 218
4.1 Percentage of Retail Distribution Trades* Funds Derived
from Share Issues (3 year moving average) 1951-70 271
4.2 Retail Trade Dividend Payments as a Percentage of gross
Trading Profit 1949-70 271
4.3 Price Indices for the Food Industry 1947-69 274
4.4 Sainsbury’s Real Growth in Turnover per Store (1954
prices) 280
4.5 Sainsbury’s Real Gross Profit per Store (1954 prices) 282
4.6 Sainsbury’s Gross Profit as a Percentage of Turnover 286
A2.1 AIOC Real Gross Profit £m (using GDP price index
1952=100) 358
A2.2 AIOC Real Gross Profit £m (using Retail Price Index
1952=100) 359
A4.1 AEI, English Electric and GEC Real Gross Profit £m
(using GDP price index 1952=100) 361
A4.2 AEI, English Electric and GEC Real Gross Profit £m
(using manufacturing output price index 1954=100) 361
5
• List of Abbreviations
AACP Anglo-American Council on Productivity
BEAMA British Electrical and Allied Manufacturers Association
BIOS British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee
BTH British Thomson-Houston
CFP Compagnie Frangaise des Petroles
CIOS Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee
COR Commonwealth Oil Refineries Ltd
EIU Economist Intelligence Unit
FIAT Field Intelligence Agency Technical, US Group
FMF Food Manufacturers’ Association
IGD Institute of Grocery Distribution
JS Archive Sainsbury Archive
MAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
Metrovick Metropolitan-Vickers
MRC Modem Record Centre
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
RPM Resale Price Maintenance
sq.ft Square feet
6
• Acknowledgements
There are truly too many individuals to thank for the help and encouragement 
that I have received in the researching and writing of this work. I would therefore 
like to thank all those who have helped me, in however small a way, over the past 
four years.
In particular I would like to thank Leslie Hannah and Peter Howlett for their 
unstinting supervision and considerable effort in reading early drafts and Tony Cliff 
for pioneering an approach that has been so valuable to me. Jim Bamberg, at BP, and 
Bridgette Williams, at Sainsbury’s, along with all the archivists and librarians at the 
numerous archives made available to me. Of course all views, opinions and mistakes 
contained within this work are mine alone in making. For other reasons I would like 
to thank the Economic and Social Research Council, for without their generous 
financial support, (award No. R00429234227), this PhD would without doubt not 
have been completed.
Above all, however, thanks must go to Simone for her love and tolerance and 
Eleanor and Myles, who were always on hand to prevent this PhD from taking on an 
importance far beyond that which was necessary.
7
Chapter One
• Contextualisation. Institutions and Markets in Economic History: firms make 
history but not in circumstances of their own choosing:1
• Introduction
The two decades after the Second World War presented the British economy 
with its best opportunity of reversing the relative economic decline it had faced over 
the first half of the twentieth century. The world which emerged after 1945 was one in 
which demand for goods was high. British firms also had an initial advantage, over 
French or German rivals, due to their plant being less damaged by war. Yet by the end 
of the 1960s the British economy faced serious problems. Major firms within important 
industries, including the British Leyland Motor Corporation in mass produced car 
manufacturing and Rolls Royce in aero engine manufacture, were soon to need 
rescuing from bankruptcy. The end of the long post-war boom left British capitalism in 
a weakened state relative to its post-war rivals. But was this inevitable? Was there truly 
an opportunity to change after 1945 and if so how and why was it squandered? These 
are some of the questions that concern the present author and are a recurring theme 
within many studies of economic and business history after 1945.
This thesis, utilising a business history case study approach within a transaction 
cost framework, examines the development of three industries in relationship to a 
changing market environment. Could the opportunities available to the British firms 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the General Electric Company and J. Sainsbury in 1945
1 With apologies to K. Marx whose classic statement on historical materialism 
ts l  ! ‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please;
they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under 
circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.’, K. Marx, 
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. (Third edition 1984), p. 10.
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be exploited to create sustainable competitive advantage? To what extent was the 
development of these three firms determined by their own decisions or a function of a 
pre-determined or path dependent process. Fundamentally this thesis is concerned with 
the link between economic development and human agency.
• Contextualisation
For those who only see decline in the British economy a depressingly familiar 
story can be told of a once dominant position eroded, or extinguished, in the face of 
international competitive pressure.2 The long term decline in the share of world trade in 
manufactured goods is one such story. Britain's share fell from over 37% in the 
nineteenth century to 25.5% by 1950 and continued to decline to 8.6% in 1990.3 The 
notion of 'decline' is indeed so pervasive, within British popular culture, that the 
possibility that Britain's share of world trade in manufactured goods could remain 
steady and even increase to 9% is seen as evidence that perhaps the great 'decline' has 
been halted, and is therefore a marvellous victory.4
This chapter will therefore look, initially, at some of the alternative views on 
the nature and causes of the relative decline in the British economy and suggest that 
writers on economic decline are perhaps asking the wrong questions. The chapter will 
argue that Britain's pre-eminence in the world economy was merely a function of its 
early beginning and that the downgrading of its relative economic strength was 
inevitable. It will also suggest that treating decline as homogenous fails to distinguish
2 See W. Hutton, The State We’re In. (1995), for one of the most recent and popular 
examples of this thesis.
3 N.F.R Crafts, ‘Reversing Economic Decline? the 1980's in Historical Perspective’, 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy. Vol.7, No.3, 1991.
4 See Prest and Coppock's, The UK Economy, ed. M.J. Artis, 12th edition, (1989), 
p. 184.
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the historically inevitable element of Britain's uniqueness from the elements which 
were indeed self-inflicted. This concentration on laying blame at someone's door, on 
finding a suitable scapegoat, ignores the real issues. The second role of this chapter will 
be to construct a framework for a more realistic interpretation of economic change and 
possible failure. In so doing a testable hypothesis will be formulated and the format for 
testing such a hypothesis throughout the rest of the thesis will be elaborated upon.
In attempting to quantify the elements in economic growth writers have looked 
at the use of the factors of production and utilised concepts from neo-classical 
economics such as the Cobb-Douglas production function.5 The development of 
growth accounting techniques, in particular utilising a Solow exogenous growth based 
model for the measurement of total factor productivity as a residual, has been at the 
methodological heart of econometric analysis. More recently attempts to reduce the 
importance of the residual, by factoring out the influence of human capital, have 
emerged in the form of endogenous growth models. However what is surprising in the 
results of both forms of growth accounting is the limited degree to which the analysis 
accounts for economic growth, with the continued existence of significant unexplained 
residual values.
This continued difficulty in accounting for growth is highlighted in Crafts and 
Broadberry's regression for the 1930's of the determinants of the rise in British labour 
productivity, where less than a quarter of the change is explained. Considering that 
their production function is more subtle than the Cobb-Douglas, with data on capital- 
labour ratio increases and employment falls along with dummy variables for trade
5 S.N. Broadberry and N.F.R. Crafts, 'Britain's Productivity Gap in the 1930s: Some 
Neglected Factors.', Journal of Economic History. No.3 Vol.52, 1992 and N.F.R. 
Crafts and M. Thomas, 'Comparative Advantage in UK Manufacturing Trade, OIO­
SS', The Economic Journal. 96, 1986.
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union density, emerging versus declining industries and market power through firms’ 
price-cost margins, such a result appears disappointing.6 As Crafts and Broadberry 
recognise ‘important effects on productivity outcomes (are) not readily captured by a 
regression approach’.7
The conclusion suggested by these difficulties must be that a straightforward 
log or linear relationship between the factors of production and output is too simplistic 
a model for quantifying relative growth. Writers such as Theo Nichols, and sociologists 
in general, have instead argued that production should be understood as a set of social 
relations.8 The need to understand production as a complex set of social relations is 
also bome out by looking at the literature on relative decline.
• Labour
One of the main factors of production the literature focuses upon is labour; its 
inefficient use and the deleterious role played by trade unions.9 The long term strength 
of workers' organisation led to a system of production that relied upon skilled craft 
workers. Craft workers were able to determine not only output levels but also the 
organisation of the production process itself. The result was that managements 
preferred to conclude agreements with trade unions rather than confront workers' shop 
floor power and impose their will over the production process. As a result the 'system 
of industrial relations that evolved was highly decentralised, uncoordinated and
6 Broadberry and Crafts, op.cit.. p.538 has a coefficient of determination of 0.244 
and regression coefficients which (while statistically significant) are of relatively low 
value.
7 Ibid. pp.553-4.
8 T. Nichols, The British Worker Question. (1986).
9 A. Kilpatrick and T. Lawson, 'On the Nature of Industrial Decline in the UK', 
Cambridge Journal of Economics. No.4 1980 and G. Hutton, Whatever Happened to 
Productivity?. (1980)
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relatively unsuited to the later needs of mass production'.10 This system of industrial 
relations was in stark contrast to that developed within the United States, where weak 
trade unions allowed for the introduction of mass production techniques. Strong 
managerial control over the production process was essential for the successful growth 
of large scale enterprises in the United States. The dominance of British trade unions 
over production continued throughout the post-war era, reaching its most damaging 
stage in the 1970's. Thus craft-based union organisation increased X-inefficiency and 
restricted the introduction of more modem production methods. *
There certainly is plenty of evidence put forward for such theories and there are 
also examples of how employers who did confront workplace organisation were able to 
reduce X-inefficiencies and so boost labour productivity. Indeed this is one of the main 
elements, Richardson suggests, for the reversal of British decline in the 1980's.11 
Nevertheless, a few examples do not a theory make. When looking for a long run 
theory of decline there remains many problems for the ‘trade unions are to blame’ 
school.
Britain in the nineteenth century relied heavily upon its abundant supply of 
skilled labour. In contrast to the United States, whose labour force was largely 
unskilled and ethnically mixed, British employers could allow workers a much larger 
degree of control over production. Similarly the use of apprenticeships provided a 
low cost method of creating skilled labour and so further deterred managements from 
directly controlling the training of skilled workers.13 As a result, it is argued, craft-
10 Kilpatrick and Lawson, op.cit.. p.87.
11 R. Richardson, ‘Trade Unions and Industrial Relations’, The British Economy 
Since 1945. eds. N.F.R Crafts & N.W.C. Woodward, (Oxford 1991), p.438.
12 For the US case see M. Davis, Prisoners of the American Dream. (1986).
13 M. Dintenfass, The Decline of Industrial Britain 1870-1980. (1992) p.28-29.
* \\. Letkeastein,
based trade unions hindered the growth of mass production techniques and managerial 
structures which Chandler has identified as being key to understanding the 
development of multi-divisional firms in the United States.14
The point is, did such craft-based organisations really impede British economic 
growth? Here economic historians' writing is particularly weak, with poor 
characterisations and ill-informed, sweeping generalisations. It is true that British trade 
unionism was always numerically greater in comparison to that of the United States in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, yet, as Kirk suggests, ‘to see workplace 
relations, trade unionism and industrial protest in Britain and the United States solely, 
or even mainly, in terms of the adjectives weak and strong ... is to adopt a very limited, 
flat and misleading approach to the issues involved ’.15 Both in Britain and the United 
States in the second half of the nineteenth century there existed large craft-based trade 
union organisations in the Trades Union Congress and the American Federation of 
Labor respectively. The United States also had a significant tradition of non craft-based 
union organisation with the Knights of Labor whose membership was estimated at over 
700,000 in 1886.16
Trade union density in Britain never fell below 10% after 1896 while in 
America, excluding agricultural employment, it never fell below 10% after 1910.17 It 
should also be recognised that unions' influence was restricted to only a small section 
of the workforce in both Britain and the United States.
14 A.D. Chandler, 'The beginnings of "big business" in American industry', The 
Essential Alfred Chandler, ed. T.K. McCraw, (Boston USA 1991).
15 N. Kirk, Labour and Society in Britain and the USA. Volume 2, (Hants 1994), 
p.65.
16 Davis, op.cit.. p.30.
17 G.S. Bain and R. Price, Profiles of Union Growth. (Oxford 1980), p.37 and p.88.
13
Where craft unions existed in the United States it was also the case that they 
had significant strength. For example, affiliated to the AFL was the Amalgamated 
Association of Iron and Steelworkers, the largest union of iron and steel workers in the 
world.18 The Amalgamated Association's convention in 1891 was attended by 294 
delegates representing 24,068 members. Not only were unions a feature of United 
States society in the late nineteenth century, as in Britain, but so were successful 
strikes.19
The picture we are left with in comparing the impact of trade unions on Britain 
and the United States is one in which as Kirk points out ‘in comparison with Britain, 
one is immediately struck by the greater scale, intensity, violence and sustained 
character of industrial conflicts in the United States in these years (1880s-1918).’20
These criticisms of the mythical acquiescence of American workers also holds 
for a much later period. From the 1930s through to the 1950s industrial unrest was a 
much more serious problem in the U.S than in Britain. The 1930s saw a literal 
explosion of militancy and industrial unrest culminating in the formation of the 
Congress of Industrial Organisations, CIO. The Bureau of Labor Statistics for the three 
decades 1923-32, 1936-45 and 1946-55 shows the number of strikes as 9,658, 35,519 
and 43,279 respectively.21
An alternative approach, although from differing view points, has been adopted 
by writers such as Currie and Taylor. Currie has suggested that British trade unions 
were 'profoundly influenced' by both individualism and liberalism, unlike on the
18 D. Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor. (Cambridge 1989), p.35.
19 See H.G Gutman, Work. Culture and Society. (New York USA 1977), p.48.
20 Kirk, op.cit.. p. 149.
21 A. Preis, Labor's Giant Step. (New York USA 1982), p.420.
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continent where unions developed with a stronger background of collectivity and 
nationhood.22 This explanation would help to explain the strength of the craft-based 
unions on the shopfloor, as well as the decentralised and uncoordinated industrial 
relations system which developed in Britain. This emphasis on the shopfloor is similar 
for Taylor, who suggests that unions, as organisations, can be beneficial for 
development, although the organisation of production into work groups creates the 
conditions under which restrictive practices emerge. Work groups not only ensure that 
power is decentralised into the hands of small groups of individual workers who 
maintain control over the work process but work groups also ensure that trade unionists 
restrict skill acquisition so reducing flexibility.23
Thus for Currie and Taylor it is an ideology based upon strong individualism on 
the shopfloor, established in the late Victorian era, that is at the root of productivity 
problems rather than trade unions as organisations. Yet if we again compare the British 
and United States working classes’ political outlook, in the later nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, when individualism is said to have taken root, the trade union 
'problem' must surely be judged to be on the other side of the Atlantic.
The ideology of republicanism proved crucially influential in the formation of 
the AFL.24 Republican ideology emphasised that freemen could not be owned like 
wage slaves and that a republican society would be a community of freemen based 
around a society of small craft producers. Being laid off by the Pullman Co. was 
perceived as depriving Theodore Rhodie of his ‘right as an American citizen’.
22 R. Currie, Industrial Politics. (Oxford 1979).
23 R. Taylor, ‘Trades Union Influence on Industrial performance’, The British 
Malaise, ed. G. Roderick and M. Stephens, (Sussex 1982).
24 See S. Wilentz, Chants Democratic. (New York USA, 1984).
25 Montgomery, op.cit.. p. 150.
15
Republican ideology therefore ensured that citizenship was intimately linked to 
workers’ position in the production process, their skill levels and their control over 
their work. Many of these ideas, using different language, can also be found in the
*)f%British craft tradition. Further, it was this strength of American liberalism that 
ensured a collectivist response when challenged by the growth of the business 
enterprise. Conflict over the production process necessarily therefore became a 
conflict over both economics and ideology.
As early as the 1870's under the name of the Workingmens’ Party, labourite 
officials were being elected to office in the United States, unlike in Britain, whose trade 
unions supported the Liberal Party right up to the 1906 election. The 1912 U.S 
Presidential election saw lm votes, 6% of the Presidential vote and over 4% of the
77labour force, for E.V Debs of the Socialist Party. This again was earlier than the mass 
votes for the Labour Party, which polled an average of under half a million votes in 
the two elections of 1910, representing less than 3% of the labour force.
The importance of the above is not to prove that the working classes in the 
United States were more oppositional to employers than in Britain, although this case 
can be made, but to suggest that the similarities between workers in the two countries 
were greater than the differences.29 The simplistic characterisation put forward by 
Lawson and Kilpatrick or Hutton which merely equates trade unions with economic 
decline is mistaken. Similarly views expressed by writers such as Currie and Taylor
26 E.J. Hobsbawm, Labouring Men. (1964).
27 Davis, op.cit.. p.5 and Bain and Price, op.cit.. p.88.
28 T. Cliff and D. Gluckstein, The Labour Party: A Marxist History. (1988), p. 162 
and Bain and Price, op.cit.. p.37.
29 See S. Tolliday and J. Zeitlin, ‘Shop-floor bargaining, contract unionism and job 
control: An Anglo-American comparison’, Between Fordism and Flexibility, eds. S. 
Tolliday and J. Zeitlin, (Oxford 1992), for similar findings.
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whereby a causation process places the emphasis upon timeless static ideology ignores 
the historical context in which the development of trade unions, their form and the 
functions they carry out takes place. There is a need to understand trade unions within 
a historical context, as responses to the conditions in which they operate. As such 
British trade unions’ history is intimately bound up with the emergence of laissez-faire 
and liberalism, just as Currie points out, but they reacted and responded and changed in 
response to these influences. No institution remains static in the form in which it 
initially emerged. Just as British capitalism altered from the form it took in the 
nineteenth century to the post 1945 form, so tqhave trade unions.
A more subtle approach has been taken by Lazonick, who links the rise of mass 
production techniques in the United States to the weakening of craft-based union 
organisation but recognises that such a development was dependant first and foremost 
upon the emergence of a mass market for goods. Certainly the relevance of the 
membership details of the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steelworkers quoted 
above was that in the following year the union’s influence was weakened by the 
lockout at the Homestead steel mill owned by Andrew Carnegie.30 But the key remains 
that only with the emergence of a mass market was there a need to create a new form 
of worker: the machine operative.31 Therefore, before a case can be made for craft 
unions' deleterious effects the case must first be made for the emergence of mass 
markets in which mass production techniques producing a high volume homogenous 
product would have found demand. Because the conditions of the market in Britain 
were so different from the United States, the reliance upon skilled workers was more
30 See A.D. Chandler, Structure and Strategy, (Cambridge, Mass 1990), p.35.
31 W.H. Lazonick, 'Technological Change and the Development of Work', 
Managerial Strategies and Industrial Relations, ed. H. Gospel and C. Littler, (1983),
p. 112.
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likely to have, in relative terms, aided not hindered employers. In the shipbuilding 
industry this appears to have been an important element in Britain's continued 
dominance of unprotected export markets in which it retained an 80% share right up to 
1913, despite competition from German, United States, French and Dutch firms.32
The case for trade union power retarding economic growth and deterring 
business investment certainly can be made, however, in the years immediately prior to 
the First World War, given the growth of trade union membership and the labour 
unrest in the years 1911-14. But even here the Kilpatrick and Lawson model fails to 
explain the fact that in these years we see the impact of unskilled workers and 
militancy among previously non-unionised workers. The official leaderships of craft- 
based unions again in these circumstances need to be seen not as a cause of militancy 
or decline but more likely a restraining influence among workers and opposed to the 
emergent syndicalist movement.33 In this period, therefore, one must understand the 
disaggregated effects of trade union membership on business rather than treat unions as 
an homogeneous bloc.
The interwar period presents both support and criticism for the ‘trade unions 
are to blame’ thesis. On the one hand during these years Britain developed a new layer 
of largely non-unionised industries which (in cases such as radios) did indeed find 
mass markets and have been credited with part of the increase in the rate of growth of 
GDP over the period.34 However, against this needs to be weighed that, while, from
32 E.H. Lorenz, Economic Decline in Britain. The shipbuilding industry. 1890-1970. 
(Oxford 1991).
33 E.H. Hunt, British Labour History 1815-1914. (1981), p.329-334 and H. Pelling, A 
History of British Trade Unionism. (1963), p.139-148.
34 D.H. Aldcroft, 'Economic Growth in the Inter-war Years: A Reassessment', 
Economic History Review. 2nd Series XXI (1967) and H.W. Richardson, Economic 
Recovery in Britain 1932-9. (1967).
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1926 trade union influence over the production process was weakened and some 
movement towards the reorganisation of production emerged, it was not sufficient to 
prevent the staple industries from declining. Indeed it was this very lack of 
improvement that provided much of the justification for the post 1945 nationalisation 
measures. As a result the alternative hypotheses on relative decline, namely business 
conservatism and a lack of government intervention, have gained greater credence as a 
result.
The post-war period, similarly, has seen major debates on productivity levels 
and the effect of trade union power on the shop floor.37 In the immediate post-war 
years the Government promoted Anglo-American Council on Productivity, AACP, 
organised 66 teams to visit plants in both the United States and Britain and report on 
the methods of production, along with possible ways in which British plants could 
benefit from the United States’ advantages.38 Although there were references to trade 
unions limiting change in the AACP reports the bulk of the reports focused upon other 
areas of production for criticism: including poor plant layout, poor use of new 
technology and a lack of investment. Trade unions' attitudes to bodies such as the
<3Q
AACP has recently been argued to have been generally positive.
35 See L. Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy. (1983), p.41-53 and E. 
Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire. (1969), p.237-248 for two alternative accounts on 
the role of government in the concentration and reorganisation of industry.
36 See M.W. Kirby, ‘Industrial Policy’, The Road to Full Employment, ed. A. Booth 
and S. Glynn, (1987) and The Political Economy of Nationalisation 1920-50. ed. R. 
Milward and J. Singleton, (Cambridge 1995).
37 R.R. Nelson, 'Research on Productivity Growth and Productivity Differences: 
Dead Ends and New Departures'. Journal of Economic Literature. Vol. XIX, 1981 
and D. Metcalf, et al, Signals and Cycles: Productivity Growth and Changes in 
Union Status in British Companies. 1984-89. (LSE 1991).
38 J. Tomlinson, 'The Failure of the Anglo-American Council on Productivity', 
Business History. No.33. 1991.
39 N. Tiratsoo and J. Tomlinson, Industrial Efficiency and State Intervention. (1993) 
p.133.
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Employers like Ford and ICI also became more tolerant of trade unions in the 
immediate post-war period, recognising unions in their plants in 1947.40 Employers 
recognised a need for more bilateral co-operation between management and unions in 
order to speed up the introduction of change. The need to boost productivity in the 
immediate post-war years proved to be one of the major issues concerning government, 
employers and trade unions.41
An important finding in many of the productivity studies is the role 
unionisation can play in promoting productivity. Metcalf, himself a proponent of the 
view that trade unions can be deleterious to efficiency, nevertheless admits that 
‘between 1988-1989 there was a clear hierarchy in productivity growth’ with non­
union companies performing worst of a ll42 Metcalf explains this differential by 
suggesting that unionised firms might respond more rapidly to macroeconomic 
changes. The need to gain co-operation from unions in order to increase productivity 
was certainly part of the rationale behind both Ford's and I d s  conciliatory stance to 
unions in 1947.
The main charge against trade unions for causing economic decline, relative or 
absolute, cannot therefore be made as a general case. Indeed the low level for the 
coefficient of determination that Crafts and Broadberry obtain of 0.244 for labour 
productivity growth in the 1930's is caused in part by treating trade union influence on 
production merely as a dummy variable with one value for high union density and
40 See C. Kennedy. ICI The Company That Changed Our Lives. (Second Edition 
1993),p.51.
41 A.A. Rogow, The Labour Government and British Industry 1945-51. (Oxford 
1955), p.23.
42 Metcalf, et al, op.cit.. p. 12.
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another for low density. Such a simplistic measurement of trade union influence is 
highly arbitrary, perhaps conforming to Kirk’s view of a ‘flat and misleading 
approach’.43
We should therefore understand the production process and the factors of 
production involved as a complex process, not simply modelled. Hodgson suggests that 
economic history requires a study of belief and actions, or cognition, in order to 
explain in what circumstances conflict and co-operation takes place in the firm.44 
Productivity comparisons face a problem since knowledge is often tacit, unteachable or 
non-codifiable. Even codifiable knowledge faces problems due to the context, format 
and existing knowledge of those providing or receiving instructions.45
• Entrepreneurial Failure
The limitations of explaining relative economic decline by trade union 
influence has instead led writers to blame employers for being slow in responding to 
change46 Managers were either slow to invest in modem techniques or slow to 
respond to change in the market place with new products. This approach, however, can 
be said to maintain the blame school elements and again largely fails to explain the 
structural changes in Britain's economic development.
43 Broadberry & Crafts, op.cit.. p.538.
44 G. Hodgson, Economics and Institutions: A Manifesto for a Modem Institutional 
Economics. (Philadelphia USA 1988).
45 G. Hodgson, 'Institutional Rigidities and Economic Growth', Cambridge Journal of 
Economics. Vol. 13 1989.
46 M. Ackrill, British Managers and the British Economy, Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy. Vol.4 No.l 1988.
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The 'entrepreneurial failure' school covers a diverse series of criticisms, from 
the acceptance of craft control of the shopfloor, as detailed above, resulting in an 
under-developed managerial function,47 to the acceptance and promotion of 
uncompetitive agreements. Such agreements between firms and/or government may 
have created a feather-bedding for inefficient firms with the resultant effect of reducing
AQ
competitiveness within the industry concerned and the economy as a whole. Other 
criticisms made of entrepreneurs are that they have lost their industrial spirit, are slow 
to change and unresponsive to new opportunities 49 Again there certainly is ample 
evidence for the maintenance of production techniques long after improved methods 
have been established, such as the retention of stationary car assembly stations until 
1934 by the Morris car company, while American car producers had long since moved 
to moving production lines.50 Similarly, the failure of British entrepreneurs to invest in 
the electrical engineering industry in the pre-World War One period meant that two- 
thirds of output was controlled by the British subsidiaries of the German and United 
States firms, Siemens, Westinghouse and General Electric. This dominance meant that 
the equipment for the London Underground came almost entirely from a British 
subsidiary of the U.S firm General Electric.51 Such inward investment certainly proved 
important in creating industries such as electrical engineering, cars and chemicals.
47 W. Lewchuk, 'The Motor Vehicle Industry', The Decline of the British Economy. , 
ed. B. Elbaum and W. Lazonick, (Oxford 1987).
48 M.W. Kirby, 'The Control of Competition in the British Coal Mining Industry in 
the Thirties', Economic History Review. 2nd Series, Vol.XXVI (1973).
49 M.J. Wiener, English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit 1850-1970. 
(Cambridge 1981).
50 J. Foreman-Peck, S. Bowden and A. McKinlay, The British Motor Industry. 
(Manchester 1995), p.53.
51 A.D. Chandler. Scale and Scope. (1990), p.275-7 and J. Dunning, American 
Investment in British Industry. (1958), p.26-29.
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While there clearly are areas in which British firms failed to compete, the 
picture is not quite as simple as the entrepreneurial failure school would have us 
believe. Many entrepreneurs did make investments that succeeded, such as in 
chemicals with ICI and textiles with Courtaulds. Those firms which did invest were 
not, however, guaranteed to succeed. Courtaulds' dominance in the production of rayon 
came about due to a 'mixture of enterprise, opportunism and luck'. Even those that 
created what Chandler has called multi-divisional enterprises were not immune from 
failure. I d s  investment in the Billingham plant almost proved disastrous in the 1930s 
and its continued attempts at the hydrogenation process to produce petrol from coal 
were only abandoned after many years.52 Elsewhere, moves to create large efficient 
companies equally failed to deliver success until market conditions changed 
significantly: such as the Ford Motor Co., whose market share collapsed to 4% in the 
1920s and whose Dagenham plant operated below half capacity throughout the 1930s.
Chandler, in contrast, suggests that the failure lies not so much in a lack of 
capital investment but more in a lack of investment in the managerial structures of 
firms to create a salaried managerial layer. This British 'entrepreneurial failure' to 
develop multi-divisional firms and move away from family control has however been 
severely criticised, with writers highlighting not only the widespread existence of M- 
form organisation in Britain but also the efficiency of family-run business.53
52 D.C. Coleman, 'Courtaulds and the beginning of rayon', and W J Reader, 'Imperial 
Chemical Industries and the State, 1926-45', Essays in British Business History, ed. 
B. Supple, (Oxford 1977).
53 See L. Hannah, ‘Scale and Scope: Towards a European Visible Hand?’, Business 
History. Vol.33, No.2, 1991; G. Jones and M.B. Rose, ‘Family Capitalism’, Business 
History. Vol.35, No.4, 1993; L. Hannah, ‘Delusions of Durable Dominance or the 
Invisible Hand Strikes Back’, (Unpublished Paper 1995).
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Chandler also emphasises that the time span for such investment was short and 
easily missed.54 First mover advantages, while not insurmountable, provide a valuable 
mechanism for the creation of competitive advantages. Entrepreneurs are important 
then but it is the impact of the institutional structures that they create that is the key.55 It 
has also been argued that entrepreneurs, while adopting what appeared to have been 
less efficient techniques, could nevertheless have been taking rational decisions.56 
Certainly, in the case of the inter-war motor industry mechanisation and the adoption of 
fordist production techniques were not the most successful.57 It becomes necessary to 
consider the complexity and specificity of entrepreneur’s historical development in 
order to make judgements on efficiency. In other words the contextualisation of 
decision making is required. We are left with a more complex picture of 
entrepreneurial failure in which one needs to examine the market conditions for each 
firm before suggesting that failure lies simply with poor entrepreneurial decision 
making. Again, as with the impact of trade unions, it is necessary to recognise the role 
that market size and structure played in determining the historical development of 
firms.
It is in the area of industrial economics that analysing the importance of market 
size and firm structure that quantitative techniques have proved most useful. 
Schmalensee, utilising United States Federal Trade Commission Line of Business data 
for 1975 (covering 456 large multi-divisional firms operating within 242 
manufacturing industries), examined the relationship between firm profitability and the
54 Chandler, op.cit.. p.286.
55 H.C. Livesay, ‘Entrepreneurial Dominance in Business Large and Small, Past and 
Present’, Business History Review. Vol.63, (1989), p.3.
56 D. McCloskey and L.G. Sandberg, 'From Damnation to Redemption: Judgements 
on the Late Victorian Entrepreneur', Explorations in Economic History. Vol 9, 1971.
57 Foreman-Peck, Bowden & McKinlay, op.cit.. p.54.
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importance of inter-industry and intra-industry effects. Schmalensee suggests that up to 
80% of the variance of the rates of return achieved on assets is accounted for by
CO
differences within industries. These results were also supported, although in a 
qualified manner, by Rumelt who carried out a similar study over a four year period 
from 1974-77. Rumelt maintains that while 83% of the variance on the rate of return on 
assets was linked to intra-industry effects, two fifths of this derived from yearly 
fluctuations leaving three fifths for differences between business units. Similarly, while 
16% of the variance in profitability derived from inter-industry effects half was again 
linked to yearly fluctuations.59 In other words how firms respond in their individual 
markets is the major determinant of profitability.
Paradoxically, neither study found evidence to suggest company effects were 
important, suggesting economies of scope were absent and that diversification into 
related business areas did not necessarily lead to higher rates of return in non-core 
areas.60 This last finding was at odds with Rumelt’s earlier work examining 
diversification strategies, where it was found that economies of scope did in fact lead to 
higher rates of profitability.61 Problems arise in these areas from both the specification 
of models and the differences contained within data sets. Nevertheless, while more 
work is required, it is clear that both findings lend weight to a view that business 
organisation and individual market structure provide a complex set of inter­
58 R. Schmalensee, 'Do Markets Differ Much?', American Economic Review. Vol.75 
No.2, (1985), p.350.
59 R.P. Rumelt, 'How Much Does Industry Matter?’, Strategic Management Journal. 
Vol.12 (1991), table 4.
60 Schmalensee, op.cit.. p.349 and Rumelt, op.cit.. p. 182.
61 R.P. Rumelt, ‘Diversification Strategy and Profitability', Strategic Management 
Journal. Vol.3, (1982).
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relationships which play a determining role (/n the decision making of both 
entrepreneurs and trade unions.
Placing an emphasis upon the importance of markets and the role they play in 
determining industry’s development may help us understand whether British relative 
economic decline was merely the inevitable effect of other nations with large, 
protected, domestic markets catching up. Temin has suggested just such an explanation 
for the steel industry before 1914, with economies of scale created by German and U.S 
firms in protected domestic markets acting as a spring board for increasing competition 
against British firms in open export markets.62 McCloskey's criticism that the degree 
of relative decline cannot be attributed to increased costs of production have 
nevertheless left his central argument of an inevitable relative decline and the role of 
protected domestic markets acting to promote the growth of new industries largely 
intact.63
Other work on world trade has also pinpointed both the changing structure of 
the world economy and the industrial groups in which British relative economic 
decline has occurred.64 Lewis has suggested that a 'momentum' of past decision making 
hindered the ability to change and a lack of an 'urge to invest' limited change. While 
these problems existed the question still remains, why? More concretely, Tyszynski has 
documented the long term decline of manufacturing exports from Britain, and suggests
62 P. Temin, 'The Relative Decline of the British Steel Industry', Industrialisation in 
Two Systems. H. Rosovsky (ed.), (New York USA 1966).
63 McCloskey. op.cit.. p.96.
64 A. Maizels, Industrial Growth and World Trade. (Cambridge 1963).
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failure lay primarily in a loss of competitiveness in the industries Britain possessed 
rather than merely in a failure to shift production to modem industries.65
The results, however, need to be looked at carefully for two reasons. Firstly, 
Tyszynski's analysis of data based on price levels rather than quantity levels introduces 
index number problems due to the large relative price variation over time. Tyszynski 
himself acknowledges this fact by highlighting that while at current prices trade 
increased over eleven fold between 1899 and 1950 at constant prices this increase was 
only fourfold. Further, if measured by volume world trade increased by less than a 
factor of three.66 The chemical industry is one major case in point. While Tyszynski 
shows that by value the chemical industry saw a drop in its share of world trade from 
8.3% to 7.7% between 1899 and 1929, using Maizels data, measured by volume
f - i
chemicals is shown to have expanded roughly in line with the average. Indeed, if we 
examine the post 1950 period, we see that chemicals has expanded, in volume terms
ro
relative to pre-war levels, faster than all other categories. In attempting to examine 
the role of market structure in business organisation for mass production industries 
quantity data would need to be combined with price data, although, unfortunately, this 
is generally less available.
The second weakness is the role protected markets played in preventing 
competition, something Tyszynski does not examine. Protection for infant industries 
proved a major determining factor in their development. Protection also proved 
important in limiting world trade for some industries. In the car industry for example,
65 H. Tyszynski, ’World Trade in Manufactured Commodities 1899-1950’, 
Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies. Vol XIX No.3 1951.
66 Ibid.. table VI.
67 Ibid.. p.283 and Maizels, op.cit.. p. 164-169.
68 Maizels, ibid.. p. 165.
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sales between the main producer nations amounted to only around 5% of total exports 
until after the Second World War.69 Protectionism is one area in which business and 
governments worked closely, but whether or not tariff protection prevented relative 
decline is open to question.
Criticisms of entrepreneurs have also focused on their willingness to limit 
competition, between firms, through cartels and trade agreements or through co­
operation between government and industry, with the introduction of protectionism. 
Cartelization and protectionism, while different responses, were part and parcel of the 
same process and therefore need to be understood together. Kirby for example sees 
government action in protecting inefficient coal mines in the 1930s as reducing the 
ability of resources to flow out of declining industries and into more rapidly growing 
sectors. For the post-war period Mercer has argued that private industry deliberately 
blocked government attempts to increase competition by the banning of price fixing 
arrangements and monopolistic practices.70 Similarly, Tomlinson puts the same 
argument for government policy with respect to increasing private industry’s' 
efficiency.71 But again the exact degree to which this opposition actually hindered 
competitiveness is open to alternative interpretations. Many successful companies not 
only relied upon arrangements to regulate trade, including ICI with over 800 world­
691. Svennilson, Growth and Stagnation in the European Economy. (Geneva 1954), 
p. 149-152.
70 H. Mercer, ‘The Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission, 1949-56: a 
study in regulatory failure’, Competitiveness and the State. Government and 
Business in Twentieth Century Britain, ed. G. Jones and M. Kirby, (Manchester 
1991).
71 N. Tiratsoo and J. Tomlinson, Restrictive practices on the Shopfloor in Britain 
1945-60, Business History. Vol.36, No.2, 1994, p.68.
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wide, but also depended upon such agreements for the creation of Chandlerian type 
development in the interwar years.
The introduction of protectionist trade tariffs in the 1930s was a defensive 
response to the depression, which in the British case cushioned the economy from its 
worst effects. This was also the case in the United States where, under the New Deal, 
collusion between manufacturers over prices and output was positively promoted. In 
the post-war period, with the growth and openness of world markets, such anti­
competitive actions may well have aided relative decline in the economy as a whole, 
but again it appears that many firms responded effectively to greater competition. In the 
case of ICI after 1945, it appears that demands for reduced protectionism and anti-trust 
court cases within the United States spurred the chemical firm into being more 
competitive. Certainly, a simple acceptance of liberalisation has been questioned as a 
mechanism for sustained economic development.72 Elsewhere, Broadberry and Crafts 
recognise a distinction should be made between short and long term consequences of 
government policy. They suggest that ‘the post-war settlement in the UK was helpful in 
the short term in achieving a better inflation-unemployment performance but in the 
long term inhibited productivity growth’.73 So here again, as with trade unions* impact 
on productivity, care needs to be taken in making generalisations about the impact of 
changes in protectionism and cartelization in the post-war period for individual 
industries and firms.
It is also open to question precisely how oppositional business was to 
government attempts to increase competition and company performance. While it is
72 J. Stopford and S. Strange & J.S. Henley, Rival States. Rival Firms. (1993), 
pp169-202.
73 S.N. Broadberry and N.F.R. Crafts, ‘British Economic Policy and Performance in 
the Early Post-War Period’, (Unpublished paper 1995), p. 17.
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true to say that the employers were generally opposed to government interference in the 
working of private industry, it is not tme to say that these attitudes were either fixed or 
entirely hostile. In the case of the Anglo-American Council on Productivity (AACP), 
the Federation of British Industry's leaders changed their views, from initial hostility to 
support, when they recognised potential benefits. Similarly, on the question of 
monopoly policy and restrictive trade practices, the Federation of British Industry was 
opposed to putting forward a general case against government legislation for the simple 
reason that a general case would be indefensible, given the extent of restrictive 
practices.74
As with the 'unions are to blame' theories, the 'entrepreneurial failure' school 
appears at least to overstate the case for apportioning blame. It provides plenty of 
anecdotal evidence but we are left with little except to suggest that entrepreneurial 
failure was more a reflection of increased competition within markets than a cause of 
Britain's general relative economic decline. This lack of an homogei^us picture of 
decline also means that explanations which are limited by their inability to present 
either trade unions or entrepreneurs in the diverse and disparate ways they appear in the 
real world are inherently likely to hinder our explanation of a complex process. Our 
first set of hypotheses must be, then, that factors exogenous to the firm (and to trade 
unions) such as market size (determined by the linkages between growth of consumer 
income and constraints upon demand growth), openness to international competition 
(determined by trade agreements and tariff policy) and freedom from anti-trust 
legislation (determined by competition policy) provide a set of determining factors for 
the development of oligopolistic firms in the British economy after 1945.
74 Modem Records Centre, FBI records in general and in particular 
MSS200/F/3/S1/11 on AACP and MSS200/F/3/E3/9/1 on restrictive trade practices.
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• Culture
An alternative rationale for relative economic decline comes from explanations 
that focus on elements such as education and cultural developments.75 Here the case for 
British industry and government weakening human capital inputs into industry 
certainly seems more appealing. The continuation of an education system rigidly 
segmented until well after 1945 made it difficult for innovators and dynamic
nfkbusinessmen to counteract the control of an aristocratic, finance-orientated elite. Such 
a rigid hierarchy also led to a system of education and training which failed to provide 
the labour force with the skills required by modem industry.77 While there is a 
significant amount of evidence from the 1960s onwards, especially with regard to a 
lack of training, the evidence before 1960 is much weaker. Burgess contends that a 
continued reliance upon manual workers’ motor skills acquisition in industry meant 
that many of the ideas associated with initiatives such as the AACP were not seen as 
relevant.78 Similarly the AACP reports, while highlighting the small-scale nature of 
both management and apprenticeship training, nevertheless recognise that the task- 
specific training dominant within the United States 'cannot be substituted for a 
complete apprenticeship'.79
75 Wiener, op.cit.. pp.7-11 and pp. 159-167 and from a different political perspective 
P. Anderson, 'The Figures of Descent', New Left Review. No. 161, (1987).
76 Wiener, op.cit.. pp. 128-37 and C. Barnett, The Audit of War. (1986).
77 S.J. Prais, 'Vocational Qualifications of the Labour Force in Britain and Germany', 
National Institute Economic Review. No.98, (1981) also M. Dintenfass, op.cit.. p.27- 
39.
78 K. Burgess, British Employers and Education Policy 1935-45, Business History. 
Vol.36, No.3, 1994, p.56.
79 Anglo-American Council on Productivity, Metalworking Machine Tools. (1953), 
p.27.
The impact of such factors is difficult to quantify, but in the case of Wiener's 
'gentrification of the middle class' its very existence is open to dispute.80 Other 
economies, particularly in Europe, accommodated far more hostile anti-business 
intellectual elites and allowed, or even promoted, the persecution of religious groups 
closely linked to business formation. Similarly, the rigid hierarchical nature of Japanese 
society, with an emperor who has higher status than the British monarch, would surely 
in Wiener's view have hindered post-war growth to a greater extent than in Britain.
The important consideration for this study of post-war Britain is the fact that, if 
gentlemanly traditions were to be eradicated, as Phelps Brown suggests, giving a 'new 
start', the solutions required would imply that government take a much more proactive 
role in directing the economy.81 The reconstruction of Britain from 1945-51, under the 
Attlee government, offered one of the best opportunities for such a change; but what 
would such a proposal have meant? Either nationalisation should have been much 
more extensive than it actually was or government should have enforced change on 
private industry, possibly through the imposition of Development Councils. 
Alternatively government could have taken a more economic liberal attitude and 
looked to supply side reform including more thoroughgoing competition policy and 
increasing the economy’s openness to international trade. Immediately it should be
Qty
pointed out that both of these alternatives were acknowledged. The Labour Party did 
have policy on wider nationalisation proposals, which were never attempted, and in 
1947 sterling became a convertible currency against the U.S. dollar.
80 See. M.J. Daunton, 'Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Industry 1820-1914', Past 
and Present. No. 122, 1989.
81 H. Phelps-Brown, ‘What is the British Predicament?’, The Managed Economy, ed. 
C. Feinstein, (Oxford 1983).
82 J. Singleton, ‘Labour, Conservatives and nationalisation’, op.cit.. eds. Milward and 
Singleton, p. 13 and A. Caimcross, The British Economy Since 1945. p.53.
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In the event nationalisation was limited and the convertibility experiment was 
abandoned in little over a month. The point of interest here is that government steered 
away from more radical change and broadly adopted a consensus approach. This leads 
us to ask: why was the status quo accepted? And still more importantly: what does this 
tell us about the nature of business and industry in Britain after 1945?
• Institutions
While it is possible to point to the limitations of the various theories on relative 
economic decline, it is quite obvious that there is some grain of truth within each of the 
theories discussed. As a result there has been a move towards attempting to incorporate 
the various factors of failure into a less deterministic and more consistent framework. 
Such an approach moves away from the theme of relative decline towards notions of 
continuous change.83 Important to understanding this process is the role played 
institutions.
The institutional school's central suggestion is that the way past economic, 
political and social structures in society emerged impacted on attempts of the economy
QA
to respond to new developments. The main issue which unites all wings of 
institutional analysis (and provides its fundamental weakness) is the deterministic view 
of the 'sclerosis' of institutions. Hodgson and Olson, from differing viewpoints, suggest 
that all institutions over time become rigid and unable to change without exogenous
83 Britain Since 1945. ed. T. Gourvish and A. 0 ’Day,(1991), p.3.
84 W. Lazonick, Business Organisation and the Myth of the Market Economy. 
(Cambridge, Mass 1991), pp.23-58.
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shocks.85 Defeat in war, dictatorship or revolution become methods of preventing 
societies’ inevitable descent into a sclerotic decline.
This determinism arises out of the misplacing of tendencies to sclerotic 
behaviour in the institutions of capitalism. For Olson, sclerosis originates in the rent- 
seeking behaviour of interest groups and distributional coalitions such as trade unions, 
employers’ associations and government bureaucracy. Lazonick, in contrast, maintains 
that coalitions are vital for economic growth and it is the very lack of sufficient 
collectivities that led to British failure in the first half of the twentieth century.86 
Olson’s deterministic view echoes the rigidity of explanations based upon labour or 
entrepreneurs. In reality the tendency for sclerotic development lies in the 
contradiction that firms, as institutions, find themselves in when responding to changes 
in the market for their produce.87 By responding to market changes through 
organisational change firms may gain competitive advantages but in doing so they will 
increase the difficulty of further organisational change. Firms become locked into a
oo
path-dependant process described as ‘competitive equilibrium’ by Lazonick.
It is therefore suggested that the key to understanding sclerotic developments 
lies in examining how firms respond to changes in markets. Our focus should therefore 
be on the interface between markets and firms. To examine exactly how this occurs it 
is necessary to look at institutional economic history and in particular the role 
transaction cost analysis plays within it.
85 M. Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations. (Yale 1982) and G. Hodgson, 
'Institutional Rigidities and Economic Growth', Cambridge Journal of Economics. 
Vol.13, 1989.
86 Lazonick, Business Organisation, p.320.
87 Contradiction is not meant to be understood as a pejorative term but should also be 
understood as a motivation for innovation within capitalist development.
88 Lazonick, op.cit.. p.75.
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• Transaction Costs. Information and Firms
In order to explain why sclerotic tendencies develop within institutions it is first 
necessary to explain why institutions themselves develop. Of primary importance is the 
role information plays as a mechanism for motivating institutions to alter their 
organisational capabilities.
Standard micro-economic analysis tells us how an individual actor in the 
market place responds to changes in the demand and supply of goods and services. 
When prices for specific goods fluctuate, the elasticity of both supply and demand 
influences the ability of sellers and buyers to continue to engage in mutually beneficial 
trade, resulting in a stable equilibrium being achieved. The rationality of actors within 
the market place determines the degree to which prices have an ability to alter and still 
find a demand.89
Theory also suggests that price mechanisms accurately reflect the relative 
scarcity of resources and the relative value to economic agents of goods and services. 
Thus price signals act as an allocation mechanism for goods, services and factors of 
production. Added to this, according to a maximising postulate, is the fact that capital 
will always flow into areas of highest return. There is therefore an incentive to ensure 
output takes place at optimal efficiency of both a technical or allocative kind which 
ensures the allocative (Pareto) optimal outcome: marginal cost being equal to price.90
In perfectly operating markets equilibrium is achieved rapidly and efficiently 
due to the existence of perfect knowledge. Of course in the real world such niceties as
89 E. Nevin, An Introduction to Micro-Economics. (1973), p. 132.
90 G.R. Hawke, Economics for Historians. (Cambridge 1980), p.98-124.
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perfectly operating markets and rational behaviour cannot be assumed and as a result 
further analytical tools are introduced to explain the more complex behaviour of the 
market. Important in this micro-economic analysis is the introduction of the 
transaction cost approach. Here the costs incurred in carrying out transactions are said 
to limit the ability of actors to maximise profits and therefore the existence of 
transaction costs are seen as a cause of inefficiencies in the market mechanism.
Chief among such costs are those of information. The standard approach is to 
assume perfect knowledge of prices both in the present and the future. The problem 
here is that the nature of production is to add value and this value cannot be quantified 
until the product is placed in the market and demand assessed. Hence the crucial 
assumption is not only of perfect knowledge but of static conditions in which the 
demand and supply of factors of production, goods and services are known in advance 
and are unchanging. Such a static model faces real problems in application to a 
continually changing world.
The lack of perfect knowledge in the real world has meant that micro-economic 
theory has introduced ideas of 'bounded rationality' to provide a recognition and 
explanation for information limitations in decision making.91 Information is considered 
to be a commodity which is both scarce and costly to attain. Price variation is 
considered to be both a manifestation and measure of ignorance within the market.92 It 
is suggested that information will be acquired through searching until marginal cost 
equals marginal benefit for each actor with each actor's marginal cost being different. 
As a result information flows are said to be asymmetric.
91 See O.E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust 
Implications. (New York 1975), pp.20-27.
92 G. Stigler, The Organisation of Industry. (Illinois 1968), p. 172.
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Stigler suggests, as a prime example of the costs to individuals of making 
transactions within the market, the search required to purchase a used car. However, 
this example highlights one of the central contradictions within classical economic 
theory - that of the individual and the firm.
The expenditure of time for an individual, as opposed to a firm, carrying out 
search activity cannot simply be considered to be financially negative unless there is an 
alternative use of the same time which will be remunerative. Normally the cost of 
individual search can only be considered to be an opportunity cost. Only firms incur 
financial costs in transactions within markets. The fact that firms have to acquire costly 
information means that they not only have a greater incentive to ensure that any 
information is accurate but they also are in a position to demand that the information 
that they acquire is up to date.93 Sticking with the car analogy, the British car market, 
both new and second-hand, is distorted due to the discounts received by company 
buyers, providing evidence that information has a different role for firms than it has for 
individuals. Companies have bargaining power within the market place due to their 
ability to buy in bulk, purchase regularly or tie in particular servicing arrangements. 
Bargaining power derives from the nature of information acquisition. Firms as 
purchasers are able to use their size as a method of gaining price advantages compared 
to individuals. Firms as suppliers know that some sales are more important than others 
due to their acquisition of information about the purchaser.
Information, then, is not simply reducible to price. Information needs to be of 
both the market and technical kind.94 Market information needs testing for quality and
93 M.C. Casson, The Firm and the Market: Studies in Multinational Enterprise and 
the Scope of the Firm. (Cambridge, Mass, 1987), p. 14.
94 See G. B. Richardson, Information and Investment. (Oxford 1990).
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reliability, while technical information requires testing for suitability and adaptability.95 
All of these conditions ensure firms have advantages over individuals. Such differences 
between individuals and firms within market transactions ensure diat the balance of 
influence between economic actors is not equal and that bargaining power is a 
function of each actor’s control over information.
So in our car analogy, if it is known that a purchaser only wishes to buy a 
Reliant Robin (a three wheeled car) or alternatively a Rolls Royce then the dealer has a 
monopolistic control over price. Conversely if the purchaser is the only purchaser of 
these cars then the relationship is one of monopsony. Either way transactions are 
determined by information based upon knowledge of substitute goods or the necessity 
actors have for carrying out transactions at all. Formally put, asymmetric information 
flows lead to the development of self-interested behaviour, giving rise to the possibility 
of further market failure as economic agents adopt practices which gain above average 
returns for the provision of goods and services through the non-disclosure or distortion 
of information.
There are three main forms of self-interested behaviour.96 First and foremost is 
opportunistic behaviour defined as ‘self-interest-seeking with guile’. Opportunism is 
one of the pillars of transaction cost analysis in that all economic actors, both principals 
and agents, are inclined to engage in the deliberate distortion or non-disclosure of 
information: opportunism gives rise to uncertainty and risk. The risk from opportunism 
is high where transactions are unique or where free riders are able to gain free access to 
information which others have had to purchase. North uses a trivial example of
95 M. Casson, ‘Economic Perspectives on business information’, Information 
Acumen: The Understanding and Use of Knowledge in Modem Business, ed. L. 
Bud-Frierman, (1994).
96 O. E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. (1985), pp.47-52.
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orange sellers (who are unlikely to resort to opportunism if they require customers to 
return regularly) to suggest that free rider problems or opportunism are limited by both 
the process of repeated transactions between actors and by markets in which large 
numbers of actors take part.97
Opportunism may also occur where one actor is required to make investments 
which are non-transferable. Asset specificity can lead to opportunistic monopoly for 
sellers or alternatively monopsony for purchasers. Williamson suggests opportunist 
behaviour under these conditions arises out of first mover advantages. Asset specific 
opportunism requires either particular forms of contract or governance bodies in order 
to mitigate the limits of bounded rationality.98
One contractual method of counter-acting asset-specific opportunism is to rely 
upon relational as opposed to discrete transactions.99 Discrete transactions (due to a 
lack of dependency between agents) are more open to opportunistic behaviour than 
relational transactions, such as labour contracts, which depend upon mutual co­
operation over time and explicitly require the re-negotiation of conditions, as power 
between those involved changes. Relational transactions are suggested as a key reason 
why large firms should prefer to deal with other large corporations.100
Simple self-interest represents the second form of self-interested behaviour. It 
is considered to be self-interest with honest disclosure of information where 
transactions occur under full disclosure and competitive advantage results from
97 D.C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History. (New York 1981), p.35.
98 Williamson, Economic Institutions, p.231, for and J. Kay & D. Thompson, 'Policy 
for Industry', The Performance of the British Economy, ed. R. Dombusch & R. 
Layard, (Oxford 1987).
99 A. Papathanasis and C. Vassillopulos, 'Task and Job: The promise of transactional 
analysis', The American Journal of Economics and Sociology. Vol.50 No.2 (1991) 
p.169-181.
100 Ibid.. p. 175.
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technological developments in patents, economies of scale and scope. Simple self- 
interest, Williamson suggests, is therefore said to represent the standard assumptions of 
neo-classical economics.101 Finally the third form of self-interest is considered to be 
obedience defined as the lack of self-interest. In reality all human micro-economic 
actions are considered to be related to forms of positive self interest and therefore 
obedience is effectively not a consideration.
The need for particular contractual arrangements or governance bodies suggests 
that it is the control over information acquisition, to reduce purchaser’s exposure to 
risk from opportunism, or control over the diffusion of information, to increase seller’s 
ability to utilise opportunist behaviour, that becomes the key to understanding the 
emergence of institutions themselves.
The starting point for understanding the connection between transaction costs 
and the formation of institutions is Coase's classic 1937 article on the nature of the 
firm. Coase's argument was that the firm originates from its ability to carry out 
transactions at a lower cost internally than externally through the market mechanism: 
‘the distinguishing feature of the firm is its supersession of the price mechanism.’ and 
that ‘The entrepreneur has to cany out his function at less cost...because it is always 
possible to revert to the open market if he fails to.102 As a result, costs of production 
are reduced in circumstances that allow the entrepreneur-co-ordinator to direct 
resources rather than the market.
A similarly efficiency based model was the central starting point for Alchian 
and Demsetz who suggest that the firm is singularly the contractual form that the team
101 Williamson, Economic Institutions, p.49.
102 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm', Economica N.S. No.4, November (1937), 
p.389 and p.392.
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use of inputs takes. For Alchian and Demsetz all transactions are identical and so there 
is no difference between the transactions within a firm and those between a grocer and 
his/her customers.103 The entrepreneur’s role within the firm becomes one of metering 
the productivity of the inputs, to prevent shirking and the opportunistic appropriation of 
the residual product. In so doing the firm becomes an efficient market for information, 
allowing for recombinations of inputs to take place in a more efficient manner than 
takes place within external markets. Alchian and Demsetz point out that intrafirm 
competition is therefore of central importance in understanding business 
developments.104
Efficiency based models and micro-economic thinking revolves around the 
conceptual framework of rational economic man limited by information asymmetry, 
which leads to sub-optimal bounded rationality and opportunistic behaviour. Of central 
importance for economic agents and principals in market transactions is the ability to 
maximise the possibilities of one’s own opportunistic behaviour while simultaneously 
limiting the opportunistic behaviour of others. The mechanisms for such limitation lie, 
as mentioned above, in, contractual arrangements and governance bodies. Now 
imperfections in the market mechanism are overcome and economies achieved through 
alternatives to the market.
Explanations based upon interest groups, rent-seeking, free rider and 
opportunism problems, oligopolistic and monopoly influences and ultimately the role 
of the state in economies are in effect attempts to resolve questions of unequal 
exchange. Institutional theory either explicitly or implicitly accepts the fact that a
103 A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, ‘Production, Information Costs and Economic 
Organisation’, American Economic Review. Vol.62, 1972.
104 Ibid.. p.795.
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continuous conflict exists between economic actors within markets. This conflict is not 
simply confined between institutions and the market, but also exists between 
institutions themselves as interest groups. Interest groups’ attempts to achieve greater 
influence over one another, through rent-seeking behaviour, may achieve a rational 
environment for themselves, yet in the process may also further increase the problems 
in another group’s environment.105 It is important to understand conflict within the 
market as a continuous inter-related, and positively feeding back, process without a 
final solution: an institution’s 'success' in achieving monopoly power can also then be 
understood as a temporary phenomenon.
The theoretical starting point for study should therefore be a recognition that; 1) 
market transactions rarely take place on the basis that marginal cost equals price and 2) 
that economic actors are not equal. Economic actors cannot make perfectly objective 
choices and benefits in exchange can be unequal. Thus the picture of economic 
activity we start with is no longer one of equilibrium and rationality but instead 
disequilibrium and bounded rationality, contradiction and change. Firms’ activity then 
is directed at controlling the destabilising influence of opportunism both within 
markets and within firms. Such activity may well appear rational for individual firms 
yet for an economy as a whole may lead to sub-optimal outcomes. Monopoly power is 
one possible case in point in which firms may reduce the degree to which they are 
affected by opportunism and in so doing maximise profits, yet consumers themselves 
may suffer opportunism, so creating sub-optimal outcomes within an economy.
Summarising the discussion so far the suggests that the view that the structure 
of the market plays a determining role in the development of the firm must be tempered
105 D.C. North, Institutions. Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
(Cambridge 1990).
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by the observation that the firm itself tries to control the operation of the market, or 
more precisely control information. The control of information leads firms to develop 
strategies for risk aversion and opportunistic behaviour in order to alter the operation of 
the market; that is, the structure of the market itself is determined by the activity of 
firms. It can further be suggested that the origin of any tendency to sclerosis lies in the 
contradiction and tension posed by this interaction.
Tendencies to sclerosis derive from the interaction of firms' attempts to control 
the market and the market's influence on firms to alter their form. As firms adopt 
similar organisational forms in response to competitive pressures, so firms increase the 
tendencies towards a competitive equilibrium. In this process future innovative 
strategies become more difficult to adopt, due to the level of initial investment required 
and the decreasing time between which innovating firms make investments and 
adaptive firms follow. Yet the alternative of deliberately creating a competitive 
equilibrium is also not a stable co-operative strategy for a group of rival firms. The 
process of creating an equilibrium simply reduces pressures for change and increases 
the degree of sclerosis within the industry, so undermining international 
competitiveness relative to new market entrants or firms not involved in the co­
operative strategy. Even in the case of monopoly, as Schumpeter argued, such 
dominance is a temporary phenomenon threatened by the ‘perennial gale of creative 
destruction’,106 in which competitors gain innovative advantage unless the monopolist 
maintains a dynamic approach to innovation.
So, referring to the discussion of changing patterns of world trade above, it 
could be suggested that the increase in world trade in some sectors of the world
106 J.A. Schumpeter, Capitalism. Socialism and Democracy. (1965), p.84.
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economy decreased sclerotic tendencies. Firms could adopt innovative strategies for 
influence within the market and develop new forms of relationship between managers, 
workers and governments. Alternatively, where the structures of trade in other sectors 
maintained separated markets, through high barriers to entry for example, industries 
will not have had as much scope for finding innovative competitive strategies. As a 
result tendencies to sclerosis will have been reinforced. Such an approach would also 
suggest that, where world trade was declining, the pressures to reach a competitive 
equilibrium would increase, as would sclerotic tendencies and under such 
circumstances separated markets, tariffs etc. would be important in decreasing such 
tendencies.
• Visible Hands
Explanations based on interest groups have provided powerful tools in 
economic history. However, there is one important shortcoming in such an analysis: the 
continuation of a picture in which the market mechanism works in an independent 
invisible manner. Coase summed it up nicely when he criticised economics for having 
a world picture in which ‘society becomes not an organisation but an organism’.107 As 
a result of such criticisms, Coase, correctly, introduced a notion of human agency into 
the development of the firm, with a recognition that the entrepreneur acts as a director 
of resources, replacing blind market forces with the conscious act of the individual 
manager. This recognition of human agency is also what has made Chandler's work so 
important to business history.
107 Coase, op.cit.. p.387.
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The importance of human agency, acting through organisation and directed 
by rational entrepreneurs, is a mirror image of the idea of a perfectly operating market. 
Work has been carried out to try and analyse the limits of rationality in organisations. 
Vanagunas, working within a transactional framework, has defined two kinds of 
rationality, formal or calculated rationality and substantive rationality, the taking 
account of 'ultimate ends'.108 Calculated rationality is the cause of market failure, 
leading government, working under substantive rationality, to carry out functions 
requiring high fixed costs such as the protection of property rights and welfare 
provision.
Transaction theory's strength lies in its recognition of the role of human agency 
within the firm as a method by which market mechanisms are counteracted. Its central 
weakness however is its unwillingness to accept that human agency plays a role in 
changing the market itself. In effect the transaction cost approach and approaches of 
market failure maintain the 'society as organism' paradigm, in which the main problem 
lies with the inadequacies of the human species to displace the organism with 
organisation, due to some socio-biological irrationality. The reality is, however, that 
the market, with the development of the firm, became an organisation not an organism 
and tendencies to sclerosis and sub-optimal solutions arise out of the form that 
organisation takes.
Now it is, of course, true to say that competitive market pressures create the 
impression of a society in which market transactions take on a life of their own. This 
can be seen since no buyer or seller can afford to relax to enjoy a dominant position. 
Despite such an impression of the market, it is necessary to adopt an approach which
108 S. Vanagunas, ‘Max Weber's Authority Models and the Theory of X-efficiency’, 
The American Journal of Economics and Sociology. Vol 48 No.4, 1989.
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sees market competition not as an independent force leading to either positive or 
negative outcomes but as the institution itself. This is the point touched on by McNulty 
in his discussion on the meaning of competition, in which competition in the market is 
equated merely with market structure and the number of firms operating within it. 
McNulty argues that the conceptualisation of competition as either a governing force 
like 'gravity' or an ideal like a 'perfect vacuum' has hindered our ideas on how firms 
compete, since all competition ‘may well be, in fact, competition for a position of 
monopoly power’ and that ‘To compete for monopoly power is not...necessarily to 
realise it.’109 McNulty, therefore, supports a separation of the notion of competition 
from market structure. Such a distinction is also made by Kay who maintains that 
markets need to be narrowly defined by an area in which the same commodity can be 
purchased for one price or by the limits imposed by consumers ability to substitute one 
good for another.110
One interpretation of Porter and Chandler - deriving from such a perspective - 
should be that the drive towards competitive advantage or multi-divisional firms is a 
drive towards control of the market and not just efficiency arising out of the search for 
scale and scope. That is why dynamic firms are willing to look to anti-competitive 
agreements on trade. In Porter’s words 'Competitive advantage grows fundamentally 
out of the value a firm is able to create', which itself is determined by both the 
organisation of production within the firm and the degree to which firms are able to 
influence the structure of the market.111
109 P J. McNulty, 'Economic Theory and the Meaning of Competition’, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics. (1970), p.639-657.
110 J. Kay, The Foundations of Corporate Success. (Oxford 1993), pp. 130-31.
111 M.E. Porter, Competitive Advantage. Creating and Sustaining Superior 
Performance. (New York 1985), p.3.
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The fact that transaction costs analysis emphasises transaction cost savings, i.e 
efficiency, as opposed to issues of control, i.e. governance, as the motivating force in 
the internalisation of market functions has led to challenges over its central tenet - the 
origins of the firm. Marglin has argued that the motivational factor leading to the 
creation of the factory system was not efficiency savings but the need to impose both 
supervisory and disciplinary controls on labour contracts. The putting-out system 
ensured that workers themselves controlled the balance between labour and leisure on a 
day to day basis. Putting-out also provided workers with the opportunistic 
opportunities to cheat employers, through theft, over the level of production in any 
given period. Marglin suggests that supervisory control within the factory ensured 
employers could increase labour inputs through control over the division of labour; 
hence increases in output relied upon longer working periods, not improvements in 
technical efficiency. Disciplinary control within the factory system, preventing workers 
from appropriating the results of their labour for themselves, meant that there was also 
no increase in allocative, (Pareto), efficiency.112
Marglin’s approach has however been refuted by Landes who questions why, if 
supervisory and disciplinary control was the object of the factory system and no 
efficiency improvements derived from its introduction, did workers simply not set up 
co-operatives for themselves and so by-pass entrepreneurs.113 The answer to Landes 
comes in two parts. First, as Hudson and Berg make clear, this is exactly one of the 
approaches which in fact did occur. The industrial revolution was marked not by a
112 S.A. Marglin, ‘What Do Bosses Do? The Origins and functions of hierarchy in 
capitalist production’, Review of Radical Political Economics. Vol.6, No.2, 1974 and 
S.A. Marglin, ‘Knowledge and Power’, Firms. Organisation and Labour: Approaches 
to the Economics of Work Organisation, ed. F. Stephen, (1984).
113 D.S. Landes, ‘What Do Bosses Really Do?’. Journal of Economic History. No.3, 
1986.
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rapid, uniform change from putting-out to a factory system but by a slow, regionally 
diverse transition which included large co-operative factories, sub-contracting of 
factory space to individual craftsmen and the continuation of putting-out.114 Despite the 
telescoping of events by Marglin and Landes the ultimate success of a labour system 
based upon supervision and discipline is explained by Pitelis. Pitelis suggests that the 
key distinction to be made is not with the factory system but with the earlier 
development of the firm itself. Pitelis maintains that the employers’ specialist 
knowledge of the market as a purchaser or raw materials and seller of finished products 
provided employers with the advantages required to dictate the form of production, 
putting-out or factory-based, to workers. For Pitelis the ‘exploitation of the fruits of the 
division of labour was the driving force behind the emergence and evolution of the 
firm.’115 The merit of an approach based upon power has been conceded by 
Williamson, although he maintains a lack of operationalisation ensures power remains 
unsatisfactory as a conceptual tool.116
Yet again, therefore, we are returning to the role information plays as a 
motivating factor leading to the internalisation of transaction costs. A similar control 
based approach is also adopted by Cowling and Sugden who, in rejecting Coase’s 
model, suggest that firms need to be understood in terms of a ‘nexus of strategic 
decision making’ for the control of residual product.117 Under such a model the 
boundary between the firm and the market is not the essential distinction of the firm;
114 P. Hudson, Regions and Industries. (Cambridge 1990) and M. Berg, Age of 
Manufactures. (1985).
115 C. Pitelis, Market and Non Market Hierarchies. (Oxford 1991) p.31.
116 Williamson, Economic Institutions, p.238
117 K. Cowling and R. Sugden, ‘Behind the Market Facade: A reassessment of the 
Theory of the Firm’, (Unpublished Paper, 1994) and K. Cowling and R. Sugden, 
Beyond Capitalism. (1994).
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rather it is the relationship between the nexus of strategic decision making and factors 
under its influence that should be examined. Therefore the firm can be considered to 
cover not simply its own production processes but also those of firms in the supply 
chain, an example being between Japanese car manufacturers and their suppliers, even 
where there is no ownership involvement.
Other examples of this need to achieve greater control over labour contracts 
without leading to increases in efficiency, comes from the move towards internal 
labour contracts, as opposed to earlier contracting out in the United States steel 
industry between 1890-1920.118 More generally, the fact that employers as well as 
workers may engage in opportunistic behaviour and bargaining leads Skillman to 
suggest that employers are likely to sacrifice efficiency for control.119
The entrepreneur’s role in the production process was not therefore as a 
Coasean resource allocator or an Alchian-Demsetz co-ordinator of inputs but as the 
autarchic accumulator of the residual product, resulting from their asymmetric access 
to and control over information in the purchasing and sales processes. The importance 
of the Marglin/Pitelis approach is to understand the role of the firm in relation to the 
conflict that exists over the existence of long-term contracts. The firm becomes a 
governance body for the internal resolution of conflict.
The transaction cost approach has also come under criticism from Lazonick, 
who similarly places the rise of the firm not merely as a cost-saving mechanism but in 
terms of achieving organisational capabilities unavailable within the market. In 
Lazonick’s view:
118 K. Stone, ‘The Origins of Job Structures in the Steel Industry’, Review of Radical 
Political Economics. Vol.6, No.2, 1974.
119 G.L. Skillman, ‘Efficiency vs. Control: A Strategic bargaining analysis of 
capitalist production, Review of Radical Political Economics. Vol.23, No.l&2, 1991.
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‘The history of capitalist development in the twentieth century challenges the 
outlook of those economists who continue to propound, and indeed elaborate, 
the vision of the market-co-ordinated economy....Without substantial control 
over market forces, manufacturing enterprises in all the major industries would 
not have the incentives to make the large-scale investments in plant, equipment 
and personnel necessary to participate in global competition. Nor would these 
enterprises have the organisational capabilities to develop and utilise these 
investments to create value and attain competitive advantage.’ 120
For Lazonick the limits of transaction cost theory arise out of its ‘ahistorical
191and methodological approach’, since the fixed costs, incurred by a firm in 
internalising transactions, are incurred in advance of any savings and under conditions 
of uncertainty. In order to solve these problems the entrepreneur is forced to look 
towards investment strategies which are innovative and dynamic and as a result move 
towards a form of organisation which maximises the economies available within the 
firm. Thus for Lazonick the market stifles innovation and value creation and needs
199replacement for economic development to take place.
The advantage of McNulty and business strategists such as Kay and Porter on 
the one hand and Lazonick on the other is their recognition that neither competition 
nor markets should be seen as ahistorical independent concepts. Rather, what is 
necessary is to understand the specific nature of competition within the market. The 
market itself should be seen as an institution, created and defined by the firms 
themselves in the process of production and competition. Similarly competition itself 
should be understood as created and defined by firms in the process of marketing and 
selling. Neither competition nor markets can be discussed outside the institutional 
framework in which they exist.
120 W. Lazonick, Business Organisation, p. 147.
121 Ib ii ,  p. 195.
122 Ibid.. p.65.
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It is Lazonick who has gone furthest in attempting to analyse how control over 
the market has developed. The decision by firms to invest in innovative strategies of 
production and organisation is a method by which they attempt to increase their control 
over fixed costs. In so doing innovative firms attempt to increase the fixed costs of later 
movers, forcing firms to increase expenditure on gaining product acceptability, for 
example. So innovation and the creation of what Lazonick terms 'organisational 
capabilities' needs to be understood in the context of firms' drive to gain greater control 
over their market. Equally, in the case of adaptive investment strategies, the aim of late 
movers is to reduce the fixed costs which first movers incurred. In so doing, late 
movers aim at gaining an advantage in organisational capabilities, producing for the 
cheaper end of a product market being an example. Here again the question of power in 
the market and ability to influence the changes in the market becomes a crucial 
determinant of a firm’s success or failure. An example of this would be the struggle 
between firms over formats for high technology goods such as between VHS, Betamax 
and Philips in video. Such battles are won and lost by the power of firms, and their 
relationship to bodies such as manufacturers of both players and films, financiers, 
distributors and government. 123 Outcomes of competition, it can be suggested, are 
rarely based upon technological superiority or a finr/s internal competitive advantage.
The question of power in the markets in which firms operate is a point that 
even Lazonick understates. When analysing the decline of the cotton industry, 
Lazonick mentions the rise of the cotton industry and laissez faire during the nineteenth 
century. However, the rise and fall of cotton was intimately linked to British laissez
123 M.A. Cusumano, Y. Mylonadis & R.S. Rosenbloom, 'Strategic Manoeuvring and 
Mass-Market Dynamics: The Triumph of VHS over Beta', Business History Review. 
Vol.66, No.l 1992.
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faire trade policy, as was the organisation of the industry itself.124 Lazonick like
Marglin, Stone and Pitelis places firms’ internal structure as the motivational factor for
organisational developments. In contrast the hypothesis here is that it is the power that
firms can wield within the market that provides the motivational element in
determining organisational developments. Through the development of organisational
capabilities, firms influence the institutional form of the market which in turn requires
firms to develop new organisational capabilities.
The failure to look at concepts of power in the market as a key determining
factor in firms’ success and at the market as an institution itself creates serious
weaknesses in both transaction and institutional analysis. The forms of power with
which this study is primarily concerned are those which allowed for either control over
market information, such as retail price maintenance, or control over market structure,
1such as government restrictions on monopoly. Maintaining both these forms
required explicit collusion between interest groups within society and both came under
sustained attack, in the post-war period, by other interest groups.
Much of the emphasis on a firm’s need for control can also be introduced into
an analysis of the internal changes of the firm. Both Lazonick and Coase accept that the
advantage of the creation of the firm is that it provides the controllers of resources (be
#
they an owner proprietor or a salaried managerial layer) a greater influence over the use 
of the factors of production available to them. Thus the internal organisation of the 
control of power is a crucial factor in the development of firms and involves large 
numbers of supervisory layers to ensure returns accrue to the controllers of resources.
124 W. Lazonick, ‘The Cotton Industry’, Decline, ed. Elbaum & Lazonick.
125 See E. Ronald Walker, 'Beyond the Market', Power in Economics, ed. K. 
Rothschild, (Middlesex 1971).
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Leibenstein's notion of X-inefficiencies within firms recognises the difficulty 
that institutions have in maintaining control over such power.126 X-inefficiency is a 
recognition that the labour-wage contract does not take place as freely as classical 
economics would suggest and that the power relationship between participants needs to 
be considered.
The drive to control fixed costs relative to other firms can be understood as a 
mechanism for the enhancement of both power in the market place and power within 
the firm. Firms will look to alternative methods of internal organisation to achieve 
greater control in the production process itself, so ensuring the maximum level of 
output from a workforce. The rise of Taylorism is intimately linked to the need to 
maintain power over the production process as mass production methods spread.127 
Equally, the shift away from Fordist production methods in the late twentieth century 
can be seen as a response of employers to the need to establish new organisational 
capabilities to maintain both power over the production process and power within the 
market itself. Other forms of internal reorganisation include those documented by 
Chandler: the development by innovative firms of new production processes and the 
movement towards integration both vertically and horizontally.
Externally fixed costs can be controlled through the introduction of measures, 
such as cartel arrangements between firms operating in the same markets, which aim to 
reduce competitive pressures. The restrictive trade practices in Britain after 1945 
should be seen in this light, as firms use black lists, agreed levels of discounts etc., to
126 H. Leibenstein, Beyond Economic Man: A New Foundation for Microeconomics. 
(Cambridge 1976), p.204.
127 See Montgomery, op.cit.. p.9-58 for an example of the change from external sub­
contracting to internal direct hiring in the U.S. steel industry and S. Wood and J. 
Kelly, Taylorism, responsible autonomy and management strategy', The Degradation 
of Work. S. Wood ed., (1985).
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reduce competition. The external attempts at control may well be a defensive response 
to diminishing returns facing adaptive firms where the costs and risks of further 
innovative strategies are too high. But equally firms may also look to external attempts 
at control to secure an environment conducive to an innovative strategy.
On another level are attempts by firms to restrict competitive pressures through 
winning government support for tariff protection. Import substitution has been used as 
a method of protecting infant industries, but it may also act to maintain individual 
firms' profitability from international competitors with greater organisational 
capabilities. Moreover, Jones maintains, the period from the 1930s to the 1970s was 
one which saw government restrictions emerge world-wide upon the activity of 
foreign multinational enterprises.128 In the case of government interest in freer trade, it 
should not come as a surprise that the economies in which this was promoted (Britain 
in the nineteenth century and the United States after 1945) were also the economies 
with industries and firms that appeared to have achieved superior organisational 
capabilities. Through opening up markets, innovative firms attempt to maximise the 
return on their investment strategies and alter the structure of the market in order, as 
Lazonick suggests, to increase the fixed costs incurred by later movers.129 Interestingly, 
it was not the United States which appears to have benefited most from the move 
towards free trade after the 1950s. This raises the question; were the benefits of free 
trade for economies like the U.S or Britain unevenly spread between individual firms 
and the national economy?
128 G. Jones, The Evolution of International Business. (1996), p.270.
129 W. Lazonick, Business Organisation, p.205.
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• The Role of Government
The discussion so far has maintained that firms are primarily motivated to
develop organisational change in order to increase their control over the markets in
which they operate. It is immediately obvious that government attitude to such a
process would play a significant role within this development. It is government which
establishes the framework for economic activity, by defining both property rights and
the limits under which economic transactions (and opportunist behaviour) can develop.
It is also only government that has the ability to enforce these limits, utilising as D.C.
1 ^0North suggests its 'comparative advantage in violence'. In so defining these limits 
government provides a framework within which firms can further limit their exposure 
to opportunism. Importantly, this framework is not static and has changed dramatically 
in the decades after 1945. All of these changes need to be considered in order to 
understand firms’ motivation for adopting organisational change. The business- 
govemment relationship is usually viewed as important for defining the market 
environment in the key areas of international trade and domestic competition policy. 
However we would also wish to consider the role government itself has as a market for 
private industry.131
In the area of international trade the post-war period has seen significant, but
slow, shifts away from closed, protected markets. The collapse of an international
trading system in the inter-war years and the emergence of trading blocs proved highly
1
significant for the development of markets for business. Between 1938 and 1950 the
130 North, Structure.
131 This is a point touched on by W. Grant, Business and Politics in Britain. (Second 
Edition, Hampshire 1993), pp.63-4.
132 See The Golden Age of Capitalism, eds., S.A. Marglin and J.B. Schor, (Oxford 
1991), pp.65-72 for an assessment of the importance the new international order had 
for economies after 1945.
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sterling area grew in importance for British firms, with the share of exports rising from 
44.9% to 47.8%.133 After 1945 this concentration upon what turned out to be slower 
growing markets is suggested to have hindered business competitiveness.134 Not until 
the Dillon and Kennedy rounds of GATT negotiations from 1962 onwards did tariff 
barriers fall rapidly, leading to a marked increase in international trade.135 However, 
the 50% reduction in tariffs resulting from the Kennedy round is also suggested to have 
raised British imports by as much as 15%, leading to a temporary re-introduction of 
tariffs followed by the devaluation of sterling in 1967.136 One of the bi-products of a 
reduction in tariffs was an expansion in government subsidies to private industry. By 
1970-1 UK government subsidies to private industry had reached approximately 7% of 
total government expenditure from where they doubled in real terms, reaching some 
£5.5b by 1974-5 before declining in the late 1970s.137
The second area in which government is traditionally understood to have had a 
major impact on business development is through competition policy. The passing of 
the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act in 1948, the Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act in 1956, the Resale Prices Act of 1964 and finally the Monopolies and 
Mergers Act of 1965 together created a market environment which was increasingly 
hostile to collusion and restrictive trade practices. British competition policy is 
suggested to have converged with that of the United States over this period leading to a
133 Caimcross, op.cit.. table 2.3.
134 A.S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State. (1992), pp.345-424.
135 J. Foreman-Peck, A History of the World Economy. (Herts, 1983), p.298.
136 J. Foreman-Peck, ‘Trade and the Balance of Payments’, op.cit.. eds. Crafts and 
Woodward, pp. 161-2.
137 G. Denton, S. O'Cleireacain & S. Ash, Trade Effects of Public Subsidies to Private 
Enterprise. (London 1975), p.51 and J. Tomlinson, Dead Ducks, Lame Ducks and 
Little Grey Swans: British Industrial Policy in the 1970s', Brunei University Discussion 
Papers in Economics. N.9303, (Undated), Table 1, p.l 1.
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managerial corporate economy which closely approximated that of the United 
States.138 This convergence was not however an inevitable, gradual or evolving 
process. Rather Mercer maintains that the demand for anti-cartel legislation was highly 
contentious. While anti-cartel legislation was promoted by the United States and 
sections of the labour movement, the timing of its emergence derived largely from 
debates between British businessmen. She maintains that the removal of restrictive 
trade practices, leading to more open competition, was a product of agreement from 
larger, multinational firms that had developed the organisational capabilities to enter 
into more direct competition. By the early 1960s British multinationals required a more 
transparent domestic competitive framework in order to prevent retaliatory action in 
export markets.139 Anti-cartel legislation, then, was effectively prevented from 
materialising until British multinationals required liberalisation within the British
140economy.
While the creation of an international and domestic competitive business 
environment dominates the literature on links between business and government, 
government also acted to enable the creation of organisational capabilities through its 
role as the single largest purchaser of goods and services from private industry.
The displacement effect of the Second World War on government expenditure 
permanently raised the level of expenditure in relation to national wealth and thus, with 
the post-war nationalisation programme, increased the importance of the state sector in 
the British economy.141 The overall scale of government expenditure in relation to
138 T. Freyer, Regulating Big Business: Antitrust in Great Britain and America 1880- 
1990. (Cambridge 1992), p.269.
139 Jones and Kirby, op.cit.. p.89.
140 H. Mercer, Constructing a Competitive Order. (Cambridge 1995), p. 173.
141 A.T. Peacock & J. Wiseman, The Growth of Public Expenditure in the United 
Kingdom. (Oxford 1961).
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national wealth is well known. By the end of the 1940s 17% of GDP was accounted for 
by the public sector (excluding social security transfer payments) and one half of all 
capital expenditure was accounted for by the public sector.142 Between 1950 and 1965 
central government expenditure on goods and services rose slowly from 19.8% of GDP 
in 1950 to 20.9% in 1965. This growth was not, however, continuous and expenditure 
as a proportion of GDP fluctuated around 20% with 1960 being the year of lowest 
expenditure at 19.7%.143
Post-war Treasury concern focused upon re-establishing sterling as a 
convertible currency and solving problems caused by a shortage of dollars rather than 
levels of government spending. Similarly government concern over the budget focused 
on the degree to which budgetary policy could be married with controls for the 
management of demand, as opposed to the scale of government expenditure.144 Despite 
the focus upon macro-economic issues, government was nevertheless also aware of the 
degree to which its orders were important for business development. The Lemon 
Committee established to determine whether advantages could be attained through the 
standardisation of engineering products reported in 1949 that some 30% of engineering 
products not exported were purchased by the public sector.145 Elsewhere the 
Investments Programme Committee under Sir Edwin Plowden in 1947 undertook the
142 A. Caimcross, ‘The Post-war Years 1945-77’, The Economic History of Britain 
since 1700. ed. R. Floud and D. McCloskey, Vol.2, (Cambridge 1981), Gourvish & 
O’Dav. op.cit.. p.l 13 and Milward & Singleton, op.cit.. p.309.
143 Artis, op.cit.. Table 2.6, p.l 13.
144 N. Rollings, ‘The Reichstag method of governing?’. Labour Governments and 
Private Industry, eds. H. Mercer, N. Rollings & J. Tomlinson, (Edinburgh 1992), 
p.17.
1 Ministry of Supply, Report of the Committee for Standardization of Engineering 
Products. (1949), p.24.
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task of limiting capital investment to those that promoted exports and import saving.146 
More generally still the nationalisation measures were often understood in terms of the 
efficiency that state ownership, investment and planning could bring.147
Although there was some concern over the growth of public expenditure by 
British governments in the 1950s and 1960s, this concern again centred upon macro- 
economic issues; the prevention of destabilising short-term inflationary pressures.148 It 
was not until the Plowden Report, in 1961, that concern over the inadequacies of long 
term planning within government expenditure programmes emerged. As a result, from 
the 1960s government consciously began using public sector expenditure as a policy 
option, to promote changes within private industry. Purchasing policies within the 
nationalised industries, limiting the numbers of companies capable of submitting 
tenders, and the creation of the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation were both aimed 
at promoting mergers and rationalisation.149 The British government’s inability to 
develop successful planning mechanisms increasingly became a central concern of 
debates on industrial policy throughout the 1960s.150
It is also well known that the defence sector represented a major component 
of government expenditure.151 In 1950 40% of all public authority expenditure on
146 M. Chick, ‘Private industrial Investment’, op.cit.. eds. Mercer, Rollings and 
Tomlinson, p.77.
147 See A. A. Rogow, The Labour Government and British Industry. (Oxford 1955),
p. 161
148 Caimcross, British Economy, p.91.
149 A. Graham, ‘Industrial Policy’, The Labour Government’s Economic Record 
1964-70. ed. W. Beckerman, (1972), pp.189-91.
150 See T.J. Hutton & K.A. Chrystal, 'The Budget and Fiscal Policy', op.cit... eds. Crafts 
& Woodward, p.61 and A. Shonfield, Modem Capitalism (1969) and P. Hall, 
Governing the Economy. (Oxford 1986), p.252.
151 The discussion that follows conforms to the distinction made within the National 
Income and Expenditure Accounts between public authorities (national and local 
government) and public corporations (nationalised industries).
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goods and services was accounted for by defence and even after wages and salaries 
are excluded the figure remains at 21%.152 This expenditure rose by 1953 to 50% 
(32% excluding wages and salaries) before falling to 35% (19% excluding wages and
1 ^ 3salaries) by 1965. The next most important area for public authority expenditure 
on goods and services was in public health. While health spending increased from 
17-20% of total expenditure on goods and services between 1953 and 1965, 
excluding wages and salaries expenditure remained almost static at around 9%.154 
This skewing of expenditure has led Edgerton to suggest that post-war Britain should 
be characterised as a warfare rather than welfare state.155
Outside of public authority expenditure on goods and services, other private 
industries found support in the form of expenditure on domestic fixed capital 
formation, direct subsidies and through the public corporations. Local government 
housing consistently represented the largest single item of gross fixed capital 
formation in public authority expenditure, despite falling from 50% of the total in 
1950 to 37% by 1963.156 Agriculture and food was similarly the main beneficiary of 
support in the form of subsidies throughout the period, accounting for 80% of all 
subsidies in 1950 and 46% in 1965.157 Within the nationalised industries themselves 
it was the purchases of goods and services combined with capital expenditure that 
proved important. Public corporations’ purchases of goods and services, excluding
152 National Income and Expenditure Tables for the United Kingdom. 1961, table 44 
and D.C. Page, ‘Defence Expenditure’, National Institute Economic Review. No. 10 
(1960), table 4.
153 National Income. 1959, table 42, 1961 table 44 and 1966 tables 47 & 53.
154 Ibid.
155 See D.E.H. Edgerton, 'Liberal militarism and the British state' in New Left Review. 
No. 185, 1991.
156 National Income. 1959, table 41 and 1966 table 46.
157 Ibid.. 1959, table 41 and 1966 table 53.
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wages and salaries, was throughout the period equivalent to almost 90% of those of 
the public authorities, while capital expenditure rose from 59% to 86% of the public 
authorities total.158
National Income and Expenditure data suggest that in the post-war years 
government and the public corporations acted as significant markets for private 
industry. However it also appears that these markets were changing over time and 
becoming more diverse. Defence, agriculture and housing all remained important 
sectors for government expenditure but all saw their shares of total expenditure fall 
significantly by the mid 1960s.
• Sectoral importance of government expenditure
Input-Output tables provide an opportunity to examine in greater detail the 
importance of government expenditure for private industry. Input-Output tables 
derive from post-war governments’ interests in economic management. Their origins 
lie in the work of the economist Leontief in the 1930s on interdependence of industry 
within economies.159 The flow of goods between industrial sectors, and the need to 
understand the impact of increases in output from individual sectors upon the economy 
as a whole, led to their widespread use. Input-Output tables use an industry x industry 
flow matrix to show the dis-aggregated value of purchases of intermediate goods 
between industries. They also provide aggregated information on final product 
purchases for current expenditure by consumers and government along with final
158 Ibid.. 1959, tables 30,34,41 & 42 and 1966 tables 36,47 & 52.
159 See W. Leontief, Input-Output Economics. (New York, USA 1966), p.134 and 
W.W. Gossling, Input-Output of the United Kingdom: Proceedings of the 1968 
Manchester Conference. (1970).
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product purchases leading to domestic capital formation, imports, exports and final 
output.
Table 1.1 shows the purchases from industry by the public sector (public 
authorities and public corporations combined), excluding expenditure related to gross 
domestic capital formation, where they account for over 10% of final domestic output, 
for the years 1948 and 1963.160 The table clearly highlights a growing importance of 
government orders for a wide range of industries by the mid 1960s. This is consistent 
with the evidence from National Income and Expenditure Tables and suggests that 
government was increasingly becoming integrated into the whole of the British 
manufacturing sector as the period developed.
In the case of the aircraft industry public sector orders were almost entirely 
responsible for the survival of the industry. In the heavy mechanical and high 
technology industries, including the shipbuilding, locomotive building, radio and 
telecommunications and scientific instrument industries, the public sector accounted 
for around 40% of domestic orders. For a wider range of industries outside of the heavy 
mechanical engineering sector, including the pharmaceutical, oil, wires and cables, 
rubber, small arms and general mechanical engineering industries, the public sector 
again represented a key market with around a quarter of total demand.
Below this the public sector was a major market, responsible for over 10% of 
domestic orders, in a diverse range of industries including domestic electrical 
appliances, electrical machinery, printing and publishing and lubricating oils, polishes, 
explosives and general chemicals.
160 Input-Output tables primarily relate to intermediary products and therefore do not 
disaggregate domestic capital formation sufficiently to distinguish between the 
public sector and private industry.
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Table 1.1161
Public Sector Purchases of Goods and Services from Manufacturing Industry 
as a Proportion of Domestic Output in 1948 and 1963162
1948 1963
Aircraft 77 80
Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering 13 43
Locomotives, carriages & railway equipment & other 
vehicles
17 42
Radio and Telecommunications 39
Scientific instruments 12 36
Oils & Greases163 54 26
Pharmaceutical & toilet preparations 10 26
Insulated wires & cables 25
Motors & cycles 25
Rubber 22 20
Ordnance, small arms, general mechanical engineering 17
& other mechanical engineering __
Domestic appliances & miscellaneous electrical goods 14
Electrical machinery 14
Wood & cork 13
Industrial Engines 12
Engineers small tools 11
Printing & Publishing 11
Chemicals, lubricating oils, dyestuffs, explosives, polishes 
& allied industries
17 10
Construction 10
Machine tools 10
It should be bome in mind that these results are open to significant under­
estimation measurement errors and should be considered as minimum orders of
161 See Appendix One for a detailed account of the way in which this table was 
generated.
162 Sources: Input-Output Tables for the United Kingdom. 1963.(1970). table 9 public 
authorities expenditure on goods and services, table A make-matrix and table D 
industry x industry flow matrix and LG. Stewart, ‘Input-Output Table for the United 
Kingdom’, The Times Review of Industry. December 1958, pp.vii-ix.
163 Classified as Mineral oil refining in 1963 tables.
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magnitude rather than exact calculations, due to limitations of the data. In particular, 
within the shipbuilding, locomotives and electrical machinery industries it would be 
expected that public sector orders would be significantly higher. The explanation for 
this lies in the fact that the input-output data primarily refers to expenditure on goods 
and services and does not include detailed data on expenditure leading to increases in 
gross domestic capital formation. In the three industries mentioned the proportion of 
domestic output accounted for by increases in gross domestic capital formation in 1963 
were 47% for electrical machinery, 30% for shipbuilding and 24% for 
locomotives.164
National Income and Expenditure tables contain data on public sector 
expenditure leading to increases in gross domestic fixed capital formation within the 
broad categories of plant and machinery, vehicles, ships and aircraft and finally 
construction (dwellings and other new buildings combined). Table 1.2 shows the 
results of combining National Income and Expenditure data on capital formation 
with input-output data on expenditure on goods and services.
Table 1.2 further highlights the growth of public sector orders for a widening 
range of British manufacturing. Plant and machinery sectors’ reliance upon public 
sector orders increased rapidly in the fifteen years covered by this data, while in the 
vehicles, ships and aircraft sectors’ reliance grew only slowly. If the 1954 
categorisation is used, combining vehicles, ships and aircraft with plant and machinery, 
we find that the growth in the public sector as a market rose from 16.5%, 26.8% and 
27.4% in the years 1948, 1954 and 1963 respectively. The construction industry
164 Input-Output Tables 1963. table D, columns 77 & 78.
64
similarly is also highlighted as a major recipient of public sector orders throughout the 
period.
Table 1.2165
Public Sector Orders as a Percentage of Total Domestic Output 1948-63166
1948 1954 1963
Plant and 
Machinery
11.22
26.77
24.16
Vehicles, Ships and 
Aircraft
33.67 38.06
Construction 49.01 52.87 48.97
Over the period 1948-63 there was clearly a shift in the pattern of public sector 
purchases from private industry. The public sector also represented a larger share of 
sales to private industry by the early 1960s. While deficiencies within the data make it 
impossible to show either the exact timing of changes or intermittent fluctuations, they 
nevertheless present a clear picture of the direction in which the changes were taking 
place. The public sector as a market was clearly becoming more influential for a 
significant number of important private industries and firms were increasingly 
becoming dependent upon its orders for their success. Initially the aircraft, construction
165 See Appendix One for a detailed account of the way in which this table was 
generated.
166 Sources: National Income and Expenditure. 1955, table 51 and, 1969, table 52, 
Stewart, op.cit.. table 2, column 61 minus column 58 and total state purchases derived 
from table 2, columns 53, 54 and 55 along with table 1, columns 4, 45, 46 and 47, 
Board of Trade, Input-Output Tables for the United Kingdom 1954. Studies in Official 
Statistics. No.8. total domestic output for sectors 14-23 inclusive is derived from Table 
B, column 51 minus column 48. Total state purchases of intermediary and final 
products is derived from Table A, columns 2, 43,44 and Table 1, column 15. Input- 
Output Tables 1963. Table 9 for government current account expenditure.
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and shipbuilding industry appear as key recipients of public sector orders but this 
rapidly diversifies to capture virtually all the electrical and mechanical engineering 
industries and important sectors of the chemical, pharmaceutical and even paper and 
printing industry.
The emergence of the public sector as a market also appears to coincide 
chronologically with the development of more stringent competition policy within 
government from the mid 1950s. The state emerged as a more important partner in the 
late 1950s and this may well have heightened governments’ interest in adjusting the 
balance between competition and collusion in markets. Alternatively, it may be that in 
Mercer’s framework British business was finding in public sector orders a mechanism 
for the creation of organisational capabilities which then allowed for the acceptance of 
the removal of restrictive practices.
• Conclusion
The need to understand the market not as an ahistorical being with its own 
dynamic but as an institution created and shaped by the need for productive 
organisations, namely firms, to compete for power is necessary in order to draw the 
maximum benefit from analysis such as Lazonick’s. In such a scenario firms should be 
understood as risk-averse institutions who are motivated to develop organisational 
capabilities by their need to control information.167 Unfortunately, even Lazonick 
himself appears to shy away from such a conclusion, preferring to limit his criticisms 
of transaction cost analysis to its lack of understanding of the internal benefits of 
organisational capabilities. The way in which the institution of the market is shaped
167 Richardson, op.cit.. pp. 173-190.
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and altered, through the business-govemment relationship, therefore takes on a crucial 
importance in the understanding of the rise of organisational capabilities and needs to 
be incorporated into a Lazonick/Chandlerian framework in order to fully exploit the 
insights of their theories.
The discussion above has set out the hypothesis that firms are themselves 
motivated by the need to control and direct the institution of the market. The discussion 
further suggested that if the market is indeed an institution then firms should be 
considered not as transaction cost minimisers but as governance bodies. The ability of 
firms to succeed in influencing the institutional development of the market is also 
dependent upon the role of government and oligopolistic firms links to government. 
Further, the tendency towards sclerosis lies in the inter-relationship and contradictory 
pressures created between firms’ control over the institutional development of the 
market and the impact of the market on firms themselves.
In order to test the central hypothesis and the subsequent suppositions, the rest 
of the thesis will examine the development of British industry in the two decades after 
1945. In particular we are interested in the movement away from government-imposed, 
wartime regulation towards de-control and finally the emergence of competitive 
markets by the early 1960s. In wartime government regulated all aspects of the market, 
including raw material supply, price, company profitability, labour supply and 
consumer demand, but by the mid-1960s government regulation and company 
restrictive practices had been abandoned. The focus of the following chapters is, then, 
the transition from one competitive framework to another. The chapters’ examine how 
firms responded to these changes. What role did information play in this transition?
67
Did links to government have an impact?; Did ownership matter and, most 
fundamentally, how responsive were firms to change?
The following three chapters chart these changes though an examination of 
firms in three industries. The firms and industries are chosen not for their similarities 
but rather to test these developments across a small but diverse sample and to gain 
evidence of the broad range of competitive issues facing firms in this period of rapid 
changes in market structure.
It is immediately obvious that this thesis concentrates upon a supply-side 
explanation of change. This is not to remove issues of demand as important elements 
within these developments. Rather it is to emphasise that firms need to be understood 
as the active agents in this process. In order to address this imbalance each chapter 
begins with a discussion of demand side changes before addressing the question of 
how firms responded and adapted under conditions of uncertainty.
The firms covered in the case studies^ the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
(subsequently renamed B.P.), the three firms which combined together to form the 
General Electric Company by 1968 and the grocery retailer J.Sainsbury. All three 
proved to be highly successful in the post-war period. Their success suggests that not 
only were they all capable of responding well to changes within the market 
environment but, if the hypothesis is correct, they were also successful in adapting the 
market environment to their own advantage.
Finally, in the conclusion the thesis returns to a theoretical approach based 
upon a transaction cost analysis to discuss the degree to which firms’ use of 
information and an institutional perspective of markets informs our understanding of
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business history and economic development. The conclusion will also examine further 
hypotheses emerging from this study and possibilities for future research.
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•  Chapter Two
• The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 1945-54: Successful market governance.
' for the purposes o f the case, [the company is] 
indistinguishable from the government o f Great Britain.A
• Introduction
The oil industry must be the prime example for any study examining the 
ability of business to govern markets. The industry is arguably the most famous case of 
an industry dominated by the cartelized control of production.2 Ever since the oil price 
shocks of the 1970s the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC, has 
been synonymous with restrictive controls preventing the operation of the ‘free 
market’. The reputation of the oil industry is not however simply linked to OPEC. 
Prior to the emergence of OPEC, the oil industry had won itself an almost 
unchallenged reputation for oligopolistic practices and profiteering. The fully 
integrated major oil companies, dubbed the Seven Sisters, were the focus of damning 
criticism from nationalist opposition movements within oil producing countries and the 
historiography of the oil industry is dominated by criticism of the power of the majors.
The oil industry has been accused of structuring markets nationally and 
internationally to exploit consumers in the advanced world. Thus ‘transnational firms
1 Explanation given by Judge Kirkland of the U.S. Federal District Court for quashing 
the subpoena issued against the Anglo Iranian Oil Co., by the U.S. Justice Department 
during anti-trust investigations. Times. 16 December 1952.
2 See A. Sampson, The Seven Sisters. (1975) and D. Yergin, The Prize. (1991) for 
two of the most popular histories of the industry.
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view individual states as resources to provide conditions amenable to business’.3 
Alternatively the oil majors are presented as a mechanism through which the first 
world exploits the wealth and resources of the third world. They have been dubbed 
western governments’ willing ‘vehicle of the national interest’ on the understanding 
that, in international commercial oil matters, a policy of economic liberalism, i.e. no 
direct government involvement, would be pursued in return for the companies’ active 
participation in the promotion of their government’s international interests.4
The oil industry has certainly been recognised as an industry with major 
strategic importance for all industrialised nations. Most famously this was stated 
immediately after the First World War by Lord Curzon, a member of the British War 
Cabinet and later Foreign Secretary, who recognised that ‘The Allied cause had floated 
to victory upon a wave of oil’.5 As recently as 1991 the access to reserves and the 
control over the production of oil provided the major reason for a further war in the 
Middle East. While this strategic importance suggests a continuity in the relationship of 
the oil industry to governments, it is also the case that the nature of the relationship and 
the structure of the industry itself has changed dramatically over the period.
It is this changing relationship that has provided a qualification to the dominant 
historiography. Bamberg, author of the second volume of the British Petroleum 
Company’s, (B.P.), official history, has suggested that, rather than the oil majors 
dominating government policy, they were simply attempting to cope in an ‘unstable 
and uncertain environment’. B.P. in particular was subject to severe economic 
fluctuations and suffered from being a ‘pawn’ in a global ideological conflict between
3 G.P. Nowell, Mercantile States and the World Oil Cartel 1900-39. (New York 
1994), p.286.
4 D.S. Painter, Private Power and Public Policy. (1986), p.208.
5 Quoted in Yergin, op.cit.. p. 183.
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superpowers.6 The oil industry, then, in more acute form than any other industry, 
embodies the issues involved in the original hypothesis concerning structuring of 
markets. Our hypothesis suggests that firms’ activities are understandable in terms of 
their attempts to control and change their environment. The reason why firms are 
required to control their environment lies in the difficulties they face due to 
opportunism and, most importantly, information asymmetry. If firms are to reduce 
their exposure to opportunist behaviour they are required to control the flow of 
information to markets. Vertical integration, collusion, price controls and market 
sharing therefore become understandable as methods of influencing information flows, 
or of governing the market.
• Issues and Hypotheses
The chapter examines the degree to which the institutional framework of the oil 
industry was intimately linked to the continued presence of the major oil companies 
and, further, examines the complex linkages between the companies and the 
governments of both the developed and newly industrialising world. To what degree 
would the removal of any major element of those linkages or an individual player have 
disturbed the entire institutional framework throughout the world?
This chapter also examines the degree to which the oil companies themselves 
have been successful in controlling their environment. In particular the chapter will 
examine whether the British government was simply a malleable institution captured 
by transnational capital, or, was the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, AIOC, merely an
6 J. Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum Company: The Anglo-Iranian 
Years 1928-54. Vol.2, (Cambridge 1994), pp.517-21.
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expendable firm whose disappearance would not have had severe repercussions for the 
rest of the oil industry?7
The focus of the chapter is the development of the industry between 1945 and 
the mid 1950s, with a specific emphasis upon the changes that took place within the 
AIOC. This ten year period is the shortest of any of the three case studies and is due to 
the influence of international considerations upon the oil industry. Decisions on the 
timing on the removal of wartime controls were not the preserve of individual 
governments. While the British government could maintain domestic petrol rationing 
until 1950, it was unable directly to influence the growth of demand internationally. 
Hence both oil exporting and importing countries required the relaxation of controls 
over the trade in oil from the earliest possible date. International aspects of demand and 
supply also dominated oil company strategy. This was not simply due to the fact that 
crude oil originates in one part of the world and is used in another, but was linked to 
the very structure of an oil industry itself, based upon a high level of vertical 
integration and multinational operations. It will be suggested that the structure of the 
industry is intimately bound-up with and determined by the specific needs of market 
governance. It will also be suggested that the regulation of the market also determines 
the external barriers of the oil companies themselves. As a result it will be possible to 
determine whether the oil industry is as collusive and anti-competitive as much of the 
historiography maintains; or was the oil industry simply a more visible example of 
businesses’ attempts at market governance?
7 The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, AIOC, had been known as the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company until 1935 and has been known as British Petroleum since 1955. This 
chapter will refer to AIOC throughout.
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Essentially the chapter will show that the immediate post-war period presented 
the major oil companies with a dilemma of how to regulate markets. Could the 
companies prevent a return to the slump conditions of the 1930s, while simultaneously 
reconciling the political demands of the victorious allied powers for a plentiful and 
cheap supply of oil to all friendly nations? The key to the resolution of this dilemma lay 
in information flows. Crucially, could information related to the market (absolute size 
and growth of demand) be translated into co-ordinated activity, among those with 
interests in production, to ensure an equilibrium between demand and supply was 
achieved?
To emphasise the international nature of the industry is not to understate the 
importance of the British market. The chapter documents developments within the 
British oil market in order both to highlight the detailed way in which oil companies 
themselves reconciled international issues, within a particular market, and to highlight 
the difficulty firms faced interacting with government institutions. The chapter 
maintains that the government/industry relationship in Britain, although not without 
conflict, was in general extremely favourable towards the oil industry and AIOC in 
particular. This relationship also proved crucial to the creation of a stable market 
structure in an industry containing a small number of multinational oligopolistic firms.
Finally, it will be shown that the changes in the structure of the industry 
required the companies themselves to examine their own internal structure. Changes in 
the post-war industrial structure required new forms of company organisation to ensure 
that a continued balance between supply and demand could be maintained. As a result 
not only did the oil companies adjust their production processes, to maximise the use 
of continuous flow techniques, but companies also altered the boundary between
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internalised transaction costs and external market operations. However external 
constraints, placed on the ability of companies to adopt new organisational forms, also 
hindered their ability to alter the structure of the industry itself. Hence the relationship 
between company organisation and industrial structure should be seen as a dynamic 
and inter-dependent one.
• Demand for Oil
The description of the post-war world growth in demand for oil inevitably 
relies upon adjectives such as enormous, gargantuan or exponential. In order to 
satisfy rising demand, daily crude oil production, in the free world alone, rose from 
8.7 million barrels in 1945 to 42 million barrels by 1972.8 By the 1950s, 
measurement errors of a billion barrels ‘or so’ in estimated reserves for individual 
fields were no longer considered important.9
In order to gain some understanding of this growth the measurement of rising 
demand will be restricted to the British economy. The British market for oil products 
was not untypical of economies in the developed world and, of equal importance, 
growth in demand was not unrepresentative. The British market was the second 
largest single market for oil products (outside Russia) and of major importance for oil 
companies throughout this period.
Consumption of petroleum products in Britain had grown almost continuously 
throughout the interwar period, even in the worst years of the recession. The total 
increase in inland consumption from 2.6 million tons per annum in 1921 to 9.0 million
8 Yergin, op.cit., p.500.
9 Letter by the geologist E. DeGolyer to F.E. Wellings of the Iraq Petroleum 
Company. Ibid.. p.499.
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tons at the peak in 1938 represented increase.10 This growth in consumption
came overwhelmingly (73%) from the rise in demand for motor spirit (including 
aviation spirit) whose consumption rose 568% and for fuel and diesel oil whose 
consumption rose 232%. The 1930s saw at first a slowing down of the rate of increase 
in consumption and in 1939 a slight fall in consumption, (see Figure 2.1). Thus by the 
start of the Second World War total inland consumption of petroleum products was a 
little under 9.0 million tons per annum.
The war years themselves saw a more mixed picture. An initial fall in 
consumption in 1940 of 1.2 million tons, almost exclusively accounted for by a fall in 
motor spirit, was followed by a period of generally static consumption between 8.6-9.1 
million tons per annum between 1941-43. Another significant change lay in the 
redistribution of consumption patterns, with a fall in most areas counteracted by a rise 
in consumption of aviation spirit. In 1944, however, a rapid increase took place, with 
consumption reaching a new peak of 13.0 million tons. This increase was almost 
entirely accounted for by a rise in military consumption of aviation spirit; it was only 
temporary: total consumption was to fall back again to 9.6 million tons by 1946. This 
was again almost entirely due to falls in demand for aviation spirit and in fact virtually 
all other oil products saw a rise in consumption. Nevertheless by 1946 total 
consumption was higher than in any year prior to the war.11
10 All figures for consumption refer to inland consumption excluding refinery 
consumption and bunkering and unless specified otherwise, derive from British 
Petroleum Archive (hereafter B.P.) 7446, Petroleum Statistics of the British Isles 1954, 
Table 2.01 and Institute of Petroleum Information Service, U.K. Petroleum Industry 
Statistics. Consumption and Refinery Production. Table 1, years 1948-66.
11 Official government figures for wartime consumption differ from those quoted 
above, although the trends discussed do not. See Fighting with Figures. (1996), table 
5.16.
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Figure 2.1
Log of Inland Consumption of Petroleum Products
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The years 1946-66 saw an acceleration in the growth of demand, compared 
with the interwar years, with consumption rising from 9.6 million tons to 68.4 million 
tons per annum, an increase of&i'iifo. While motor spirit consumption rose 277% and 
accounted for 12% of the total increase, the most important component element in the 
rise in consumption now came from fuel oil, whose increase alone accounted for 48% 
of total growth (see Figure 2.2). Sales of other petroleum products such as diesel fuel, 
along with gas and diesel oils, also increased and new products such as light distillate 
and chemical feedstock, which had previously been of little significance, became 
important elements in the pattern of consumption.
Demand for refined oil products was strong and growing throughout the period 
under consideration. The growth in mass markets was intimately linked in the interwar 
years to the newly developing industries, notably the car industry. It was the emergence 
of the car industry that provided the market for motor spirit and provided an outlet for 
over 50% of the oil industry’s products in these years, measured either by quantity or 
price. However by 1956 fuel oil had overtaken motor spirit as the single largest 
product, by quantity, in the British market for the oil industry. If fuel oil is taken with
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gas and diesel oils then the demise of motor spirit as the premier product came in 
1954.12
7.6 T
Figure 2.2
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Order of magnitude estimates derived from input-output tables show that by 
1963 sales related to the motor industry must have been well below 40% of domestic 
consumption.13 Increasingly the oil industry’s growth was reflecting not merely the 
growth of the motor industry but the growth of industry generally. Oil’s importance 
was as an intermediary product for industry, as opposed to a consumer product for 
owners of motor vehicles. In industries with large energy requirements, oil provided a 
flexible substitute for more traditional solid fuels. Markets were also found among 
smaller users for the central heating of offices, flats and industrial units.14
12 Institute of Petroleum Information Service, ibid.. table 1,1957.
13 Input-Output Tables for the United Kingdom for 1963. (1970), table D. If all 
intermediate purchases from the motor vehicles and transport industries are included 
and the (invalid) assumption is made that all final product purchases by consumers 
and public authorities are purchases for motor vehicles, then total purchases account 
for 39% of total domestic consumption.
14 For contemporary discussions on the uses of fuel oils see C.A. Roast & W.E.J. 
Broom, ‘Place of Fuel Oil in the U.K. Fuel Economy’, Institute of Petroleum, The 
Post-War Expansion of the U.K. Petroleum Industry. (1954).
78
This was part of a general trend away from solid fuels. Government policy 
from the late 1940s was to increase coal and oil supplies and prevent any further coal 
shortages of the kind that had developed in the years after 1945. Although the demise 
of coal was still many years ahead, the weakening of the dominance of coal as an 
energy source had begun. The shift away from coal was so strong that, even when the 
government attempted to slow the contraction of the coal industry in order to maintain 
employment levels in the early 1960s, the rise in consumption of fuel oil continued 
relentlessly.15
The replacement of coal by oil was an international phenomenon. Throughout 
Europe the market for oil as a source of energy was increasing. Britain lagged behind 
France and Italy in replacing coal, although Britain was ahead of West Germany 
throughout the 1940s and 1950s. In terms of energy consumption per capita, however, 
Britain was ahead of other European countries until the 1970s.16
• Limitations on domestic demand
Although demand increased rapidly after 1945 it did not do so free from all 
restrictions. The restrictions upon demand reflected both the difficulties of 
readjustment in the aftermath of the Second World War and the rapidity with which 
growth in demand for oil products re-established itself.
Wartime regulations restricted the quality of motor spirit to one grade through 
the limitation on octane content. The use of pooling until 1948, whereby all producers 
supplied the Petroleum Board who in turn supplied retailers with unbranded products, 
also prevented oil companies from marketing products. On top of this, quantity
15 Yergin. op.cit.. p.544.
16 P. Odell, Oil and World Power, (seventh ed. Middlesex 1983), figure 1, p.l 18.
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controls, via the rationing of motor spirit for private motoring, continued until 1950. 
Post-war pooling and rationing of motor spirit was the consequence of the combined 
shortages of physical supply and shortages of hard currency to pay for imports.
British fuel and power demands were restricted through a shortage of all fuels, 
most importantly coal, which was still responsible for supplying 90% of all energy 
requirements in 1952.17 Shortages of coal encouraged the British government to 
promote the use of fuel oil as a replacement for industrial purposes. In 1947 the oil 
companies and government clashed over the companies’ inability to supply adequate 
quantities of fuel oil to Britain. Within a year the coal/oil conversion campaign was 
abandoned.18
A more long lasting restriction was that imposed by the shortage of dollars. 
With the end of the war in the Pacific came a rapid abandonment of the United States 
policy of wartime economic support. The economic benefits derived from the U.S. 
Lend-Lease agreement were unilaterally withdrawn from the British government two 
days after the Japanese surrender. Despite the explicit stipulation, in the U.S. Congress 
at the time of approval, that aid would be withdrawn on cessation of the war, its 
removal caused consternation within the British government. The funding from Lend- 
Lease had been used to finance two-thirds of Britain’s external deficit during the war; 
its removal therefore magnified the difficulties of re-conversion. These problems were 
still further compounded by the surge in exports from the United States between 1946 
and 1947. In 1947 the U.S. trade surplus amounted to over $12b.19
17 Ibid, p. 118.
18 See Bamberg, op.cit.. pp.315-321.
19 A. Caimcross, Years of Recovery. 1945-51. (1985), p.70.
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The dollar shortage was not, of course, simply a British problem; rather it 
effected the whole of the European continent and indeed the world economy. It also 
ensured that the solution to the problem, Marshall Aid, would place the United States 
at the heart of economic and political settlement within Europe.20
The dollar shortage placed limitations upon the rise in sales of oil, due to the 
unwillingness of the British government to purchase oil from American companies, 
who required payment in dollars.21 Attempts by the British government to encourage 
domestic oil companies to increase their operations (which would either reduce dollar 
payments or earn dollar exchange) was, as will be documented, at the heart of 
difficulties between the government and the British oil companies in this period.
Difficulties in satisfying demand were not restricted to governments but were 
also linked to company activity. The effect of the war was to ensure government action 
significantly distorted the structure of consumption patterns between 1940 and 1945, 
altering the demands on oil companies and in turn impacting upon firms’ post-war 
decisions. The major oil companies believed, towards the end of the war, that the 
slight 1938-49 fall in consumption could reassert itself and, as will be shown, these 
views proved crucial to explaining the actions of the major oil companies after 1945. 
Although expectations changed with post-war experience, the combination of 
government’s attempts to address re-conversion issues and companies’ attempts to
20 See A. Carew, Labour under the Marshall Plan. (Manchester 1987) and A.
Mil ward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51. (1984) for more on the 
wider political and economic issues relating to Marshall Aid.
21 See C.R. Schenk, ‘Exchange controls and multinational enterprise: the 
Sterling/Dollar oil controversy in the 1950s’, (Unpublished paper 1995) for details of 
British government policy and H.R. Larson, E.H. Knowlton & C.S. Popple, History of 
Standard Oil Company (New Jersey). New Horizons 1927-50. (New York), pp.701- 
713 for the impact on the Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey).
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forecast demand resulted in an intensification of the difficulties of ensuring adequate 
supply.
• Supply and government regulation
It is in the area of supply that changes in government and company activity can 
most easily be seen. The post-war period saw rapid changes in the supply of oil 
products to importing countries. Western economies rapidly developed domestic 
refining capabilities in the first decade after 1945. Before 1940 only around 25% of 
British demand for refined products was satisfied from domestic refineries whereas 
after 1945 consumption was increasingly satisfied through domestic refining. The 
growth of domestic refining was such that a net surplus of refined products existed by 
1952.22 It is important to note that, although a surplus of refining capacity existed in 
Britain, refined imports still continued, although in diminished quantities, due to the 
fact that not all product lines had a domestic surplus and at other times imported 
refined products were cheaper than domestically produced products.
The decision to increase domestic refining was one of the main changes in 
companies’ investment strategies after 1945. This shift was an international 
phenomenon, with governments using a ‘carrot and stick’ approach of offering tariff 
protection to oil companies. Shortages of dollars for imports and possible dollar 
earnings from exports of refined products also played a major role in promoting 
domestic refining. In Britain the wartime ban on imports of Russian oil continued both 
to promote domestic refining and reduce dollar payments.
22 B.P. 7446, op.cit., table 1.10.
23 Odell, op.cit.. p.l 12.
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The companies themselves also had commercial reasons for rapidly adopting 
domestic refining. Transportation costs were falling as large oil tankers began to be 
commissioned and the siting of refineries outside the Middle East acted to spread the 
political risks taken by companies such as AIOC. Despite domestic refining 
increasingly being supported by both governments and companies, the move towards 
domestic refining was not a smooth one. The issue was at the centre of debate between 
oil companies and their respective governments.
In contrast to demand (where world trends could be examined through the 
British experience), it is virtually impossible to understand changes in British supply 
without examining changing trends within world supply. International issues 
dominated supply considerations for the oil companies. A further contrast with demand 
lies in government’s role in influencing supply patterns. Whereas government policy 
was unable to prevent an inevitable rise in demand, government policy, particularly 
that of the United States, played a decisive role in determining post-war developments 
in supply. After the Second World War the Middle East became the centre for oil 
exploration. Between 1948 and 1972 Middle East output of crude oil was to rise from 
under 13% to over 43% of world production.24 By 1956 the Middle East also 
contained over 63% of the world’s proven reserves.25
Towards the end of the war worries within the United States over the extent of 
domestic oil reserves led the government actively to promote oil exploration outside 
the U.S.A. and, as a result, the new emphasis upon the exploitation of Middle East oil 
was directly shaped by United States government policy. Government concern for
24 Yergin, op.cit.. p.500.
25 The Structure of British Industry, ed. D. Bum (Cambridge 1958), Vol.l, p.158.
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adequate supplies lay at the heart of the partnerships which had emerged between the 
governments of Britain and America and their respective oil companies.
By the outbreak of the First World War governments had recognised that oil 
was to be of major strategic value within developed economies. This recognition came 
earlier in Britain than in the United States, probably due to the fact that Britain was a 
nation without significant known oil reserves, whereas the United States remained a 
net oil exporter until after 1945. As a result of the economic and military role of oil and 
the strategic value governments placed on it, government links to the oil industry were 
inevitably to be close, with the consequence that companies’ needs were important 
considerations both for foreign policy and competition policy.
By the end of World War One the United States government was ensuring that 
domestic oil companies were taking full part in the division of the old Ottoman Empire 
and gaining access to Middle East oil concessions.26 Indeed government intervention 
was essential for the inclusion of United States companies in the oil concessions of the 
1920s. The demand for an ‘open door’ policy to oil concessions, i.e. inclusion of 
United States interests, would not have developed without the explicit intervention of 
the United States government.27 Once the U.S. majors had gained entry into the Middle 
East concession agreements, the open door policy was however ‘pragmatically’ 
forgotten with the ‘self denial’ clause of the Red Line Agreement.28 The ‘self-denial’ 
clause prevented further exploration within the Red Line area, covering the whole of
26 See Larson, Knowlton & Popple, op.cit.. p.43 for details of the origins of the Red 
Line Agreement.
27 An account sympathetic to the U.S. oil companies makes plain that it was the State 
Department that was most insistent upon an open door policy. See S.J. Randell, 
United States Foreign Oil Policy 1919-48. (Montreal, Canada 1985), pp.37-38.
28 Ibid., P-40.
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the Middle East with the exception of Iran and Kuwait, without the prior agreement 
from all participants to the agreement.
From 1943 these concerns also led the U.S. Petroleum Administration to 
believe that the ‘national policy of the United States should aim at securing, for 
American nationals, access to the world’s oil resources.’29 Middle East oil was of 
such importance that Harold Ickes, appointed by F.D. Roosevelt as Petroleum Co­
ordinator for National Defence in 1941, urged the government to take a proprietary 
and managerial control of U.S. foreign operating companies. Although the proposal 
was abandoned, this highlights the growing concern of the United States government 
over Middle East oil.
After 1945 the Truman doctrine, for the containment of the spread of 
communism, ensured that United States oil companies would actively participate in oil 
exploration in the Middle East, in order both to guarantee long term oil supplies for the 
U.S. and to increase the United States’ influence within the Middle East, to counter the 
threat of the Soviet Union.31 It was these concerns that led the American owned oil 
majors to call for a re-negotiation of the Red Line agreement after 1945. As Holman, 
the President of Standard Oil (New Jersey) stated ‘There had been a substantial change 
in the attitude of the American public and Government toward restrictive agreements 
and, under current conditions, reaffirmation of the agreement seemed inadvisable.’
29 R.H.K. Vietor, Energy Policy in America since 1945. (Cambridge 1984), p.29.
30 Ibid.. p.29 and Randell, op.cit.. p. 142.
31 Randell, op.cit.. pp.236-244 and Vietor, op.cit.. p. 15.
32 United States Federal Trade Commission, The International Petroleum Cartel. 
(Washington USA, 1952), p.101
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The British government was also attempting to reassert its influence in the 
Middle East after the Second World War.33 British oil needs throughout the period 
from 1921 to 1966 were almost exclusively satisfied through imports. Prior to 1940 the 
four most important sources for oil imports, in decreasing order, were Venezuela, Iran, 
the United States and Russia;34 yet by 1951 the Middle East alone provided over 80% 
of supplies.35
The motivation of the British government’s interest in the Middle East was 
however somewhat different to that of the United States. British companies already 
controlled exploration across large parts of the Middle East through AIOC’s exclusive 
Iranian concession and through AIOC’s support for the ‘self denial’ clause. Neither 
was the British government as obsessed with the Soviet threat as the Americans. 
Instead domestic economic issues played a central role in determining policy, most 
notably British government attempts to reduce the economy’s reliance upon dollar 
purchases. To alleviate balance of payments constraints, the British restricted dollar oil 
imports to oils (such as lubricating oil) which could not be obtained elsewhere than 
from dollar sources.36
By 1945 then, both the British and United States governments were keen to 
ensure the participation of the oil majors in the development of the post-war 
settlement. However, the oil companies themselves had a differing viewpoint: their 
concern was to ensure that supply did not exceed demand. To understand the differing 
attitude of the oil industry after the Second World War it is necessary to understand
33 J. Saville, The Politics of Continuity. British Foreign Policy and the Labour 
Government 1945-6. (1993).
34 Yergin, op.cit.. pp.236 and 264.
35 The Petroleum Times. 4th May 1951, p.337.
36 Bamberg, op.cit.. pp.321-4.
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why the industry was characterised by a small number of fully integrated firms and why 
these firms faced a crisis in the 1930s. It was these experiences that informed company 
thinking throughout the industry in the post-war years.
• Imperfect competition and company regulation
The oil industry’s early development was technologically determined by the 
ability to transfer experimental chemical and engineering knowledge into applied 
processes. The origins of the modem oil industry lie in the 1850s and derive from the 
ability to break down crude oil into lighter component mixtures to create saleable 
products. The crucial technologically determining element for the industry was the 
progression from batch production to continuous flow techniques in the refining 
process. The first commercial continuous flow refining plant originated from 1885 and 
rapidly became the normal method of refining, allowing for greater throughput of crude 
oil. Useable products had initially been created by the repeated vaporisation of heavy 
cmde oils but the replacement of vaporisation first by cracking and in the 1930s by
op
catalytic cracking ensured that the oil industry could rapidly increase throughput.
The use of continuous flow technologies determined the structure of the 
industry which emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Oil 
companies were required both to secure a steady source of cmde oil, ready for 
processing, and secure a steady supply of outlets for the products. Under these 
conditions information relating to final product markets had to be matched with 
information relating to sources of raw materials and information relating to production 
and transportation capabilities. This therefore required companies either to create
37 Bum, op.cit.. p. 158.
38 British Petroleum, Our Industry. (3rd ed. 1958), p. 13.
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capabilities, or to make long term contracts, for transportation from oil fields to 
refineries, refining, then further, often, international transportation and local 
distribution and sales networks.
The need for fine balances between supply, refining, distribution and sales was 
of primary concern to industries, such as the oil industry, which relied upon continuous 
flow technology. It was this striving for a balance between demand and supply that is 
central to an understanding of the oil industry.40 Not surprisingly, the first company to 
emerge capable of maximising the use of continuous flow technology, with an 
investment strategy based on vertical integration, appeared in the economy with the 
largest single market for oil products, the United States. The Standard Oil Company 
was the largest company in the U.S. until 1902 and thereafter it remained the second 
largest company until its forcible break-up in 1911, following an anti-trust 
investigation 41
While vertical integration was an efficient organisational strategy, it alone 
could not provide firms with the competitiveness to survive, long term, within the oil 
industry. Firms were rapidly forced to operate on a multinational if not global basis. 
This structure and scale of operations was necessary in order to compete against the 
predatory strategies adopted by other integrated firms, which aimed at driving 
competitors out of business 42 The fully integrated firms used price reductions and 
cross subsidisation in order to force competitors to exit from markets. Multinational 
integrated oil firms such as Standard Oil sold products at a loss in competitive markets,
39 A. D. Chandler, Scale and Scope. (1990), pp.23-25.
40 It is Bamberg’s contention that AIOC’s difficulty in achieving a balance of supply 
and demand proved to be one of the company’s central weaknesses. Bamberg, 
op.cit.. p.278.
41 A. D. Chandler, Strategy and Structure. (Cambridge, Mass 1991), p. 165.
42 Sampson, op.cit.. pp.62-66 for case of how Shell challenged Standard Oil.
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using excess profits gained in markets where no competition existed, to remove 
competitor companies. Such ‘cut-throat’ competition was extensively used in the 
industry’s early development.43 Only by operating on a multinational basis could oil 
companies use a tit-for-tat strategy to deter the multinational integrated firms from such 
activity.
Firms therefore required not only upstream organisational capabilities in 
exploitation of oil fields and pipeline transportation as well as midstream capabilities in 
refining capacity and international transportation, but also investments on a 
multinational basis in the downstream capabilities of national distribution and sales 
networks to guarantee markets for refined products. A high degree of vertical 
integration, combined with multinational operations, became both a pre-requisite for 
survival and a significant barrier to entry for competitors. This strategy was to ensure 
that only seven major integrated companies, five American, one British and one Anglo- 
Dutch, popularly known as the ‘Seven Sisters’ or ‘majors’ were to dominate the 
world’s oil resources. An indication of the size of these majors comes from the fact 
that, of the three largest non U.S. private corporations measured by sales in 1964, two 
were the oil majors Royal Dutch Shell and AIOC.44 Similarly all five of the U.S. oil 
majors were among the 16 largest corporations in the United States 45
These early barriers to entry were all based upon physical capital investment, 
producing an integrated chain, rather than ones based upon the cost of information, 
patenting or the following of learning curves. Unfortunately, vertical integration and 
multinational operations still proved incapable of creating stability within the industry.
43 See Yergin, op.cit.. p.72 for detail of Standard Oil’s use of this strategy.
44 Fortune. August 1965, p. 170
45 Ibid.. July 1965, p. 150
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The degree of vertical integration and the scale of production necessary to guarantee 
economies of scale, while ensuring that the industry’s structure would develop with a 
small number of very large firms, did not resolve the problem of balancing demand 
with supply. Indeed the development of multinational firms (although aimed at 
preventing intense competition) arguably intensified the difficulties of achieving a 
balance between supply and demand through the creation of an excess of supply.
Before 1945 the danger of intense price competition between larger integrated
firms spilling beyond single international boundaries and onto the world markets was
such that the majors developed new strategies to reduce the pressures of competition.
Importantly, it was the major oil companies’ competitive strategy that dictated that they
attempt to achieve secure markets for the sales of oil products. The majors became 
<5 a.
more reliant ^ non-physical barriers to entry. Outside the United States, concessionary 
agreements, providing exclusive exploration rights, between the oil companies and the 
rulers of the nations in which exploration took place became increasingly important. 
The Red Line Agreement negotiated between 1922-8 was the most far reaching of 
these agreements. The importance of the Red Line Agreement was that it allowed for 
the limitation of the supply of products to markets, in order to maintain price levels, 
through the ‘self-denial’ clause’s strict limitation upon exploration.
Firms also attempted to reduce the pressure of price competition through a 
reduction in competition for market share. The Achnacarry, or As-Is, Agreement in 
1928 is the most famous example of this strategy. The aim of ‘As-Is’ was to ensure 
that each company's’ market share, in each national market, was guaranteed by its 
rivals, so reducing competitive pressures. From the 1920s the major oil firms aimed to
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achieve an oligopolistic cartel which regulated all aspects of the industry from 
production to market share and prices.
Despite the elaborate attempts to control access to oil fields and the market for 
oil products, the integrated oil companies were unable, in the interwar years, to fully 
achieve a balance between supply and demand, with the result that they were unable to 
prevent competition from emerging. The depression of the early 1930s was so deep 
that, despite the cartelization of the industry, over-production and price collapses 
developed. The problem was most stark in the unregulated American market. In the 
United States smaller non-integrated firms could achieve temporary success in 
developing upstream areas of production with new oil fields where, under the law of 
capture, oil concessions for whole fields were illegal and oil belonged to whoever 
extracted it. As a result drilling wells were geographically highly concentrated, literally 
next to one another, with a mass of small non-integrated oil companies racing to 
extract as much oil for themselves as they could before the fields were exhausted. The 
instability caused by this lack of regulation was catastrophic in the United States 
market and threatened the structure of the world oil market created by the integrated 
companies by the 1930s, as excess oil flowed onto the world market.
The scale of the depression in the United States, leading to reduced demand, 
combined with the discovery of the East Texas oil field sent oil prices tumbling. 
Despite a fall in world oil production from 199.5 million tons in 1929 to 175.7 million 
tons by 1932, prices per ton fell from a high of $13.78 in 1926 to $7.45 in 1930 and 
from there to $ 1.12 in May 193146
46 It should be noted that the price of oil decreased below $1 per ton at the lowest point. 
R.W Ferrier, The History of the British Petroleum Co.. Vol.l 1901-32. (Cambridge 
1982), p.639 and Yergin, op.cit.. p.247. Barrels converted at the rate of 7.45 barrels = 1 
ton.
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This instability in the US market led the majors to demand federal and national 
government regulation. The Texas Railroad Commission, established in 1932, was 
designed to oversee the introduction of a quota system for production. This was 
reinforced by the introduction of the National Recovery Administration Oil Code in 
September 1933.47 Although the NRA code was mled unconstitutional in January 
1935, within one month the still more powerful Connolly (Hot Oil) Act was passed 
outlawing the extraction of oil above agreed quotas 48
Outside the unregulated U.S. market the majors were more successful in 
achieving the balance between supply and demand that they desired. However, as 
Bamberg argues, this balance was bought at a considerable cost. Despite extensive 
restrictive agreements the oil majors had to accept rapidly falling profit margins in 
order to maintain stability.49 Nevertheless the combination of falling profit margins 
with the threat of cut-throat competition, as the large integrated firms relied upon their 
international profits to cross-subsidise the temporary competition in individual national 
markets, proved with few exceptions, a successful barrier to entry.
It was the experience of the interwar period that was responsible for shaping 
post-war views of the oil companies. For the oil companies the American experience 
needed to be avoided; hence they were utterly opposed to the changes which would 
lead to the de-regulation of markets and favoured co-operation on the limitation of 
exploration and production. These fears of over-supply and un-regulated markets 
explain why the oil companies looked to inter-firm restrictive arrangements both in the 
interwar years and after 1945. The oil majors also recognised the need for partnership
47 G.D. Libecap, ‘The Political Economy of Crude Oil Cartelization in the United 
States 1933-72’, Journal of Economic History. No.4, 1989, pp.838-9
48 K.R. Mirow and H. Maurer, Webs of Power. (Boston USA 1982), pp.75-6.
49 Bamberg, op.cit.. p.514
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between government and themselves. The U.S. experience highlighted that the 
industry’s high degree of vertical integration and oligopolistic structure could not be 
maintained, at times of stress, without both extensive co-operative arrangements and 
active government support.
• AIOC and the creation of the 1945 Settlement
With the knowledge of these twin approaches (government political concern 
for secure supplies and company commercial concern for the regulation of markets), it 
is possible to highlight how supply considerations were reconciled in the first post-war 
decade with respect to the British market and the British company AIOC.
The need to create a highly structured market through inter-firm co-operation 
and co-operation with government can most clearly be seen in the experience of the 
AIOC. AIOC’s relationship with the Britain government has been described as 
‘exceptional’ due to the Admiralty’s purchase for £2m, in 1914, of 51% of the 
company shares.50 The purchase of shares in a private company by a government 
department was certainly exceptional, although Harold Ickes’s recommendation to 
take proprietary and managerial control of U.S. Middle East interests would have gone 
well beyond the financial interest the British government held in AIOC. The 
‘exceptional’ relationship was arguably by 1945 more a reflection of government’s 
general attitude to the oil industry than a relationship with particular firms.
The purchase of shares by the British government was understood as a 
mechanism for maintaining security over oil supplies for the Empire and the navy and
50 See G. Jones, The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. (1981) for a 
detailed history of the birth of AIOC.
93
not as an attempt to gain managerial control, unlike the Ickes proposal.51 Although the 
British government would appoint two directors, it was explicitly stated that it would 
not interfere in the commercial decisions of the company. This abdication of 
responsibility by the government was in fact to lead to criticisms from the Foreign 
Office, of the ‘superannuated civil servants’ appointed as directors by the Admiralty 
after the nationalisation of the Iranian oil fields in 1951.52
As with other majors AIOC entered into the co-operative agreements during the 
inter-war period. Indeed AIOC was central to the whole co-operative process with 
AIOC’s Managing Director and Deputy Chairman, William Fraser, drafting the 
original Achnacarry agreement.53 The company had also succeeded in making more 
far-reaching agreements with Shell, in 1928, forming the Consolidated Petroleum 
Company and the Consolidated Refineries. These companies were established to 
market products within a consolidated area, stretching from Cyprus in the north to 
South Africa in the South and Ceylon in the East.54 In response to competition within 
Britain itself, Shell and AIOC formed Shell-Mex & B.P., in 1932, to market and 
distribute their products domestically.55
Within the British market the three major companies AIOC, Shell and Standard 
Oil (New Jersey), together known as the combine, dominated supply. In 1928, a year 
when competition was at its height, the three companies accounted for between 85- 
95% of sales across all the major product areas.56 When a new entrant did establish
51 See Ferrier, op.cit.. p.243, for Cabinet discussion, in 1916, of the Board of Trade 
memorandum ‘The Future of Oil Supplies’.
52 Sampson, op.cit.. p. 136.
53 Bamberg, op.cit.. p. 109.
54 Ferrier, op.cit.. p.512 and B.P., Our Industry, p.412.
55 Bamberg, op.cit.. p. 107 and p.l 19.
56 Federal Trade Commission, op.cit.. table 17, p.317.
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itself, such as the Russian Oil Products Ltd. with a 6.6% share of the motor spirit 
market by 1929, the combine rapidly struck agreements to limit price competition.57 
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission enquiry into petroleum cartels considered the 
British market to be ‘remarkable’ for its price stability in the 1930s. Only 17 price 
changes took place for wholesale products in the nine years from 1930-39. Five of 
these occurred in 1931 alone, itself reflecting the wider difficulties within world 
markets, and a further six occurred in 1937-8, due to rapid fluctuations in Gulf export 
prices and tanker charges.58 The ‘solidity of the structure of control’ within the British 
market can be compared with the instability of the unregulated U.S. market where in 
the twenty years to 1933, before regulation, cmde oil prices changed 67 times.59
The British market was therefore typical of regulated markets throughout the 
world and AIOC was typical of the major oil companies in its attitude to co-operation 
and maintaining structured markets. As a company actively involved in the regulation 
of world markets AIOC was therefore closely involved in post-war discussions on the 
development of post-war supply and was particularly concerned to maintain its own 
interests within the Middle East.
Three distinct views were held towards the end of the war on the future 
prospects of the industry: those of the governments of the United States and Britain 
and, third, that of the oil companies themselves. Both the United States and British 
governments foresaw an era in which a ‘greatly increased demand’ would develop on a 
world-wide basis. In the short term it was expected that a temporary problem might 
develop, namely an excess of supply caused by the transition to peace, which would
57 Bamberg, op.cit.. p. 130 for ROP’s market share and Federal Trade Commission, 
ibid.. p.314 for details of the 1929 agreement.
58 Federal Trade Commission, ibid.. pp.319-20.
59 Ibid.. p.320 for ‘solidity’ quote and Libecap, op.cit.. p.842 for US price changes.
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require an ‘orderly adjustment’.60 An excess of supply, even if temporary, was very 
much at odds with the expectations for other raw materials in the immediate aftermath 
of 1945, when rationing and shortage w * the norm.61etc
The projections of a greatly increased demand were based upon the recognition 
that oil was essential to creating a ‘collective security’ around the world. The two 
governments therefore placed the need for a ‘ready access to oil to all nations under 
(conditions of) expansion and abundance’ at the top of their agendas.62 As a result the 
setting up of an Anglo-American Oil Commission was proposed, with the aim of 
settling disputes over oil supplies between nations. Although the United States 
government later abandoned this idea, there remained two key concerns for the United 
States. First, the United States had extensively used its own oil reserves during the war 
and wished to guarantee continued access to oil. Second, the ‘self-denial’ clause of the 
Red Line Agreement presented an impediment to further access to new sources of oil 
and could threaten the long term stability of the West.
In contrast, the British government’s interest lay primarily in ensuring the 
continuation of what a Treasury official stated was ‘a nicely adjusted balance between 
competing interests’ and preventing any open competition in which the Americans 
would ‘hold most of the trump cards’.64 They maintained that there was no shortage of 
oil and that discussion should focus upon the world situation, rather than simply the 
Middle East65 The British government’s view was that British firms were not in a
60 PRO POWE 33/1492, Anglo-American Exploratory Discussion on Petroleum, 18 
April 1944, p.l.
61 A. Caimcross, The British Economy since 1945. (1992), pp.64-65.
62 All quotes from PRO POWE 33/1492, op.cit., pp.2-8.
63 See PRO POWE 33/1391 for Minutes of proposed Anglo-American Petroleum 
Commission.
64 PRO T 236/219, Oil Policy Document written by M.T. Flett, 20 June 1944, p.5.
65 PRO POWE 33/1492, op.cit., pp.22-23.
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position to compete in open markets and, probably more importantly given Britain’s 
financial dependence upon the United States, the government was not capable of 
resisting United States government demands to open up the Middle East. Under these 
circumstances cartelization could defend both company and government interests. 
British interests, therefore, were considered to lie in the re-introduction of the pre-war 
cartel structures, with agreement on market shares, product quality and prices among 
the oligopolistic firms and in the prevention of any changes to the agreements 
regulating exploration in the Middle East.
The third view on post-war developments was held by the oil companies 
themselves. The discussions held purely between the oil companies suggest that (while 
a party to the inter-governmental committees) they privately took a much more 
pessimistic view of the prospects for the industry.66 Expectations of a return to the 
conditions of the 1930s were widely held: as a result discussions took place between 
the major companies to discuss how to prevent ‘a struggle for markets’ which would be 
‘damaging to all’. The period between the end of the European war and the end of the 
war against Japan saw meetings between Standard Oil (New Jersey) and AIOC to find 
a solution. Standard Oil expected a major fall in orders following the ending of the war 
against Japan and AIOC agreed with such a prognosis 67 Indeed this was bome out in 
Britain, with the war time consumption peak of petroleum products in 1944 followed 
by the 26% drop to 1946. This fall in consumption, combined with the proposed 
doubling of production from Iran and a tripling from the Iraq Petroleum Company 
administered fields, threatened new price instability. Standard Oil stated that while, due 
to anti-trust laws, it could not formally adhere to the ‘As-Is’ agreement ‘they wanted no
66 Larson, Knowlton and Popple, op.cit.. p.663.
67 B.P. 43853, Note of meeting 18 June 1945, p.l.
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greater percentage of the trade than they had previously enjoyed.’ In other words a re- 
introduction of the principle of ‘As-Is’, but without the formalised structure of the 
original agreement or the restrictions of the ‘self-denial’ clause on further exploration. 
On AIOC’s part, while agreeing with Standard’s analysis of the situation, they 
considered their ‘fundamental policy’ to be ‘the maintenance of Persian production on 
an acceptable scale.’68 Therefore for AIOC any limitation of production had to come 
from fields outside of Iran; this would have to involve agreement from the other 
partners in groups such as the Iraq Petroleum Company. Over the next two months 
further meetings elaborated the views of not only AIOC and Standard Oil (New Jersey) 
but also of Shell. Both AIOC and Shell wished to abide by the Red-Line agreement 
although it is suggested that neither company was prepared to vigorously defend the 
agreement against Standard Oil (New Jersey).69
The expected need for an agreement creating an ‘orderly adjustment’ to 
production was central to AIOC company thinking towards the end of the war. To 
avoid a return to the worst conditions of the 1930s would require co-operation and 
planning between the major companies. Yet the co-operation of the original ‘As-Is’ 
agreement and the ‘self-denial’ clause structured into the Red Line agreement had 
failed to prevent the collapse of prices following the slump of 1931 and the over­
production caused by the exploitation of fields like the East Texas oil field.
It would appear, then, that both governments and companies like AIOC were 
on collision course over the resolution of supply issues. In actual fact, however, the 
threatened slump in oil demand proved only temporary and, instead, demand rose at
68 Ibid., p .l. Persia was renamed Iran in 1935, although the name Persia continued to 
be used.
69 Federal Trade Commission, op.cit.. pl02
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such a rate that shortages existed by 1947. The rapid rise in demand allowed the 
companies to accept the abandonment of the ‘self denial’ clause following the signing
nc\of the Memorandum Regarding Heads of Agreement in November 1948. At the same 
time however the oil majors did not abandon their co-operative strategies to regulate 
the market.
• AIOC and Successful Company Regulation after 1945
The rapid post-war growth in demand provided the majors with the degree of 
flexibility required to accept government inspired liberalisation of the Middle East and 
to respond to changes in markets, while still maintaining a highly structured market 
environment. The essential difference in the post-war period was that, under conditions 
of rapidly rising demand, companies wished to avoid the ‘restrictive covenants’ that 
had been common in interwar agreements.71 Participants to agreements, while agreeing 
to sharing markets and preventing direct competition, nevertheless wished to remain 
free to respond flexibly to the new conditions.
It should immediately be stressed that it would be wrong to assume from the 
above that, because companies operated in structured, cartelized markets, neither 
competition nor conflict existed. Competition did exist but in strictly defined forms 
which all competitors accepted. Where these formal and informal conditions were 
broken, open competition could and did break out until a new set of conditions was 
accepted. By examining AIOC it is possible to show both the degree of flexibility 
provided by the post-war conditions and the methods adopted to resolve conflict and 
competition.
70 Ibid.. p. 105.
71 B.P.43853, Letter from Sir William Fraser to G. Legh-Jones, 13 January 1949.
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In 1949 both Shell and AIOC agreed to end the restrictions imposed upon each 
other’s activity, contained within the ‘Marriage Letters’ during the establishment of the 
consolidated companies.72 The consolidated companies therefore had not only 
originally agreed to combine marketing and distribution facilities but had agreed to 
restrict any new operations of each partner to specific geographic regions. The only 
exceptions to the ending of these restrictions was to be the continuation of restrictions 
safeguarding AIOC’s operations in Iran and Mesopotamia and Shell’s operations in 
Indonesia and British Borneo.
One new arrangement entered into between AIOC and Shell in 1949 covered 
the sale of aviation spirit. All aviation spirit sales in the Eastern hemisphere, covering 
Africa, Europe, South East Asia and Australia, were to be merged into a single 
company, while retaining separate brands. The agreement was to ensure a Shell/AIOC 
split of 50:50 by 1955 from the 72.5:27.5 share that existed in 1949. Such an 
agreement would have enormous impact on the market for aviation spirit and as Shell 
pointed out ‘advantage might be gained by the set-up which in the initial years at least 
would indicate two independent and competing organisations.’73 While AIOC wanted 
an ‘overt’ act early on to announce the merger, it was Shell’s view that it need only 
take place as a ‘Postscript at some date after the fruits of the secret and illicit 
association have been fully harvested.’74 The logic behind this agreement was that 
AIOC with an over-capacity in the production of aviation spirit would gain access to 
Shell’s extensive distribution and sales network, while Shell would gain access to 
AIOC’s supplies on favourable terms. The ability to reduce competition between firms
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., letter G. Legh-Jones to Sir William Fraser, 19 January 1949.
74 B.P. 80918, Joint AlOC/Shell Aviation Agreement, 15 May 1951.
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within individual markets would also enable each company to retain the benefits of 
economies of scale, while maximising the ability to engage in cut-throat competition, 
as a joint company, if so desired against external third-party competitors.
Despite the adjustments made to the companies’ quotas in 1951, the agreement 
was generally not implemented, resulting in the mutual termination of the agreement in 
1952. The specific failure of the agreement was due to Shell’s unwillingness to hand 
over market share and to AIOC’s unwillingness to supply Shell with aviation spirit on 
‘most favoured nation terms’ following its loss of the Iranian Abadan refinery in 1951, 
due to nationalisation.75
More generally it might be suggested that the Aviation Agreement failed 
because it still reflected the restrictive conditions under which the companies had 
operated in the 1930s, whereas under the post-war conditions a less restricting type of 
agreement was required. Comparing the decisions in 1949 to end the Marriage Letters 
and to enter into the Aviation Agreement, it could be suggested that the two companies 
were only beginning to alter their views and respond to the new post-war era.
Despite this set-back for co-operation between AIOC and Shell, further 
collaboration continued. Both companies began to meet from December 1951 to 
discuss future investment programmes in order to avoid duplication of investment and 
direct competition. AIOC, even after losing its Iranian production, was against
nfimanufacturing aviation spirit in its Aden refinery ‘unless forced to’ by government. 
Similarly, when discussing expansion plans for B.P. Chemicals at Grangemouth, the
75 B.P. 80918, op.cit„ p. 1-2,19 May 1954.
76 B.P. 70322, Shell Refinery Plans, 14 February 1952.
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company agreed not to manufacture tetra-ethyl lead, the anti-knocking agent in leaded 
petrol, because this would compete with Shell.77
The flexibility provided by the growth of post-war demand can also be seen 
within the majors’ approach to competition. AIOC generally opposed moves to the 
monopolistic control of markets, recognising that this could only lead to complaints 
from competitors and possible investigation by government. When it did find 
competitors attempting to win market share, in particular if its own market share was 
considered too high, AIOC was prepared to concede sales, on condition that 
competitors did not introduce products of a better quality or at lower prices.
One of the most important cases of this was in the Australian market in 1955. 
The AIOC/Australian-govemment-owned company, Commonwealth Oil Refineries 
Ltd, COR, had increased sales of products by 268% against an overall increase in 
consumption of only 108% between 1938 and 1950.78 AIOC’s sales in the 
Australasian market grew at a faster rate than any other geographical market after 1945 
and was one of the company’s marketing success stories.79
By 1955 COR not only held 43% of the Australian furnace oil market but also 
held a contract with the government body, the Australian Shipping Board, for fuel oil, 
which included a continuation clause virtually guaranteeing its renewal. Further, in the 
area of motor spirit both AIOC and Shell had combined together to fix prices and 
quality. This overall market position was considered to be too dominant by AIOC.80
77 B.P. 25725, British Petroleum Chemicals Forward Programme, p.2,9th March 1954.
78 B.P., 95170, AIOC evidence to Federal Trade Commission Investigation on the 
International Petroleum Cartel, Appendix n, 29th September 1952.
79 Bamberg, op.cit.. p.297.
80 B.P. 65179, 28th December 1955, p.l.
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AIOC were concerned about the ‘difficulties through political channels’ that 
could be made by the American entrant Caltex, if the continuation clause were 
discovered; it was also worried that the French firm Compagnie Fran?aise des Petroles, 
CFP, might undermine price and quality agreements in motor spirit.81 As a result of 
these fears, AIOC took the view, here expressed with reference to CFP’s entry into the 
motor spirit market, that ‘if some general understanding on quality and price could be 
reached [COR] would maintain our existing sales policy i.e. [COR] would neither 
facilitate by price cutting markets or take any special steps to impede [CFP’s] entry into 
market in return for which [CFP] would be accepted from the outset as entitled to 
participate in industry discussions.’82
The approach adopted in Australia was in stark contrast to that taken in Britain 
to Russian oil imports where a ban had been introduced since 1938, with the result that 
Shell-Mex & B.P’s market share in motor spirit sales had increased from 42% in 1938 
to over 51% by 1954.83 The important difference in these two examples lies in the 
knowledge AIOC had that ‘political difficulties’ were unlikely to surface within the 
British government. The British government supported a ban on Russian imports in 
order to reduce dollar payments and to actively promote the growth of output from oil 
fields controlled by British firms, notably from AIOC.
The evidence of co-operation between AIOC and Shell and from the Australian 
market reinforces the conclusion that AIOC, and other major oil companies, did not act 
simply as short-run profit-maximising organisations. The motivation of company
81 Ibid., Letter G.R. Shelboume to H.G. Cooper, 26th August 1955.
82 Ibid., COR Melbourne telegram to AIOC Head Office, 8th February 1955.
83 Bamberg, op.cit.. p. 130 and B.P.7446, table 2.15.
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activity came from the need to safeguard the survival of an international industrial 
structure whereby large oligopolistic firms were able to protect the stability reached in 
consumer markets. Only by following such a strategy could changes in product prices 
be controlled on a long-term basis, so ensuring that long term decision making was not 
jeopardised by wildly fluctuating consumer prices. As can be seen from Figure 2.3, the 
oil majors were successful in preventing the wildly fluctuating nominal price changes 
that had occurred in the interwar years from returning. Real oil prices were falling after 
1945 (see below), but for the companies this was more than compensated for by rising 
demand. AIOC was able to increase its sales tonnage from 20.4m long tons in 1946 to 
39.8m long tons by 1950, with real pre-tax profits rising over 53% from £15.3m to 
£23.5m (at constant 1929 prices and dollar/sterling exchange rate).84
Figure 2.3
World Crude Oil Prices 1921-66 (U.S. $/barrel)
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Source: Gilbert Jenkins, Oil Economists1 Handbook. (1985), table 18
The impact of falling real oil prices combined with rising demand on AIOC’s 
profitability after 1950 is more difficult to trace. The data provided in the company 
accounts is not wholly reliable and makes analysis of company profitability extremely
84 Bamberg, ibid.. table 20.1, p.515.
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difficult. The consolidated accounts produced from 1947 excluded major subsidiary 
companies, including most of the subsidiary marketing companies.85 Although this was 
not unusual for the period, the international nature of the industry makes these 
omissions arguably more important. Still more importantly however, the loss of the 
Iranian oil fields and the imposition of an accumulated tax liability on operations in 
Kuwait in 1954 makes the use of trading profit data for the years 1951-54 particularly 
problematic. For this reason two sets of data are provided for the years 1951-54, gross 
trading profit before and after depreciation. The gross trading profit after depreciation 
is technically more consistent, in an accounting framework, as it makes adjustment for 
the impact of changes in capital assets and tax liabilities. However, our concern lies in 
distinguishing between developments occurring within the industry over time and the 
specific impact of the nationalisation on AIOC. Therefore gross trading profit before 
depreciation for the years 1951-4 provides a more reliable proxy measure of 
profitability for the counter-factual case of AIOC retaining its Iranian operations.
Despite these difficulties, it is clear from Figure 2.4 that the company was able 
to boost its profits in real terms over the period, as a whole, even after taking into 
account the difficulties caused by the nationalisation of its major oil fields in Iran 
between 1951-54 (see below).87 Real gross profits were still higher in 1952 than they
85 Ibid.. Appendix 1, p.523 for a discussion on the limitations of the company 
accounts. Discussions with Jim Bamberg suggest that firm conclusions cannot be 
drawn from the company accounts in this period.
86 Nationalisation in 1951 saw sales fall 9.6% (from 39.8m tons in 1950 to 36m tons in 
1951) yet the consolidated balance sheet suggests that gross trading profits, after 
depreciation, fell 44% (from £85.7m in 1950 to £47.7m in 1951) whereas if 
depreciation is excluded the fall was 17% (to £71.4m). B.P. Annual Report and 
Accounts for the years 1950-52 and Bamberg, op.cit.. table 20.1, p.515
87 A price index for plant and machinery is used in Figure 2.4 to allow for 
comparison between the evidence presented here and that contained within 
Bamberg’s official history.
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had been in 1949, depreciation apart, despite the loss of the company’s Iranian oil 
fields one year earlier.88
Figure 2.4 AIOC Real Gross Profits £m (1952 prices)
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It is also possible to gauge the success of the post-war strategy followed by 
AIOC from Figure 2.5. Against a background of falling profit margins AIOC and other 
major companies were able to avoid the ‘struggle for markets’ which had been 
characteristic of the interwar years. It also appears that the companies were able to 
reduce, although not remove, the wide fluctuations in profit margins in these years.
The establishment of a market structure facilitating international co-operation 
between oligopolistic firms did not mean that firms could simply enjoy monopoly 
profits in a passive way. Firms had continually to strive to change their methods of 
operation in order to maintain a stable market structure.
88 This is still true even if a GDP or retail price index is used. See Appendix 2 for the 
results using alternative price indices.
106
Figure 2.5
Index of AIOC Real Gross Profits per ton of Crude Oil 
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Monopoly profits reflected a Schumpeterian process whereby oil majors had to 
run to stand still. In particular, companies were forced to adapt to a market 
environment characterised by falling profit margins. While monopoly profits are 
associated with higher prices, some evidence on the impact on price changes after anti­
trust cases suggests that horizontal price fixing was arranged to ensure lower prices.89 
One reason behind such a development may have been the creation of a barrier to entry 
for new competitors. Although in the case of AIOC, it should be added that, the profits 
it derived throughout the period were so high that it never required external financing 
for investment.
One of the new strategies AIOC developed within this environment was in the 
utilisation of refined oil products in chemical manufacturing. British Petroleum 
Chemicals was set up and operated plant on the Grangemouth refinery site with the 
intention of creating chemical products for sale in new markets. AIOC also entered into 
a joint venture with the Distillers Company in 1947, after a failed attempt to link up 
with ICI, in order to further develop its chemical manufacturing capabilities.90
89 M.F. Sproul, ‘Antitrust and Prices’, Journal of Political Economy. No.4, Vol.101, 
1993.
90 B.P. 8651, letter from Lord McGowan to Sir William Fraser, 31st July 1947.
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Oil companies also focused more closely upon the retailing of products such as 
motor spirit to consumers. Prior to 1950 petrol stations were owned by independent 
proprietors and had to be approved by the Motor Agents Association, MAA, before the 
national oil companies would supply them with branded products. Oil companies 
themselves owned few stations, preferring to supply individual traders and providing 
staff training through the ownership of a small number of outlets. Wholesale and retail 
prices were fixed and price competition was controlled through the Motor Trades 
Association, the MAA and the oil companies.91 The advantage of such a situation for 
the oil companies was that prices could be maintained through the application of ‘As- 
Is’ principle into the retail market and products could be sold in a large number of 
sites.92 Oil companies avoided a strategy of forward vertical integration directly into 
retailing because the large number of outlets and the (as yet, small) markets made 
turnover of products too low for large scale investment. With the ending of petrol 
rationing in 1950, oil companies moved rapidly towards exclusive dealing, or solus,
Q <5
agreements with petrol stations for the supply of products. By 1953 at least 80% of 
petrol retailers had entered into solus agreements with suppliers.94 Solus agreements, 
originating in the United States, enabled oil companies to gain economies of scale by 
reducing the number of deliveries while at the same time increasing the quantity 
supplied. Solus agreements also allowed oil companies to increase their advertising 
impact through the display of company signs. In return oil companies provided rebates 
on purchases, free training for staff and improvement loans to retailers. A third and
91 Federal Trades Commission, op.cit.. pp.311-20.
92 Ibid.. p.320.
93 Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, Report on the Supply of 
Petrol to Retailers in the United Kingdom, pp.30-9, (1967).
94 Ibid., p.20.
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final motivation of the solus arrangement was to prevent the return of independent 
retailers using cheaper unbranded products, as had occurred with Russian petrol in the 
1930s. As a result by 1954 only 12.7% of all sites were both independently owned and 
supplied, with the majority of these sites equipped with only one pump.95 Consumer 
sales of motor spirit in Britain by 1954 became dominated by the creation of larger 
designated sites with three or more pumps primarily for the sale of petrol. There were 
36,404 sites throughout the British Isles, 16,326 (45%), containing three or more 
pumps. Shell-Mex & B.P. directly controlled, through tied agents, 7,696, or 47% of 
these.96
From 1953 Shell-Mex & B.P. started a new strategy of direct ownership of 
sites. In 1955 the company opened a new petrol station in Reading which was of the
Q7modem design we know today. The company provided leases to the tenants of the 
sites and tied the site directly to the company for the sale of products through solus 
agreements.
This strategy evolved from the United States, where the 1949 Supreme Court 
anti-trust case against Standard Oil of California and six other oil companies outlawed 
exclusive dealing agreements. Instead of stations retaining independence through the 
adoption of ‘split-pump’ arrangements, whereby many companies’ products would be 
sold, oil companies moved rapidly to direct ownership of outlets.98 In Britain in 1955 
the government refused to mount a Monopolies Commission investigation into the
95 B.P. 7446, table 3.10.
96 Ibid.
97 See Times. 17th June 1955.
See Y.J. Lin, ‘The Dampening of Competition Effect of Exclusive Dealing’, Journal 
of Industrial Economics. 39, 1990, pp. 209-223 and D.P. O’Brien and G. Shaffer, ‘On 
the Dampening-of-Competition Effect of Exclusive Dealing, Journal of Industrial 
Economics. N o.2,1993 pp.215-221.
109
distribution and sales of petrol in Britain." Nevertheless the oil companies adopted a 
strategy of vertical integration towards the market. There are a number of possible 
explanations for this change. While Shell-Mex & B.P. argued there was a need for 
modernisation and injection of capital into the retailing of petrol, oil companies also 
saw in direct ownership a way of pre-empting possible monopoly investigations into 
restrictive dealing arrangements.100 Second, while the long run increase in demand for 
petrol encouraged oil companies to develop new marketing opportunities, through the 
greater control over the distribution and sale of products that direct ownership 
provided, it simultaneously also provided new physical barriers to entry, at a time when 
less integrated firms were beginning to establish themselves. Thus the movement from 
solus agreements to direct ownership in petrol retailing appears to inextricably combine 
elements of governance with efficiency.
The favourable post-war conditions provided the background for a flexible 
approach to the resolution of competitive pressures. This flexibility ensured that 
restrictions upon competitors’ operations could be abandoned, new entrants could be 
accommodated and the majors could move towards direct selling of products to mass 
consumers. Rising demand also allowed the majors to accept changes in British and 
American governments’ post-war oil policy. As a result the history of the industry from 
the end of the Second World War to the mid-nineteen fifties needs to be understood as 
the high point of the history of the majors’ inter-company co-operation and market 
control.
99 See PRO POWE 33/2193, Possible Monopolies Commission investigation into 
Distribution in the oil Industry, 1955.
100 Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, op.cit.. p.56.
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• The Majors under Threat
To say that the years from 1945 to the mid-nineteen fifties represents the high 
point of the majors’ market control is not to suggest that conflict did not emerge. 
Despite the successful liberalisation of exploration within the Red Line area, it was in 
firms’ relationships with governments that the difficulties within the market structuring 
approach faced its most severe difficulties. These difficulties first focused upon 
domestic reconstruction issues, centering upon the impact of shortages of raw 
materials and government attempts to limit their damage. From the early 1950s 
onwards more serious international threats emerged, linked to the political hostility oil 
companies were facing in the Middle East and the emergence of national and non­
integrated or independent oil companies.
• Domestic Threats
The shortages of raw materials such as steel and coal provided the greatest 
problems for the West European economies in the aftermath of the war. Such shortages 
were considered to be both short-term and unavoidable, given the destruction and 
dislocation caused by war. As noted above the fall in demand for oil products 
anticipated by the oil companies proved to be only a short-term phenomenon and by 
1947 the British economy was already facing a shortfall of oil supplies by some
200,000 tons.101
The shortage of oil was a major problem for the British government and in 
response the government pressurised both AIOC and Shell to provide extra supplies. 
Conflict between the companies and the British government arose in these early post­
101 Bamberg, op.cit.. p.319.
I l l
war years over these requests and over AIOC and Shell’s continued supply of oil to 
other nations. AIOC claimed that to divert supplies from foreign countries to Britain 
would undermine its commercial position in overseas markets.102 However, to what 
extent was this ‘shortage’ of oil a deliberate policy of AIOC to maintain price levels in 
a sellers’ market? or a result of the after-effects of the war?
In 1949 AIOC estimates of its oil requirements for the following five years, 
allowing for a 4.5% annual increase, suggested demand would increase (see Table 2.1) 
from 39.6 million tons in 1950 to 53.5 million by 1954. Crude oil production was split 
between Iran, Kuwait and Iraq Petroleum Company, IPC, with Iran providing almost 
70% (see Table 2.2) of supplies. Yet the cmde oil availability from Iran (see Table 2.3) 
was in all years far in excess of the actual production target set. Iranian production 
estimated never rose above 85% of the fields’ capacity.
This point is reinforced when we consider that, when AIOC lost its Iranian oil 
fields in 1951 it had replaced the lost production with oil from Kuwait and IPC within 
two years.103 When Iranian oil again came on stream, the company was able to achieve 
a new record level of sales in 1956 of 56 million tons, exceeding the 1950 high by 14.5 
million tons.104 AIOC recognised the excess productive capacity of its oil fields, stating 
in 1949 that there is ‘no necessity for any major alteration to our crude oil policy.’105 
Therefore we can conclude that there was no shortage of crude oil.
102 Ibid., pp.321-3.
103 B.P. 72322, Production Department Report 1952.
104 B.P., Our Industry, p.413.
105 B.P. 91002, Forward Programme 1950-54, 8 September 1949, p.2
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Table 2.1.
Estimated Anglo Iranian Oil Company Crude Oil Requirements 1950-54 (M tons).106
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
Product Requirements 27.2 28.6 30.2 31.4 32.5
Crude oil sales 9.0 10.2 16.9 17.0 17.0
Crude to meet Product 
Requirements
30.6 32.1 33.9 35.3 36.5
* TOTAL (M tons) 
crude oil requirements
39.6 42.3 50.8 52.3 53.5
* Total is given by the addition of rows two and three
Table 2.2
Estimated Anglo Iranian Crude Oil Production bv Region 1950-54 (M tons).107
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
Iran 28.5 30.5 34.5 36.5 38.5
Kuwait 10.4 11.3 11.3 11.3 11.3
IPC 2.6 4.4 4.5 5.2 5.2
Total (M tons) 41.5 46.2 50.3 53.0 55.0
Table 2.3
Estimated Iranian Crude Oil Availability 1950-53 (M tons).108
1950 1951 1952 1953
Availability 33.0 35.0 40.5 43.0
Desirable Capacity 35.0 37.5 39.5 42.0
106 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
107 Ibid., p.2.
108 B.P. 72339, Forward Programme Statement on Crude Availability 22 May 1950.
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With regard to refining however, AIOC was, prior to 1950, already running 
plant to its limits and would be facing a shortfall by 1953 (See Table 2.4). The ‘oil 
shortage’ problem for both the British economy and AIOC lay not in the extraction of 
crude oil but in its transportation and refinement into useable products. This was 
AIOC’s long-term weakness as a company: it had increasingly become a major 
producer and supplier of crude oil but had never created the extensive refining and 
sales networks necessary to fully utilise its upstream capacity. This had been one 
reason for AIOC’s adoption of long term supply agreements, such as that with Standard 
Oil (New Jersey) in 1946.109
Table 2.4
Estimated Refinery Capacity 1950-54.110
Million Tons 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
Product Requirements 27.2 28.6 30.2 31.4 32.5
Crude to meet Product 
Requirements
30.6 32.1 33.9 35.3 36.5
Target Capacity 31.5 32.1 34.1 36.1 36.1
Existing Refining Capacity* 30.7 33.5 35.1 34.5 34.5
* Of this the Abadan refinery complex contributed 25 million tons alone.
Some of the shortages in transportation and refining derived from the after­
effects of the war. AIOC lost 44 ships from its tanker fleet of 93 vessels as well as 39 
out of the 102 ships that AIOC controlled for the Ministry of War Transport.111 A
109 Bamberg, op.cit.. pp. 303-5
110 B.P. 72339, op.cit, p.2 and appendix C and B.P. 69283, Memorandum to Finance 
Committee, 8 December 1949, p.l.
111 Longhurst, op.cit.. (1959) p. 127 and B.P. Briefing Paper, The Road from Persia. 
(1993), p.5.
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shortage of shipping existed and (despite AIOC’s own fleet expanding to 139 ships by
1950) the company was forced to commit a further £20m expenditure on shipping
between 1950-54.112 This expenditure represented one of the company’s major
investment programmes, accounting for 12.2% of the total investment programme of 
1 1
£ 164.7m. In 1950 the capital expenditure allowed for shipping was only exceeded by 
that of refining.114
However, in terms of shortages of refining capacity, the war cannot be singled 
out as the major causal factor. By 1947 a realisation had developed that a rapid long­
term rise in demand for oil products was occurring. The Marshall Aid Planning Group 
for the European Zone estimated that the demand for oil would rise from its 1946 level 
of 33m tons in 1946 to a minimum of 43m tons by 1947, 59m tons by 1949 and 69m 
tons by 1951. The rise in demand would require an extra 30-40m tons of refining 
capacity.115 The key factors in the shortage of refining capacity lay with the 
unexpectedly rapid rise in demand for refined oil products, in particular the 20m tons 
increase in United States demand, which itself exceeded total British consumption!116 
This increase, combined with the lack of strength in AIOC’s downstream operations, 
was the cause of the shortage in refining as much as the effects of war. It was also this 
background that brought AIOC into further conflict with the British government over 
steel allocations and the construction of new refining capacity.
As a refining plant would take four years to come on stream, AIOC clearly had 
an urgent need for raw materials such as steel and manufactured plant. Much of the
112 Bamberg, op.cit.. p.291.
113 B.P.69283, Five Year Capital Expenditure 1949.
114 Ibid., Total annual capital expenditure cap was set at £30m with shipping allocated 
£6m.
115 B.P.72339, Forward Requirements, 17 November 1947.
116 PRO T 236/1314, Cabinet Production Committee, PC(47)24, 10th December 1947.
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manufactured plant would need to come from the United States, as they held a 
technological lead in such equipment. The oil industry’s consumption of steel and
^re­
importation of dollar manufactures wib inevitably going to create an area of conflict
between the companies and government. In September 1947 the steel allocation to the
oil industry was limited to 800,000 tons per annum, of which 500,000 tons (rising to
600,000) was to come from United Kingdom sources.117 AIOC complained bitterly
that its steel allocation was barely enough to maintain existing operations. G.H. Coxon,
the Director of the Central Planning Department for AIOC, maintained that efforts to
increase refining capacity were being ‘nullified by our complete inability to get the
necessary permits from government.’118 However, was it really the case that the oil
companies were singled out for particularly harsh treatment?
Government ministers and civil servants generally supported the oil companies 
in their demands for raw materials, recognising the role the oil industry could play in 
providing valuable export earnings. This recognition can even be said to have extended 
as far as the Treasury itself, who were prepared to sanction an increase in imports of 
semi-manufactured goods from the United States in order to promote domestic 
refining.119 Unofficially the oil companies were also informed that government would 
rather the companies themselves prioritised investment programmes and that their 
decision would be supported.120 This was a suggestion rejected by AIOC, but shows 
that government was not opposed to oil company expansion, merely that a shortage of 
steel was a fact that could not be ignored. Similarly when in 1948 government worries
117 Ibid., 5th September 1947 and Bamberg, op.cit.. p.311.
118B.P. 72339, op.cit., p.2.
119 PRO T 236/1314, op.cit., Overseas Steel Programme for the Oil Industry, 29th 
October 1947, p.2.
120 B.P. 72339, op.cit., p.2.
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over oil supplies increased the steel allocator for the Petroleum Division in the Ministry 
of Fuel and Power suggested to both AIOC and Shell that it would be ‘an excellent
1 *71opportunity to press again for a higher allocation of steel to the oil industry.’ The 
view that the oil industry was favourably treated is reinforced when we consider that 
shipbuilders were also prioritised in steel allocations and that the oil industry was the 
major private purchaser of shipping in the post-war period.
While the oil industry was favourably treated there were nevertheless three real 
reasons for conflict over steel allocations with government. The first was the massive 
projected increase in production of crude oil by the companies. The Ministry of Fuel 
and Power oil expansion programme suggested that British companies’ crude oil 
production would increase from 54 million tons in 1947 to 100 million tons by 1954, 
requiring 3.8 million tons of steel for production purposes alone. The Treasury 
considered this to be ‘quite fantastic’ and were opposed to an expansion on such a large 
scale.122
The second, and most important, disagreement between the government and 
AIOC lay in the companies' use of steel. After the war Britain became a large net 
exporter of steel, averaging some 1.68m ingot tons from 1946-55 compared with under 
0.5m ingot tons in the decade before the war.123 Central to government thinking was 
the need to increase exports of finished goods in order to earn as much foreign 
currency, especially dollars, as possible.124 As a result the exporting of steel was 
considered less favourably than when used domestically. The oil companies, in
121 Ibid., Note of meeting between the Petroleum Division and H.E. Snow, 14 May 
1948, p.2.
122 PRO T 236/1314, Cabinet Investment Programme, 5th September 1947.
123 Bum, op.cit.. p.272.
124 PRO T 236/1314, op.cit., Note to Chairman from G.H. Coxon 17th November 
1947, p.2.
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particular, faced criticisms on this issue. In October 1947 the steel allocator rejected a 
requested quarterly increase to 153,000 tons to the Petroleum Division and instead 
reduced the allocation of 138,000 tons to 133,000 tons per quarter, or 532,000 tons per 
annum.125 The reason behind this cut was that almost all the steel allocated to the oil 
industry was being used outside Britain and as a result the Treasury argued for a limit 
of 100,000 tons per quarter on the allocation to the Petroleum Division available for 
export.126
Conflict between government and oil companies over the exporting of steel
c lS
w ^  not unique to Britain. In the United States export restrictions were introduced in 
1947 and as a result Standard Oil (New Jersey) was unable to gain steel for the 
expansion of its Creole operations in Venezuela.127 U.S. export restrictions also had the 
effect of removing the possibility of importing extra steel into Britain from the U.S. to 
satisfy the shortages and resolve this conflict.
The final area of conflict over steel allocations was again linked to the issue of 
how allocations should be used rather than the quantity allocated. As early as 1945 
government had been seeking to boost domestic refining to save sterling expenditure, 
create both direct and indirect employment and boost dollar earnings through exports 
of refined products.128 However it was not until 1947-8 that the companies themselves 
became convinced of the advantages of domestic refining.129 The government’s aim to 
increase domestic refining meant an increase of capacity from 4.8 million tons 
throughput to 20 million tons between 1947 and 1952, with a total steel requirement of
125 Ibid., and Bamberg, op.cit.. p.311.
126 PRO T 236/1314, op.cit., 5th September 1947 and 29th October 1947.
127 Larson, Knowlton and Popple, op.cit.. p.668 and p.671.
128 PRO POWE 33/1478, Post-War Planning; Home Oil Refining, 13 March 1945,
pp. 1-6.
129 Bamberg, op.cit.. p.289
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330,000 tons.130 Once agreement was made between the government and the oil 
companies steel allocations were made on top of the oil industry’s existing allocation 
and priority was given for its delivery. Authorisation for the use of reserves was also 
provided, even though it was suggested that the there was little chance of these projects 
being started by 1948.131
AIOC’s decision to build a refinery plant in Kent with capacity of 2 million 
tons per year for the supply of customers in the South East was chosen for a number of 
reasons. First, although oil companies preferred to build refineries near to the area of 
crude production, the Abadan refinery, with its capacity of 25 million tons per year, 
was judged both politically and strategically to be a ‘considerable placing of eggs in 
one basket’.132 Second, Abadan was already facing extensive work to improve the 
quality and diversity of products in order to satisfy changes in demand. Finally, while 
AIOC was considering a maritime site for a new refinery, the possibility of an 
immediate start for such a project was slim. Therefore a commercially sized plant 
which coincided with the demand in the region and could be expanded if a maritime 
site was postponed appeared as a rational decision for AIOC. A Kent refinery would 
also be seen by the government as AIOC acquiescing in their calls for increasing 
domestic refining capacity.
The key factor in the difficulties AIOC faced in gaining steel allocations was 
the limits imposed upon construction, given the international shortages of raw 
materials rather than the difficulty importing steel from the United States, assuming it 
had been available, would cause for the balance of payments. Steel shortages certainly
130 PRO T 236/1314, op.cit., Annex B, 4th September 1947.
131 Ibid., 5th September 1947.
132 B.P.72339, AIOC Policy Document, p. 10.
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delayed AIOC’s investment plans, but these were seen as short-term problems caused 
by the redirection of the economy towards peacetime. These were problems facing all 
the majors both in the U.S. and Britain.133 Nevertheless, the oil industry fared 
remarkably well and definitely benefited from its links to government. The refinery 
expansion project was an outstanding success, raising capacity from 17.6% of total 
consumption in 1947 to 101% by 1952.134 The oil companies’ change to favour 
refining close to markets proved important to achieving this success. AIOC placed the 
refining expansion at the top of its capital investment programme, accounting for 
£81.3m, or 49%, of capital total expenditure between 1950-54. The Abadan and Kent 
refinery projects were to be the most significant.
While post-war shortages may have created difficulties in the relationship 
between oil companies and governments, these were not significant enough to disturb 
the balance within markets which the majors were able to achieve. In fact the slowing 
down of investment plans and restrictions upon supply may also have slowed down the 
emergence of the more significant international threats to the market structure created 
in the post-war settlement.
• Internationally
The flexibility of approach afforded the oil majors by the rapid growth of 
demand certainly provided them with the ability to strive for a balance between 
demand and supply. AIOC could allow the entrance of CFP or Caltex into the 
Australian market. However, in doing so the majors were sowing the seeds for a further 
crisis within the industry.
133 Larson, Knowlton and Popple, op.cit.. pp.668-671
134 B.P. 7446, table 1.10.
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Pressures were building up which threatened the majors’ dominance of supply. 
The growing demands of economic nationalism, from opposition movements within oil 
exporting economies, combined with demands for greater competition and a reduction 
of restrictions, from oil importing Western economies, were to threaten the post-war 
settlement within the industry. In so doing it was also to highlight the degree to which 
the oil majors could gain support from their respective governments. Nowhere were 
these dangers more starkly brought home than in the nationalisation of the Iranian oil 
fields in 1951, the U.S. anti-trust case in 1952 and the challenge to the majors’ 
regulation of the European market after 1954.
The relevance of these events for this study is to what degree was AIOC, or 
were the oil majors generally, commercially-motivated organisations?, or were they 
simply private “ministries” for their respective Western governments? Following on 
from the answer to the above is the question, to what extent was the successful 
structuring of the oil industry a result of the combination of interests between strictly 
commercial oil firms and Western governments or the result of government structuring 
of markets? And, finally, how ‘exceptional’ does this make the oil industry?
In 1951 AIOC’s most important oil fields and its massive Abadan refinery 
complex were nationalised, by the Iranian government headed by Muhammad 
Musaddiq, following nationalist agitation involving the pro-soviet Tudeh Party. In 
response, an international boycott of Iranian oil was introduced that lasted until 1954, 
when AIOC regained access to its lost oil after a military coup.
135 For the nationalisation see Bamberg, op.cit.. pp.410-436, F. Fesharaki, 
Development of the Iranian Oil Industry. (New York 1976) and C.T. Rand, Making 
Democracy Safe for Oil. (Boston USA 1975).
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AIOC was seen within the Iranian nationalist movement to be part and parcel 
of the British government and as such it became the focus for nationalist propaganda. 
AIOC itself felt unjustly portrayed as part of the British government. The company 
maintained that it had not used ‘duress’ to obtain its 1933 concession and that, rather 
than exploiting the country’s natural resources, it had been part and parcel of creating 
the new wealth within the country. AIOC had not only invested £95.8m in Iran 
between 1924-50 but had paid over £113.9m in royalties from 1913-50.137 On top of 
this the company was also criticised by the British government for not doing more to 
reach an earlier settlement with the nationalist movement.138 AIOC felt it was stuck 
between a rock and a hard place.
The guaranteed independence of AIOC from the British government ensured
that the company increasingly saw itself as a strictly commercial enterprise, as opposed
to an arm of the civil service. Bamberg, convincingly, documents that, while under
Cadman (Chairman from 1927-41) the company was prepared to act as a diplomatic
representative of the government, under Fraser (Chairman from 1941-56) the company
1took on a more hard-nosed commercial attitude. This change in ethos ensured that, 
as Bamberg highlights, Fraser incurred hostility, if not contempt, from not only the 
British government but also from within the United States administration.140 Behind 
this clash of personalities lay a real issue. AIOC was struggling to achieve a balance
136 B.P. 9233, The Company’s Interest in Iran, p.5, 2 July 1951.
137 Ibid., 20 September 1951.
138 PRO POWE 33/1968, Letter from D.A.H. Wright (Foreign Office) to V.S. Butler 
(Ministry of Fuel and Power) for an example of the criticism of AIOC’s tendency to 
‘run Persia too much from London’, 29th May 1952.
139 Bamberg, op.cit.. p53 and pp.326-8.
140 Ibid.. pp.326-8 and p.463.
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between supply and demand in a period in which the international system of regulation 
for the industry was to face a series of fundamental challenges.
The independence from the British government that the company felt it had was 
most clearly stated in its post-war policy document. This explicitly spelt out that its 
central concern lay with maintaining its own relationship with Iran at all costs:
‘From the company’s point of view...the position of Iran [is] unique.’
‘A clear distinction must always be drawn between those considerations 
that are paramount and those that are secondary. The position of Iran is 
obviously paramount and, wherever a conflict of interests arises, must 
always be given precedence.’141
The company’s attitude to the ‘requirements of the British Empire’ were 
explicitly stated to be of ‘secondary’ importance.142 This document was written 
exactly two years after the conflict with the British government over the diversion of 
fuel oil from other European economies, when AIOC, for fear of losing market share, 
was refusing to satisfy the ‘requirements of the British’ government. The British 
government had been crucial for the creation of AIOC. Not only had it purchased 
shares, but it had been instrumental in creating a distribution company for AIOC 
products with the sale of a tanker fleet to the company. On top of this the government, 
through the Admiralty, was also a guaranteed market for the company’s products. 
Nevertheless AIOC took a strictly commercial attitude and saw its primary concern as 
the continuation of the Iranian supply concession rather than satisfying the demand for 
products. AIOC’s focus on supply rather than demand can be said to have also placed 
the requirements of the British government ‘second’ to those of Iran.
141 B.P. 72339, Forward Planning, 17.11.49 pp.5-9.
142 Ibid., f.S-S.
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Could AIOC have reached a settlement with the nationalist movement in 1951? 
The company was certainly well aware of the increasing militancy of the nationalist 
movement symbolised by the growth of the communist Tudeh Party in Iran and better 
informed than at least some in government of the strength of nationalist support. 
Whereas the Admiralty thought Iranians should feel ‘gratitude’ to the British, AIOC 
recognised that the feeling in Tehran was that ‘the British government had been getting 
far too much out of Persia.’143 Two of the issues that caused particular problems for 
AIOC were that the British government was receiving more in taxes and dividend 
payments than the Iranian government and second that the Admiralty maintained a 
contract with AIOC to buy oil at discounted prices.144 AIOC also recognised as early as 
1948 that a re-negotiation of the 1933 concession might be necessary following the 
Venezuelan agreement granting a 50/50 split of profits between the government and 
the oil companies.145
The company policy was, without doubt, to reach an agreement if one had been 
possible. In Fraser, a more strictly commercially minded Chairman, was a man who 
would certainly have taken a more internationalist perspective than Cadman and would 
have been more likely to sever the links with the British government if a deal with the 
nationalist movement had been feasible.
Such a scenario, however, was unrealistic, given both the conditions within Iran 
itself and the institutional framework of the industry as a whole. The failure to pass the 
Supplemental Agreement after 1949 lay less with the Iranian government opposition to
143 B.P. 8334 Meeting between N.A Gass and Admiralty 13 December 1948.
144 Ibid., p.2, AIOC’s contract with the Admiralty to supply cheap fuel oil became 
intensely embarrassing for AIOC when the Admiralty began selling excess fuel oil at 
below market prices.
145 B.P. 8334, meeting between Sir Wilfred Eady of the Treasury and Sir William 
Fraser 9 August 1948.
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it than with the recognition that, given the growing strength of the nationalist 
movement, the Iranian government could not reach an agreement without signing its 
own political death warrant. That this is so can be seen from Musaddiq’s assertion that 
the Iranian National Front government would have paid compensation for 
nationalisation if the pressure on him had not been so great.146 Therefore even if the 
Supplemental Agreement had been passed, it would probably not have prevented the 
nationalisation measures.
Not only was the nationalist movement unwilling to reach an agreement but for 
AIOC any agreement removing them from Iran would have threatened the whole basis 
of international regulation and control which the oil majors had long fought to 
maintain. Industry regulation was based upon the control of the market for both crude 
oil and petroleum products, predicated on vertical integration and exclusive control 
over the extraction of crude oil. The central issue at stake was not 
company/government profit sharing but the control over the extraction of oil. After the 
Aramco consortium reached a 50:50 profit sharing deal with the Saudi government in 
1950, oil company officials conceded that even a 15:85 split favouring the producer 
country’s government would still have been profitable.147
The essential point was that to have conceded control of crude oil to the nation 
where it was extracted would have created in one stroke instability throughout the 
industry, by making even the Venezuelan 50:50 agreement look like highway robbery, 
by the oil companies, to the nationalist movements of producer nations.
146 Rand, op.cit.. p. 138.
147 PRO POWE 33/2105, Middle East Oil Policy. G.C. Pebham to Anthony Eden 
No.41(E) 1534/20/54 14th March 1954.
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Previous attempts at removing oil companies’ control over the extraction of 
crude oil, such as the nationalisation of the Mexican oil fields in March 1938, had led 
to boycotts by the oil companies for the very reason that the viability of a strategy of 
vertical integration, pursued by the fully integrated major oil companies, would have 
been gravely threatened. A Shell director recognised this when referring to the Mexican 
nationalisation, stating that removing the company’s control ‘would jeopardise the 
whole structure of international trade and the security of foreign investment’.148 In the 
case of Iran, AIOC’s Director of operations within Iran was surely correct when he 
stated that ‘If Mossadeqh were allowed to get away with this [nationalisation]...Other 
Mossadeqhs would arise and what would be left of the fabric of the oil industry?’.149
As a result of the impasse, AIOC found itself with a company policy of 
supporting a ‘strong government’ in Iran before 1951. It was even suggested to AIOC 
that they should contemplate military occupation, with the setting up of a new colony 
surrounding the oil fields, populated by refugees displaced from the newly formed 
Indian and Pakistani states.150 Yet it was this strong government policy that had linked 
AIOC to a discredited regime and helped ensure AIOC became a target for the 
nationalist opposition.
The second issue which threatened the international regulation of the oil 
industry was the anti-trust investigations, initiated by the United States Justice 
Department, between 1947 and 1952. The oil majors were accused of over-charging
148 Quoted in Yergin, op.cit.. p.276.
149 Quoted in Bamberg, op.cit.. p.464. There are two English translations for the 
National Front leaded name.
150 B.P. 8334, letter N.A. Gass to Sir William Fraser, 15 November 1948, for ‘stronger 
government’ and B.P.9233, letter from Hollis Burrows to N.A. Gass, 3 January 1951, 
for military occupation.
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the European Co-operation Agency, by $67m, for oil imports into Europe.151 While 
price fixing in international markets fell outside the jurisdiction of the U.S. anti-trust 
laws, funding for the ECA came from Marshall Aid, and hence it was the American 
tax-payer who was being over-charged, which in turn brought the issue within the remit 
of the U.S. anti-trust legislation. The U.S. government’s Mutual Security Agency 
further maintained that oil imports into the United States realised a net price some 30% 
lower than those in Europe, leading the anti-trust investigators to further suggest that 
the majors were also harming domestic producers through the undercharging for 
imports into the U.S.152 As part of the investigation, the Justice department issued a 
subpoena ordering the companies to disclose internal documents.
Unlike the Iranian case, the company clearly wished to be closely linked to the 
British government in order to frustrate the Justice Department’s demands for access to 
company records.153 The British Government ordered the oil companies not to pass on 
any documents to the US, or disclose any material, without first gaining their approval. 
Eventually the Justice Department subpoena of AIOC was quashed on the grounds that 
‘for the purposes of the case, (the company was) indistinguishable from the 
government of Great Britain.’154 In this instance the government/company relationship 
proved extremely important in preventing any disruption to the industry’s structure.
The key to British government support for AIOC was not ownership of shares 
but the strategic role oil played in creating a collective security in the face of the 
emerging cold war. The British government not only refused to allow AIOC and Shell 
to pass documents to the United States Justice Department but it also gave similar
151 Financial Times. 27th August 1952.
152 Wall Street Journal. 22nd August 1952.
153 B.P.71283 and B.P. 35984, on cartel allegations.
154 Times, 16 December 1952.
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instructions to the subsidiary's of all the United States oil companies operating in 
Britain, including Esso, Vacuum and Regent.155 The oil companies were extremely 
eager to gain this cover from the British Government even though, on their own 
admission, the documents requested were ‘fairly innocuous’.156 Government support 
went so far as to cover not only 100% U.S.-owned subsidiaries, such as Esso, but 
subsidiaries which were not even mentioned by the original subpoena. The scope of 
these restrictions was such that the British Government was in the incredible position 
of preventing a U.S parent company from examining its own subsidiaries’ files! Not 
surprisingly the British Government recognised that the instruction ‘admittedly has no
1 ^7force of law in an American Court’.
The U.S.-owned firms also gained support from the U.S. State Department, 
with the result that the original anti-trust case was abandoned. The conclusion to be 
drawn from this is that share ownership was not the deciding factor in the ‘exceptional’ 
government/oil company relationship. Instead the ‘exceptional’ relationship which 
AIOC enjoyed with the British Government should be understood as indicative of a 
relationship between oil companies generally and their primary government.
Precisely what can be concluded from the nationalisation and anti-trust events 
in terms of the linkage between government and oil industry? It is the contention of 
Nowell that oil companies proved successful in substituting oil companies’ interests for 
the interests of the nation state, with the result that consumers lose out, for example 
through higher product prices. States became subordinate players in the rationalising of
155 See Appendix Three for text of H.M.G.’s letter to US oil companies.
156 PRO POWE 33/1857, notes of meeting between Vacuum Oil Co. and Ministry for 
Fuel and Power, Treasury and the Foreign Office 7th October 1952.
157 PRO POWE 33/1857, letter from J.H. Brook from the Ministry of Fuel and Power 
to R.L. Sich, 25th November 1952.
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the international oil market and this subordination was at its most successful in cases 
where the state identified with a national firm. Further Nowell suggests that states 
could be encouraged to wage conflict with other states with the aim of winning ‘special 
privileges’, although these privileges and the institutional arrangements for the sharing 
of these privileges, such as cartels, were ephemeral and open to capture by other 
interest groups.158 In Nowell’s case study of the French oil industry before 1940 he 
suggests that what has been described as ‘etatism’, should be considered to be the 
successful co-opting of the French state in the interests of the emergent French oil 
industry in a process of transnational structuring. The high point of this transnational 
structuring came in the successful creation of the Compagnie Frangaise des Petroles 
and its subsequent development to become what is often referred to as the eighth 
sister.159
An alternative view, at first glance, is presented by Painter, who suggests that 
the unifying theme of both the U.S. independent, domestic, producers and the major 
multinational oil companies was the limitation of the government’s role in foreign oil 
affairs.160 United States governments were content to rely upon the U.S. majors to 
protect and promote the national interest; the U.S. government would limit itself to 
preventing or reversing nationalisation by producer countries. This resulted in a 
‘reliance on the major oil companies as vehicles of the national interest in foreign oil’ 
which in turn ‘facilitated control of the world oil economy by the most powerful 
private interests.’161 Whether or not Nowell and Painter’s views can be interpreted as 
compatible with one another derives from the definition of the ‘national interest’.
158 Nowell, op.cit.. p.43
159 Ibid.. p. 170.
160 Painter, op.cit.. p.203.
161 Ibid.. p.208.
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Nowell is careful to avoid defining the national interest - preferring to suggest that it 
represents the interests of a collection of rival interest groups. Thus for Nowell ‘Much 
of politics is argument over what constitutes the national interest. There is no 
answer.’162 Transnational structuring becomes a broad, international interpretation of 
rent-seeking behaviour.163 In Painter’s approach the national interest directed 
government to pursue an ‘Open Door’ policy for access to oil as this ‘could provide a 
model for other raw materials and would best serve U.S. interests because U.S. 
companies were favourably positioned to gain advantage from equality of access.'164 If 
the national interest included, as U.S. President F.D. Roosevelt and the U.S. Petroleum 
Administration believed in 1943, the ‘securing for American nationals access to the 
world’s oil resources’165, then Nowell and Painter’s views can clearly be combined. 
Such an interpretation would suggest the relationship between company and 
government was essentially co-operative rather than one to be understood in terms of 
institutional capture.
In contrast, Bamberg contends that, while the oil companies strove towards 
achieving a highly structured market, they were far from successful. In particular 
AIOC, because of the relative international weakness of the British government and 
hostility from the United States government, suffered greatly to the extent that it 
almost lost all its control over Iranian oil. Thus, for Bamberg, the success of AIOC lay 
in its ability to ‘cope in an unstable and uncertain environment’.166
162 Nowell, op.cit., p. 11.
163 Ibid., p.15.
164 Painter, op.cit.. p.202.
165 Vietor, op.cit.. p.29.
166 Bamberg, op.cit.. p.517.
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The events surrounding the anti-trust investigations lend support to the view 
put forward by Nowell that the oil companies were able to gain support from 
governments to substitute private company interests for more domestic national 
interests considerations. The United States anti-trust legislation was clearly abrogated, 
with the consent of the State Department, on the issue of price fixing for oil sales to 
Europe. European economies and consumers were charged artificially high prices for 
oil while conversely U.S. domestic producers suffered unfair competition from 
artificially low prices. In Painter’s interpretation the excess profits accruing to the oil 
majors would, for the U.S. government, represent a price worth paying for establishing 
its international political and economic hegemony within the Middle East.
Painter’s view that government played no role (outside of the security and 
stability of the Middle East) also needs qualifying. Despite opposition from the un­
integrated independent companies operating within the United States domestic market, 
United States foreign oil policy clearly had a significant impact on domestic oil policy 
considerations.
Similarly the British government, with Cabinet approval, was prepared to issue 
instructions which were highly contentious. The British government could, arguably, 
prevent British owned companies from passing files held in the U.K. to American 
officials, yet it could not legally prevent a 100% foreign owned firm passing files to its 
parent company on the basis that these might then be handed over to a third party. Two 
months before instructions were sent to the U.S.-owned companies operating in Britain 
it was accepted that ‘It is common ground (between the British government and the
167 PRO POWE 33/1857, Cabinet approval for the wording of the instructions was 
given on 30th September 1952. See Letter from J.H. Brook to R.L. Sich, 10th 
October 1952.
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U.S. oil companies Esso, Regent and Vacuum) that there is no pretence of a legal basis 
for requiring an English company to withhold from its associates its ordinary business 
documents and information’.168 That it was widely accepted that these instructions 
were contentious is still further backed up by the knowledge that both the Attorney 
General and the Treasury were both opposed to their use, arguing that, as the subpoena 
was on the US parent firms within the US and not their British subsidiaries, 
international comity was not breached.169
On the anti-trust issue Bamberg’s thesis appears weakest, as it was AIOC and 
Shell that first received government protection against the Justice Department. 
However on AIOC’s permanent loss of access to Iranian oil, Bamberg’s case appears 
stronger. The importance of the nationalisation events in Iran can be gauged by 
Penrose’s parallel with the shock faced by Standard Oil in 1911.170 It can also be 
accepted that the United States government would have sacrificed AIOC if the need 
had arisen. However, AIOC not only maintained its link to Iran, after the CIA-backed 
coup, but also continued to be the largest element in the consortium that took over 
Iranian production in 1954.171
The explanation for this again in part lies with the close links AIOC had with 
the British government. The boycott of Iranian oil, which followed the nationalisation 
measures, saw AIOC work very closely with the British government to ensure its 
effectiveness. In 1951 Iranian oil production ceased, with the exception of a kerosene
168 Ibid., 3rd October 1952.
169 Ibid., Letter from V. Butler to J.H. Brook, 26th November 1952.
170 E.T. Penrose, The Large International Firm in Developing Countries. (1968), p.114.
171 See M.A. Heiss, ‘The United States, Great Britain and the Creation of the Iranian 
Oil Consortium, 1953-1954’, International History Review. N o.3,1994 for details of 
the negotiations leading to AIOC’s return to Iran.
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plant for the domestic market.172 Yet by 1953 the boycott was beginning to be 
undermined. In 1952 Iran supplied $60,000 of oil to Japan and in 1953 after a bartering 
agreement was signed $1.2m of oil was supplied.173 On top of this Italian tankers were 
also known to have been loaded at Abadan.174 The oil deal with Japan was trivial but 
for AIOC any breaking of the boycott could soon turn into abandonment. AIOC 
pressed the British government to enlist United States support for a re-affirmation of 
the boycott and in June it was suggested, by one company official, that the British 
government might ‘seize a Japanese tanker, not necessarily one carrying Persian oil’ to 
highlight the government’s commitment to the boycott.175 Simultaneously, the British 
government was also making plain to the United States by June 1953 that if Musaddiq 
was to be removed by force the British would prefer not to ‘go it alone’.176 British 
government interests in the Middle East lay both with the valuable overseas earnings 
oil companies made to the Treasury and the extensive investment made by companies, 
such as AIOC. It was therefore abundantly clear to the American government that the 
British government’s interests coincided with those of AIOC and it was not prepared 
to see the company abandoned in the dispute.
The second, and most important, reason why AIOC was not sacrificed by the 
United States government on the altar of the fight against communism lies in the link 
AIOC had to other major oil companies. Here an Olsonian analogy is useful. Olson
172 Economist Intelligence Unit, Economic Review of Persia. N o .2 ,1952, p.2.
173 Ibid.. No.6. 1954, table 15.
174 Times. 4th May 1953.
175 PRO POWE 33/2090, Report of discussion between AIOC’s Mr Rice and A.D.M. 
Ross on U.S. and U.K. views on Nationalisation, 19th June 1953.
176 PRO POWE 33/1968, Middle East Oil Policy, 12th June 1953, meeting between 
Mr V.S. Butler & J.H. Brookes (Ministry of Fuel and Power) with E. Moline U.S. 
Petroleum Attache.
133
has suggested that economies grow more slowly where narrow distributional coalitions 
develop over time. In economies undergoing defeat in war, revolution or occupation 
these distributional coalitions are removed allowing the market to operate more 
efficiently which in turn leads to more rapid growth.177 For Olson distributional 
coalitions were initially mainly considered to be political parties and pressure groups, 
but also included trade unions and business organisations.178 However Olson has 
explicitly extended his approach to distributional coalitions at the level of the firm. For 
Olson ‘The general point is that organisations to cartelize markets or to lobby 
governments do not need a majority or even a plurality of the society to obtain their
17Qobjectives’. It can be suggested that the major oil companies represent an Olsonian
distributional coalition and the events between 1951-2 provided a series of Olsonian
shocks to AIOC.180 However, AIOC’s ability to survive Olsonian shocks lay not with
a destruction of a distributional coalition, namely the AlOC/Iranian concession
agreement, but in the continuation of strong distributional coalitions, namely those
1 81between governments and those between the major oil companies. Competitor 
companies and governments were not prepared to see AIOC destroyed: rather they 
worked to ensure that no competitor would gain new crude oil supplies, following the 
nationalisation, through the enforcement of the boycott. After the military coup the oil 
company/government coalition ensured that AIOC not only regained much of the oil
177 See M. Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations. (New Haven, Conn., 1982).
178 Ibid.. p.76.
179 M. Olson, ‘The Devolution of Encompassing Organisations’, (Unpublished paper 
presented at LSE 1995 and in the author’s possession), p.41
180 The five American, one British and one Anglo-Dutch oil companies that made up 
the majors could not be considered to be an encompassing coalition, as neither 
independents, producer nations, nor consumers were able to participate.
181 Note the difference in the shock faced by Standard Oil when it was broken up 
following the anti-trust case of 1911. See E.T. Penrose, op.cit.. p.l 14.
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production it had lost but ensured compensation payments from competitors who 
gained new supplies of Iranian oil.
To continue with the Olsonian language the conclusion to draw would be that 
the non-encompassing distributional coalition of major oil companies foresaw a threat 
to its own existence if one member of the coalition was removed. Profit maximisation, 
by taking advantage of AIOC’s discomfiture, was firmly placed at the bottom of the 
agenda, below the stabilisation of the market and defence of the industry’s’ 
oligopolistic structure. Instead of competing, the distributional coalitions of oil 
companies and their governments acted as part of a coherent and unified group in order 
to maintain international stability, even if this was at the expense of abandoning profit 
maximisation in the short term. The scale of the threat, posed by the spread of 
communism, ensured that even those governments that were attempting to create 
national oil companies in opposition to the majors, such as France and Italy, were 
reluctantly prepared to abide by the boycott of Iran. Significantly, this suggests that 
increases in monopolistic control by non-encompassing distributional coalitions, rather 
than the break-up of distributional coalitions, was important to the continued 
maintenance of a ‘collective security’ based upon access to oil under conditions of 
‘expansion and abundance’.182
We are left therefore with a view of the AIOC and British government link 
which suggests that the company proved very successful in gaining support from 
government for the defence of oil interests. However it was not simply the use of states 
for company interests that was essential in successfully resisting threats to the market
182 PRO POWE 33/1492, op.cit., p.l
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structure. Of greater importance in defending AIOC’s interests in the Middle East and 
against anti-trust investigations was the company’s linkages to the other majors. The 
removal of one player in the oligopolistic structure would have thrown the world oil 
industry into turmoil removing controls over supply and competition. Still more 
worrying would have been the ability of producer nations to wrest control over the 
extraction of oil from the majors, through the breaking of concessionary agreements.
A second weakness in Nowell’s thesis lies in the view AIOC had of its own 
operations. AIOC’s post-war policy document proved wrong in that the Iranian 
concession, despite AIOC’s intentions, ultimately turned out to be of ‘secondary’ 
importance while the link with the British government proved to be of ‘paramount’ 
importance. Iranian oil could be substituted for oil from Kuwait, but without the link to 
the British government AIOC may not have recovered from the Iranian episode and it 
may not have withstood a confrontation with sections of the United States government 
either. Thus Nowell’s view of a world of coherent company activity in which nation 
states are subordinated actors needs qualification.
Finally, it is also clear that over both nationalisation and international oil 
pricing the British and U.S. governments had similar interests to the oil majors. The 
British government had its own interests at heart when it secured the continuation of 
AIOC’s role within Iran. By 1952 Britain for the first time became a net exporter of 
refined products. Exports of capital for the oil industry and dollar oil purchases had 
been the single largest commodity group within the current account deficit in hard 
currency balances between 1946-52, accounting for the £ 1.7b.183 Hence the British
183 Caimcross, Years of Recovery, pp. 79-80 and Bamberg, op.cit.. p. 321.
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government should not be seen simply as an institution captured by monopolistic 
private industry.
The independence of the British government from AIOC is still more clearly 
seen if we consider the conflicts between the company and the government during 
post-war reconstruction. Whether we choose the case of oil shortages and the diversion 
of supplies, the shortages of steel or the move towards domestic refining it is far from 
clear that the British government subordinated the national interest to those of the oil 
companies. Nowell’s thesis appears to be a good deal less secure in the examination of 
more detailed changes within the domestic industry. Indeed it is Bamberg’s thesis that 
these conflicts and the damage done to AIOC show the degree to which the company 
was unable to control events.
The interpretation offered here is that, whether we examine conflicts over 
Iranian nationalisation, U.S. anti-trust investigations or domestic reconstruction, it is 
clear that neither the oil companies nor governments were able to adopt autonomous 
approaches. Both companies and governments, while presenting independent 
viewpoints, were nevertheless mutually dependent upon one another. AIOC would 
have liked to have avoided being so closely linked to the British government within 
Iran and the British government would have liked to have had greater influence over 
AIOC commercial operations, over diverting supplies or refinery investment decisions. 
Yet both sides required support from one another. Thus government must be seen more 
as a partner than a subordinate to the oil companies. Government could achieve success 
when AIOC supported its plans, in particular the move towards domestic refining was 
a remarkable success story under conditions of shortage and post-war reconstruction. 
Equally, however, as the redirection of supplies issue shows, the oil companies were
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able to resist unwarranted government interference unless, as in the case of domestic 
refining, developments began to favour their own interests.
The origins of the success in this period derives, not from the dominance of 
either government or company, but from the realisation that both sets of interests 
required a combined and collaborative response. The benefits of oligopoly, primarily 
control over the balance of supply and demand plus control over the rate of change of 
product prices (see below), derived not from institutional capture but from the co­
operation between government and oil companies.
The relationship between government and AIOC in the post-war era does not 
appear to be exceptional for the oil industry. Shell and U.S. majors were able to 
achieve similar concessions from governments. Still more importantly, however, this 
relationship was not capable by the end of the 1950s of preventing the challenge to the 
structured markets, from within European markets, which the oil majors had so 
carefully maintained.
• European Threats
The strategic importance of oil was not lost on other European nations. France 
and Italy were both keen to create national oil companies for exactly the same reasons 
as the British: guaranteeing of supply, employment opportunities, dollar shortages and 
export earnings were international issues. European governments encouraged the 
development of national oil companies, most notably CFP in France and ENI in Italy. 
Access to supplies for these new national companies was a crucial issue for their 
growth. By the mid 1950s the national companies were able to gain supplies from the
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open market, in particular oil from the non-integrated producing companies within the 
U.S. and from Russia was supplied to European markets.
While agreements could be made with companies such as CFP, who had been 
incorporated into the Middle East agreements, in other European markets price 
competition began to emerge. From an era of relative price comparability across 
Europe, Table 2.5 highlights the diverging pattern of fuel oil prices across the 
European market from the early 1950s.
Within Britain, France & the Netherlands, established national oil companies 
gained support from government for the regulation of supplies and the maintenance of 
product prices. In Italy, however, governments were keen to develop national oil 
companies, and alongside Germany, utilised cheaper imports to challenge the majors’ 
regulation.
By the late 1950s, the ability of the majors to limit supplies to markets was 
again under threat. As Shell recognised in 1962, while a controllable surplus had 
existed in the past, ‘in recent years it had got out of hand with the advent of new 
sources of oil and a large number of new operators’.184 The ability of the majors to 
maintain higher prices within protected markets was also beginning to be questioned. 
In 1961 the cement industry and the Iron and Steel Confederation were complaining 
over the failure of British fuel oil prices to fall in line with other parts of Europe.185 
And in 1962 the Treasury was also moving towards the repeal of limitations upon the
1R6importation of Russian oil.
184 PRO POWE 61/108, Mr. Wilkinson on Shell policy, 25th April 1962.
185 PRO POWE 61/49, D.H. Crofton to J.D. Bryars, 13th July 1961.
186 PRO POWE 61/108, A. MacKay to K.L. Stock, 2nd February 1962.
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Table 2.5
Estimated Fuel Oil Price Index 1954-61(1954=100).
U.K France Germany Italy Netherlands Belgium
1954 100 100 100 100 100 100
1955 102 103 105 102 103 105
1956 112 110 109 112 127 114
1957 138 131 114 112 153 133
1958 116 145 82 107 113 110
1959 118 148 77 93 110 105
1960 122 145 77 86 110 110
1961 139 141 77 86 117 105
Source: PRO POWE 61/108, The Coal Reappraisal Group, CRG 4, 7th February 1962.
Derived from Oil and Gas International and Petroleum Times
With the establishment of new refining and distribution companies, combined 
with the challenge that OPEC, formed in 1960, was to make, the vertically integrated 
oil companies’ system of regulated markets was being undermined. The high point of 
structured markets and control over supplies was nearing an end.187 However, this end, 
it should be stated, was slow coming. Vemon notes that until the early 1970s the seven 
majors continued to produce almost 70% of cmde oil and were also the purchasers of 
approximately 70% of all oil traded internationally.188
187 See R. Vemon, Two Hungry Giants: The United States and Japan in the Quest 
for Oil and Ores. (Cambridge, Mass 1983), pp. 19-37, for the undermining of the 
majors influence after 1960.
188 Ibid.. tables 2.1 & 2.2
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• The Maiors and Oil Pricing
That the major integrated oil companies’ strategy of creating a balance 
between supply and demand through co-operation between firms and governments was 
highly successful may be widely accepted. The U.S. anti-trust case and the British 
Treasury highlighted that significant price variations existed across markets which 
were not explainable in terms of either differences in product quality or regional 
transportation costs. Certainly some, although not all, of this price variation was due to 
government activity, including increased taxation upon oil products, in Britain, by the 
early 1960s to support coal prices. In 1961 The Times also suggested that government 
had used ‘persuasion’ to prevent companies from reducing fuel oil prices.189
Government intervention in price determination was not however the whole 
story. Penrose maintains that ‘crude oil ‘prices’ in the post-war period up to the late 
1950s were more related to the internal requirements of the international firms than to 
conditions in any free market for crude oil’.190 In the nine years to 1956, the average 
annual posted (export) price of Saudi Arabian crude f.o.b. Ras Tanura changed in only 
four years and f.o.b. prices in the U.S. Gulf oil only changed in one of the nine years.191 
Even more remarkably price stability within the regulated U.S. market after 1934 
meant that there were only 24 price variations for crude oil in the 38 years up to 1972.
The explanation for such price stability, Penrose suggests, lies in the fact that 
crude oil prices reflected transfer prices within organisations rather than expressions of 
market competition. By the 1960s seven companies controlled 75% of total crude oil 
production outside the U.S. and the Eastern bloc.192 The oil companies were able to
189 Times. 22nd March 1961.
190 Penrose, op.cit.. p. 186 and p. 190
191 Ibid, p.189.
192 Ibid, p.88.
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control not only prices but also the expansion of crude oil supplies onto the market. 
Penrose points out that crude oil prices and supply varied only marginally during the 
events between 1951-4, when Iranian production ceased and then re-entered the market 
(see Figures 2.3 and 2.6).193 Penrose’s emphasis upon company control over crude oil 
prices is not wholly accepted. However, while Adelman presents an alternative 
explanation for price stability, (based upon government support for limitations on 
imports into the U.S.A. acting to stabilise prices), it is nevertheless accepted that the 
1950s was the high point for the majors* control over the market.194
It also appears that the majors were able to significantly influence product 
prices. Nominal price variations, after 1947, were never as extreme as before 1945, 
although, in real terms, prices were falling steadily (See Figures 2.7 and 2.8). As 
discussed above, against this background AIOC was still able to increase gross profits 
between 1946 and 1950 from £28.9m to £85.7m at current prices, or 53% in real 
terms.195
Penrose’s emphasis upon control over supply, similarly, appears to explain 
control over prices within product markets. Vertical integration was such that, in 
product markets such as Britain, the Shell-Mex & B.P. group alone were directly 
responsible for the supply of 76.1% of the total quantity of fuel oil consumed in 1954. 
If some of the smaller distribution companies which were supplied by the Shell-Mex & 
B.P. group are included, this total rises to 80.8%. The next largest competitor was 
Standard Oil (Esso) with 15.6% of sales.196 In other words in the single most important 
market for oil products in Britain, AIOC and Shell, through their associated company,
193 Penrose, op.cit.. p. 150.
194 M.A. Adelman, The World Petroleum Market. (Baltimore 1972), pp. 139-56.
195 Bamberg, op.cit.. p.275.
196 B.P.7446, op.cit., table 2.21.
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maintained a monopoly of supply in the legal sense and a virtual monopoly in the 
popular sense.197
A similar picture can be described for the market in motor spirit in 1954. While 
Shell-Mex & B.P. were directly responsible for sales of 32.6% amongst dealers and 
33.1% among commercial consumers, the company was, through sales to secondary 
distributor companies, indirectly responsible for 51.4% of sales among dealers and 
51.1% of sales among commercial consumers.198
Figure 2.6 
Real Crude Oil Prices 1945-65 
(U.S. dollars/barrel)
Sources: Gilbert Jenkins, Oil Economists Handbook. (1985), table 18 and UK 
Monthly Digest of Statistics. 1950-66, for price index
197 Using the legal sense of a monopoly as controlling over 33% of output. See J.G. 
Walshe, ‘Industrial Organisation and Competition Policy’ The British Economy Since 
1945. (eds.) N.F.R. Crafts & N. Woodward, (Oxford 1991), p.368.
198 B.P. 7446, op.cit., table 2.15.
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• Conclusion
The experience of the post-war years was to the satisfaction of both the 
companies and governments concerned, in that an expansion and abundance of oil did 
indeed develop, ironically after an initial shortage, and so did the highly cartelized 
structure of the oligopolistic industry, made up of agreements on production, 
distribution and sales, which the companies had strived for. Under the conditions of 
rising demand, involving a form of Neo As-Is, informal and formal agreements
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between the oil companies stood a much greater chance of success. The high point for 
co-operation and control was between 1945 and the mid 1950s, when it was threatened 
by new developments.
A return to a period of over-production of crude oil by the late 1950s provided 
the opportunity for the rise of less integrated ‘independents’, who were able to avoid 
making extensive investments backward to production and rely upon the creation of 
organisational capabilities based upon refining, marketing and retailing. The effect of 
the rise of the independents can be seen on the divergence in prices between economies 
such as Italy and West Germany, which utilised the over production of crude oil to 
challenge the hold of the majors (see Table 2.5). This threat forced the majors to react 
by reducing the posted price of crude oil (the price royalties to producer nations were 
calculated from), which in turn led, directly, to the formation by oil producing nations 
of the Organisation of Oil Exporting Countries, OPEC, in 1960.
The link between the major oil companies and their respective governments 
proved essential for the establishment and maintenance of an institutional structure 
favourable to the oil companies. The cases of Iranian nationalisation and the U.S. anti­
trust investigation highlight the importance of the relationship between the British 
government and AIOC. Nevertheless government cannot be considered to have been 
simply malleable to oil companies’ concerns. Rather government maintained its own 
agenda. This agenda, based upon domestic and international economic considerations, 
at times brought government into conflict with AIOC. While Nowell is correct to 
emphasise the nature of transnational restructuring, governments were not impartial 
observers; rather, they, too, were concerned to maximise their political and economic 
objectives as nation states, through a tight control over access to oil.
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Our starting point in the last chapter was the question of the nature of 
information acquisition and asymmetric information flows. In the oil industry between 
1944-5 the governments of Britain and the United States held differing views of the 
post-war world compared to the majors. Despite these differences, a high degree of co­
operation emerged which the chapter suggests led to a period of successful market 
governance. The issue of asymmetric information flows was however more important 
between governments of the oil producing countries and the oil majors. The oil 
producing countries’ inability to free themselves from long-term, contractual 
agreements based upon concessionary bargaining provided one area of focus for 
continuing conflict, including further wars such as the Suez crisis in 1956.
Conflicts over long-term contracting raise questions over the longevity of the 
success which the oil majors achieved. The high point of market structuring within the 
oil industry was relatively short-lived, lasting between one and two decades. From the 
end of the 1950s new mechanisms for market structuring had to be developed, 
including a dispersion of oil exploration away from the Middle East and new forms of 
contractual arrangements within the Middle East itself. This reinforces the view put 
forward in Chapter One that the process of influencing the institutional form of the 
market is a dynamic dialectical process. A further consideration raised by the short 
term nature of this success derives from the issue of exceptionalism. It may well be 
that the relationship between oil companies and governments was simply more visible, 
perhaps due to the internationalised nature of the industry, and therefore the oil industry 
may not be quite as exceptional as the dominant historiography implies. Both of these 
issues will clearly be of concern in the following case studies.
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• Chapter Three
• The General Electric Company 1945-65: Failure in market governance.
“what a wonderful opportunity we have to educate the 
[Monopolies] Commission and through them the whole 
country as to the reasonableness of our well established 
customs.”1
• Introduction
How typical was the experience of the oil industry for British manufacturing 
industry generally? How important were close links to government for the successful 
development of an industry and creation of a balance between supply and demand for 
the development of industrial corporations? What role do issues of ownership play in 
determining firms’ success in structuring markets? These were some of the issues 
which emerged from the case study of the oil industry and which will be further 
developed in this chapter.
The electrical engineering industry represents one of the success stories for 
British manufacturing industry. The industry belongs to what is often described as the 
second industrial revolution and can trace its roots back to the later decades of the 
nineteenth century with the supply of electric lighting in urban areas.2 Britain’s early 
industrialisation, utilising gas for public lighting, may have led to a slow development
1 W.L. Wates, Chairman of British Electrical and Allied Manufacturers Association 
(hereafter BEAMA), Newsheet. 10th May 1951 on the investigations into restrictive 
practices within the electrical engineering industry.
2 See A.G. Whyte, Forty Years of Electrical Progress. The Story of the GEC. (1930) 
and T. Sakamoto, ‘Technology and Business in the British Electrical Industry 1880- 
1914', Development and Diffusion of Technology: Electrical and Chemical Industries, 
ed. A. Okochi and H. Uchida, (Tokyo 1980).
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of the electrical industry before 1914, but by the end of the 1930s the industry appears 
to have caught up with other European producers in the production of modem 
machinery.3 In the three decades after 1935 the industry saw both its employment 
and its share of total manufacturing output more than double.4 Finally, by the early 
1970s the major British company General Electric Co., GEC, was the third largest 
electrical manufacturing concern in Europe and eighth within the world.5 Thus in 
electrical engineering, as with oil, we have an industry in which the opportunities for 
dynamic firms to emerge existed.
The historiography of the industry certainly reflects this impressive growth. 
Business history studies are dominated by the triumph of technology over adversity, 
documenting a history of twentieth century innovation and diffusion.6 The two world 
wars in particular stand out in this historiography as marking a leap forward for both 
innovation and the creation of new markets for the subsequent diffusion of new 
products.7
It is in this role of diffusion of high technology products and a reliance on 
government purchasing that the industry has found its critics. At one level the British 
electrical manufacturing industry is said to have been over-committed to the 
development of products for the arms trade or for the repression of civilian
3 A. D. Chandler, Scale and Scope. (1990), p356.
4 United Kingdom Census of Production. 1948 and 1968, Summary Report, Table 1.
5 Counter Intelligence Services, The General Electric Company. An Anti-Report. 
(1973), p.3.
6 H. Nockolds, Lucas: The First Hundred Years. Vol.IL (Vancouver, Canada, 1978) 
and Whyte, op.cit.. (1930).
7 See W.J. Baker, A History of the Marconi Company. (1970) as a particular case in 
point.
opopulations. This commitment is subsequently said to have not only led companies 
to give political support to repressive regimes but also jeopardised the non-military 
trade of British companies with other developing economies.9 For example GEC’s 
involvement with the apartheid regime in South Africa after 1976 was criticised as it 
threatened to ‘sacrifice our trading prospects with those nations whose economic 
strength appears to be increasing in order to protect our trade with a country whose 
prospects for survival in the long-term can at best be described as doubtful.’10 While 
claims at this level are difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate, the point serves to 
i highlight a similarity with the previous case study. Anglo-Iranian’s support for 
‘strong government’, from a discredited regime, created significant difficulties in 
maintaining the industry’s stability. In general then, economic issues facing business 
operating within a multinational framework should not simply be divorced from the 
political arena.
An over-commitment to government purchasing has also led to a more 
narrowly focused criticism of the companies themselves. GEC, in particular, from 
the 1960s onwards is suggested to have adopted a short-termist approach to 
investment and product development, relying upon a small set of monthly financial 
statistics to determine strategic direction.11 Indeed, short-termism was promoted as a
8 Counter Intelligence Services, The Arms Industry. No.31, (1982).
9 See Christian Concern for Southern Africa, GEC Ltd.. A Review of the Company’s 
Relationship with South Africa (1976).
10 Ibid.. p.3.
11 K. Williams, J. Williams & D. Thomas, Why are the British Bad at 
Manufacturing?. (1983) for more on Arnold Weinstock’s managerial style.
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positive virtue when the company publicly claimed that its development time span 
was limited to twelve months.12
A second set of criticisms laid at the door of the industry is that of collusive 
behaviour. Cartelization has a long tradition within the industry, with the Phoebus 
agreement, regulating competition between electric lamp manufacturers, and the 
International Notification and Compensation Agreement, regulating competition 
between capital goods manufacturers, being almost as famous as those within the oil 
industry.13
Domestically the cartels, or rings, are said to have had the effect of allowing 
the ‘least efficient to stay in business’ and acted to bloc the quest for efficiency 
which would ultimately have led to cheaper products.14 Support for collusive 
behaviour continued even after the break-up of many of the rings. The rationalisation 
after 1968 is suggested to have been achieved at a ‘high cost’, involving increases in 
market power and continued extraction of monopoly profits.15
Internationally collusive behaviour is suggested to have had a much more 
deleterious impact. In developing economies the rings are accused of systematically 
weakening infant domestic electrical engineering industries, with the result that
12 “We look 12 months ahead...We don’t look in detail beyond two years.” Quoted in 
CIS, opxit., (1973), p.3.
13 See D. Barjot, International Cartels Revisited 1880-1980. (Caen 1995) and E. 
Hexner, International Cartels. (1946) for general historical interpretations of the 
impact of cartels.
14 R. Jones & O. Marriott, Anatomy of a Merger. (1970), p.318.
15 See K. Cowling, P. Stoneman, J. Cubbin, J. Cable, G. Hall, S. Domberger and P. 
Dutton, Mergers and Economic Performance. (Cambridge 1980), pp.206-8
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import substitution policies were undermined in economies such as Brazil, and 
economies subsequently suffered from rising imports from the rings participants.16
Thus again, as with the previous case study, the relationship between 
companies and governments and between the companies themselves appears to lie at 
the heart of any understanding of the industry. Similarly the wider issues of market 
information, pricing, competition and its regulation are all subjects of importance for 
the industry.
• Issues and Hypotheses
The electrical manufacturing industry represents an extremely diverse and 
continually changing industry. The industry as a whole has changed significantly and 
in the post-war decades the rate of change increased, as technical innovation combined 
with commercial exploitation to open up new uses for electrical appliances and new 
markets for electrical goods. The industry covers not only capital goods produced for 
the electrical industry and used in power generation and distribution (such as turbines, 
transformers, switchgear and cabling) and capital goods used in other commercial, 
industrial and military areas (such as computers, telecommunications and radar 
equipment) but also extends to consumer products for domestic uses (such as heating, 
lighting and entertainment). Thus the industry ranges from the manufacturing of 
electric light bulbs to the building of space stations, it covers both high and low 
technology appliances, capital, consumer, intermediate and end-user products. The 
diversification and expansion of the electrical manufacturing industry means that, for
16 K.R. Mirow and H. Maurer, Webs of Power. (Boston, Mass 1982), p.6.
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the most part, its products are part of a new industry much of which dates from the 
Second World War: computers and nuclear power are but two areas of recent 
development.
The general definition used in this chapter corresponds to those products 
covered by the Electrical Engineering Industry, Order IX of the 1968 Census of 
Production.17 The diversity of the electrical manufacturing industry creates major 
problems in attempting to make generalisations about either the industry or the 
companies involved within it. Nevertheless, the chapter will be emphasising general 
processes operating across the whole industry. A more detailed discussion will focus 
primarily upon the electricity generating capital goods sector, because, not only was 
the heavy electricity generating plant sector of central importance for both domestic 
and export orders, but it was in this sector that the processes we are concerned with 
were most apparent. The electronics and armaments sectors will not be the subject of 
such detailed examination, with the exception of their wider impact on research and 
development. This is because most of the commercial developments within the 
electronics sector (semi-conductors, micro electronic circuits and capital goods such as 
mainframe computers) post-dates the period under discussion.18
17 This covers machinery, wires and cables, telegraph and telephone equipment, radio 
and electronic components, broadcasting receiving and sound reproducing equipment, 
computers, electronic capital goods, domestic electrical appliances and miscellaneous 
electrical goods but does not cover watches and clocks, scientific instruments nor 
photographic and document copying equipment.
18 Baker, op.cit, pp.394-6, for the Marconi Co.’s pioneering work on early integrated 
circuits. For a discussion of the development of the computer industry see J. Hendry, 
Innovating for Failure: Government Policy and the Early British Computer Industry. 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts 1989) and R. Hamilton, ‘Despite Best Intentions: The 
evolution of the British minicomputer industry’, Business History. No.2, 1996.
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This chapter aims to examine the development of the industry in the two 
decades after 1945, prior to the radical transformation of the industry in 1967-68. In 
these two years the General Electric Company Limited acquired Associated Electrical 
Industries Limited (AEI) and the English Electric Company Limited. GEC purchased 
AEI in 1967 (following a successful take-over bid) and then in 1968 a merger with 
English Electric completed the process. The take-over and merger represented a 
mammoth leap forward for GEC in terms of the scale of resources open to it, with 
sales of almost £lb and assets of over £lb. The merger also made GEC the largest 
private employer in Britain, with a workforce of some 240,000.19 As a result of the 
merger, GEC gained a 90% share of the UK locomotives and equipment market, 70% 
of the grid switchgear market and 50% of the turbo generator, process control and 
automation and defence electronics markets.20 This chapter will suggest that the 
creation of a large electrical manufacturing company such as GEC in the late 1960s 
represented an attempt at resolving the challenges which the industry had faced since 
the end of the Second World War. The formation of the modem GEC, through the 
purchase of AEI and the merger with English Electric, was arguably a conclusion for 
processes which this study aims to highlight in the years from 1945-65.21
The study focuses upon the changing structure of the market facing the 
electrical manufacturing industry and, through the development of the three major 
constituent firms which formed GEC, examines the attempts by companies to
19 Jones and Marriott, op.cit.. p. 12.
20 Industrial Reorganisation Corporation, 14th September 1968. Quoted in CIS, 
op.cit.. (1973), p.34.
21 For a discussion of the merger itself see Jones and Marriott, op.cit.. pp.265-313 and 
for the impact of the merger see Cowling et. al., pp 198-213 and pp238-269.
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influence those changes after 1945. There are two key areas of interest in the study. 
First, the move away from formal cartel arrangements both in Britain and 
internationally from the early 1950s onwards and the emergence of competition 
initially in domestic appliances and later in capital goods. Second, the role played by 
the growth of government procurement contracts on the development of the firms and 
the industry itself.
Our interest is in the use of information under conditions of uncertainty. Did 
the existence of formal cartels reflect high levels of uncertainty and risks of 
opportunism within the industry? Were cartels a reflection of the need to develop 
governance procedures where high levels of asset-specific investment was required? 
What does their abandonment then tell us about information asymmetry, risk and 
opportunism within electrical engineering? We are also interested in the impact of the 
development of market governance mechanisms on firms. Did a reduction in 
competitive pressures help or hinder the development of organisational capabilities? 
What role did government orders play in electrical engineering? Finally, what was the 
impact of market governance mechanisms on the market? Are firms successful in 
controlling competition within the market? Or do firms simply face a continually 
changing environment in which new competitive threats always emerge?
These issues will be addressed through the testing of two specific questions in 
this chapter. Did the ending of formal cartels have a detrimental effect on the 
companies concerned, by simply highlighting the lack of international 
competitiveness? If this is so it would suggest that increasing information asymmetry, 
through cartels, is simply a market governance mechanism for the uncompetitive firm.
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Second did government orders provide a secure backdrop for company investment in 
areas such as research and development, and if so, could the companies utilise this 
security to improve their competitive position in more hostile markets (i.e. is the 
restriction of information necessary for the creation of organisational capabilities)?
The chapter will follow the model of the previous chapter; first it will 
examine the growth of demand for electrical engineering products, and in particular 
focus upon the pattern of international trade, before discussing supply and the 
regulation of markets. In so doing it will examine the apparent paradox of its 
growing importance to the British economy yet relative decline in world markets. 
The chapter will highlight the link between this paradox and the regulation of 
competition, before exploring the pressures leading to change within the industry. In 
response to these pressures, firms developed alternative regulatory responses. These 
changes further highlight the role played by information acquisition and ownership 
patterns in explaining firms’ initial motivation in developing market governance 
mechanisms. Finally, the chapter examines the impact these processes had on the 
firms themselves, by examining the degree to which they hindered or helped the 
creation of competitive firms.
• Demand for Electrical Engineering Equipment
The pattern of demand for electrical equipment in the 1940s was markedly 
different from that of the 1950s. Throughout the 1940s demand alternated between 
high levels of defence orders and high levels of civilian orders, whereas in the 1950s
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high levels of demand for defence equipment reinforced high levels of demand for 
civilian products.
The Second World War engulfed the productive capacity of the electrical 
manufacturing industry. Unsurprisingly there was high demand for military devices 
such as radar, aircraft guidance systems and telecommunications equipment. The 
industry was not only responsible for supplying complete systems but also components 
and products including circuits, fuses, switches, bulbs and batteries, along with the 
countless number of other products required in all military equipment using electrical 
power. Largely as a result of this military demand, real net output grew by 49% 
between 1935 and 1948, employment rose over 85% and the number of establishments 
within the industry virtually doubled to over 1600 (see Table 3.1).22 For firms in the 
industry, between 1940 and 1945, output was almost exclusively for the war effort. At 
GEC, 93% of output was defence-related, while for competitors such as EMI the 
figure was 98%.23 The picture was also the same internationally: output from the US 
firm, General Electric, was also almost totally war-related.24
The dramatic fall in UK government expenditure on defence (from over £5b in 
1944 to £750m by 1948) presented industries such as electrical manufacturing with 
major reconversion difficulties.25 Yet, despite the move away from wartime
22 United Kingdom Census of Production. 1951, Summary Report Table 1. Figures 
only refer to larger establishments employing over 25 workers. In 1948 only 1.6% of 
workers within the industry were employed in smaller establishments.
23 Sir Alexander Aikman, EMI Chairman's Annual Report. 1946, p.4 and GEC 
Archive (hereafter GEC), Box 1952, Witton News Jubilee 1902-52, p. 13.
24 Even during 1945, the year of reconversion, war production for General Electric 
(USA) amounted to over 75% of net sales. General Electric (USA) Yearbook. 1945
A. Caimcross, Years of Recovery. (1985), p.212.
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production, the growth in output of the industry continued. Output growth was now 
markedly different from the wartime growth: the industry no longer relied purely upon 
the military. Post-war reconstruction saw major problems of satisfying demand for 
electricity, with winter power cuts still taking place as late as the early 1950s.26 The 
United Kingdom, as with other developed countries, also saw its consumption of 
electricity growing at around 7% per annum and consumption was therefore expected 
to roughly double every decade.27 Not only was there a large market for civilian 
versions of military products like radar, as well as aircraft and marine guidance 
systems, after 1945, but there was also a growing market for a wider range of capital 
and intermediate goods within industry, as the use of electrical machinery and power in 
the production process spread.
On top of these industrial markets the early post-war years saw an emerging 
civilian market for new domestic appliances such as televisions, washing machines 
and refrigerators, despite the continuation of rationing. Between 1945 and 1950 
revenue from sales of television sets grew from £0.42m to £29.98m, while sales of 
radiograms grew from under £10,000 to £ 10.65m.
Demand grew steadily in the 1940s but it was the 1950s that saw high defence 
and civilian demand coincide. In 1951 the outbreak of the Korean war resulted in a 
rapid rise in defence spending. Military expenditure in Britain rose from £86 lm  to 
£l,652m between 1951-3, representing a rise from 7.0% to 10.3% of GNP.29 Military
26 See L. Hannah, Engineers. Managers and Politicians. (1982), pp.23-9.
27 Ministry of Supply, Exports of Heavy Electrical Plant. Part 1.. (1954), p.8-9.
28 T. Wilson, 'The Electronics Industry', The Structure of British Industry. Vol.2, ed. D. 
Bum, (Cambridge 1958), p. 138.
29 D.C. Paige, 'Defence Expenditure', National Institute Economic Review. No. 10 
1960, p.28
spending stayed at these levels in money terms throughout the 1950s, although if 
measured as a percentage of GNP it gradually fell to 7.5% by 1960.
The spread of domestic household appliances within British society was also 
extremely rapid after 1950. This development had a profound social impact as new 
forms of entertainment and culture entered into society for the first time. Equally these 
developments were part and parcel of a radical change in the roles of women. Between 
1950 and 1959, sales of television sets, refrigerators, washing-machines and vacuum 
cleaners grew on average by a rate of 16.5% against an annual average increase in 
consumer sales of only 2.2%.?° Demand for these products was spreading well beyond 
the realms of the upper classes and into many middle class homes. The spread of 
domestic appliances into lower class households was however significantly slower and 
not until the 1958 did the majority of lower class households posses either a television 
set or a vacuum cleaner, along with the most popular domestic appliances, the electric 
iron and the radio.31
The increase in demand for domestic appliances arose from the combination of 
rising real incomes and the substantial fall in the real cost of products in the 1950s. The 
1950s saw the relative retail price of televisions and refrigerators fall by a third, 
washing machines by a quarter and vacuum cleaners by a fifth. These price falls 
accounted for approximately 30-50% of the rise in demand.32 Non-monetary stimulus 
to demand also proved important with the learning effect, as consumers became
30 L. Needleman, 'The Demand for Domestic Appliances', National Institute Economic 
Review. No. 12, 1960, p.24.
31 Upper class households accounted for 11% of households, middle class for 18% and 
lower class for 71%, ibid.. p.27.
32 Ibid.. p.29.
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familiarised with products, and later the replacement of older equipment boosting 
sales. Another factor which effected the market for domestic appliances was the 
development of saturation levels, the point at which every household would own an 
appliance and new purchases would be the result of replacement. Saturation effects 
occurred at different times according to social class.
1959 represented the peak year for sales throughout the 1950s and 1960s for 
domestic appliances, with sales of televisions, refrigerators, washing machines and 
vacuum cleaners totalling 1.5% of total expenditure, some £6.5b.33 The subsequent fall 
i was in part due to the life of the appliances being longer than expected, leading to a 
slower rise in the purchase of replacement appliances and an accentuation of the 
saturation effect a by the early 1960s. Table 3.1 shows the industry’s increasing 
importance to the growth of the British economy as a whole, with its share of total 
manufacturing net output doubling to 9.0% between 1935 and 1968. Thus by 1968 the 
electrical manufacturing industry’s gross output had risen to some £2.7b and it 
employed 753,000 workers in over 4,000 establishments.34 GEC in 1968 was 
responsible for approximately one third of total output and employment.
This impressive performance, however, needs to be qualified. As Table 3.1 
also shows, despite the nominal fourfold growth in output between 1935 and 1948, the 
rapid expansion of the industry, measured by real net output, came from the early 
1950s onwards. Pre-war real output and productivity levels were not matched until the 
mid-1950s and as a result early post-war growth came from increasing the numbers
33 T.A.B. Corley, Domestic Electrical Appliances. (1966), p.53 and Anon, 'Long term 
forecasts of demand for cars, selected consumer durables and energy', National 
Institute Economic Review. No.40,1967.
34 United Kingdom Census of Production. 1968, Summary Report, Table 1
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employed.35 This poor early post-war performance is important to understanding 
subsequent decisions within the industry. Employment fell in the early 1950s and real 
net output per person employed rose markedly to 8.6% per annum between 1951 and 
1954. However, this impressive productivity growth was not sustained and fell back to, 
the still very respectable, 4.6% per annum between 1958 and 1963. Finally 
productivity growth was again to increase in the 1960s, to an annual rate of 5.1% p.a. 
between 1963 and 1968.
The industry appears to have faced initial difficulties in the aftermath of the 
Second World War but by the early 1950s was responding rapidly to a new 
environment, achieving high, if fluctuating, productivity growth throughout the 1950s 
and 1960s.
35 Real net output per person employed suggests that the 1940s was a period of 
negative productivity growth. However, the price index used is wholesale prices for 
all manufacturing industries (see table 3.1 below). Given rapidly falling relative 
prices for domestic appliances we therefore have a potential for a classic index 
number problem and so some care should be given to statements on real productivity 
growth.
160
Table 3.1
Growth of the Electrical Engineering Industry 1935-196836
Year Net
Output
Real Net 
Output
Real Net Output per 
Person Employed
Employment Percentage of Total 
Manufacturing Net Output
£m 1954=10037 £ 1954 = 100 000’s
1935 69.4 55 800.4 106 301.1 4.3
1948 277.8 83 645.7 85 555.8 5.2
1951 368.0 85 602.6 80 614.3 5.0
1954 434.9 100 757.9 100 573.8 7.1
1958 615.2 127 849.2 112 652.6 7.8
1963 956.4 184 1043.0 138 767.4 8.8
1968 1,375.3 227 1308.2 173 753.7 9.0
36 Source: The figures correspond to Order IX 'Electrical Engineering' of the 1968 United Kingdom Census and are derived from the United 
Kingdom Census of Production. Summary Report, 1951, 1958, 1963 & 1968, table 1 and United Kingdom Annual Abstract of Statistics. 
1954, table 138.
37 1954 wholesale output prices for total manufacturing indices derived from B.R. Mitchell, British Historical Statistics, (Cambridge 1988), 
tables C-F. Electrical engineering wholesale prices were rising less rapidly than those for manufacturing generally from 1963-68 suggesting 
that at least for the 1960s productivity growth is underestimated. See Annual Abstract of Statistics. No. 107,1970, table 388.
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• Electrical Engineering and International Trade
Patterns of international trade highlight both the strengths and weaknesses 
within the British electrical engineering industry throughout this period. A large 
discrepancy developed between both the rates of growth and product composition of 
imports and exports that was indicative of not only the relative strength of the electrical 
manufacturing industry immediately after the war, with respect to international 
competitors, but also the industry’s relative decline by the late 1960s.
Although a positive balance of trade remained throughout the period the rate of 
growth of imports far exceeded those of exports. In 1966 the United Kingdom 
imported £150m worth of goods in the electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances 
sector compared with a figure of £2.3m in 1947, representing an increase of 6Jf32% 
against an increase in imports generally of only 332%.38 The essential explanation for 
such a large increase in imports was that tight restrictions were placed upon imports 
immediately after 1945 and therefore the 1947 figure was artificially low. Limitations 
upon domestic demand of consumer durables continued throughout the 1950s and 
1960s, when credit restrictions were used first to boost then to reduce demand. 
Decomposing the component elements sheds further light on this growth in imports. In 
1968 the market share of imports was; generator sets and switchgear (0%), electric 
wires and cables (2%), motors and control gear (16%), telegraph and telephone
38 Board of Trade, op.cit.. 1950 and 1968, tables 1&3.
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equipment (5%) and domestic appliances (14%).39 The explanation for the continuing 
low levels of imports within the heavier end of the industry lies in the fact that 
purchasers of heavy equipment were almost exclusively nationalised industries who 
continued to buy from domestic manufacturers. The growth of demand was the result 
of long term planning by monopsonist commissioning authorities.
In the case of electricity generation, while undergoing significant year to year 
fluctuations, demand was based upon GDP growth rate estimates of 3.0% per annum 
and well established estimates of electricity consumption growth of just below 7% 
i per annum.40 The i Area Boards, the Scottish Boards and the Central Electricity 
Authority, CEA, (after 1958 the Central Electricity Generating Board, CEGB) were 
the authorities responsible for commissioning adequate levels of equipment, based 
upon these estimates, to satisfy the simultaneous maximum demand with a 17% 
margin.
The same was also true of orders from the Ministry of Defence, where 
political objectives and commitments linked to the cold war, were the result of long­
term planning. Thus, for the manufacturers, aggregate demand was considered to be 
largely inelastic and price competition could only lead to lower profits rather than an 
aggregate increase in domestic demand 41 In contrast to government orders demand 
for consumer durables was highly elastic. In consumer durables, demand was instead 
constrained by government concern over macro-economic conditions. Despite the
39 NEDC, Electrical Engineering EDC. table 1.02 and NEDC. Electronics EDC. 
tables 2.01 & 2.02.
40 NEDC, Electrical Engineering EDC. p. 16.
41 See G.B. Richardson, The Future of the Heavy Electrical Plant Industry. (1969), 
p.20 for the companies1 views.
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growth of consumer durable sales noted above, the emergence of a market for 
consumer durables was restrained through the period.
• Exports
The electrical engineering industry was also of growing importance for the 
British economy due to its earnings of foreign currency. Electrical machinery, 
apparatus and appliances was the third largest single category of exports from the 
United Kingdom by value in 1966, with exports of over £346m per annum, exceeded 
only by those of non-electrical machinery and transport equipment.42 The industry’s 
exports overtook those of declining industries such as cotton yams and manufactures 
and woollen and worsted yams and manufactures, as well as more modem industries 
such as iron and steel. While total United Kingdom exports rose 442% by value 
between 1947 and 1966, those of the electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances 
division rose by 700% 43 In 1955 British exports accounted for over 20% of world 
trade in both capital goods and transport equipment.44
The main demand for British electrical manufactures was in capital goods: in 
1948 the most important exports were electric wires and cables (£23m), telegraph and 
telephone equipment (£12m), generator sets (£7.7m) and switchgear (£6.8m), whereas 
in consumer goods the main exports were radio sets (£3.6m), refrigerators (£1.7m) and
42 Figures on exports derived from Board of Trade, Report on Overseas Trade. 
VoLXIX No.l 1968, table 2. Note that chemicals exports as a class exceeded those of 
electrical machinery but no single chemical division exceeded those of electrical 
machinery, appliances and apparatus.
43 Figures on exports derived from Board of Trade Report on Overseas Trade. Vol.l 
No.l 1950 and VoLXIX No.l 1968, table 1&2.
44 A. Maizels, Industrial Growth and World Trade. (Cambridge 1963), Tables A72 & 
A74
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vacuum cleaners (£1.7m).45 By 1968 this bias towards capital goods exports remained, 
with exports of generator sets and switchgear (£40.9m), motors and control gear 
(£60. lm), electric wires and cables (£39. lm), telegraph and telephone equipment 
(£35m), and all domestic appliances combined (£32.0m).46
In the late 1940s the sterling overhang and dollar shortages saw government 
attempts to utilise exports of electrical appliances to boost overseas earnings.47 
Demand for goods was high, particularly in Europe, where competitors still had to 
recover from the effects of war. Yet Ministry of Supply figures suggested that exports 
of domestic appliances by mid 1947 had only reached 16-18% of production.48 
Frustration with the failure to export led the Board of Trade to argue for either an 
outright ban on all production of electric fires for the domestic market or a restriction 
of production to exports and those required in new homes.49
Manufacturers’ export targets were increased from 50% to 80% in 1947. Some 
notable successes followed from these targets. British exports of domestic washing 
machines, amounting to £3.9m, succeeded in capturing 49% of the world export
45 BEAMA, Catalogue. 1949-50, pp.239-40.
National Economic Development Council, Industrial Report bv the Electrical 
Engineering EDC on the Economic Assessment to 1972. (1970), table 1.02 and 
National Economic Development Council, Industrial Report bv the Electronics EDC 
on the Economic Assessment to 1972. (1970), table 2.01. Note the difference 
between total figures for electrical exports and the specific elements documented is 
accounted for by electronic exports, mainly computers.
47 See J. Tomlinson, Public Policy and the Economy since 1900. (Oxford 1990), 
pp.207-12 for a general discussion of British post-war trade issues.
48 PRO BT 64/2925, Domestic Appliances and Gas Appliances: Diversion from 
home to Export, 30th June 1947.
49 Ibid., 16th May 1947 and 30th June 1947.
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market by 1950 and in electric cookers and heating appliances (including irons) 
exports, amounting to £3.1m, captured 46% of the world market.50
However, despite the clear opportunities for British electrical exports in the late 
1940s, manufacturers’ initial response to export promotion, in the domestic appliance 
sector, was to lay off workers and close plant. In 1948 Morphy Richards threatened to 
close its plant in the Blyth development area producing fires, toasters and vacuum 
cleaners, while EMI laid off almost 200 workers at its Rhondda plant, in February of 
the same year, stating that it would close it entirely due to restrictions imposed upon 
domestic sales of irons and fires.51 A similar response occurred in the 1956 reduction 
of domestic demand: firms failed, with the exception of vacuum cleaners, to increase 
exports to compensate. 52 This failure was in direct contrast to France where, as 
Milward points out, exports grew in response to falling domestic sales.
By the early 1960s only between 10-20% of domestic consumer goods were 
exported, whereas firms were much more dependent upon export orders for heavy 
capital goods with, for example, AEI’s traction division exporting more than 70% of 
total production in 1964 54
The general failure of manufacturers to export consumer goods thus appears in 
stark contrast to the successes achieved within the capital goods sector of the industry. 
However, in examining in more detail the markets for British electrical exports it
50 Maizels. op.cit.. table 12.11
51 PRO BT 64/2925, op.cit., 20th February 1948. Note the Board of Trade believed 
EMI’s argument was simply an excuse to relocate production back to its main Hayes 
plant.
52 A. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State. (1992), pp.420-24.
53 Ibid., p.422.
54 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Prospect. Winter 1960, p.6 and AEI, Annual 
Report and Accounts. 1964, p.20.
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becomes clear not only how it was that manufacturers generally failed to export in the 
consumer durable sector but also that the export success in capital goods was far less 
obvious than initial figures suggest.
• Supply and slower growing markets
The export success of British heavy electrical engineering disappears when 
examined against the growth in world markets. Tyszynski estimates that before the 
Second World War British exports accounted for 22% of world trade in electrical 
goods rising to 34% by 1950.55 British Government estimates in 1957 confirm this 
growth, suggesting that the British share of the world turbine, generator, motor and 
transformer markets rose from 29% in 1937 to 37% in 1949.56 This success, 
however, was not to last.
The re-establishment of West German firms in export markets was very rapid. 
In 1949 West German exports of electrical machinery amounted to only £7.1m, or 5% 
of the British total, but by 1951 this had grown to £56.3m, 30% of the British figure.57 
Between 1950 and 1955 West German exports of machinery increased 355% and in 
transport machinery this increase was still more rapid at 500% by value at constant 
1955 prices.58 The markets to which Germany exported were mainly within Western 
Europe and, initially, it was US and other European firms that were the main losers to
55 H. Tyszynski, ‘World Trade in Manufactured Commodities 1899-1950’, 
Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies. No.3, 1951, tables IV-V.
56 Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission, Report on the Supply and 
Export of Electrical and Allied Machinery and Plant. (1957), Appendix 14, table 4.
57 BEAMA, The Electrical Industry Exports Bulletin. February 1953, p.23.
58 Maizels, op. cit.. pp.490-493.
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German competition.59 As Table 3.2 shows, Britain’s share of world trade in turbines, 
generators, motors and transformers, at 35%, remained above its 1948 level until 
1950, whereas the US saw its share fall from 40% to 35%. Among European 
economies, the market share of Sweden, Belgium & Luxembourg remained static, 
while Italy’s actually fell. However from 1950 onwards Britain’s share of world trade 
also began to decline; by 1953 it had fallen below its pre-war level, to 28%.60 This 
decline continued with the Economic Development Council estimating Britain’s 
share of world trade in electrical engineering falling from 19.5% to 13.5% between 
1963 and 1968.61 The fall in the 1960s occurred at the same time as the market shares 
accounted for by West Germany and the United States remained almost constant and 
those of Japan and Italy nearly doubled. On top of this, the international market for 
heavy plant was growing at approximately 7% per annum.62
Table 3.2
Percentage of Exports of Steam and Water Turbines. Generators. Generating Sets.
Motors and Transformers from Eight Principal Manufacturing Countries of the
World63
Year
Percentage from;
1938 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952
U.K 32 33 37 35 28 26
USA 14 40 35 31 31 31
Germany 28 1 1 5 10 17
France 3 4 5 6 8 6
Sweden 8 4 4 4 4 5
Switzerland 9 8 9 11 10 8
Belgium/ Luxembourg 3 6 6 6 5 4
Italy 3 4 3 2 4 3
Ministry of Supply, Report on Exports of Heavy Electrical Plant. Part One, 
(1954),p.iii.
60 Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission, op.cit.. table 4.
61 NEDC, Electrical Engineering EDC. table 2.03.
62 Ibid.. p.7 and p. 17.
Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission, op.cit.. Appendix 14, table 4.
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The Board of Trade estimated that between one quarter and a third of the loss 
of Britain’s share of world trade derived from the geographical distribution and 
commodity structure of exports. Milward maintains that this is likely to be an under­
estimate as a geographical orientation of trade with western Europe would have gone 
some way towards addressing the productivity difficulties British manufacturing 
faced.64
The geographical location of Britain’s trade in electrical manufactures 
certainly goes some way to explaining the industry’s relatively poor export 
performance. Britain retained a strong positive balance of trade among 
Commonwealth countries and the Sterling area in electrical manufactures, with around 
half of all exports going to these areas. The largest export markets for British goods 
were the Commonwealth countries, such as Australia, Canada and India and South 
Africa. In 1963, for example, of the £175m exports of electrical and allied machinery 
the largest markets were Australia (£29m), South Africa (£25m), India and Canada 
(£20m).65
Western Europe also provided a major export area, taking some 30% of 
electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances in 1965 and 1966, of which half went to 
the EFT A countries and half to the rest of Western Europe.66 These figures represent 
an increase in the proportion of exports to Western Europe in comparison to the 1950s, 
with both the Board of Trade estimates and Trade Association figures suggesting that
64 Milward, op.cit.. pp.423-4.
65 BEAMA, Annual Report. 1963-4, p.9.
66 Board of Trade, op.cit.. 1968, tables 1 & 13.
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around 20% of exports went to Western Europe in the years 1957 and 1958. The 
balance of exports to EFTA and non-EFTA countries remained relatively unchanged
7throughout. A positive balance of trade existed with Western Europe as a whole 
although, importantly, the European Community itself was showing a negative trade 
balance in this sector by 1966. The third major export area of crucial importance in a 
study of the industry was the United States. The United States was the single largest 
market for electrical goods, yet only 6% of exports of electrical machinery, apparatus 
and appliances were destined for the US. As a result of the lack of penetration into the 
US market by British manufacturers a large negative trade balance existed by the late 
1960s with the US in this sector.68
This pattern of exports was, with the exception of the United States market, 
markedly different from that of West German exporters. Over 72% of West German 
exports of electrical goods went to Western Europe, of which almost 64% went to the 
European Community and EFTA countries. Outside Europe important export markets 
were in Asia (9.4%), USA (4.8%) and the rest of America (7.9%).69 West German 
imports of electrical goods further highlight these differences. While West Germany’s 
imports of electrical goods amounted to only 9.3% of exports, these originated 
overwhelmingly from Europe (77.3%, including 9.4% from Britain) and the United 
States (18.4).70
67 BEAMA, Annual Report. 1958-9, p.26 and Board of Trade, op.cit.. Vol X, No.l, 
1959, table 11.
68 Board of Trade, op. cit.. 1950, tables 10 & 11, 1959, tables 11 & 12 and 1968, table 
13.
69 BEAMA, Bulletin. Vol.9, No.48, July 1963.
70 Ibid.
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Western European and American markets were of growing importance for the 
electrical manufacturing sector by the late 1950s. That a growing proportion of exports 
were destined for these markets and that a negative balance of trade existed with the 
most developed parts of Western Europe and the United States suggests that 
internationally the industry was increasingly becoming dependent upon major 
competitors’ domestic markets for sales and that the British electrical industry 
specifically was struggling to maintain a competitive position in these key markets in 
the face of stiff competition.
The main manufacturers’ association, the British Electrical and Allied 
Manufacturers Association (BEAMA), in attempting to promote exports and to boost 
the knowledge about British suppliers, published a series of detailed catalogues 
covering the full range and specifications of products from its members, along with 
details of all the members’ overseas agents and sales organisations. These impressively 
large volumes (complete with a foreword from the President of the Board of Trade) 
were then distributed internationally to named individuals responsible for purchasing 
policy who were nominated by the exporting companies. Copies were also sent to 
British government overseas trade officials and foreign government officials. These 
volumes and their distribution further highlight the orientation which British firms had 
in the early post-war period. For example some 9,087 1949 BEAMA Catalogues were 
distributed abroad, of which 1,244 went to Australia, 1,015 to Canada, 855 to India 
and 767 to South Africa. However only 87 went to the United States, which was only
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just more than the 70 that went to Kenya. Similarly of the 1,812 that went to Europe 
only 7 went to Germany and the same to Rumania!71
That British electrical manufacturers had such little contact with major markets 
in western Europe is still further highlighted by the fact that, while GEC in the 1949 
catalogue lists its complete overseas sales agents and organisations including the 
Falkland Islands and Grenada, it fails to list any sales agents in Germany.72
A more detailed look at the three firms in the study shows that all were highly 
reliant upon export orders, particularly in the capital goods and heavy plant areas of 
production, and that all had an orientation on Commonwealth markets. In the case of 
AEI, around 25% of output was destined for foreign markets, including 55% of the 
output of one of its largest divisions, the Turbine-Generator Division, going to South 
Africa, Hong Kong, British Ghana, Canada, Australia, Spain, Mexico and New 
Zealand.73
English Electric’s exports, as a percentage of total output, increased from 20% 
in 1939 to 50% in 1952 but by 1958 this had fallen back to 33%.74 The main exports 
for English Electric were electric traction equipment for use in railways, mining and 
other heavy industrial purposes. Key markets after 1945 were South Africa for rectifier 
equipment, Australia for diesel electric locomotives and India and New Zealand for 
electric locomotives.75 English Electric also found export markets for high technology
71 BEAMA, Publicity Committee Minutes Jan-Dee 1949, 30 November 1949, minute 
598.
72 BEAMA, Catalogue 1949-50, pp.818-20.
73 J. Latham, Take-over. The facts and the Myths of the GEC/AEI Battle. (1969), p.26 
and AEI, Annual Report and Accounts. 1961, p.22.
74 English Electric, Annual Report and Accounts. 1953, p.6 and 1955, p.8.
75 English Electric, Electricity in Transport. (1951), pp. 134-157.
172
electronic goods and importantly it was these that found access into more developed 
markets, with, for example, the Marconi Instruments subsidiary selling over half its 
navigation equipment to North America and Europe.
In the case of GEC, as Table 3.3 highlights, the reliance upon overseas markets 
was still more important. Heather has stated that overseas sales (from subsidiary plants 
located abroad) and exports from Britain accounted for 42% of turnover in 1953, up 
from 25% in 1938.77 This continued to rise and accounted for as much as 49.9% of all 
GEC sales in 1957. GEC was responsible for around 10% of all British exports in the 
electrical machinery category. Again, similarly to the other firms, some 70% of exports 
went to Commonwealth nations, in particular, with South Africa, India and Australia 
accounting for 35% of total overseas sales in 1953. Of the European economies only 
Portugal, Eire, Holland and Sweden were significant export markets for GEC in the 
early 1950s, but all these combined accounted for less than 9% of overseas sales. By 
1965, however, a slight shift in the direction of exports had taken place, with 40% now 
going to India, Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand and Japan.78 Rapid fluctuations in the 
direction of exports could take place in the short term. The main reason for this lies in 
the fact that British electrical exports were concentrated in the heavy plant and 
machinery end of the industry. As a result individual contracts such as Japan’s nuclear 
power plant contract with GEC in 1965, or the purchasing of military aircraft by the
76 English Electric, Annual Report. 1961, p. 13.
77 T.W. Heather, The GEC. its History. (1953), p.53.
78 Ibid.. p.63 and GEC, Annual Report. 1965, p.4.
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Indian government with English Electric engines in 1955, could significantly alter the 
short term trends in exports for individual companies.79
Table 3.3
GEC Sales and the Influence of Overseas Markets 80
Year Total
Sales
£m
Exports
£m
Overseas
Production
£m
Exports and Overseas 
Production as % of Total 
Sales
1938 25
1953 42
1954 75.3 18.6 16.86 47.1
1955 79.3 17.83 18.91 46.3
1956 89.3 19.34 22.09 46.4
1957 98.4 24.49 24.58 49.9
1958 104.4 22.99 26.96 47.8
1959 108.1 23.77 27.73 47.6
1960 116.9 23.62 28.59 44.7
1961 118.6 18.4 31.5 42.1
1962 135.2 16.1 30.4 34.4
1963 146.5 22.1 31.3 37.3
1964 158.1 24.6 32.1 35.9
1965 170.1 28.1 36.8 38.2
79 These factors also create some difficulties in comparing company data with official 
government data as they will often be recorded over different time periods. Company 
reports record orders received at the time of signing of contracts and payments 
received in terms of gross revenue which can be over a number of years but Census of 
Production and Export /Import data record production as it occurs. Hence contracts 
taking many years to complete will be recorded in a way that makes direct 
comparisons problematic.
80 Sources: GEC, Annual Reports. 1965, 1960, 1958 and Heather, op.cit.. p.52 for 
1938 and 1952 figures on overseas trade. Figures refer to the financial year ending 31st 
March. Gross profit figures refer to profits derived from trading and investments. 
Overseas sales for 1963 calculated by interpolation.
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The reliance of British firms upon the Commonwealth countries (and their 
lack, with notable exceptions, of an orientation towards the USA and what emerged as 
the Common Market) can in part be explained by the fact that in the late 1940s there 
was little or no competition in many markets. As late as 1953 it was still the case that 
‘the principal factor in overseas competition in heavy plant is no longer price but
Q 1
delivery, i.e. it is still a seller’s market in capital goods.’ Although it was also 
recognised that ‘in other goods, especially domestic electrical equipment, it is now 
very much a buyer’s market and here price is the determining factor’.82 A 
concentration upon the heavy plant sector ensured that, as Figure 3.1 highlights, real 
gross profits for the three companies were rising throughout the late 1940s and early 
1950s. Not until West German, and other European, competition, had re-emerged did 
the orientation upon slower-growing markets begin to have an impact on the 
companies’ profitability. GEC’s real gross profits peaked in 1952 while those of AEI 
and English Electric peaked in 1955 and 1956 respectively.83
The failure to develop trade with western Europe is a key element in 
understanding how the British electrical engineering industry failed fully to develop 
export markets. Why did it occur?
81 BEAMA, The Electrical Industry Export Bulletin. February 1953, p.22.
82 Ibid.. p.22.
83 This result, with the exception of English Electric, is not dependent upon the 
index used. See Appendix Four.
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Figure 3.1 
Real Gross Profits £m (1952 prices)
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Sources: Annual Reports 1955-65 and B.R. Mitchell and H.G. Jones, Second Abstraqt 
of British Historical Statistics, (Cambridge 1971), Tables 4a-c for retail price index.
• Imperfect Competition and Business/Government Conflict
The growing importance of the electrical industry for the British economy and 
the growing difficulty the industry was facing in developed markets were two factors 
that led to the government’s active participation, through the Industrial Reorganisation 
Corporation, in the merger of GEC/AEI with English Electric in 1968. However, the 
IRC’s role needs to be understood in the context of the failure of earlier government 
attempts to gain the industry’s support for changes that would have improved its 
export performance.
Milward maintains that the failure of British exports lies in entrepreneurial 
failure. Thus it was ‘the failure by British exporters to do battle... British industrialists, 
offered the opportunities arising from occupation, did not take them.’84 However, to 
blame such a lack of promotion of goods in important markets such as Germany and 
the US on simple entrepreneurial failure would be too simplistic; after all British firms 
did, perhaps not terribly successfully, export to these countries. Government 
investigations into exports and the loss of Britain’s proportion of world trade in
84 Milward. op.cit.. pp. 403-4.
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electrical manufactures revealed two important findings: First, that the loss of export 
markets derived from an institutional failure and not simply entrepreneurial failure, 
and, second, that government and industry were moving further and further apart from 
agreement as the investigations progressed.
Well before 1968, the British government was attempting to address the 
industry’s failure to realise its export potential. As early as 1949 the Ministry of 
Supply’s Lemon Committee’s Report into the Standardisation o f Engineering 
Products pointed to a lack of standardisation among producers, leading to products 
failing to ‘reflect the real differences in cost of production’. Engineering manufacturers 
all too often built products to customised specification levels in the belief that 
standardised bulk produced goods would lead to lower quality.85 As a result prices 
were too high. Again in 1954 the Ministry of Supply Report on Exports o f Heavy 
Electrical Plant specifically pin-pointed to high prices as a serious problem facing 
electrical exports. In Europe, where competition from West Germany was strongest, 
UK prices were estimated to be at least 20% greater than competitors’ and elsewhere 
prices quoted by Dutch, Italian and German producers were lower by as much as 
40%.86 Even in markets where British firms benefited from tariff protection, such as 
New Zealand, with its 20% tariff, the report noted that ‘British manufacturers are 
barely able to compete on price’,87
85 Ministry of Supply, Report of the Committee for the Standardisation of 
Engineering Products. (1949), pp.6-15.
86 Ministry of Supply, Report on Exports of Heavy Electrical Plant. Part One, (1954), 
pp. 1-2 and p.46.
87 Ibid.. p.54.
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The report also highlighted a number of other non-price factors which had 
damaged the reputation of British manufacturers in export markets. The shortage of 
workers and component parts including forgings, due to the rearmament programme 
following the outbreak of the Korean war, along with the CEA’s priority over delivery 
(giving them guaranteed commissioning of plant within three years of ordering), were 
all pinpointed as causing delays in deliveries to international customers. Thus, in the 
Indian market, while British firms quoted a fifteen month delivery date for 22 Kilovolt 
isolators, German firms quoted six months and for large steam turbo-alternators the 
corresponding delivery dates were 27-42 months and 20-23 months respectively.88
The urgency of addressing these problems was made apparent by the close 
studies of individual markets. British companies supplied 80-90% of supplies to South 
Africa, but the ending of discrimination favouring Britain by the South African 
government would, it was expected, see stiffer competition. In Canada, where 85-90% 
of the large steam turbo-generators market were supplied by British firms, shorter 
delivery dates had allowed Japanese competitors to enter the market and the Italian and 
Germans were expected soon. Finally, in Australia, US and European firms had been 
winning orders away from British competitors since 1951.89
It would be wrong to suggest that manufacturers were unaware of the 
competition emerging within export markets. As early as 1949, despite the industry 
operating in a ‘seller’s market’, in which shortages of electrical products was the norm, 
the electrical manufacturers were beginning to recognise the problem. However, for
88 Ministry of Supply, Report on Exports of Heavy Electrical Plant. Part Two, (1954), 
Appendix Cl.
89 Ministry of Supply, Report on Exports. Part One, pp. 12,14 and 46.
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manufacturers the key issues affecting international competition were those of 
protectionism and non-price advantages which competitors had achieved. BEAMA, 
pointed out that ‘Except for British Colonies there are no overseas markets where we 
do not face straight away a hostile tariff ...from 5-50% and in the USA the average for 
a wide range of products is 40%’. BEAMA also pointed to the use of import licences 
in over 50 countries which were ‘often’ cancelled before delivery and so hindered 
exporters.90 In 1953 further domestic supply problems were put forward as causes of 
loss of international orders. ‘The present tightness in supply of labour and the 
shortages, notably in draughtsmen, moulders, skilled erectors and fitters... must be 
overcome if exports are to be increased and competitive delivery periods quoted.91 
Here the industry highlighted further non-price factors such as the British 
government’s ‘failure’ in ensuring an adequate supply of skilled labour and particularly 
the problem of uncompetitive delivery dates as factors in reduced competitiveness.
BEAMA was also aware that it was the re-emergence of West Germany as an 
exporter that was responsible as ‘the chief factor’ for Britain’s fall in proportion of 
world trade. In particular BEAMA singled out West German producer’s use of 
extended credits, finance and long-term loans, in order to finance projects, as 
damaging to British exporters’ interests. Thus competitors were winning contracts 
through a range of non-price advantages.92
The industry not only refused to accept the Ministry’s argument that product 
prices were consistently too high but actively argued against the introduction of price
90 BEAMA, Publicity Committee Minutes Jan-Dee 1949, speech by H.S. Bosworth 
19th October 1949.
91 BEAMA, Exports Bulletin. February 1953, p.22.
92 BEAMA, Annual Report. 1953-4, p.32.
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competition. On behalf of the manufacturers , BEAMA readily acknowledged that ‘it 
is broadly true that the majority of heavy electrical plant is sold on the basis designed 
to eliminate price competition’, while simultaneously refuting the view that ‘price 
arrangement is synonymous with high costs and profits.’93 Under these circumstances, 
it is not surprising that the industry maintained that ‘the set-up of the industry is no 
disadvantage to securing export orders’ and instead argued that government 
investigations should confine themselves to non-price factors.94
In recognising the growth of non-price factors eroding British firms’ market 
share, BEAMA’s response appears as a classic case of crass conservatism and 
entrepreneurial failure. The industry accepted a continued erosion of its export markets 
rather than look for alternative approaches. Manufacturers’ only rational response to 
new types of international competition and government imposed restrictions, which 
were outside their control, could only have been through deriving economies from new 
methods of manufacturing and marketing.
The Lemon report had pointed to the advantages of standardisation. In 
production, the use of bulk production techniques could have gone some way to 
dealing with shortages of skilled workers; in marketing, the abandonment of 
competition based upon custom specification could lead to price reductions.95 
Certainly, poor productivity levels in the late 1940s suggests there was a great need to 
move away from skill-intensive production techniques. Other alternatives lay in 
rationalisation and merger leading to specialisation between manufacturing plants. By
93 BEAMA, Agreed Prices in the Heavy Electrical Plant Industry. (1956), pp3-4.
94 BEAMA, Annual Report. 1953-4, p.2.
95 Ministry of Supply, Report on Standardisation, p.7.
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the end of the 1950s British firms were significantly smaller than leading European 
competitors. Fortune’s 1958 listing of the 100 largest non US firms documents a large 
gap between the largest European manufacturers, the Dutch firm Philips and the West 
German firm Siemens, with annual sales of over $800m, and the other major European 
manufacturers, all with sales ranging from $280m to $462m.96 Perhaps still more 
interestingly the 1965 listing shows that the only non US firms with over half the 
annual sales of either Philips ($1.9b) or Siemens ($1.6b) were the Japanese firm 
Hitachi ($1.2b), West German firm, AEG ($0.95b) and the Japanese Tokyo Shibaura 
Electric ($0.84b).97
It is important to recognise that these figures do not suggest that large size 
would have necessarily led to increases in efficiency, but that British firms were failing 
to maintain their relative position against competitors and that staying relatively small 
in the electrical engineering industry was unlikely to be a successful strategy for firms. 
From the late 1950s onwards, at least, British firms were smaller than leading 
European competitors.
There is, however, more to firms’ failure than entrepreneurial failure. The 
central reason why the electrical manufacturers failed to export to the growing 
markets, in Europe and the United States, lies not with entrepreneurial failure but with 
the co-operative agreements reached by the companies themselves, which created a
96 Fortune. August 1958, pp. 116-7. 1958 annual sales were; AEG $462m (W. 
German), English Electric $428m, AEI $419m (W.German), Brown Boveri $350m 
(Swiss), BICC $310m (British) and GEC $280m.
97 Fortune. August 1965 pp. 170-71. 1965 annual sales for subsequent non US 
electrical equipment companies, were; Matsushita $779m (Japan), AEI $662m, 
Brown Boveri $660m, Bosch $650m (W. German), English Electric $636m, BICC 
$604m, Mitshubishi $560m (Japan), Cie Generale d’Electricite $508m (French) and 
GEC $476m
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rigid institutional framework unconducive to change. As Milward notes, but then fails 
to explore, industrialists (European and American included) acted like a ‘threatened 
cartel’ faced with the re-establishment of markets during reconstruction.98 Pricing 
policy between the oligopolistic companies was carefully co-ordinated to ensure that 
tendering did not become cut-throat. All the major manufacturers, including 
subsidiaries of US companies operating outside of the United States, were involved in 
highly formalised co-operative agreements aimed at limiting both price and non-price 
competition.
The cartel agreements helped to ensure that competition was restricted to non­
price factors; delivery, quality, reliability, finance and credit facilities. Importantly, the 
cartels did not stop competition but instead created an accepted framework within 
which it could take place. It was therefore the factors affecting competitiveness within 
this framework that BEAMA addressed when discussing improving export 
performance and not questions which would alter the competitive framework of the 
industry internationally.
This is in direct contrast to the oil industry, where it was suggested that 
regulation was beneficial to investment and innovation. There domestic refining could 
emerge, as could vertical integration towards the retailing of products within a 
structured environment. To understand fully why the adoption of new methods of 
production, standardisation and lower prices or merger and specialisation would have 
de-stabilised agreements in electrical engineering it is necessary to look in more detail 
at the origins and operation of the rings themselves.
98 Milward, op.cit.. p.404.
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• Successful Regulation before 1945
The cartelization of the industry had developed rapidly in response to the world 
slump of 1929-31, with the signing of the International Notification and Compensation 
Agreement, INC A, in 1934. INC A was administered by the International Electrical 
Association, IEA. Essentially the aim of INCA was to ensure co-operation between 
companies in maintaining prices, allocating market shares and sharing patents. As a 
result, the two US firms (General Electric and Westinghouse) did not face European 
competition within the US market and, in return, the US companies avoided 
competing directly with European firms in their domestic markets. In geographical 
markets not covered by the IEA, the BEAMA and other trade associations (such as the 
Lamp Manufacturers’ Association or the British Radio Valve Manufacturers’ 
Association) maintained cartel agreements. Thus a series of multinational and national 
agreements covered all markets in which these firms operated.
The rationale behind such agreements was put forward in 1927 by BEAMA, in 
a comparison between Britain and the combinations and trusts operating within 
Europe. BEAMA argued that the close linking of manufacturing and finance, in 
Germany and across Europe, had created powerful industrial combinations involving 
manufacturers and banks. Such a ‘powerful organisation’ promoted long-term 
decision-making, as opposed to the short-term view allegedly predominant in Britain, 
caused by a divorce of finance from industry. As a result British support for free trade 
could no longer be simply applied:
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‘The time has certainly past when industry merely to preserve in all 
their pristine purity the doctrines of free trade should allow itself to be 
forced out of existence. The survival of the fittest may be natural law 
but interpretation of the law may take different forms. In the least 
civilised form it is the bitter struggle of individuals in a chaos of 
destruction with perhaps the emergence of one victorious type. At its 
highest it is co-operation of individuals to ensure the highest common 
level of advancement without strife and without destruction.’ 99
The strength of these views and the subsequent support for cartel agreements was so 
widespread within the British electrical manufacturing industry that it was noted that 
no British manufacturer had ever refused an invitation to join the IEA.100 GEC was 
still a member in 1977.101 It is the combination of British firms trading within a 
cartelized framework and in geographical areas which were not the most significant 
that provides the key to understanding the institutional failure of the industry in the 
post-war period.
• Successful Regulation after 1945
After 1945 the rings were rapidly re-established and operated by the trade
associations. Although technically separate from the trade associations, the Trade
Groups which negotiated and policed the agreements were intimately linked to the
trade associations. For an example of this close relationship we should look at the
BEAMA, whose membership consisted of over 360 companies operating in the British
99 BEAMA, Combines and Trusts in the Electrical Industry. The Position of Europe in 
1927. (1927), pp.6-7.
100 Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, Report on the Supply and 
Exports of Electrical and Allied Machinery and Plant. No.42, (1957), p.30.
101 K.R. Mirow and H. Maurer, Webs of Power. (Boston USA 1982), p.254.
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electrical manufacturing sector, covering some 80% of all capital employed in the 
industry.102
BEAMA’s president and past presidents included all the chairmen of the 
leading electrical manufacturers in Britain, namely GEC, English Electric and British 
Thomson-Houston (BTH) and Metropolitan-Vickers (Metrovick), which together 
formed AEI. BEAMA provided all the secretarial and administrative staff, along 
with accommodation for the physical operation of the rings. Of BEAMA’s annual 
income of £200,000 in 1953 some £59,600 derived from earnings by BEAMA in 
servicing 37 of the rings, covering alternators, electric motors and transformers.104 The 
links between BEAMA and the rings went still further than this. The rings operated 
through BEAMA were co-ordinated through the Groups’ Joint Administration Board, 
a committee established in 1933. The membership of the GJAB was appointed and 
made up of the Chairmen of BTH, GEC, English Electric, Metrovick and later the 
chairman of the fifth major British electrical plant manufacturer, C.A. Parsons. In 1944 
the routine work of GJAB was delegated to a Groups’ Joint Administration 
Committee, staffed again by members from the same companies.105 Thus the electrical 
manufacturers were involved in an incestuous relationship in which competition was 
virtually removed. Such a strategy appeared to be highly successful and the companies 
concerned saw their real gross profits rising rapidly in the late 1940s.
102 BEAMA, Publicity Committee Minutes, 19 October 1949.
103 Metropolitan-Vickers is sometimes referred to as Metro-Vick but here Metrovick 
will be used.
104 Total expenditure for the Trade Groups covering alternators, electric motors and 
transformers in 1953 was £91,687 of which 65%, £59,565, was charged by BEAMA 
for secretarial and accommodation costs. Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices 
Commission, op.cit.. pp. 16 & 20.
105 Ibid.. p.22.
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The co-operation between firms was so highly organised and of such 
importance that it required the activities of the company chairmen to ensure that the 
restrictive agreements continued to operate. Two conclusions can be drawn from this 
relationship. The prices quoted by the Trade Groups were of such authority that 
purchasers, in particular international purchasers, believed the prices to be official 
BEAMA prices and therefore the close link to BEAMA provided authority to the 
Trade Groups in the eyes of third parties.106 Such authority was crucial to the effective 
operation of the rings in order to prevent manufacturers breaking the agreements. 
Second, the involvement of the company chairmen indicates not only the importance 
of the co-operation to the companies themselves, but also that the companies 
maintained a deep distrust of one another and only contact between the executives at 
the very highest levels of the companies could maintain co-operation. Indeed the need 
to maintain daily contact and close supervision of each competitor’s activities led to 
AEI, GEC and English Electric maintaining their Head Offices within one hundred 
yards of each other in the Kingsway, London. When AEI moved to Grosvenor Place 
(still in Central London and only five stops on the tube network), there were 
complaints about the distance from GEC and English Electric!107 Thus while 
competition was virtually eliminated, employers firmly believed and feared the 
possibility that competition could easily return and that the ‘chaos of destruction’ that 
would follow could only be damaging for all concerned.
These fears also explain the highly formalised nature of the agreements 
themselves. The agreements covered all aspects of competition and created an
106 Ibid.. p.24.
107 Jones and Marriott, op.cit.. p. 171.
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organisational forum to ensure they were adhered to. The 1948 Lamp Agreement was 
typical of these agreements. It was signed between British Thomson-Houston, 
Crompton Parkinson, Cryselco, Edison-Swan Electric Co., General Electric Co., 
Metropolitan-Vickers, MV Philips, Siemens Electrical Lamps and Supplies and the 
Stella Lamp Co. on the 26th June 1950, but retrospectively covered the period from 1st 
July 1948 until 30th June 1955 and continued the 1941 agreement.108 Throughout its 
operation it was expressly stated that it should be kept a strict secret from all third 
parties.109 The Lamp Agreement designated distinct areas within the Commonwealth 
in which it would operate, namely: 1. Great Britain, 2. Australia, 3. New Zealand, 4. 
India, Pakistan and Burma, 5. South Africa, and 6. Remaining territories which 
consisted of Ceylon, Singapore, Malaya, Borneo and the British West Indies.110
The document carefully defined all lighting products covered by the agreement 
and set out a framework within which the agreement would operate. A committee 
appointed from representatives of the companies would be established at the annual 
meeting of all the companies concerned. Thus the ‘Executive Committee consisting of 
5 members [would be made up of] one representative from BTH, Edison-Swan or 
Metrovick, one from Crompton Parkinson, one from GEC, one from Philips and one 
from Siemens’.111 The participants were also given voting rights, based upon permitted 
quantity of sales, ranging from GEC 59,369,635 and Philips 37,784,988 down to 
Stella’s 1,496,469.112
108 GEC, 1948 Lamp Agreement, Article 1, p.l and article 12 p.32.
109 Ibid., p43.
110 Ibid., p.8 and 48.
111 Ibid., p.21.
112 Ibid., Part H, Article 10 (A) 3, p.53.
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The agreement set out detailed conditions to be accepted by participating 
companies with regard to market shares, (see Table 3.4) and prices in each territory, 
which were enforceable through the use of fines. Hence Article 6 of the agreement 
stated that ‘Any company which sells above its Local Participating Percentage (LPP) 
shall pay 30% of its net profit per unit up to 7.5% of sales above LPP. Any sales over 
the 7.5% will require a payment of 52.5% of net profit per unit.’113
Importantly the agreement also ensured that the agreement could be extended 
to other ‘reputable manufacturers’ and that signatories would agree to adjustments 
being made to their ‘participating percentages’.114 If an opportunity became available 
to purchase a manufacturer not covered by the agreement then all participants to the 
lamp agreement would be notified and the purchase would take place ‘on account of 
all the Parties’.115
113 Ibid., p.9.
114 Ibid., Article 12, p.27.
115 Ibid., Article 30, p.30 and p.43.
Table 3.4
Local Participating Percentages of 1948 Lamp Agreement116
Co. and Voting Rights Britain Australia New
Zealand
India, Pakistan & 
Burma
South Africa Remaining Territories
Philips 37,784,988 9.09246 48.57497 33.74575 35.62008 36.89245 20.84013
BTH/Ediswan
28,700,110/
18,297,483
77.56517
18.16496 19.10960 11.55292 16.17640 13.79285
GEC 59,369,635 12.13994 19.47455 27.94631 19.56835 36.97112
Metrovick
7,717,391
2.81754 2.74643 8.22438 5.10276 5.49247
Siemens
20,007,110
1.92529 1.87670 1.80421 1.85329 1.99483
Stella 1,496,469 0.92426
C.P. 30,049,991 12.41811 16.37730 23.04697 14.85210 20.40675 20.90860
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
116 Ibid., Annex B, pp.52-3.
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The operation of cartel agreements involved companies in a number of 
administrative tasks, which together provided a mechanism for the IEA’s regulation of 
international markets. Under the Tendering and Contracting Agreement, covering 
electrical plant, companies had to ensure the co-ordinating body was notified as soon 
as an enquiry or sale was made: this would then be passed on to the other parties.117 
When any tendering process was complete, the successful firm would then compensate 
those unsuccessful for their costs incurred in preparing the tender. Thus the cost of the 
tendering process was passed on to the purchaser. Firms could also claim the right to a 
sale if they had tendered successfully to the client in the past.118 Under such 
circumstances, competitors would increase their tender price in order to lose the 
contract. However, such co-operation would require a quid-pro-quo, whereby in other 
markets competitors would pull out of direct ‘competition’ in return, in order to ensure 
that such protection could not be used to gain advantage by individual firms.
Most importantly, the agreements covered the setting of minimum prices for 
equivalent goods. For heavy plant, prices were based upon technical specifications so 
that identical specification, despite differing designs, would ensure identical prices.119 
The minimum prices, or Contract Prices, were adjusted through the notification of 
firms via the trade association newsletter, such as the BEAMA Bulletin, which was 
exclusively sent to members of the trade associations. This dissemination of details of 
the contract price not only provides still further evidence of the intimate link between
117 It is this agreement that has been suggested to have been so damaging to 
developing countries, as it encouraged predatory pricing. It is also said to have still 
been in operation in the 1980s. See Mirow and Maurer, op.cit.. p.249.
118 Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, op.cit.. p.26.
119 Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, Annual Report (1956), 
pp.25-27.
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the trade associations and trade groups but it also highlights how firms not formal 
parties to the rings could be made aware of the prices operating, with the aim of 
gaining informal co-operation. Finally, the agreements set out supplementary clauses 
to ensure common handling charges, conditions of sale and resale, all of which were 
designed to reinforce the minimum price clause.
In other areas such as cathode ray tubes and products distributed through 
wholesalers, firms maintained dual prices for initial sales, of products used in the 
assembly of final goods such as televisions, and ‘significantly’ higher prices for 
replacement devices.120 Other practices, including lists of approved wholesalers, 
distributors and engineers, were adopted to restrict the sale of goods to those abiding 
by the manufacturers’ conditions on prices. The practice was so formalised that the 
companies printed their retailers’ minimum sale prices on their publications, detailing 
discounts and purchase tax.121 These formalised mechanisms for co-operation between 
manufacturers proved highly effective in limiting competition and boosting prices in 
the post-war period. Most famously, this occurred in the manufacture of lamps. Lamps 
proved an ideal product for price-fixing cartels due to their high price inelasticity, since 
their use was dependent upon the cost and access to electricity rather than the price of 
the product itself. As GEC’s lamp manufacturing company, Osram, itself admitted, 
prices ‘have always been relatively high and certainly they have not fallen 
commensurably with factory costs of production.’ Nevertheless the manufacturers 
maintained that this was justified since the ‘resulting high margin of gross profit has of 
course not been retained wholly by the makers but has been shared with distributors
120 Ibid.. p.23.
121 GEC, Osram Electric Lamp Catalogue, 1948.
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who have high discounts and rebates.’122 In comparison to the US market, the lamp 
manufacturers in Britain maintained a significantly higher profit level. The ratio of 
realised ex-factory price (including 38% discount) to manufacturers’ costs was 237% 
in Britain compared to only 73% in the US. When measured as a ratio of retail price to 
manufacturers’ costs, the difference was 433% in Britain and 211% in the US. 123 In 
terms of gross profit, it was recognised that ‘whereas the US trade made a living out of 
distribution and a gross profit of 6.6c per lamp the British counterpart absorbed a 
difference of 14.4c or over twice as much as in the US.’ Some of this discrepancy 
between British and US manufacturers’ profit rates was due to the parallel distribution 
system of wholesalers which British manufacturers maintained, compared to the US 
system of sales exclusively through wholesalers. Nevertheless, it was admitted that 
‘Viewing the situation only in the light of the facts affecting the supply of the retail 
user, it cannot be denied that in comparison with the USA the British lamp producers 
are either making excessive profits or are grossly wasteful in their methods of 
distribution or both.’124
The other central difference between the two countries lay in the US 
government’s opposition to cartels and tmsts. In the United States, General Electric 
suffered from a prosecution under the anti-trust laws which ran from 1941 until 1953. 
The effect of the case is said to have ‘wreaked havoc’ upon its international business 
leaving the General Electric ‘empire in a shambles’. 125 Although more recent studies
122 GEC, Osram-GEC Lamp Price and Distribution Policy, by J.Y. Fletcher, 12 May 
1945.
123 Ibid., p.5.
124 Ibid., p.5.
125 M. Wilkins, The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad 
1914-70. (Harvard 1974), pp.294-5.
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of post-war anti-trust policy has tended to suggest that it was pursued with less vigour 
than previously suggested, from the recession of 1949 through the Korean War and 
into the mid 1950s, despite the passing of the Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger Act, 
amending the 1914 Clayton Act, anti-trust enforcement was generally ‘quiescent’.126 
Much of the evidence cited here also suggests that the US companies continued to 
participate, either informally or actively, in these agreements. In 1949, despite the 
withdrawal of General Electric and Westinghouse from the INCA agreement in 1947,
i onthe United States government believed the restrictions still to be in operation. Indeed 
as late as June 1955 the agreement between GEC and the General Electric Co., 
limiting exports of lamps to the US was still in operation.128
• Regulation under Threat
In electrical engineering it appears that the rings helped to ensure the 
continuation of what Lazonick has described as a ‘competitive equilibrium’. Unlike in 
oil, where a balance between supply and demand was difficult to maintain, the sharing 
of information led firms in electrical engineering to become subject to similar cost and 
revenue constraints. The result was that, at a time when profit levels were high in a 
seller’s market, individual firms were unwilling to abandon these agreements for a
126 T. Fryer. Regulating Big Business. Antitrust in Great Britain and America. 1880- 
1990. (Cambridge 1992), p.300.
127 US Government, NRA RG 469/392, UK Subject Files, Box 40, Possible barriers 
to Improvement of UK Balance of Payments Position Erected by Private 
Agreements, 6th September 1949.p.5 (I am grateful to Jim Tomlinson and Nic 
Tiratsoo for this reference).
128 GEC, Electric Lamp Manufacturers Association enquiry into agreements relating to 
the Electric Lamp Business in Great Britain to which General Electric is a party, 
(undated).
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190more competitive business strategy. Unfortunately for the firms involved, the failure 
of business to respond to calls for increased export promotion provided more 
evidence pushing government to examine the anti-competitive nature of cartel 
agreements.
British government investigations into cartels and their impact originally 
stemmed from wartime discussions between the allies over the establishment of a 
post-war trade and international payments regime.130 The Board of Trade carried out 
a study on the extent of British participation in international cartels in 1943 and, in 
1944, a further study on the extent of domestic cartels.131 These investigations 
highlighted the degree to which cartels and wider restrictive practices were used to 
regulate international trade and domestic competition. In electrical engineering 
77.6% of sales were estimated to be covered by restrictive agreements.132
Investigations by the US government in 1949 further highlighted cartels as a 
barrier to improvements in the UK balance of payments position. The investigation 
pointed to ‘market arrangements [that] were in effect among producers of important 
commodities which would prevent UK exporters from entering new markets or 
reducing prices in such markets.’133 It was the industry’s failure to respond to 
government calls for greater exports that inevitably led the Board of Trade into
129 W. Lazonick, Business Organisation and the Myth of the Market Economy. 
(Cambridge, Mass 1991), p.75.
130 See Tomlinson, op.cit.. pp. 172-202.
131 See D.C. Elliott and J.D. Gribbin, ‘The abolition of cartels and structural change 
in the United Kingdom’, Welfare Aspects of Industrial Markets, eds. A.P. Jacquemin 
and H.W. de Jong, (Leiden Netherlands 1977).
132 Ibid.. table 4, p.353.
133 US Government, op.cit., Box 40, September 1949.
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questioning the wider institutional structure of the industry through the 
investigations of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission.134
The Ministry of Supply’s 1950 Lemon Committee and 1954 Report on 
Exports o f Heavy Plant, combined with the Board of Trade’s Monopolies 
Commission reports on the Supply o f Electric Lamps (1951), Supply o f Insulated 
Wires and Cables (1951), Supply and Exports o f Electrical and Allied Machinery 
and Plant (1957) and Supply o f Electronic Valves and Cathode Ray Tubes (1957), 
forced the manufacturers and their trade associations into taking on board a view in 
which, rings, quotas and oligopolistic profiteering were frowned upon. The change 
exemplified in the BEAMA records highlights this change of attitude.
BEAMA’s response to criticism of its members and the industry was, in the 
late 1940s, one of preventing any open debate taking place. The accepted view was 
that all decision-making and discussion of the industry should take place behind closed 
doors, in order to limit any proposals. So when the industry was castigated for ‘almost 
a complete lack of competition’, following the publication of the Anglo-American 
Council on Productivity report on the supply of electricity, the response from the 
Director of BEAMA was that ‘the best policy would be to ignore them’.135 In 1951, 
when monopoly investigations into the electrical industry were beginning, the 
Chairman of BEAMA, G.L. Wates, claimed that ‘if the Monopolies Commission come 
a little closer to the BEAMA than they have hitherto done’ (in other words were less
134 See J.D. Gribbin, ‘The Post-War Revival of Competition as industrial Policy’, 
Government Economic Service Working Paper No. 19, (1978) and H. Mercer, 
Constructing a Competitive Order. (Cambridge 1995) for discussion of the general 
development of antitrust policy.
135 BEAMA, Publicity Committee Minutes, 7th November 1950, Minute 775.
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critical) then the investigation itself would be ‘a wonderful opportunity to educate the 
Commission and through them the whole country as to the reasonableness of our well 
established customs.’ The fact that BEAMA, and the industry generally, were well 
aware of the difficulties arising both within export markets and in domestic 
competition policy suggests that they were complacent with regard to responding to the 
challenges presented in the late 1940s.
By the late 1950s the response of BEAMA had changed significantly. That the 
formal character of the domestic rings and cartels was seriously under threat had 
become obvious and, equally importantly, the rings were no longer acting as a 
guarantee of high profits. Now BEAMA sought to respond to these changes through 
adopting less formalised approaches to inter-company co-operation, while maintaining 
its long-held philosophy favouring rings. BEAMA’s role would be ‘to work out the 
proper and permissible ways in which electrical manufacturers should co-operate in 
their mutual interest and the interest of the country’. Further, it proposed a series of 
strategies that would not conflict with the 1956 Restrictive Trade Practices Act. The 
Act outlawed the collective enforcement of restrictive trade practices considered to be 
against the public interest, as interpreted by the Restrictive Practices Court. Collective 
agreements on resale prices, discounting and distribution, including stop lists and 
agreements on specifications and tendering, were all covered by the act and were 
widespread in the electrical manufacturing industry.137
136 BEAMA, Newsheet. 10th May 1951.
See B.S. Yamey (ed.), Resale Price Maintenance. (1966) for details of the effect of 
the Restrictive Trade Practices Act.
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In particular firms could, through BEAMA, interchange price lists, information 
relating to discount structures and also information relating to standardisation or 
research and development, as long as technical information was not related to any 
specific tender enquiry.138 The move to outlaw restrictive practices was an 
international one and BEAMA was, as with the 1956 Act in Britain, forced to carry out 
a similar exercise with respect to clauses 85-90 of the Treaty of Rome, which covered 
restrictive trade practices in the Common Market.139
By the mid-1960s, BEAMA had reluctantly recognised the need to accept the 
abandonment of formal cartel agreements within Britain. Even in the case of informal 
agreements such as restrictions upon resale prices, BEAMA was reluctantly accepting 
the changed commercial circumstances. In 1964 the Resale Prices Act extended the 
prohibition on collective agreements covering resale price maintenance to include 
individual agreements. Thus in 1964 the Domestic Appliances Division of BEAMA 
announced its intention to register resale price agreements but ‘only when members of 
the other Divisions of BEAMA who are affected by the (Resale Prices) Act have 
decided on their own course of action.’140 The acceptance of such changes was not, 
however, the same as welcoming them. The electrical manufacturers railed against the 
measures aimed at cutting prices and preventing collusion. The Chairman of English 
Electric, Lord Nelson, complained that ‘cutting prices does not create more demand for 
heavy plant, it only moves work from one manufacturer to another and lowers the 
margins of the business’. Further, he reaffirmed his belief in co-operation stating that
138 BEAMA, BEAMA and the future, 28 September 1959, pp.5-7.
139 BEAMA, The European Common Market and Restrictive Trade Practices. (1962).
140 BEAMA Bulletin, Vol. 10 No. 166,18 August 1964, p.153.
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‘surely the supplier and the user must be in partnership so that each can prosper 
through the other.’141 Importantly the abandonment of formalised cartel agreements 
did not lead to an abandonment cf the commitment on co-operation. Rather the 
complacency of the 1940s gave way to the pragmatism of the late 1950s and by the 
early 1960s the manufacturers were in the process of developing new methods of co­
operation which would allow the industry to retain a mutually agreed framework in 
which competition could be regulated.
The role of the cartel agreements in the British export failure is now clear. 
The agreements created a rigid and restricting institutional framework which hindered 
electrical manufacturers’ operations. A competitive equilibrium was established which 
the British firms were unwilling to challenge. As mentioned above, the late 1940s 
represented a sellers’ market in the extreme. British exporters, with little exaggeration, 
were capable of selling virtually any electrical goods they could chum out of their 
plants in any market around the world, with the exception of the United States. But due 
to their adherence to the international cartel agreements they systematically opted out 
of key markets so that, when the cartels were broken and they began to orientate on 
Western European markets, they faced stiff international competition. The result was 
that British manufacturers lost the opportunity to develop first mover advantages 
during post-war re-construction.
Such a conclusion, however, raises two key questions. First, why should the 
major British firms within the industry have relied upon these agreements for so long, 
when it was well understood that international competitors, particularly German but
141 English Electric, Annual Report. 29 March 1962, pp.7-8.
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other European firms as well, were gaining more from them? And second, why was 
there no single firm capable of gaining competitive advantage through a strategy of 
abandoning collusion and competing in the key markets of Western Europe and the 
United States? Answering these questions will, in turn resolve the first of our main 
questions, namely did the ending of formal cartels have a detrimental effect on the 
companies concerned by simply highlighting the lack of international competitiveness? 
It will be recalled that our general interest lies with the role of information under 
conditions of uncertainty. We are therefore concerned with the issue of whether or not 
the sharing of information, through cartels, was a defensive strategy for uncompetitive 
firms or did it play an important role in the creation of organisational capabilities for 
innovative firms.
• Information Sharing
Electrical manufacturers’ defence of price agreements rested upon the view, 
argued by Lord Nelson, that cutting prices did not create more demand. Outside of 
consumer durables, demand for electrical engineering products was viewed as being 
inelastic with respect to price. Given a limited number of orders producers could 
rapidly face the difficulty of competition leading to falling margins and bankruptcy. 
This problem was compounded by the fact that the industry was also one in which high 
levels of research and development expenditure were required. If R+D expenditure
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was to be safeguarded, then the manufacturers believed it was necessary to restrict
• • 142price competition.
An intimate relationship certainly existed between R+D, patenting and 
technology sharing and the regulation of price competition. The sharing of patents had 
always been a significant part of the interwar ring agreements. Patent pools acted both 
to extend the knowledge of invention and innovation available to firms and to further 
the knowledge of each firm about the capabilities of competitors. Thus patent pools, as 
with other aspects of the rings, had an inherent restrictive component to them. While 
these agreements in the interwar years may not have led to the growth of patenting, as 
such, it appears that firms within the electrical industry increasingly specialised in their 
R+D activity.143 Such specialisation allowed firms to gain monopolies over specific 
areas of technology and as a result the patent pools created a mechanism for firms to 
co-operate in the sharing of technologies.144 The crucial aspect in the operation of 
these patent pools was that each firm was involved in carrying out research and as a 
result a free rider problem did not arise.
After 1945 extensive research and development programmes continued within 
the electrical industry. By 1957 BEAM A estimated that, excluding radio and 
telecommunications, company research amounted to £6m per annum on laboratory 
work with a further £12m per annum on developmental work. R+D programmes have
142 This view was put forward for BE AM A by G.B. Richardson, op.cit.. p. 19 and is 
also accepted by writers who otherwise favour price competition. See Jones and 
Marriott, op.cit.. p.318.
143 J. Cantwell & P. Barrera, The Influence of International Cartels in Large Firms. 
(Unpublished paper 1994), p.l 1.
144 D.E.H. Edgerton & S.M. Horrocks, ‘British Industrial Research before 1945', in 
Economic History Review. Vol.XLVn, N o.2,1994, pp.227-8.
200
been shown to have been highly concentrated in a small number of large projects. 
Studies of R+D within OECD nations revealed that over two thirds of all R+D was 
performed in the 100 largest projects in the late 1960s.145 In Britain it was also 
revealed that over 60% of industrial R+D was carried out by firms employing over 
10,000 employees.146 A further illustration of the importance of research for large 
firms comes from the evidence that large firms increased their proportion of United 
States patents, awarded for UK-located research in the electrical industry, from 21% 
between 1920-24 to 53% between 1935-39 and rose still further to 56% between 1940- 
59.147 Of the companies under study, only GEC held a significant proportion of US 
patents awarded to British companies in the electrical industry. Between 1920-39 GEC 
was responsible for over 20% of all patents in electrical technologies awarded to large 
UK firms.148 It should be noted that AEI’s and English Electric’s technology sharing 
agreements with the US companies General Electric and Westinghouse respectively 
would have resulted in a lower propensity to patent in the US.
This growing importance of R+D is also brought out by examining the history 
of the three companies under study. GEC had established the Hirst Research Centre as 
a research laboratory in Wembley in 1922. By 1939 the company employed 550 in 
research, including graduates and non-graduates. The Second World War saw this
145 C. Freeman, 'Size of firm, R+D and innovation', Department of Trade and Industry. 
International Conference on Monopolies. Mergers and Restrictive Practices, ed. J.B. 
Heath, (Cambridge 1969), Japanese R+D provided the only exception in this study.
146 Ibid.. pp. 147-8.
J. Cantwell & P. Barrera, The rise of corporate R+D and the technological 
performance of the largest European firms from the interwar years onwards', 
University of Reading. Discussion Papers in Economics. No. 271, (Reading 1993), 
Table 6, p.38.
148 Shares of UK patents awarded to large firms were RCA 11.24%, GEC 8.25%, EMI 
3.67% and all large firms 40.61%. Ibid.. Table 11, p.43.
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increase to 1,700, although this was subsequently reduced to approximately 1,000 by 
1948.149 From 1948, research activity again increased, such that GEC’s research 
laboratory had a budget of some £2m and a staff of over 2,000 by 1951.150 By 1965 
GEC had further expanded its defence electronics orientated research, through the 
establishment of Applied Electronics Laboratory and the purchase from the 
government of the Stanmore Research laboratory. The Stanmore laboratory had 
originally been set up and run by GEC in 1949 as a centre for research for into radar 
and guided missiles.151 Including the Stanmore laboratory, by 1956 research spending 
was running at approximately £3m per annum, with around 3,000 people employed, 
including 650 graduates.152
In the case of AEI, the company established a research laboratory at 
Aldermaston in 1946, which was concerned primarily with fundamental research. 
Developmental research work was carried out in laboratories at its plants at 
Manchester, Rugby, Harlow and Woolwich. In total the research budget by 1949 was 
over £lm .153 Chandler has claimed that only GEC had ‘established research facilities’ 
before the war, yet BTH had established its’ laboratory in 1924 and Metrovick’s 
research and development laboratory was formed in 1917, five years before GEC.154 
The two subsidiaries employed a combined total of 293 staff in their research
149 O.W. Humpreys, 'The Organisation and Planning of Research and Development in 
the GEC Ltd.', R.S. Edwards & H. Townsend, op.cit.. p.328.
150 GEC, Chemistry & Industry. 1951, pp.518-9.
151 GEC, Annual Report. 1949, p.2.
152 Humphries, op.cit.. p.329.
153 AEI, Annual Report and Accounts. 1949, p.9.
154 See Chandler, op.cit.. p.354 and A. Fleming, B.G. Churcher & J.L. Davies, 'The 
research laboratories of Associated Electrical Industries Ltd.', Proceedings of the Roval 
Society of London. 210A, 1951, p.151 and p.168.
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laboratories in 1930, growing between 1935-6 to over 360 and to 940 by 1951.155 If 
AEI’s Aldermaston laboratory is included this figure rises still further to 1020.156
Research expenditure within English Electric was also extensive. The 
company’s innovative use of micro integrated circuits ‘changed the centre of gravity’ 
of the computer industry when it was the first company to market a third generation 
computer.157 This lead was however lost, due to both Britain’s inability to produce the 
necessary quantity of integrated circuits and the American company IBM’s entry into 
the market.158 The company claimed to spend around £6.25m per annum, employing 
about 6,000 scientists, designers, engineers, draughtsmen and craftsmen in research 
and development by 1953.159 Such an amount would be well in excess of both AEI and 
GEC put together and so cannot be relied upon as a comparable figure for the 
company’s research expenditure.160
Lazonick maintains that oligopolistic organisations may avoid uncertainty 
and the need for innovative, high cost and high risk, strategies by creating market 
conditions which favour adaptive strategies.161 The use of patent pools can be said to 
have acted to encourage this development. However, the disruption of World War 
Two undermined this regulation, leading to increases in uncertainty, with regard to 
the nature of competitor firm’s productive and R+D capabilities. As a result, at the
155 See D.E.H. Edgerton, 'Science and Technology in British Business History', 
Business History. No.4, 1987, appendix 1, p. 100.
156 Fleming, Churcher & Davies, op.cit.. p. 146.
157 Economist. 17 November 1965, p.978.
158 See Hendry, op.cit.. for a detailed account.
159 English Electric, Report and Accounts. 1953, p. 14.
160 English Electric is not a company referred to in one recent study on industrial 
research. See Edgerton & Horrocks, op.cit.
161 Lazonick, op.cit.. p.206.
203
end of the war US and British firms were eager to discover the extent of German and 
to a lesser extent Japanese firms’ development.
In general the investigations into German manufacturing processes at the end 
of the war are considered in terms of government’s attempts to extract either 
reparations or specific military technology, particularly rocket technology.162 In 
reality the investigations were much wider than this. Teams of technical experts 
toured German electrical plants to investigate the full extent of German manufacturing 
capabilities. These teams were controlled under three different groups, the Combined 
Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee (CIOS), the British Intelligence Sub- 
Committee (BIOS) and the Field Intelligence Agency Technical, US Group (FIAT). 
They consisted of technicians from the leading companies and government experts. 
BEAMA itself organised a number of the teams, including the one responsible for the 
examination of German switchgear production. An indication of the extent of these 
investigations into electrical engineering comes from the 1948 list of reports showing 
that, for the electrical manufacturing industry alone, 430 separate reports were 
prepared, covering 25 different subject areas. These included 27 on cables and cable 
making machinery, 71 on electric meters, measuring, testing and recording apparatus
162 See A. Caimcross, The Price of War. British Policy on German Reparations 
1948-49. (Oxford 1986) and M. Harrison and N. Simonov, ‘Invention, Imitation and 
Soviet Rocketry after 1945’, (Unpublished paper 1996), presented to the Warwick 
Economic History Research Workshop.
163 British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee Final Report (hereafter BIOS), 
No. 1429, Item 31. Modem German Switchgear Production.
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and 13 into alternators, generators and rotary connectors (see Appendix Five for full 
listing).164
The basis for all the investigations was similar; ‘to determine whether or not 
there have been any major design developments in design or production by the 
Germans’.165 The reports highlighted a number of common themes, in particular that 
the German electrical industry had suffered severe shortages of materials, which had 
resulted in ‘careful consideration from the point of view of economical manufacture 
and use of materials’.166 Although reliability problems had occurred as a result, 
important lessons had been learnt which could prove valuable in the future. With 
respect to transformer operation, in particular, it was noted that ‘reduced reliability 
must be attributed in part to the German conception of design involving extreme 
economy in materials... it is evident that the designers have learnt a lot from
, 167experience .
On the lamp and lighting industry it was observed that, while ‘it is the 
conclusion of this report that, in general, lighting practice in Germany has been equal 
to, if not better than, that in the UK and not so advanced as that in the USA.’, in the 
quality end of household lighting German manufacture and design were ‘much more 
advanced than in the US and in the UK.’168 Still more importantly, in areas such as 
research and development into gas turbines, it was noted that the head of the
164 Reports of BIOS, the Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee (hereafter 
CIOS), and the Field Intelligence Agency Technical, US Group (hereafter FIAT), 
Classified List, No. 18,1948 (see Appendix Five for full listing).
165 BIOS, Final Report, No.274, October 1945, p.2.
166 BIOS, Final Report, No.l429,p.6.
167 BIOS, Final Report, Visit to German Electric Power Station, Item 33, No.98, June 
1945, p.8.
168 FIAT, Final Report, No. 274, October 1945, pp.3-6.
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Aerodynamic Institute at Gottingen, Dr. Encke, as the chief consultant on axial 
compressors for the whole of the aerodynamic industry, ‘has done a large amount of 
valuable basic work’. This was considered so important that the report stated ‘It is 
considered essential that his records should be investigated in detail by a competent 
aerodynamicist. ’169
Thus the reports focus upon technological advances made outside the patent 
pools. They proved not only the value of technology sharing in avoiding being left 
behind by competitors, but also that it was only a matter of time before the advances 
made by the electrical industry in Germany were again put into practice. The fact that 
British firms were aware, even before 1949, of the likely competitive advantages 
which the German manufacturers would have provides the explanation of why British 
firms wished to see the re-creation of the rings. British firms were well aware of their 
technological deficiencies with respect to German producers. The major British 
companies opted for an adaptive co-operative strategy based upon the sharing of 
technology as a defensive device. These strategies continued the long traditions 
established within the industry and replaced the patent pools that existed within the 
cartels. Now companies swapped patents and technological expertise free of royalty 
charges and licensing payments.
Thus the agreement between AEI and the International General Electric Co. Inc 
signed in 1951, reaffirming the 1931 agreement and extending its operation until 1955, 
granted AEI ‘a non-exclusive license to manufacture, have manufactured and sell’
169 CIOS, Research and Development on Gas Turbines at Junkers Motoren Werke, 
Item No.5, p.9.
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‘without limitations’ ‘all (GE) products...except lamps’.170 Less far reaching, but more 
typical, was the gaining by AEI of GEC’s work on vacuum pumps in exchange for 
AEI’s work on space simulators.171 Again a further agreement in operation from 1st 
January 1956, four years after the resolution of the anti-trust case against General 
Electric in the US, was made between US General Electric Co. and AEI, extending the 
existing agreement on turbo-starters until 1965.172 Importantly, Wilkins notes that 
these agreements could also be used by firms, such as Westinghouse, to prevent 
licensees from exporting into the American market.173
The GEC archive documents a number of these agreements between British 
firms and between British and international firms dating from 1956. However, the 
records are not sufficiently complete to tell us how new or how widespread these 
agreements were. One Electric Lamp Manufacturers’ Association enquiry into 
agreements relating to the Electric Lamp Business in Great Britain, to which the GEC 
was a party, documented 53 agreements between GEC and other individual companies, 
relating to sales and patent exchanges.174 It certainly appears to be the case that patent- 
sharing agreements proved important from the mid-1950s onwards and acted as an
170 GEC, Box 1951, Amended Agreement between International General Electric Co. 
Inc, AEI, BTH, Metrovick, Edison Swan and Ferguson Pailin, 26th May 1951.
171 GEC, Box 1963,19 September 1963.
172 GEC, Box 1954-58, 1st January 1956. Note the International General electric Co. 
became a division of General Electric in 1952.
173 Wilkins, op.cit.. p541, footnote 29. Not until 1970 was challenged by the US 
Justice Department.
174 GEC, Electric Lamp Manufacturers Association enquiry, (undated but probably in 
response to the 1949 announcement of the monopolies commission investigation into 
the supply of electric lamps). Of the 53 eight had been signed between 1945 and 1948.
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alternative method for inter-firm co-operation which lay outside the restrictions of 
monopoly policy.175
The explanation behind electrical manufacturers’ interest in the restriction of 
price competition therefore derives from two concerns: increases in uncertainty due to 
the breakdown of the patent pools during the war, and an early realisation among 
producers of their weak position with respect to technical advance. The cartels 
reflected a lack of competitiveness among British manufacturers, but this leads us to 
our second question: why was there no single British firm capable of gaining 
competitive advantage through a strategy of abandoning collusion and competing in 
the key markets of Western Europe and the United States? If the cartels were simply 
restrictive in their aim, it might also be asked: why then did the American companies, 
which did have a competitive advantage, also allow the rings to be re-established? In 
examining the ownership structure of the industry it is not only possible to answer 
these questions but also to achieve a complete explanation for the development of the 
post-war rings.
• Ownership and Control
The conclusion arrived at above implies that the motivation of firms, in the 
creation of market conditions favouring adaptive strategies, derives from a lack of 
competitiveness. However the key to explaining the failure of any single firm to break 
from the rings, and adopt an innovative strategy, in fact derives from the influence of
175 It is unlikely that technology sharing agreements ever completely replaced 
agreements on price since even as late as 1974 it was revealed that cable manufacturers 
had secretly combined together to operate a parallel pricing arrangement for sales to 
the Post Office. See Cowling et.al., op.cit., p206.
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American ownership on the British firm AEI, and to a lesser extent English Electric, 
rather than a lack of competitiveness.176 Associated Electrical Industries was the 
largest of the electrical manufacturing companies operating in Britain in the 1930s. 
AEI was formed in 1928 as a holding company for British Thomson-Houston and 
Metropolitan-Vickers and their subsidiaries. Both BTH and Metrovick themselves 
were two of the largest firms operating within the industry in the interwar period and 
from 1928 General Electric of America owned both companies via the ownership of 
up to 54% of AEI’s shares.177 As a result, General Electric (USA) directly controlled 
the decision making process of the company through appointed directors such as 
Howard Levis, the first Chairman of AEI, William Lusk, his successor and Managing 
Director of BTH until 1944, as well as Lusk’s successor Harry Sporborg.178 This 
relationship was so close that AEI’s Head Office was also the London office of 
General Electric’s subsidiary company dealing with all international agreements, the 
International General Electric Co.179 AEI thus became the mechanism through which 
General Electric (USA) gained a substantial level of control over the British electrical 
industry.
General Electric (USA) progressively reduced its shareholding in AEI to 40% 
by 1940.180 This shareholding was still further reduced, largely due to US anti-trust 
investigations, to 34% in 1946 and finally with the sale of the rest taking place in 1953.
176 See L.S. Reich, ‘General Electric and the World Cartelization of Electric Lamps’, 
International Cartels in Business History, eds. A. Kudo and T. Hara, (Tokoyo 1992) 
for the extent of General Electric share ownership of international competitors.
177 Jones and Marriott, op.cit.. p. 108.
178 Ibid, pp.66-7.
179 Ibid, p. 157.
180 Ibid, p.160.
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As a result AEI became a British-owned manufacturer by 1953.181 Despite the 
reduction of its shareholding, co-operation continued with General Electric, allowing 
AEI free use of the former’s patents and technology in the 1951 agreement. The 
influence of General Electric was not however restricted to AEI. General Electric also 
owned the largest single block of preference shares in GEC in the 1930s, although the 
lack of voting rights ensured that Hugo Hirst was able to prevent General Electric’s 
attempted merger of the British companies in 1929.182
Further American influence within the British electrical engineering industry 
came from Westinghouse’s influence upon English Electric. Westinghouse maintained 
financial influence within English Electric and supplied managerial expertise by 
appointing George Nelson, a Westinghouse-trained engineer, as Chairman.183 Nelson 
remained in the position until his death in 1962.184 Westinghouse (similarly to General 
Electric) also provided technical knowledge to English Electric through patent and 
licensing agreements.
The American influence proved crucially important to the creation of the rings 
in the 1930s and their re-creation in the post-war years, since it was AEI who had been
1RSthe prime mover behind the original rings in the 1930s. This ownership structure is 
of significance not simply for understanding the origins of the rings themselves but 
also for understanding the difficulties faced by any firm who broke the conditions the 
rings imposed.
181 Ibid.. p. 162.
182 Williams, Williams and Thomas, op.cit. p. 134.
183 Chandler, op.cit.. p.353.
184 Jones & Marriott, op.cit.. p. 175.
185 Ibid, pp. 166-70.
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Any firm that broke away from the rings in the late 1940s would have faced 
two types of threat. While the possibility of benefiting from gaining market share in 
important international markets would undoubtedly appeal to firms, the dangers were 
great. The first was posed by General Electric, USA. As a manufacturer with a 
significant size advantage it was capable of introducing predatory price competition. 
The company in 1948 employed some 216,000 people in almost 170 plants and had 
gross sales of $ 1.87b. Therefore in the US market there would have been significant 
problems facing a new entrant. General Electric’s exports only accounted for 6% of 
sales in this period and therefore a competitive firm may have had greater success in 
Western Europe, particularly as the European competitors were still years away from
1 87regaining their previous strength. On balance these issues could be said to appear to 
favour a first mover in breaking from the conditions imposed by the rings.
Any firm breaking from the cartel agreements would also have faced stiff 
competition through the concerted and co-ordinated action of those companies which 
adhered to the ring agreements in domestic and Empire markets. An explicit element 
of the rings was that firms would co-ordinate both competition in international markets 
and legal action against patent infringements against any firm breaking the agreements. 
As the managerial influence of American firms over British firms makes clear, this 
was certainly no idle threat. Again on balance this would almost certainly have worked 
against any competitive firm and possibly have wiped out any advantage achieved in 
other markets. The rings therefore provided not simply an institutional framework
186 General Electric (USA), Annual Report. 1957 and Yearbook. 1949, p.9.
187 General Electric (USA), Yearbook. 1949, p.4. Interestingly, General Electric was 
actually encouraging the British company AEI to enter the US market at this time in its 
attempt to stave off anti-trust investigations. See Jones and Marriott, op.cit.. p. 172.
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which restricted company activity but, even more importantly, the companies foresaw 
in the rings an institutional framework which restricted their competitors’ activity.
When AEI became a British-owned company, in 1953, it could be argued that 
the above constraint not longer applied, or at least not so strongly, as the direct 
American influence was removed. However, a number of points need to be made with 
respect to the 1950s. First, AEI’s adherence to rings was not simply a business strategy 
foisted upon it by a multinational parent company: the support for rings was internally 
generated, as it was for other British manufacturers. The origins of the support for 
rings lay in the firm’s attempts to reduce competitive pressures in the 1930s and there 
was widespread acceptance of the view that only co-operation between firms could 
ensure intense competition did not return.
Second, for either a single firm or all the British firms to have adopted a more 
competitive approach would have required an investment strategy aimed at least at 
widening R+D expertise and almost certainly at reducing production costs. Yet, as 
Figure 3.2 highlights, the industry was already considerably more reliant upon capital 
markets for funding than the rest of British industry generally. It is possible that the 
industry was already near the limits of its ability to raise finance from capital markets 
and a competitive strategy based upon high levels of investment would have required 
new sources of finance, from either higher levels of retained earnings or long term 
bank loans.
Higher levels of retained earnings were however ruled out. As can be seen 
from Figure 3.3 the return to investors was already less than impressive, in relation to 
all stock market quoted companies, leaving the dangers posed by take-overs, from
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investors disposing of poorly performing stock, ever present. These concerns were 
reinforced by the legacy of American ownership that made firms acutely conscious of 
the dangers of take-overs, posed by large concentrations of shares being held by other 
groups. AEI had particular difficulty in 1953, when the last disposal of shares owned
by General Electric took place, of ensuring that they were not purchased by a rival
188group.
Figure 3.2
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188 Jones and Marriott, op.cit.. p. 161.
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Greater investment would therefore have been highly reliant upon long-term 
bank lending. Unfortunately the ability of the British financial system, particularly the 
banking sector, to provide long term loans and its link to relative decline is a hotly 
contested issue well beyond the scope of this study.189 What can be accepted is that an 
issue of financing industrial reorganisation would have emerged for any firm 
attempting to create a first mover advantage. However, on balance, though important, 
this alone would probably not have proved decisive in deterring an alternative 
competitive approach from emerging.
Finally, and arguably most importantly, the timing for any new approach was 
crucial. The early 1950s, as documented above, saw the return of international 
competitors, in particular European competitors, into foreign markets and as a result 
the support for rings by all firms, to reduce competitive pressures, can be said to have 
been strengthened not weakened. As the 1950s wore on, the Kennedy round of GATT 
negotiations and growing economic independence of Commonwealth countries saw 
the preferential tariff discrimination favouring Britain removed. The prospect of more 
open competition would have still further increased the pressure on British firms to 
maintain the institutional framework which protected these markets from international 
competitors.
As a result it can be concluded that the late 1940s acted as a window of 
opportunity that was lost for electrical manufacturers to break out of the institutional
189 For a discussion of these issues see W.P. Kennedy. Industrial Structure. Capital 
Markets and the Origins of British Economic Decline. (Cambridge 1987), M. 
Collins, Banks and Industrial Finance in Britain 1800-1939. (1991) and J.F. Wilson, 
British Business History 1720-1984. (Manchester 1995), pp. 180-194.
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framework which the industry had constructed for itself. Having lost such an 
opportunity, firms within the electrical industry became still more reliant upon 
protected markets in particular through state procurement projects. The reliance of the 
British electrical manufacturing industry upon government orders was also reinforced 
by Britain’s unsuccessful attempt to enter the Common Market. Although tariffs were 
generally falling, the failure to be part of the Common Market could not have helped 
the price disadvantage that the government studies suggested British firms were 
suffering.
The entrepreneurial failure is understandable, not simply as Jones and Marriott 
or Milward would have it as ‘the failures of men’, but as a complex problem with its 
roots in the pre-war ownership structure of the industry, which was itself linked to the 
creation of successful, innovative US firms operating within a multi-national 
framework.190 Cartels in this view were not the result of defensive strategy of 
uncompetitive firms but were primarily the strategy of the competitive firms which 
dominated the international industry. The British firms were the junior partners within 
this regulatory system and although they were well aware that the rings were not, in the 
long run, to their benefit, they were faced with significant difficulties in breaking out 
of this system. The removal of the rings, therefore, simply highlighted the long term 
weakness of British firms within the international market and as a result the firms were 
increasingly forced to rely upon smaller more secure markets, namely British 
government defence and nationalised industry contracts.
190 Jones and Marriott, op.cit.. p.319.
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• Measuring Success or Failure?
The pessimistic conclusion drawn above suggests that the rings were wholly 
deleterious to the development of the British electrical engineering industry. Certainly, 
the evidence of a weakening of the British share of world trade, British firms’ loss of 
world ranking in terms of sales among non-US firms and the creation within the firms 
themselves of a particularly strong anti-competitive culture all back up such a 
conclusion. This would also suggest that the answer to the resolution of the chapter’s 
second main question, (Did government orders, civil and military, provide a secure 
backdrop for company investment in areas such as research and development and if so 
could the companies utilise this security in orders to improve their competitive position 
in more hostile competitive markets?), will also be in the negative.
However, it has also been documented that the industry was one of the 
manufacturing success stories for the British economy; its share of total domestic 
output and employment more than doubled between 1935 and 1968. Elsewhere, 
writers such as Chandler maintain that the industry was highly successful. In the post­
war period ‘the leading firms in Britain’s heavy-electrical-equipment industry 
developed the organisational capabilities to compete and expand in international 
markets over the long run’.191
It could simply be that the focus of investigation leads to two different 
conclusions. The British electrical engineering industry suffered from a relative decline 
with respect to international comparisons but within the domestic economy no such 
decline took place, and in fact the reverse occurred: the industry thrived and became
191 Chandler, op.cit.. p.354.
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one of the more dynamic sectors within the domestic economy. Alternatively, it could 
also be that our general interest in the role of market information and its control is of 
relevance here. It will be recalled that the relevance of the chapter’s second question 
derives from our concern that the restriction of information may be necessary for the 
creation of competitive firms. In other words the re-establishment of the rings, and 
British firms’ support of them, was not wholly deleterious to the British companies 
themselves.
• Costs and Benefits
The failure to redefine the competitive framework in the late 1940s, would be 
expected to have had an impact on the companies themselves. It will be recalled that 
the view was presented, in Chapter One, that it is the governance of the market that 
requires firms to develop organisational capabilities. We would expect therefore that a 
failure to alter market governance mechanisms would have an impact on the 
subsequent development of the firms themselves. Of course this process was not 
deterministic, nor in a singular direction, but nevertheless it should be possible to find 
further evidence backing our earlier conclusions.
All three firms saw a rapid rise in their respective stock market valuations 
between 1945 and 1965 from £6.5m to £51.7m in the case of AEI, from £5m to £45m 
in the case of English Electric and from £11.6m to £65.6m for GEC.192 All three
192 AEI’s valuation of includes £48m of issued stock consisting of £43m ordinary 
shares and £5m preference shares. English Electric’s valuation includes £40m issued 
consisting of £37m ordinary shares and £3m preference shares. GEC’s valuation 
includes £61m of issued stock consisting of £55m ordinary shares and £6m 
preference shares. Stock Exchange Official Year-Book. (1945), pp. 787,1110 and 
1155, (1965), pp. 1771,2240 & 2330.
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companies were also typical of the industry in using share issues to raise capital, with 
GEC issuing stock in 1944, 1952, 1961 and 1964, while English Electric carried out 
seven share issues and AEI carried out eight within the same period.193 This apparently 
impressive growth was, however, against a background of falling profitability. Figure
3.4 highlights most starkly the falling gross profits to sales ratio which caused 
difficulties for both GEC and AEI in the 1950s.194
Figure 3.4
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Falling profit margins resulted in the companies facing severe managerial 
difficulties in creating and sustaining competitive organisations throughout the 1950s. 
These problems were at their most obvious in the cases of AEI and GEC, and it is in 
comparing these two companies’ experiences that the advantages gained from 
protected markets can also be found.
193 Ibid.. 1965. p.2330.
Sales data for English Electric is not available over the whole period. However 
data for the period 1955-59 shows the ratio of sales to gross profits falling from 
4.95% to 3.77%. English Electric, Annual Reports and Accounts. 1959.
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The abandonment of the proposed rationalisation of the electrical 
manufacturing industry attempted by General Electric (USA) in 1929 left the two main 
subsidiaries of AEI, BTH and Metrovick, as entirely separate companies, competing 
and hostile to one another.195 This hostility was to ensure that expansion and 
rationalisation after 1945 was to continue to pose enormous problems. The animosity 
between the rival firms was such that, despite BTH working under contract from 1935 
onwards with Frank Whittle, the inventor of the jet engine, Metrovick simultaneously 
and independently was also developing a jet propulsion system.196
With the exception of manufacturing plants in India and Australia, AEI’s 
production was totally within Britain after the war and, despite the opening of further 
plants overseas, such as in South Africa in 1955, over 90% of production still took
1 Q7
place within Britain by the end of the 1950s. The main plants were situated in 
Manchester, Rugby and Woolwich. The company’s post-war expansion included the 
expenditure of £16m on buildings and plant between 1946-53.198 From 1953 this 
expenditure increased rapidly and amounted to approximately £10m per annum until 
1959.1"  As a result the number of main manufacturing plants had increased to over 40 
by 1958 from 17 in 1945.
195 Chandler, op.cit.. pp.351-3.
196 J. Jewkes, D. Sawers & R. Stillerman, The Sources of Invention. (2nd. ed. 1969), 
p.263 and Marriott & Jones, op.cit.. pp. 155-6.
197 AEI, Annual Report and Accounts. 1955, p.5.
198 AEI, ibid.. 1953, p.5. Jones and Marriott give a figure of £16m between 1945-9 but 
do not state where the figure is derived from, p. 159.
199 Latham, op.cit.. p. 18.
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From the early 1950s, AEI began a series of changes and reorganisations 
whose aim was to resolve the difficulties posed by the ownership structure of AEI. Not 
only did the company have to ensure that General Electric’s share disposal did not lead 
to the company being taken over, but the directors’ aim of avoiding paying tax had 
created an anomaly over the Metrovick ownership arrangements, whereby until 1951 
AEI directly owned the physical capital of Metrovick.200 In the process of resolving 
ownership issues, AEI also centralised financial control of the subsidiary companies 
under its own authority. Once the ownership issues had been unravelled AEI set about 
resolving the conflict between directly competing and hostile subsidiaries.
Prior to the 1950s AEI’s management recognised the rationale for maintaining 
two separate companies lay with the high profits derived from the price fixing 
arrangements. Price fixing ensured high profit margins and AEI management believed 
two separate companies gained greater market shares within the cartels than one larger 
firm.201 As the company secretary stated ‘the [1956] Restrictive Trade Practices Act 
has done away, or will do away, with price arrangements and the old arguments in
•  • 0 (Y )favour of duplication of manufacturing and operating companies are no longer valid.
While it can be readily accepted that the removal of formalised cartels and 
price fixing arrangements removed some of the arguments against rationalisation, the 
need for rationalisation derived primarily from other causes. In 1964 AEI’s Chairman
200 Essentially Metrovick was a company with a turnover of £30m per annum but 
whose nominal capital was £10,000. M.G. Walker, 'Development and organisation of 
AEI Ltd', Business Enterprise: Its growth and organisation, ed. R.S. Edwards and H. 
Townsend, (1958), p.309 for BTH ownership problems and Jones and Marriott op.cit.. 
p. 161 for disposal of General Electric shares in AEI.
201 Marriott and Jones, op.cit.. p. 159.
202 GEC, talk by George Walker to Staff College course 6th September 1958, p. 15.
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admitted that a lack of specialist knowledge had led to a severe strain being placed 
upon the design and manufacturing departments, due to the CEGB’s demands for high 
capacity turbo-alternators of 500MW.203 This was after a period from 1959 to 1963 
when the company had seen a reduction in demand for its products. In other words it 
was the reduction in orders, itself due to an orientation on restricted markets, which 
prevented the continuation of the dual companies. Individually neither BTH nor 
Metrovick were capable of developing the capabilities necessary to produce the new, 
large capacity plant.
In 1954 the subsidiary companies had been organised under five product 
groups: BTH Group, Metrovick Group, Hotpoint Group, Overseas Group and Siemens 
Edison Swan Group. In 1960, with the reduction in demand in both government and 
civilian markets, it had become obvious that ‘Something had gone terribly wrong’ and 
AEI was forced into a further series of alterations. The return on capital had been 
reduced by almost two thirds in five years and the company’s debt had increased by 
£30m.204 As a result the Aldermaston research laboratory was closed and research 
concentrated in Manchester and Rugby. In 1962 the workforce was reduced by 2,000 
and in 1963 AEI decided that the Group’s original trading names (including British 
Thomson-Houston and Metropolitan Vickers) should be finally discarded and renamed 
as AEI groups.205 Thus Siemens Edison Swan Ltd became AEI (Woolwich) Ltd, the 
group with the largest turnover producing cabling and associated products, and the
203 AEI, Annual Report and Accounts. 1964 p. 18 and Hannah, op.cit.. p.260.
204 Latham, op.cit.. p. 19.
205 Stock Exchange Official Yearbook. 1965, p. 1770.
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Hotpoint Group became AEI Appliances Ltd. Finally in 1963 BTH became AEI 
(Rugby) Ltd and Metrovick became AEI (Manchester) Ltd.206
The company also sought to reduce the scope of its production into core areas. 
AEI’s valve interests were sold to English Electric, as was its last remaining interest in 
television production, Multi-Broadcast (Rentals) Ltd. A joint venture with Thom 
Electrical Industries Ltd was also formed, to take-over and rationalise the two 
companies’ lighting interests.207 Despite these changes AEI continued to face 
managerial problems in defining and rationalising its major plants throughout the 
1960s.
AEI’s experience of the 1950s was echoed at GEC, yet by the early 1960s GEC 
had begun to resolve the lack of integration between subsidiaries and still more 
importantly, following Arnold Weinstock’s entry into the firm in 1961, developed a 
marketing and sales organisation that was essential for the company’s return to 
profitability.
In 1945 GEC had twelve factories operating in Britain, including its main 
plants at Witton, producing heavy electrical plant such as A.C. generators and A.C. 
and D.C. motors, and Erith, producing turbo-altemators. Smaller plants at sites such as 
Wembley, producing electric filament lamps, were responsible for the production of 
mass-produced products. In all the company had investments in 33 manufacturing and
90Rmarketing companies, owning all the shares in eighteen of these. The wholly-owned
206 AEI, Annual Report and Accounts. 1963, p.5.
207 Ibid., 1963 p.5 and 1964, p.5.
208 GEC, Annual Report. 1946, p. 10.
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subsidiaries included marketing and manufacturing companies in Argentina, Australia, 
China, India, South Africa and New Zealand, as well as manufacturing capabilities in 
Britain, in neon and fluorescent lighting, passenger and goods lifts, X-ray and cathode 
ray tubes, as well as scientific equipment.209 By 1955 GEC had expanded, owning 
nineteen manufacturing companies (for the most part in Britain) and sixteen trading 
companies (mainly operating internationally). This expansion continued throughout 
the period, with GEC, by 1960, increasing the number of wholly-owned manufacturing 
subsidiaries to 24, along with 31 trading companies.210 If associated companies are
91 1also added the figures would be higher still. This increase occurred despite the 
disposal of a number of shareholdings and subsidiaries, including the wholly-owned 
Electric Development and Securities Trust Ltd. in 1948 and the 50% shareholding of 
Pirelli-General Cable Works Ltd. in 1962. The Electric Development and Security 
Trust had itself also been a holding company, owning eleven regional electricity supply 
companies, including West Cumbrian Power Co. and South East Yorkshire Light & 
Power Co.
The rapid expansion after the Second World War made re-organisations 
inevitable and by 1965 a series of re-structuring programmes had taken place. These 
were designed to change the company from a large mass of disparate subsidiaries into 
a company with a hierarchical divisional structure, while retaining GEC’s holding 
company ownership pattern. The restructuring took a number of forms and was carried 
out in a number of stages between 1960-62, following reports from the consultants
209 Stock Exchange Official Year-Book. 1945, p. 1152.
210 Ibid, 1955, p.2257, and 1960, p.2362.
211 An associated company was one in which GEC owned up to 50% of the company 
but did not own a controlling interest.
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Urwick Orr & Partners. The manufacturing companies were reorganised into five 
product groups. Each product group was to be autonomous and have its own Managing 
Director who would in turn be responsible to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the 
GEC holding company.212 The move towards holding groups was to decentralise and 
to rationalise the manufacturing processes. For example, GEC Engineering was 
formed in 1961 to take over the management of the heavy plant engineering at the 
Witton and Erith works. Similarly GEC Home Products, again formed in 1961, took 
over both GEC Domestic Equipment and Allied & Radio, the television subsidiary that 
had led to Arnold Weinstock joining GEC. Under GEC Home Products, the Coventry 
radio works was placed under the Radio & Allied management and the Sutton 
refrigerator and cooker manufacturing was integrated. Some new ventures were also 
started including the joint venture with Mullard to integrate semi-conductor 
production.213 The result of this re-organisation was that many of the previously 
separately-named and separately-run competing subsidiaries disappeared into GEC 
product groups, with, for example, Steel Conduit Co. Ltd becoming part of GEC 
Lighting Equipment Ltd, which in turn was part of the Osram (GEC) Ltd product 
group.
The second part of the restructuring process was to integrate the manufacturing 
processes of the product groups with the distribution and sales processes of the branch 
networks. The extensive network of homes sales branches was disbanded, with trading 
activities transferred to the product groups and the branch premises disposed of. These 
new integrated groups were now re-defined as GEC divisions. Thus by 1965 GEC had
212 GEC, Annual Report. 1959-60, p.6.
213 Ibid, 1962, p.5-21.
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integrated product and marketing divisions in Electronics, Engineering, Consumer 
Products, Telecommunications and Research.214
Although the integration of product and marketing functions proved highly 
successful for GEC in the 1960s the re-organisation itself was a painful process. Figure
3.4 highlights the low point for gross profits as a percentage of sales occurring in these 
years of restructuring, before recovery by the mid-1960s. The years 1961-2, in 
particular, were clearly a difficult two years for the company, as it distributed all but 
£0.2m of its post-tax profit in dividends and in 1961 it sought an extra share issue in 
order to reduce its liabilities and bank overdraft of £13.24m.215 This financial 
weakness also led English Electric to attempt, unsuccessfully, a merger with GEC in 
I960.216 Thus, both AEI and GEC suffered from severe managerial difficulties during 
the 1950s.217 However, GEC was able to respond during the early 1960s and solve the 
key weakness suffered by all firms operating within the industry by integrating the 
production, marketing and sales functions of the firm.
It is also clear that GEC’s success in re-organising the company was intimately 
linked to the continuation of protected markets. In Chapter One it was highlighted, 
using Input-Output tables, that government purchasing grew in importance for a wide 
number of industries. In the case of the electrical engineering industry an under­
estimate of government final product and nationalised industries intermediate product
214 Ibid.. 1965, pp.16-18 and Stock Exchange Official Year-Book. 1965, p.2330.
215 GEC, Annual Report. 1965.
216 Jones and Marriott, op.cit.. pp. 190-4.
217 For more on the problems leading to the merger see Cowling et.al., op.cit.. p. 192
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purchases grew from 8.4% to 24.8% of total domestic output.218 Over the same period 
the importance of exports of electrical engineering goods hardly changed rising only 
from 17.5% to 20.2% of total output. These results are reinforced by a further Input- 
Output study of the electrical engineering industry which suggested that by 1975, 
including the nationalised sectors of the motor and aerospace industries, government 
purchases accounted for around 40% of domestic sales.219
Government supported markets acted as a safety net that the firms themselves 
were also able to utilise to develop organisational capabilities. The safety net promoted 
R+D and allowed firms to develop technology-sharing agreements as a mechanism for 
regulating competitive pressures. In particular, high levels of military support ensured 
that the British firms were able to continue to develop their capabilities in the field of 
research. The importance of defence spending for the development of research 
capabilities can be gauged from the fact that 59% of all R+D was financed by defence 
spending in 1955-6, falling to 49% by 1958-9 and 39% by 1961-2.220 Of this between 
one-half and two-thirds was carried out by private industry. The electrical engineering 
and electronics industry was, after the aircraft industry, the main beneficiary of this
218 Recall that expenditure leading to increases in domestic capital formation is 
excluded. Data covers electrical engineering category for 1948, derived from LG. 
Stewart, Input-Output Table for the United Kingdom, The Times Review of Industry. 
December 1958, pp.vii-ix, and electrical machinery, insulated wires and cables, radio 
and telecommunications and other electrical goods in 1963, derived from Input- 
Output Tables for the United Kingdom 1963 (1970), Summary table 1. See 
Appendix One, tables 1 & 2 for calculation.
219 V.H. Woodward, ‘A disaggregated simulation model of the UK electrical 
engineering industry’, Input. Output and Marketing, ed. S.J. Gielnik and W.F. 
Gossling, (1980).
220 Economist Intelligence Unit, The Economic Effects of Disarmament. (1963), p.26, 
D.C. Paige, op.cit.. p.30 and M. Kidron, Western Capitalism Since the War. 
(Middlesex 1970), p.51.
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spending. It received £64.5m, or 21.7% of the total military spending on R+D in 1958, 
employing some 12,400 qualified scientists and engineers.221
Protected markets also proved valuable for research and development into 
more civilian orientated areas, such as atomic power. All the major companies 
established atomic power groups. AEI set up the AEI-John Thompson Nuclear Energy 
Co., English Electric combined with Taylor Woodrow and Babcock and Wilcox to 
form Atomic Power Constmction Co. Ltd. and GEC set up its own company under the 
control of the Engineering Division.
While the existence of protected domestic markets was beneficial to the 
continuation of large scale R+D it was still more important that the end product of that 
R+D found a ready made market in protected defence procurement contracts. In 1961 
conservative estimates suggest that over 22% of output from the electronics sector was 
for military use while in the radio communications sub-sector this was over 35%.222 
All the firms in this study were highly reliant upon defence sales. AEI’s Electronics 
Group and English Electric’s Marconi Instruments Ltd, were both ‘dominated’ by 
defence sales.223 Within GEC the telecommunications and electronics divisions were 
the largest contributors to company sales, accounting for 27% of group turnover in 
1965 (see Table 3.5). The electronics division also included both the Applied 
Electronics and Stanmore Research Laboratories. Thus a large proportion of the
221 EIU, op.cit.. table 13, p.29 and C. Freeman, ‘Research and Development: A 
comparison between British and American industry’, National Institute Economic 
Review. No.20, 1962, tables 1&2.
222 EIU. op.cit.. p.65.
223 AEI, Annual Report and Accounts. 1964, p. 18 and English Electric, Chairman's 
statement Annual Report. 29 March 1962, p.5 and pp. 12-13.
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companies'1 resources and a large proportion of turnover came from the military-related 
projects which it was involved in.
Table 3.5
GEC The allocation of Resources and Contribution to Turnover bv Product
Divisions.224
Turnover UK Assets 
£m £m
1964 1965 1964 1965
Telecomm.s & Electronics 
Consumer Products 
Engineering
Other Home Subsidiaries 
Overseas Subsidiaries
39.6 47.3 28.6 34.0 
32.3 38.7 21.9 25.3
31.7 23.5 25.7 24.8
26.7 29.6 16.7 17.9 
32.1 36.8 21.4 27.7
Protected markets also went some way to encourage the process of 
standardisation recommended by the Lemon Committee. In 1947 a government order, 
SR&0.2386, restricted turbo-alternators to sets of 30MW and 60MW capacity, in order 
to reduce the lead-time in bringing new equipment on stream. Although this order 
was withdrawn in 1950 larger the first 120MW set was not installed until 1958 and the 
first, still larger, 200MW set until 1959.226
The impact for the industry was initially to provide the opportunities to bulk 
production techniques and reduce design and development work, as well as to ensure 
that the CEA acted as a purchaser of large quantities of low technology equipment.
224 Source GEC, Annual Report. 1965.
225 Hannah, op.cit.. p.25.
226 Ibid.. pi 14-115 and Cmd 9672, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the 
Electricity Supply Industry. 1956, p. 112
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This was highly satisfactory from the companies’ point of view, as this was also the 
specification of the equipment being sold in the Commonwealth markets and as a 
result the companies were required to provide little specialist work to finish orders. 
The fact that manufacturers were able to supply an almost standard product across 
markets should have allowed them to have gained efficiencies through either 
experience gained in learning curves or through the creation of economies of scale, yet 
despite this, as documented above, delivery times remained poor and firms continued 
to resist the introduction of price competition.
While it can be accepted that protected markets provided the opportunities for 
the development of organisational capabilities it is also clear that the failure of the 
British manufacturers lay in an inability to turn these opportunities into sustainable 
competitive advantages.
Firms proved highly capable of developing new products from R+D projects, 
for civilian markets, but any lead achieved was rapidly lost once international 
competitors, particularly those of the U.S, began to compete. British protected markets 
could encourage R+D and innovation but they were too small to allow for the creation 
of organisational capabilities through diffusion. When mainframe computers first 
entered the civilian market British firms were initially able to compete but fell behind 
once the US firm IBM (with larger mass markets, and still larger government support) 
began to compete.227 Similarly within the emerging mini-computer market of the
227 Most importantly see Hendry, op.cit.. p. 163 for the US government’s $8b
expenditure on the SAGE defence programme.
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1960s British producers, with their focus upon niche markets, lost out in the face of US 
competition whose interest lay in mass markets.228
New technologies found latent markets which required production facilities 
capable of satisfying demand and marketing and sales organisations to develop 
knowledge about new products. It was a failure to develop marketing and sales 
capabilities that was a key element of the lost opportunity to create a competitive 
industry. Even at the components level a lack of understanding of the relationship 
between production, marketing and sales ensured that English Electric’s lead in 
integrated circuit technology was lost due to a lack of capacity 229
Protected markets in Britain were in a sense a poisoned chalice. They were 
large enough to act as a focus for firms’ attention but too small to encourage firms to 
develop adequate sales and marketing techniques. An over-reliance on protected 
markets can thus be said to have led to a neglect of marketing and sales operations and 
as a result it was not until the 1960s that GEC began the process of creating integrated 
production, marketing and sales capabilities.
In general then it appears that the connection between the development of 
competitive organisations and the existence of secure markets is not clear cut. 
Certainly R+D was enhanced by security of orders and the industry was also able to 
develop much of this technology into commercial products. Unfortunately, weaknesses 
within the firms’ marketing and sales organisations made it all to easy for competitors 
to enter and dominate commercial markets. Although GEC did develop new marketing 
and sales operations it should be recalled that GEC was the smaller of the three major
228 Hamilton, op.cit. p. 101.
229 Economist. 17 November 1965, p.978.
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producers. While GEC’s marketing and sales organisation was the most advanced, it 
was still incapable of resisting the advantages held by firms such as IBM.
By the mid 1960s it was becoming obvious that in all product markets their 
were too many domestic producers and mergers and rationalisation were increasingly 
seen as the mechanism with which do deal with the problem. The IRC’s intervention 
was sign-posted by the CEGB’s decision to purchase only two designs of generator 
sets and the recognition that three groups bidding for atomic energy contracts was too
2 3 0many.
• Conclusion
The development of the market for the electrical manufacturing industry after 
1945 was one in which the visible hand of the manufacturers played the determining 
role. The option of introducing price competition was available to managers in the 
industry, but was rejected, this chapter has argued, on the grounds that this represented 
a high risk strategy and would have brought any firm adopting it into direct conflict 
with competitors.
A diversification of marketing and sales into the more rapidly growing markets 
for electrical manufactured products would also have required internal changes, such 
as investments leading to greater specialisation, the creation of economies of scale 
involving mergers and rationalisation, improved delivery times and reduced costs. To 
have followed this road would have necessitated an abandonment of strongly held 
beliefs in the role of international cartel arrangements in order to win market share.
230 Economist. 23 October 1965, p.414.
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For such a strategy to have proved successful it is conceivable to argue that the 
timing of such a shift would have been crucial. The most opportune time for such a 
strategy would have been prior to the return of the main European producers to world 
markets, in particular the West German manufacturers. By the early 1950s, at the 
latest, the window of opportunity available to the British manufacturers was closing. 
As a result the institutional framework adopted aided the return of the European 
manufacturers to the world market.
The failure to adopt a new competitive framework was not simply due to 
entrepreneurial conservatism but must be linked to the ownership structure of the 
British electrical manufacturing industry. British manufacturers were presented with a 
major problem; to abandon the international cartel agreements would have meant 
British firms would have not only to confront West European manufacturers but most 
importantly the manufacturers in the United States, most notably General Electric and 
Westinghouse. The major shareholding in AEI held by General Electric, until 1953, 
also meant that General Electric could have used its ownership of AEI to undermine 
British firms in their own domestic market. Thus the position of AEI in the British 
market acted as a guarantee of stability for US firms preventing the only possible 
competitors in the early post-war period from capitalising upon their own head start.
The refusal of manufacturers to adjust the competitive balance within the 
industry forced firms' to be more reliant upon government through military 
expenditure, the CEA (and later the CEGB), British Rail and the Post Office. Public 
expenditure on military and civil projects presented the electrical manufacturing 
industry with key markets and represented the bread and butter of the industry. These
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markets had a number of important attractions in that they were all for large orders, 
often accounting for over half the total output in heavy plant divisions. In electronics 
and telecommunications, military orders alone tended to account for over a quarter of 
orders and in the case of paper insulated mains cabling the National Coal Board was 
the only domestic purchaser. These markets also provided the opportunity for firms to 
undertake large scale R+D programmes. However, they were never large enough to 
allow firms exploit the commercial products emerging from R+D. In particular British 
firms were unable to develop the sales and marketing organisations or create 
relationships with customers which were achieved by US firms.231
The loss of the post-war window of opportunity resulted in a period of 
continued internal re-organisation for all the British firms, as they attempted to respond 
to international competitive pressures. An attempt to achieve a more thorough-going 
solution to the problems facing the industry came when English Electric proposed a 
merger with GEC in 1960. GEC’s rejection left the industry to continue to rely upon 
the framework that had demonstrably failed by the late 1950s, and due to changes in 
competition policy was less effective in any case. As a result the decision in 1967-8 to 
merge and rationalise represented a further adaptive strategy rather than being the 
innovative strategy it could have been two decades earlier.
Before making some wider observations emerging from this case study it is 
necessary to raise the question of whether or not a counter-factual approach is useful.
231 Freeman, op.cit.. p.31.
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One might wonder whether or not the industry should have attempted to compete in 
areas such as mainframe computer development or atomic power at all. Perhaps the 
industry should have steered away from the high technology, capital goods sectors. 
There were a number of factors pushing manufacturers to adopt the approach they did, 
making such a counter-factual an unrealistic proposition. Immediately after 1945 the 
demand for consumer and capital goods was high and in both areas British firms were 
dominant players in export markets. However, it was the capital goods sector that was 
the key market for producers to be involved in. The international consumer durables 
market was becoming more competitive by the early 1950s, with competition focusing 
upon price rather than delivery. It was therefore highly unlikely that the demand for 
capital goods could be ignored on the basis that price competition in consumer 
durables would not see a return to a ‘chaos of destruction’. Early post-war uncertainty 
over the viability of full employment would similarly have weakened firms’ faith in 
the long term prospects for the consumer durables sector. Finally, the rearmament 
programme from the early 1950s, combined with new limitations upon domestic 
demand for consumer goods in the late 1950s, could only have acted to reinforce 
pressures on firms to orientate towards government orders. Thus in the critical period 
of reconstruction there were too many pressures leading towards an acceptance of the 
status quo and a path-dependent process favouring adaptive strategies.
A second counter-factual is, however, more appealing. British producers could 
have accepted the re-establishment the post-war cartels, but on the basis of British 
firms being awarded a greater role in European markets. British producers were also in 
a strong position in the late 1940s and could have demanded a re-negotiation of the
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cartels’ conditions. Milward is surely correct to suggest that greater involvement in 
West European markets could have encouraged productivity growth. A link to more 
rapidly growing markets could have made firms more responsive to market conditions 
and promoted the creation of a sustainable competitive advantage (in production, 
marketing and sales) capable of rivalling West German and other European firms. 
Under this scenario the real lost opportunity in the early post-war years for the British 
electrical engineering industry lay not in the introduction of cartels but in the re- 
introduction of cartels based upon the conditions in existence in the 1930s. This view 
would raise the question: why was it that the British electrical engineering industry was 
excluded from West European markets whereas the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. was 
successful, not only re-storing its links to the Middle East in 1945 but still more 
importantly re-establishing its links to Iran in 1954? Government and industry 
relationships would again be the focus for discussion.
Finally, we now have two studies of industries in which the end of the Second 
World War brought an intense period of uncertainty and difficulties in forecasting. It is 
possible at this point therefore to make a very broad preliminary observation. Under 
both cases the response to uncertainty was to reduce the risks from opportunistic 
behaviour. Under these conditions the rapid re-introduction of pre-war regulatory 
conditions found widespread support. However, conditions after 1945 did not return to 
those of the 1930s and business was forced into a process of reappraisal, interestingly 
in both cases by sections of government (US anti-trust and nationalisation measures in 
Iran for oil and monopoly investigations in the case of electrical engineering). In this
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reappraisal we again see, across both case studies, an incremental, evolutionary 
approach adopted, which is highly dependent upon government support (US State 
department and British cabinet support for oil and government procurement for 
electrical engineering). Co-operation and risk aversion then appears to be at the centre 
of the decision making process related to defining competition within each market.
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• Chapter Four
• .T. Sainsburv 1945-64 : Challenging market governance
‘A very low price advertised today is bettered 
within 24 hours by a competitor. This is all very 
well short term, but in the long term it cannot be 
in anyone’s interest.’1
• Introduction: Similarities and Differences
A case study of the service sector might at first glance appear to present an 
unusual choice alongside two other manufacturing industries. Surely, one might object, 
the conditions and pressures operating within the service sector cannot easily be 
equated with manufacturing industry. Do the time scales, historical development and 
internal dynamic of the sector mean that the generalisations arising from 
manufacturing are not simply transferable to services? The choice of Sainsbury’s - a 
food retailer (as opposed to a food manufacturer or wholesaler) - means that 
comparisons with the Anglo Iranian Oil Co. and the General Electric Co. are stark. Is it 
possible to compare chalk with cheese?
It is, in fact, the differences that make such a comparison useful and the 
surprising level of similarity that makes such a case study possible. If we briefly recap 
on the issues this study has focused upon, it becomes clear that the retail trade fits all 
the criteria for being included within the study. Our hypothesis is that firms, as 
governance bodies, act to structure and control the market. We also suggested that
1 Chairman of Tesco speaking in 1985. Quoted in J. Senker, ‘Technology and 
competitive strategy in food retailing’, The Strategic Management of Technological 
Innovation, ed. R. Loveridge and M. Pitt, (Sussex 1990), p.86.
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inter-firm co-operation was an integral part of firms’ activity and that this was not just 
a response to falling markets, as had developed in the interwar slump of the 1930s. 
Lazonick maintains that British firms’ failure lies in the adoption of a low-investment, 
adaptive strategy, around 1930, which was heavily reliant upon tariff protection and 
government subsidy. This is said to contrast with United States firms which were able 
to utilise tariff protection from around 1880 to defend infant industries and to develop 
a strategy based upon transforming high fixed cost into low unit costs. For Lazonick 
then ‘as they moved into the middle decades of the twentieth century British 
enterprises and British society were ill prepared to build the organisations and develop 
the technologies required to make the transition from proprietary to managerial 
capitalism’.2
We are therefore interested in industries which are part of the growing sectors 
of the British economy in the post-war era, in order to discount the possibility that 
firms aim to restrict competition simply as a protectionist measure for declining 
industries. By focusing upon the dynamic areas of the British economy, we should be 
able to find firms that are successful in developing either innovative or adaptive 
strategies. We also wish to examine the role played by government activity, 
information scarcity and trade associations in the development of the market.
The retail trade certainly is an area of the British economy which was of 
growing importance in the post-war era with the growth of consumer expenditure. 
Although food spending was the sector of consumer expenditure in which growth was 
slowest, it was in grocery retailing that dynamic firms emerged. Of the ten largest 
retailing business in Britain today, six are food retailers. This dynamism is such that it
2 W. Lazonick, Business Organisation and the Mvth of the Market Economy. 
(Cambridge 1991), pp.l 10-111.
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is accepted that ‘what supermarkets do today, the rest of retailing does tomorrow’, and 
it is even suggested that retailing leads manufacturing industry in developing new 
strategies.3 Thus its status as a growth sector of the British economy, with dynamic 
firms, makes the comparison with manufacturing industries of relevance.
The food industry as a whole is also one that faced significant government 
intervention, most notably with the introduction of rationing during the Second World 
War and its prolongation until 1954. Government legislation including the 1956 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act and the Resale Prices Act of 1964 also had an 
important impact upon the trade. Further the food manufacturing, wholesaling and 
retailing industry developed important trade associations which again played a major 
role in the subsequent development of the industry. Again therefore the similarity of 
the development of governance bodies makes the food retailing industry a relevant 
comparison.
However, emphasising the similarities between the retail trade and 
manufacturing sector is not to obscure the differences. The case study of Sainsbury's 
and the grocery retailing trade appears in many respects to be the reverse of the two 
previous studies and it is from these differences that generalisable conclusions are to 
be drawn about firms’ behaviour.
The differences which are considered to be of importance here are: first, the 
time scale of changes operating within the retail trade. The continuation of war time 
rationing and building restrictions lasted longer for the retailing industry than in any of 
the other industries examined. The industry therefore suffered a more prolonged period 
of control and the time period under consideration, 1945-65, is longer than the
3 C. Gardner & J. Shepherd, Consuming Passions. The Rise of Retail Culture.
(1989), p.12 and p.153.
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previous case studies, with the emphasis upon the later, rather than earlier years. 
Similarly the period of decontrol and relaxation of restrictions was to some extent 
exceptional. Decontrol (combined with the outbreak of price competition, highlighted 
by the break down of resale price maintenance and the conflict arising from the 
introduction of retail trading stamps in the grocery trade) created an arguably more 
intense period of change for the industry than in the previous case studies.
The grocery retailing industry also differed from the oil and electrical 
engineering industries in that the period after 1945 was one in which atomistic 
competition predominated. Only the co-operative stores can be said to be a partial 
exception to this. The introduction of rationing saw the Co-op’s register 28% of the 
population, accounting for as much as 40% of the market for butter but only 23% of 
the overall market for groceries and provisions.4 Further, the industry was 
characterised by firms operating on a local or regional geographical basis. Although 
national companies did exist, including those owned within the Allied Suppliers group, 
they were not the primaiy beneficiaries of the post-war developments within the 
trade.5 Finally, despite the fact that foreign competition, particularly from Dutch and 
US firms, did exist, the industry was not one in which competition within international 
markets proved to be important.6 Hence the case study again acts as a counter to the 
earlier case studies in which competition within international markets was vitally 
important.
4 J. Birchall, Co-op the People’s Business. (Manchester 1994), p. 137. As these 
societies had origins and priorities very different to private retailers, the chapter will 
not be concentrating upon this form of organisation.
5 See P. Mathias, Retailing Revolution. (1967) for history of Allied Suppliers before 
1945.
6 This became an issue for retailing during the 1980s. See G. Akehurst and N. 
Alexander, The Internationalisation of Retailing. (1995)
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While competition remained within national or regional markets, it did not 
mean that the industry was blinkered to international changes occurring within 
retailing. Innovative British retailers closely followed developments in the United 
States and the United States continually acted as a vision of the future, both for the 
Sainsbury company and retailing in general.
• Issues and Hypotheses
While grocery retailing in the early post-war period was characterised by small 
scale atomistic competition, by the 1980s a phenomenal change had taken place. 
Oligopoly had replaced an atomistic industrial structure. A handful of major 
companies today dominate the grocery retail trade, with the five largest groups, 
Sainsbury's, Tesco, Dee (Gateway), Argyll (Safeway) and Asda accounting for some 
52% of the market in 1986.7 The multiples, retailers with ten or more stores, now
o
account for over 75% of the market compared to 20% in 1950.
J Sainsbury pic vies with Tesco for the position of being the single largest 
food retailer in Britain by turnover and market share.9 In 1985 Sainsbury's overtook its 
major rival, with a turnover which topped £3b and accounted for 12.3% of total 
market share, but was itself again overtaken in 1995.10 Since Sainsbury’s flotation on 
the stock market in 1973 its turnover has increased from £362m in 1974 to £8,865m
7 Institute of Grocery Distribution (hereafter IGD), Food Retailing. (1987), p.xxi and 
p.94 and Financial Times 12th April 1995, p.22.
8 T. Lang and H. Raven, Off our Trolleys. Institute of Public Policy Research, (1995), 
p.37.
9 J. Sainsbury Ltd. changed its name to J Sainsbury Ltd in 1971 and to J Sainsbury 
pic in 1982. This chapter will refer to J.Sainsbury or Sainsbury’s throughout. See B. 
Williams, ‘Multiple retailing and brand image’ in Adding Value, ed. G. Jones and 
N.J. Morgan, (1995), p.307.
10 IGD. op.cit. p.94.
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in 1994, a five fold increase in real terms, with the number of stores increasing from 
198 to 341.11 This growth of oligopoly has been accompanied by the decline of 
independent grocers. In 1986 independent grocery retailers, defined as those owning 
nine or fewer stores, accounted for 16% of grocery sales; in 1950 their share had been
19estimated to be between 52-56%. This dominance of the market has led for calls for 
the break-up of groups such as Sainsbury's and Tesco.13
The emergence of oligopolistic companies in the grocery retailing sector has 
been both an extremely rapid and recent event. The two largest companies, Sainsbury's 
and Tesco, were both regional companies operating multiple stores as late as the 
1960s. Indeed Sainsbury's network of stores never stretched beyond 120 miles from 
London as late as 1967 and even today the major companies maintain a strong regional 
bias in their organisation.14
This chapter does not aim to chart the development of the creation of a market 
characterised by oligopolistic competition. Rather the aim is to examine the 
development of the market structure in grocery retailing leading to the changes which 
took place in the 1960s, which in turn allowed for the subsequent development of an 
oligopolistic market structure.
The chapter’s central hypothesis is that the breakdown of resale price 
maintenance (RPM) in the grocery retailing industry, occurring earlier than in other 
industries, did not reflect the emergence of competitive free markets in which prices
11 B. Williams, The Best Butter in the World. A History of Sainsbury's. (1994), p.219 
and Annual Abstract of Statistics. Vol.131,1995.
12 IGD, op.cit.. p.94 and J.B. Jeffreys, Retail Trading in Britain 1850-1950. 
(Cambridge 1954), p. 163.
13 Lang and Raven, op.cit.. p.51.
14 Sainsbury Archive (hereafter JS Archive), 'Self-service at Sainsbury's', JS Journal. 
July 1967, pp. 12-14.
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were determined by the invisible hand of demand and supply equilibrium. Instead, the 
break down of RPM reflected the fact that a major shift in the balance of influence 
over the determination of prices, between manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers, had 
occurred. Hence the breakdown of RPM indicated that the form of the market within 
the retailing sector had altered. Asymmetric information flows now favoured retailers 
rather than wholesalers or manufacturers.
With this change came a shift in the balance of power (over issues such as 
price determination) between manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors and retailers. 
The chapter examines the degree to which, once RPM was abandoned, multiple 
retailers were able to regulate the emergence of price competition within the new 
market environment. Of particular importance was multiple retailers’ response to the 
introduction of retail trading stamps and the conflict that developed in 1963. Further 
the chapter will suggest that the role of trade associations proved crucial to both the 
success of the multiples’ challenge to RPM and their success in preventing 
manufacturers’ associations and marketing bodies from introducing new forms of 
minimum pricing. The chapter also suggests that the 1956 Restrictive Trade Practices 
Act and the Resale Prices Act of 1964 played an important role as a catalyst for 
change. These acts along with the 1964 Retail Trading Stamps Act also acted to 
consolidate the advantages gained by the multiples and so helped prevent 
manufacturers from challenging the new institutional structure of the food industry.
Finally it is suggested that the newly developed strength of the multiple 
retailing groups ensured that the multiples were determined to extend their influence 
beyond the simple question of prices and profit margins and into non-price factors, 
such as quality, packaging and even training, and in so doing further undermine the
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influence of the manufacturers. It was from this point onwards that retailers also turned 
to own-branding. These changes however also required multiple retailers themselves 
to carry out large-scale capital investment in new outlets to ensure the restructuring of 
the food market was successful.
• Demand for Food Products
The rising demand for food products around the world after 1945 was not 
met by British exports. The British economy was the most urbanised economy in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century and with such high levels of urbanisation 
came high levels of dependency on food imports. Between 1948 and 1960 Britain 
was a net importer in all of the fourteen commodities which accounted for three- 
quarters of world trade in food, beverages and tobacco.15
Changes in patterns of domestic consumer demand acted as a central 
element in the timing of changes within the grocery retailing sector. Food had been 
the single largest component of consumer expenditure throughout the twentieth 
century. Not until the 1980s did housing costs replace food as the single largest 
component of total consumer expenditure.16 The decline in the proportion of 
household income accounted for by expenditure on food has been a long-term 
change. Expenditure on food accounted for over 58% of all retail sales in 1900 and 
remained at over 46% until the outbreak of the Second World War.17 After 1945 
food expenditure continued a slow decline, as a proportion of total consumer
15 K. Jones, A. Maizels and J. Whitaker, ‘The Demand for Food in the Industrial 
Countries 1948-60’, National Institute Economic Review. No.20. (1962), p.46.
16 S. Pollard, The Development of the British Economy 1914-1990. (4th ed. 1992), 
p.276 and Gardner and Shephard, op.cit.. p.5.
17 Jeffreys, op.cit.. p.453.
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expenditure, from 31% in 1948 to 29.5% by 1960. Despite this falling proportion of
expenditure being spent on food, real expenditure nevertheless rose 25% between 
181949-59. However against the doubling, by volume, of consumer durables sales over 
the same period, the food retailing sector showed slower growth. This picture of a 
falling share of consumer expenditure being spent on food accelerated in the 1960s, so 
that by 1969 food items accounted for 22% of total consumer expenditure. The real 
rise in food sales also slowed to 11% between 1959-69, as did the real increase in total 
consumer expenditure at 28%.19
• Limitations on domestic demand
Consumer expenditure on food was influenced both by the existence of retail 
price maintenance (RPM) until 1958 and the post-war effects of rationing and price- 
controls. It was the interwar years that saw the widespread emergence of 
manufacturer-inspired RPM on branded packaged grocery goods. RPM ensured that 
branded goods were retailed at fixed prices by all retailers, irrespective of regional cost 
variations or size of purchases by retailers. RPM was monitored by associations of 
retailers and manufacturers and enforcement was predominantly through the use, by 
manufacturers, of stop-lists. Manufacturers refused to supply products to retailers who 
were involved in discounting, or wholesalers who were failing to enforce RPM among 
their retailer customers. RPM was also legally enforceable through contracts between 
retailers, suppliers and manufacturers, with the courts being used by manufacturers to
18 M. Hall, ‘The Consumer Sector’, The British Economy in the 1950s. ed. G.D.N. 
Worswick and P.H. Ady, (Oxford 1962), p.431.
19 Figures at constant 1963 prices, Annual Abstract of Statistics. No. 107, 1970, 
table 311
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prevent retailers discounting, where supplies could not be prevented.20 By 1930 resale 
price maintenance was ’well entrenched in the distribution of various classes of 
consumer goods', accounting for between 27-35% of all consumer goods sold in
Britain.21 By 1956 one study suggested that RPM covered up to 44% of consumer
00goods. Kuipers suggested RPM, defined as goods in which RPM was legally 
enforceable, affected between 18.6-21.2% of goods within the grocery trade in 1950.23 
If recommended prices were informally followed and cases of price-cutting dealt with 
through the stopping of supplies, even if not legally enforceable, RPM could be 
estimated to cover as much as 66% of grocery goods sold in 1956.24
The timing of the breakdown of RPM in grocery retailing in 1958 coincides 
with the sharp changes taking place within consumer expenditure, away from food 
items. It may well be that RPM, in artificially holding prices high in the 1950s, 
contributed to the more rapid rise in the growth of food sales in the 1950s, compared 
with the 1960s. The second factor helping to maintain the proportion of food 
expenditure as a proportion of total consumer expenditure lies with the continuation 
of post-war rationing, price controls and shortages of consumer durables.25 The 
limitation of food subsidies to £465m from 1948 and reductions in the 1950s led to
0(L
real increases in food costs for consumers. As will be highlighted below the
20 See Resale Price Maintenance, ed. B.S. Yamey, (1966) and J.F. Pickering, Resale 
Price Maintenance in Practice. (1966) for detailed discussion on the development of 
RPM.
21 Yamey, Ibid.. p.253.
22 Pickering, op.cit.. p48.
23 J.D. Kuipers, Resale Price Maintenance in Britain. (Washington 1950), quoted in 
B.S. Yamey, op.cit.. p.254.
24 Pickering, op.cit.. p. 49.
25 A. Caimcross, Years of Recovery British Economic Policy 1945-51. (1985), 
pp.334-5.
26 A. Caimcross, ‘Reconversion 1945-51’, The British Economy Since 1945. (eds.) 
N.F.R. Crafts and N. Woodward, (1991) p.47.
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Ministries responsible for food policy were prepared to see price increases before, 
during and after rationing in order to safeguard the continuation of production and 
distribution. The ending of rationing in 1954 and the outbreak of price competition 
from the early 1960s again coincides with the slowing down in the increase in real 
expenditure on food. Thus the slower growth in real expenditure on food items in the 
1960s understates the real growth in volume terms of food sales. This slower growth 
in demand, by value, for food was one element in the intensification of the 
competitive pressures within the retailing sector and forced retailers to search for 
new methods for achieving a competitive advantage.
• Supply and the emergence of multiple retailing
On the supply side of grocery retailing a similar intensification of competitive 
pressures was also emerging. This is most clearly seen in relation to changes in 
concentration levels between differing forms of retailing. The grocery retailing trade in 
1945 was considered to be highly atomistic. The continued existence of a mass of 
independent grocery retailers and the interwar growth of local or regional multiples 
highlights the relative ease of entry into the grocery trade, with relatively low entry 
costs. The fact that credit from wholesalers was available, while shop owners were 
paid in cash, meant that little, if any, working capital was required. This ease of entry 
has been taken by Metcalf as proof, even as late as 1966, of the highly competitive and 
atomistic nature of the industry, in which small scale retailers could enter where local
onor regional monopolies emerged. Metcalf has calculated that by 1966 concentration 
within grocery retailing was low, with the multiple chains owning between 24.2% of
27 D. Metcalf, 'Concentration in the British Retail Grocery Trade', Economics of 
Retailing, ed. K.A. Tucker and B.S. Yamey, (Middlesex 1973), p. 155.
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all establishments in London and the South East and 6 .8% in the South West. The low 
levels of concentration nationally meant that retailers were 'likely to be at a 
disadvantage in bargaining with food manufacturers where they buy in the national 
market'. However in regions such as London and the South East, where concentration 
was greater, or where retailers purchased from manufacturers in regional markets, the 
possibility of gaining lower prices was higher.28
The number of stores owned is only one, unreliable, measure of concentration. 
As can be seen from Table 4.1, measured by the number of stores, the multiples appear 
to be facing a declining level of concentration, while the independent sector 
experiences a renaissance between 1961 and 1971. Further the 1960s saw a reduction 
in the total number of stores of 28%. This decline took place throughout the 1960s, but 
significantly employment within the industry was not substantially altered. Between 
1961 and 1971 employment within the grocery trade declined from 551,601 to 
542,676. While the trade saw a rapid reduction in the total number of stores, those that 
remained, or were newly opened, were larger and employed larger numbers of people.
If turnover is used as a measure of concentration a more consistent and reliable 
picture emerges. From Table 4.2 it is clear that a general trend of increasing 
concentration within the multiple retailing sector exists. By the early 1970s the 
multiple groups had overtaken the independent sector and the Co-operative Societies 
as the major form of organisation within the trade.
28 Ibid, p. 155.
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Table 4.1
Total Number and Percentage of Grocers and Provision Stores bv Form of Organisation
Organisational Form Year and Percentage
1950 % 1961 % 1971 %
Multiples with 10 or more stores 15,247 10.61 16,522 11.26 10,973 10.42
Co-ops 11,153 7.76 13,919 9.48 7,745 7.36
Independents with less than 10 stores 117,292 81.63 116,336 79.26 86,565 82.22
Total 143,692 100 146,777 100 105,283 100
Table 4.2
Concentration within the Grocery Provision Trade bv Turnover at Current Prices.
1950 1961 1966 1971
£’000 % £’000 % £’000 % £’000 %
Multiples with 10 or more 
stores
243,992 19.95 632,393 26.90 1,056,318 36.33 1,841,889 44.31
Co-ops 284,080 23.23 488,089 20.76 485,503 16.70 549,943 13.23
Independents with less 
than 10 stores
694,646 56.81 1,230,229 52.33 1,365,834 46.97 1,764,655 42.46
Total 1,222,717 100 2,350,711 100 2,907,655 100 4,156,487 100
Sources: Totals from Census of Distribution 1961 table 1 and 1971 table 1A. Figures for 1950 from 1961 Census Table 3. Figures for
1961 and 1971 from 1971 Census Table 3. The Census for 1971 was used for the 1961 data as opposed to the 1961 census.
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In Tables 4.3 and 4.4 the same exercise is carried out for the Greater London 
region, the largest and most concentrated region. The results generally follow the 
national pattern. However, there are some significant differences in the comparison of 
concentration between the national and Greater London data. Greater London saw the 
multiples develop a level of concentration, measured by turnover, by 1950 that was not 
reached nationally until the late 1960s (see Tables 4.2 & 4.4). Further the level of 
concentration, by turnover, accounted for by the multiples in Greater London showed 
only a small growth throughout the 1960s (see Table 4.4). This suggests that, in the 
single most important geographical region, the region which led the trends nationally, 
the rates of change in market share were beginning to stagnate between differing 
organisational forms of retailers. The Co-ops had clearly suffered a loss of market 
share to both the multiples and the independent sectors in the two decades between 
1950 and 1971. However, still more importantly, the independents in the 1960s halted 
their long term decline and even improved their relative position against the multiples 
for half of the decade.
The explanation behind the halting of the multiples’ rise lies in the growth of 
voluntary chains and cash-and-carry retailing among independent retailers. Voluntary 
chains were combinations of independent stores primarily aimed at achieving the 
economies of purchasing derived from multiple retailing. Cash-and-carry retailing 
aimed at achieving lower wholesale prices through the passing of transport costs from 
manufacturers to independent retailers.29 Their introduction from 1954 onwards 
undermined the economies achieved through the centralisation of functions available 
to the multiples, including purchasing, packaging and distribution. The multiple form
29 See A. Fiber, The Independent Retailer. (1964), pp 68-70.
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of organisation in Greater London clearly lost its ability to provide a competitive 
advantage against the independent retailers by the early 1960s. If this was not to be 
repeated throughout the rest of the country, the multiples would require new strategies 
to further undermine the viability of the independent form of organisation.
The late 1950s and early 1960s was a period in which strong pressures for 
change were building up within the grocery retailing sector, amongst multiple retailers. 
The combined effects of the slow growth of demand and the ability of the 
independents to limit the supply side competitive advantages of the multiple form of 
organisation, forced the multiples into challenging the existing market governance 
mechanisms. However it was the existence of these market mechanisms, namely RPM, 
that had provided the origin of their own growth.
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Table 4.3
Concentration in Greater London bv Number of Grocers and Provision Stores bv Form of Organisation
Organisational Form Year and percentage 
1950 % 1961 % 1971 %
Multiples with 10 or more stores 2,785 22.30 3,624 31.77 1,913 21.48
Co-ops 637 5.10 746 6.54 494 5.55
Independents with less than 10 stores 9,064 72.59 7,036 61.69 6,497 72.97
Total 12,486 100 11,406 100 8,904 100
Table 4.4
Concentration within the Grocery Provision Trade in Greater London bv Turnover 1950-71
1950 1961 1966 1971 
£’000 % £’000 % £’000 % £’000 %
Multiples with 10 or more 
stores
Co-ops
Independents with less than 10 
stores
Total
61,366 37.46 184,102 58.52 247,570 60.05 355,096 62.24
24,747 15.11 34,922 11.10 37,371 9.07 53,807 9.43 
77,700 47.43 95,567 30.38 127,314 30.88 161,645 28.33
163,813 100 314,591 100 412,255 100 570,548 100
Sources: Totals from Census of Distribution 1950, Vol. 2, table 10, 1961, Part 7, table 1 and 1971, Part 8 , table 2.
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• Imperfect competition before 1954
The aim of market governance before 1954 was to restrict change within the 
retailing sector. Winstanley has suggested that imperfect competition, including 
collusion between organisations of retailers and manufacturers, over RPM, was a 
major factor in the slow development of concentration within the retail sector. RPM 
‘restricted the ability of large retail organisations to capitalise on cost advantages 
which they may have had by lowering prices to the consumer to increase their 
market share’. 30
It certainly appears that the grocery retailing trade between 1939 and 1950 was 
to a large extent frozen in time.31 Jeffreys has noted that the industrial structure of 
retailing during the war and up to 1950 remained static, highlighted by 'the virtual 
disappearance of bankruptcy among firms engaged in wholesale and retail trading'. 
This was not simply due to manufacturers’ pricing policy. To a great extent this was 
due to the conscious policy of government in response to the war and post-war 
restrictions. The Board of Trade, as early as 1938, made clear that they were opposed 
to any ‘canvassing of customers between the outbreak of hostilities and the registering 
of customers’, following the imposition of rationing. Government concern over the 
outbreak of intense competition on this issue was such that they proposed ‘immediate 
temporary agreement’ on prices. These concerns over the effects of war on the 
industry extended beyond the question of how to deal with the initial outbreak of war.
30 M. Winstanley, 'Concentration and competition in the retail sector c. 1800-1990', 
Business Enterprise in Modem Britain, ed. M.W. Kirby and M.B. Rose, (1994), p252.
31 The first census of distribution took place in 1951. All figures for retailing prior to 
the 1951 census are therefore estimates, with Jeffreys, op.cit.. providing the most 
detailed and widely accepted data.
32 Ibid.. p. 103.
33 JS Archive, SWAR2, Report of meeting between Mr A. Sainsbury and Mr R.J. 
Sainsbury with Mr Lloyd of the Board of Trade, 16 September 1938.
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The potential for disruption caused by bomb damage, food rationing, shortages of 
workers or post-war building restrictions were great. Both government and the industry 
were therefore keen to ensure agreement, in advance, that at the 'end of the emergency 
when controls could be lifted no sector or group would be better or worse off in 
relation to others than at the beginning'.34
An indication of the static nature of the industry comes from examining the 
increase in the number of branches opened. The number of branches of grocery retail 
firms, with ten or more branches, increased at a net average (after closures of existing 
branches) of 49 per annum between 1940 and 1950. For grocery retailing firms with 
twenty five or more branches, the net increase was 7 1.35 These figures were the 
lowest increases in new stores ever. However this freezing of change during the war 
and immediate post-war years was largely a continuation of a 1930s trend. The net 
number of branches opened in the 1930s collapsed and never regained the peak of 
around 450 per annum from 1926-30 for both retailers of ten or more or twenty five or 
more branches.
Jeffreys points out that RPM went some way towards 'redressing the balance' 
for small independent retailers, who were unable to achieve the economies of buying, 
specialisation of functions such processing and distribution, or access to capital for the 
development of larger main street sites that was available to the multiples. The 
advantage for smaller retailers was the fact that RPM set prices below which 
competitors could not sell branded goods and, in so doing, prevented the larger stores 
from price cutting.
34 Jeffreys, op.cit.. p. 102.
35 Ibid, p. 138.
36 Ibid. p.91.
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There are no reliable figures for the number of independent grocery retailers 
prior to the 1950 census of distribution. This is not surprising, due to the fact that the 
independent sector covers not only market traders but also grocers with nine or fewer 
stores. Indeed until the interwar years no restrictions were placed upon the conversion 
of housing into shops.37 While extra income could be gained through the selling of 
goods from one’s home, for minimal capital outlay, much independent retailing would 
inevitably consist of small and transient traders. Nevertheless, Jeffreys estimates, as a 
residual, that the independent sector saw a declining market share through the interwar 
years, from between 63-69% in 1920 to 52-56% in 1950.38
An indication of the size of the independent sector can also be gauged from the 
1950 census of distribution, which states that the number of establishments owned by 
independent grocery retailers was 102,806, against the number owned by multiples, 
with ten or more stores, as 15,421 and those of the co-operative Societies as 11,108.39
The establishment of RPM did not in fact restrict change altogether. Neither 
did the continued existence of the small retailer prevent the emergence of either 
regional multiple or national firms. Crucially, RPM reduced competitive pressures, as 
was necessary for both the independent retailer to survive and the larger multiple 
retailer to emerge.
Jeffreys estimates that while there were 138 firms with 10 or more branches 
in 1920, rising to a peak of 167 in 1930 before subsequently falling to 157 in 1939; 
over the same period the number of firms with 25 or more branches grew from 58 to
37 Winstanley, op.cit.. p.251.
38 Jeffreys, op.cit.. p. 163.
39 Census of Distribution and Other Services. 1950, Retail Trade Short Report, (1953), 
Table 5, pp. 14-15, (these figures differ from those in Table 4.1 due to the 
reclassification of specific firms to other non food retailing categories).
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83 and then 89 respectively.40 The growth of multiple firms in the 1930s was 
increasingly through amalgamation and merger with smaller multiples, rather than 
through expansion in new stores. The 1920s and 1930s saw mergers among large- 
scale firms with national sales distribution such that by 1950 three grocery retailing 
groups each controlled over 600 branches. These three largest groups had taken over 
some 40 firms between 1920 and 195041 The largest of these national retailing 
companies was Allied Suppliers group which by 1939 included the national groceiy 
retail chains Home and Colonial Stores (798 stores), Lipton’s (449 stores), the 
Maypole Dairy Co. (977 stores), along with the Meadow & Pearks Dairy Co. (762 
branches). All together Allied Suppliers owned over 3,600 branches 42
At the same time as national grocery retailers were emerging the industry also 
saw the rise of multiple retailers, concentrated within specific parts of the country. 
Thus, by the end of the Second World War, a grocery retail trade had developed, with 
a small number of large truly national firms and a larger number of regional multiples 
above a mass of independent small grocers.
The advantage, for retailers, of RPM was to reduce the amount of information 
they required regarding competitors. Retailers’ profits derived from the mark-up on 
goods sold, yet under RPM this was pre-defined by manufacturers. As a result price 
competition was removed, retailers did not require information on competitors’ prices, 
and firms where encouraged to compete on non-price factors, in particular service. The 
two main areas of non price competition lay in the use of credit and free delivery. The 
provision of credit or accounts for customers was widely practised by both
40 Jeffreys, op.cit.. p. 137.
41 Ibid, p. 140.
42 See Mathias, op.cit.. p.358.
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independent and multiple retailers. Here the smaller independent retailers, although 
less able to survive defaulters, may well have had an advantage against the larger 
multiple stores in dealing with a smaller clientele in which a significant level of 
personal contact remained important for assessing risk. Within the food sector, 
excluding co-operative societies, some £54m was owed by customers in credit in 
1957. After the breakdown of RPM, credit was restricted with the result that by 1961, 
despite a rise in sales of 17%, credit outstanding had been reduced to £45m, a fall of 
17%.43
The second area of non-price competition was in the free delivery of goods. No 
official data exists on the extent of free delivery but one survey by the National 
Association of Multiple Grocers carried out in 1959 showed that only ten out of forty 
six multiple retailers did not deliver orders below £1 in value.44 The fact that this 
survey was carried out after the collapse of RPM in the grocery trade and the 
emergence of limited price competition, along with the knowledge that at least some 
multiple firms (including Sainsbury’s) had abandoned delivery by this time, suggests 
that the extent of free delivery was probably still greater in the interwar period than 
when the survey was carried out.
Winstanley has suggested that, while RPM diluted competition, it was not the 
only factor preventing the growth of a price-competitive large-scale retailing industry 
in the interwar years. Even in sectors such as grocery retailing, in which the multiples 
had most success, intense localism and tight family control exhibited by the multiple 
firms ensured that the retailing industry would remain atomistic and small scale. 
Competition was mainly between regional multiples and local independent retailers
43 Quoted in W.G. McClelland, Costs and Competition in Retailing. (1966), p.241.
44 Ibid.. p.244.
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rather than between multiple retailers themselves. Thus, for Winstanley, non-price 
competition reflected the extent to which market imperfections existed in retailing and 
'independent shops survived because market conditions allowed them to'.45 Winstanley 
is clearly correct to point to the importance of family influence within firms, although, 
it is debatable whether the intense affinity for local or regional business strategies was 
anything but a pragmatic response to the conditions facing retailers in the 1930s. 46 
Transport costs and technological difficulties associated with keeping food fresh in 
transit would have presented significant geographical limitations upon the growth of 
retailers.
Winstanley, however, clearly seems to miss the point that the reduction of 
price competition did not simply have a retarding affect on innovative firms; rather 
RPM proved crucial for the development of the multiple firms as well. Market 
governance mechanisms, like RPM, did not completely stop change, rather they were 
essential for change to take place. The price fixing of goods ensured that firms who 
made investments in company organisation, in order to lower costs, could succeed in 
doing so with a level of security. Hence groups such as the Tesco chain, which stocked 
branded, dry packaged groceries and maintained RPM, could emerge as a regional 
multiple in this period. The first Tesco store did not open until 1931. Its opening 
marked the establishment of Tesco in grocery retailing as a firm which broke RPM, 
but in order to continue Tesco realised they would need to abide by RPM, with the 
result that by 1934 Tesco, now with forty stores, had accepted RPM 47 This reduction
45 Winstanley, op.cit.. p.255.
46 See M.B. Rose, 'The family Firm in British Business 1780-1914', op.cit.. ed. Kirby 
and Rose, pp. 61-87.
47 D. Powell, Counter Revolution. (1991), pp. 33-41.
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in competitive pressures also enabled multiple retailers to take advantage of, and 
promote, the emergence of the institutional investment market in urban property.48
The prevention of intense price competition provided the multiple firm with a 
relatively secure business environment in which investment could be made in 
company activity linked to head office functions, such as accounting procedures, 
purchasing and distribution, as well as increasing the number of outlets. The creation 
of organisational capabilities by multiple firms was underwritten by their acquiescence 
to RPM and it was not until the multiples had fully developed their internal 
organisational capabilities that RPM could be successfully challenged 49 The history of 
Sainsbury’s highlights the way in which RPM not only aided the internal 
organisational development of multiple retailers but was essential to the multiples’ 
emergence.
• J. Sainsbury and the emergence of a multiple
Sainsbury’s origins stretch back to the nineteenth century. Its strength as a 
multiple retailer lies in the company’s regional orientation upon London and the 
home counties. 50 The Sainsbury family, which dominated the running of the firm, and 
the paternalistic attitudes within the firm, were also important considerations in the 
development of the company. The company maintained a highly centralised structure
48 P. Scott, ‘The Property Market and the Growth of Multiple Retailing, 1919-39’, 
Business History. Vol.36, No.3, (1994), pp.3-8 and Mathias, op.cit.. p.396 for case 
of Allied Suppliers in 1960s.
49 This has also been suggested to be the basis for the challenge of Japanese 
supermarkets to price maintenance at the same time. See M. Tatsuki, ‘The Rise of 
the Mass Market and Modem Retailers in Japan’, Business History. Vol.37, No.2, 
(1995), p.83.
50 I have drawn much of the information on this early period of Sainsbury’s 
development from Williams, Best Butter, which has been published by Sainsbury’s 
to commemorate its 125th Anniversary.
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with a strong emphasis upon uniformity across the stores creating an in-house style. 
The ability to create and sustain this centralised organisation was also intimately linked 
to the spread of RPM.
The company’s very existence as a multiple derives from the degree to which 
competition was regulated between firms. Sainsbury’s, until the inter-war years, was a 
member of a Pact with other grocers whose co-ordinated buying aimed to gain greater 
wholesale discounts. The Pact’s policy of not opening shops close to one another and 
offering shops for sale firstly to other pact members similarly aimed to ensure that 
competition for customers was also regulated. The main effect of the Pact was in its 
wholesaling function. It provided the Pact’s members with the ability to resist attempts 
at price fixing by wholesalers. The Pact’s attempt to reduce competition between 
members is felt by Williams to have been largely ineffective. Nevertheless the 
adoption of the Pact and its advantages, perceived or otherwise, encouraged the 
Sainsbury’s family to make investments in new stores. By 1920 Sainsbury’s had 
opened 129 stores.51 Sainsbury’s growth throughout this period was based upon 
piecemeal expansion into new sites rather than expansion through amalgamation 
adopted by the national firms such as Allied Suppliers.
That the existence of RPM, and the consequent emergence of competition 
through service rather than price, did not hinder the growth of multiples like 
Sainsbury’s can be gauged from the fact that, despite the break up of the Pact in the 
inter-war years, the company continued to expand and had 255 shops by 1939. This 
growth was, again unusually, through opening of new sites, although the company did,
51 Ibid., pp. 74-75. Note that the number of stores stated in the text of the book do not 
correspond to the figures given in the table on p.219 which state the number of stores 
as 124 in 1920 and 249 in 1940.
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in 1936, take over the multiple retailer Thoroughgoods, whose stores were sited within 
the Midlands area and which had also been a member of the Pact.52
RPM provided Sainsbury’s with a safe environment to make investments in 
areas which enhanced its ability to compete in service such as the supply of credit and 
use of delivery. The development of credit, although increasing companies’ risk from 
bad debt, nevertheless encouraged customers to frequent one company. Thus the use of 
credit was an important marketing method for reinforcing customer loyalty, whose 
importance was such that by 1939 Sainsbury's Head Office maintained a list of some 
250,000 names and addresses.53 Sainsbury's also maintained a fleet of 45 vans, as well 
as using bicycles and horses and carts for home delivery service in 1928. That 
competition by service rather than price would subsequently become a problem for 
large multiples can also be seen from the fact that the scale of providing this service 
led Sainsbury's to charge customers for delivery if the value of the purchase was below 
£1 from 1934 and to abandon home delivery completely in 1955, four years prior to the 
National Association of Multiple Grocers’ survey.
It was not only in areas of retailing that RPM ensured Sainsbury’s could make 
investments and reap the advantages gained, in the knowledge that intense price 
competition would not follow. Sainsbury’s was not strictly speaking a grocery retailer 
of dry packaged goods but in fact a provision merchant. The company bought 
wholesale fresh produce, processed and packaged it into own-brand goods and retailed 
these through its stores. Thus, unlike Tesco and other multiples, Sainsbury’s originated 
as a company which manufactured and stocked a high proportion of its own-brand 
products. Furthermore, this resulted in the company *v dealing with^six suppliers
52 JS Journal. March 1966, p.7.
53 Williams, op.cit.. pp.87-88.
261
that supported RPM in 1937.54 The fact that the company emphasised quality in its 
own-brand produce helped to ensure that it could successfully compete on price and 
quality with the branded goods under conditions of RPM. The establishment of RPM 
therefore not only removed the risk that Sainsbury's would be involved in intense price 
competition at a time when it was involved in relatively large scale investment in 
production, but it also allowed for the output of its manufacturing investment to be 
sold in competition with goods which were sold at artificially maintained prices. 
Essentially, Sainsbury’s success was based on the fact that in both manufacturing and 
retailing it could act as a classic free rider.
The benefits of RPM were also felt in the distribution of goods to stores. At 
the end of World War One, Sainsbury's moved the distribution of goods away from rail 
and onto road, using contractors for deliveries outside London and an in-house 
delivery department for London shops. Sainsbury's rapidly increased its motor 
transport until it internalised all deliveries to stores, using some 40 vans and 80 horses 
and maintained these two forms of delivery until 1937 when horse drawn deliveries 
were finally abandoned for 4-ton vans.55
Crucially for Sainsbury’s development of a uniform house-style was 
investment in training. Despite the depression of the 1930s RPM provided the safe 
competitive environment under which training could still continue to be carried out. 
Sainsbury's always promoted itself as a retailer of high quality own-brand food, with 
an emphasis on consistent quality and uniform price across its stores. As a result, the 
training of staff in the production, packaging and selling of its produce was given a 
high priority by the company from the beginning. Just as pricing, purchasing and
54 Ibid.. p.86.
55 W.C. Gurr, 'Delivered to your Door', JS Journal. January 1950, pp. 2-6.
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deliveries were centralised, so the delivery of service was to be uniform through the 
centralisation of training. Training was strongly hierarchical, with employees taken on 
as juniors in stores or apprentices for craft employment. Staff were graded at the age of 
21, with red (qualified status) and black (ordinary) coloured uniform buttons, in order 
to distinguish rank within the stores. These were abandoned in 1945 when a 
proficiency grading system was introduced.56
It is clear that investment in production, distribution, retailing and training 
within the company was largely assured by the establishment of RPM and other market 
imperfections within the retail trade. In general the regional multiples were able to 
enhance their service to customers through investment, which was to create significant 
advantages over rival firms adopting alternative organisational forms. The multiples 
operating within a regional context created sufficient organisational capabilities, such 
that in the post-war period these capabilities could be utilised to reshape the market for 
the grocery trade.
• The Multiples under threat
The limitation of price competition followed by rationing played a 
determining role in the formation of organisational capabilities for multiple retailers 
before 1954. Firms such as Tesco, selling branded dry packaged groceries, could 
develop against the safety net of RPM and a firm such as J. Sainsbury, selling 
provisions, could also develop using free rider advantages. Before 1954 price 
maintenance also defended the position of the independent sector against the 
competitive advantages available to multiple retailers. However, between the ending
56 JS Archive, WAR 2, February 1945.
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of rationing in 1954 and the breaking of RPM in 1958 the independents were also 
to discover that they too could achieve similar organisational capabilities to those of 
the multiples. The origins of the multiples’ competitive advantage, in RPM, was now 
becoming the origins of their relative failure, and as a result, by the early 1960s the 
success of the multiple form of retailing organisation began to falter. The multiple 
chains were forced into challenging the structure of the food retailing market if they 
were to maintain their competitiveness but they were also to discover that the removal 
of rationing and the ending of RPM was no longer enough to re-establish their 
competitive advantage against a competitive independent sector.
• Post-war restrictions
Before any alteration to the retailing market could take place, however, the 
multiples were first faced with finding solutions to a series of difficulties linked to 
post-war restrictions (slow growth in demand, labour shortages, continued government 
purchasing of foodstuffs and building restrictions) and to changes in retailing itself 
(self-service and supermarket retailing).
The slow growth in the demand had two important effects for retailers. The 
food retailing industry was fortunate in that it was not as affected by the extreme 
fluctuations in demand, caused by the consumer credit restrictions from the mid-1950s 
onwards, making the food retailing industry more stable than other areas of retailing.57 
Food retailers were, however, unfortunate to be trading within a slower growing 
retailing sector. If food retailers were to capitalise on the growing demand for 
consumer goods, they were faced with making two types of change aimed at increasing
57 For the impact on the car industry see J. Foreman-Peck, S. Bowden and A. 
McKinlay, The British Motor Industry. (Manchester 1995), p. 197-204.
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their turnover. One mechanism was a movement away from provisions. Retailers 
increasingly sought to have more products pre-packaged as restrictions upon packaging 
were removed. The second mechanism for increasing turnover was through expanding 
their product lines not simply in food products but also into non-food items as wall. In 
response to these changes in demand, the multiples abandoned their traditional narrow 
range of standardised products and both expanded their packaged food product lines 
and moved into non-food items. The larger multiples also responded to greater and 
more varied demand by introducing own-brand products, with the result that around 6- 
7% of sales derived from own-brand products by the mid 1960s.58
War and reconstruction also presented the retail sector with a series of supply 
problems which were not resolved until the late 1950s. During the war, retailers faced 
severe staffing shortages and after 1945 the continuation of rationing and building 
restrictions further hindered development. Government priorities during the war were 
for maximising the output of manufactured products and as a result service sectors, 
such as food retailing, suffered from a continual loss of staff. The increase in the 
employment of women workers represented a change that was to remain permanent. 
By 1955 women workers made up 60% of those employed within the industry.59
Similarly after the war government priorities for reducing the dollar drain 
meant that industries which imported goods for domestic use would face significant 
difficulties. The Ministry of Food, Ministry of Agriculture, Board of Trade, Ministry of 
Supply and the Treasury were all involved in the decisions over the degree to which, 
and the rate at which, if at all, imports could be deregulated after the war. British food
58 Pickering, op.cit.. p. 137.
59 J.B. Jeffreys & D. Knee, Retailing in Europe. (1962), p.21.
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consumption was, as we have seen, largely met by imports in the post-war era. 
Although able to reduce imports from 70% of total supplies from 1948-52 to 62% by 
1958-60 Britain was still the largest single importer of foodstuffs among the major 
industrial nations.60 The Government, through the Board of Trade and the Ministry of 
Supply, was directly responsible for the centralised purchasing of foodstuffs on the 
world market. Because government departments had been responsible for the 
purchasing of foodstuffs for such a length of time, difficulties were created in any 
moves to remove government controls. In 1950 consideration was in fact given to 
extending, rather than reducing, governments’ powers to buy, sell and manufacture in 
competition to the private sector by the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Supply.61 
Treasury officials were also concerned that the inexperience of private buyers within 
world markets could lead to a failure to buy the correct quantity at the best price, 
leading to excess currency outflows.62 As a result, while government centralised 
buying was gradually removed, quantitative restrictions were placed on imports, and 
maintained until the late 1950s. Even as late as 1958 some 10% of imported 
foodstuffs continued to face some form of import restriction.63
The success of the British government’s post-war economic policy was also 
dependent upon the growth of exports with the result that any industry which required 
capital goods for the expansion of domestic demand would again be faced with further 
supply difficulties. The existence of building restrictions, are alleged to have reduced
60 Jones, Maizels and Whitaker, op.cit.. p48 (excluding wheat and wheat-flour).
61 PRO BT 64/736, Memorandum by the Minister of Health on the Economic 
Planning and Full Employment Bill, GP(50)230, 18th October 1950.
62 PRO T 230/196, Government Bulk Purchases and Controls, Official Committee 
Papers, 23rd August 1950.
63 Speech of Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food to the London Provision 
Exchange, JS Journal. No.48, March 1958, p.2.
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the ability of firms to move towards self-service layouts until the mid 1950s.64 
Financial limits were placed on all building work carried out without a licence from 
the Ministry of Works. These restrictions were extremely tight, allowing only £100 of 
work to be carried out in any twelve-month period for ordinary buildings. Only 
commercial buildings with a floor space of over 10,000 sq.ft. could exceed this, being 
limited to an expenditure of £1,000.65
Self-service had become established within the United States before the war 
and it was direct comparisons with the United States that led the British multiples to 
adopt this form of organisation. Self-service stores first made their appearance within 
the Co-op stores in Britain, while the multiple stores continued to rely upon their 
emphasis on service. As late as 1960 the Co-ops operated almost 50% of all self- 
service stores and it was not until 1963 that all the multiples combined operated more 
self-service stores than the Co-ops.66
The experience of self-service in the United States - with more rapid rates of 
stock turnover leading to lower levels of breakages, spoilage or theft per unit of stock 
and suggested increases in average purchases of up to 40% - made its introduction into 
Britain only a matter of time 67 These advantages, combined with the continuation of 
staff shortages and rising wage costs after the war, meant that the multiples were 
slowly forced to adapt their methods of retailing. The conservatism amongst the 
multiples on self-service, however, cannot simply be adequately explained due to 
supply factors such as building restrictions. Special building licences were introduced
64 Williams, op.cit.. p. 130.
65 Food Manufacturers’ Federation (hereafter FMF), Bulletin. July 1949, p. 122.
66 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Retail Business. No.93, 1965, p.8.
67 K. Collins, ‘The Trend Towards Self-Service’, Journal of Retail Trading. Vol. 
XXI, No.l, February 1945.
267
by the Ministry of Food in a scheme for the building of new self-service stores and 
conversion of existing shops to self-service layout in the late 1940s. With a budget of 
£150,000, individual licenses could cover building work to a maximum of £3,000 and 
in exceptional cases still larger conversions could be granted. However, due to the 
‘poor response’ amongst retailers, the scheme’s deadline for applications was extended 
by eighteen months until November 1950. Eventually when the scheme did close, it 
became apparent that the organisation which was most interested was the Co-operative
/TO
Society, which had been granted 60 of the 92 licenses awarded.
Neither is it apparent why the multiples should have suffered, more than the 
Co-op stores, from the other external factors put forward in explaining this 
conservatism, namely local planning authorities’ unwillingness to grant permission for 
changes and the existence of poor sites unsuitable for self-service.69
It is however, possible to put forward explanations, based upon the multiples 
themselves, for this apparent conservatism. The continued existence of RPM and 
competition through service as opposed to price meant that the multiples were 
unwilling to lower their levels of service, and possibly risk consumer hostility, by 
introducing self-service. Certainly the Ministry of Food believed that the multiples
• 70were ‘apparently watching before committing themselves’ to self service. Hence 
the conclusion drawn earlier that RPM aided the multiples’ emergence, where service 
rather than price was the arena in which competition took place, is strengthened.
When the multiples were interested in self-service, their interest lay in the 
degree to which self-service could be married with the development of supermarkets,
68 PRO MAF 99/1847, letter E. Doling to Miss Wrett-Smith 25th October 1951.
69 Williams, op.cit.. p. 130 and Powell, op.cit.. p.62.
70 PRO MAF 99/1847, op.cit.
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defined as stores with over 2,000 sq.ft. The development of supermarket retailing 
again had its origins in the United States in the 1930s, where self-service and cash-and-
71carry operations were utilised. There, larger stores required greater numbers of staff: 
United States stores employing more than twice the average number employed in 
Europe and a third more than in Britain, but, with increasing stock turnover, retailers 
were able to achieve efficiency gains.72 Simply transplanting American business 
practice into Britain was not feasible for British retailers. The building of stores of 
around 7,000 sq. ft., with large car parks was not possible, due to both the high cost of 
land and the lower levels of car ownership, until the late 1960s. Similarly, lower levels 
of ownership of refrigerators meant that British shoppers were forced to shop more 
frequently than in the United States.73 Nevertheless, multiple retailers in Britain were 
much more rapid in their adoption of supermarkets than of simply self-service. By 
1964 multiple retailers operated 1,080 supermarkets, 66% of the total opened.74 
Furthermore, the independents and Co-ops were unable to alter this picture. By 1967 
the multiple retailers owned 67% of the 2,803 supermarkets operating in Britain.75
The large-scale capital investment necessary for the development of newer 
stores created new barriers to entry for competitors. It was predominately barriers to 
entry in centralised head office functions that the multiples had relied upon for 
competitive advantages against the independent sector in the decades prior to 1960.
71 D.I. Padberg, Economics of Food Retailing. (New York 1968), p.l 1. 
Supermarkets in the United States are defined as stores with an annual turnover of 
over $500,000.
72 Jeffreys & Knee, op.cit.. p.29.
73 JS Archive, TRAN 1, The Effect of Modem Distribution Methods on the Cost and 
Availability of Consumer Goods, c.1962, provides a discussion of the differences 
between the US and British experiences.
74 EIU. op.cit.. No.93. 1965, p.9.
75 Ibid., No. 129, 1968, p.6 .
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From the end of the 1950s new physical barriers to entry based upon investment in 
retail outlets became the strategy for developing organisational capabilities. It was this 
change that undermined the Co-operative’s market share. Further evidence for this 
can be seen by examining stock exchange data for all quoted retail distribution 
companies.
Goudie and Meekssstudy of stock exchange quoted companies’ performance 
shows that between 1958 and 1963 retailers generally turned to capital markets and 
share issues in order to raise funds (see Figure 4.1). It should be noted, however, that 
although share issues accounted for as much as 26% of total annual capital raised, this 
was in line with stock exchange listed companies generally. After the introduction of 
the Companies Act in 1965 and corporation tax the attractiveness of share issues for 
raising finance among retailers temporarily declined.77 This increased need for capital 
also halted the rise in company profits distributed to share holders after 1959. Figure 
4.2 highlights the rising share of gross profits accounted for by dividend payments 
prior to 1959. After 1959, despite the boosting of dividend payments following the 
introduction of corporation tax, a trend increase in retained earnings clearly establishes 
itself.
76 Birchall, op.cit.. p. 145.
77 See J.A. Kay and M.A. King, The British Tax System. (Oxford 2nd. ed. 1980), 
p i85, for details of tax changes.
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Figure 4.1
Percentage of Funds Derived from Share Issues
(3 year moving average)
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Figure 4.2
Retail Trade Dividend Payments as % of Gross Trading Profits
1949-70
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Meeksfcarlier study of merger activity among listed companies between 1964- 
71 notes that gross investment is positively correlated with acquisition activity. As 
Meeks points out ‘the active acquirer appears then to have invested more heavily than 
average in new fixed assets too’.78 Finance capital derived from share issues was 
important for retailers prior to 1963 for merger and acquisition activity, while retained
78 G. Meeks, ‘Disappointing Marriage: A Study of the gains from merger’, 
Department of Applied Economics Occasional Paper. No.51, (Cambridge 1977), 
Table 5.c and p.65.
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earnings, along with debt finance, became increasingly important for investment in 
new assets after 1959.
The Goudie and Meeks data refers to all listed retailing companies, yet the 
timing of change in grocery retailing is probably somewhat earlier than in retailing 
generally. Not only did RPM break down in grocery retailing prior to retailing 
generally but the growth of the multiple stores’ networks of stores, measured by 
numbers of stores, also occurred earlier. As Table 4.1 shows, the number of stores 
operated by the multiples reaches a peak by 1961, whereas the peak for all multiple 
retailers was not until 1966.79 Nevertheless the data clearly highlights changes in 
business strategies within retailing, from growth based upon a combination of merger 
and acquisition activity along with new fixed capital investment towards an increasing 
reliance upon new fixed capital investment by the early to mid 1960s. The 
development of self-service and supermarket retailing can explain this shift as retailers 
closed smaller stores and invested in new larger stores.
The movement towards self-service and supermarket retailing also had a 
significant impact on the development of the food industry. Retailers and wholesalers 
were increasingly influential in the determination of retail prices for food items, 
compared to producers and manufacturers. Figure 4.3 shows indices for retail food 
prices, wholesale inputs to the food manufacturing industry and wholesale outputs of 
the food manufacturing industry.
After the ending of rationing in 1954 and until 1964, food manufacturing input 
prices remained below their 1954 level, while output prices for the food manufacturing 
industries and retail food prices increased. This was at a time when agricultural
79 Census of Distribution. 1971, Part 1, Table 3, gives the total number of all 
multiple stores as 66,701 in 1961, 73,852 in 1966 and 66,785 in 1971.
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subsidies from central government fell by 77% in real terms.80 If farmers were to re­
coup their lost subsidies we would expect wholesale input prices to be rising. That this 
did not happen suggests that farmers and producers of fresh produce were losing power 
within the market to determine prices. For farmers profits could only be maintained 
through efficiency savings.
Influence over prices lay increasingly with processors, wholesalers and 
retailers. In part this can be explained by a higher value added content in both 
manufacturer’s wholesale output prices and retail prices. As mentioned above, 
retailers were increasing their range of pre-packaged and processed foods. However, it 
can also be seen that a widening of the gap between food manufacturing output prices 
and retail food prices develops between 1954 and 1960. Retail prices grow more 
rapidly than wholesale output prices suggesting that retailers were of growing 
importance in determining retail food prices. The collapse of RPM in grocery retailing 
is clearly detectable here in the stagnation of manufacturing output prices between 
1957 and 1961. The manufacturing output prices index, measured at constant 1954 
prices (i.e. 1954=100), reaches a peak in 1957 (1957=107.1) which is not equalled until 
1961 (1961=107.2), while the retail prices index rises from 1954=100 to 1957=112.7 
and 1961=117.2.81 Census of Distribution data confirms this shift of influence with 
retailers’ gross profit margins as a percentage of turnover rising between 1957 and 
1961 from 17.6% to 18.0% for multiple retailers and 14.6% to 15.2% for independent 
retailers.82 The gap between manufacturing output prices and food retail prices also 
increases from the mid 1960s. The parallel movement between manufacturing output
80 Calculated at 1958 prices, National Income and Expenditure Tables, table 53,
1966 and table 42, 1961
81 Annual Abstract of Statistics. Vol.99, (1962), tables 362 & 386.
82 Census of Distribution. 1966, Vol.l, table 10.
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prices and retail prices in the early 1960s may also be evidence that, while collective 
RPM was prevented after 1956, many firms were able to continue to use individual 
RPM agreements, even after 1958.83 This parallel movement also suggests that the 
multiples themselves were unwilling to enter into intense price competition or to drive 
down manufacturers’ margins after 1958. Census of Distribution data again confirms 
this with gross profit margins as a percentage of turnover falling back from its 1961 
high by 1966, to 17.8% for multiple retailers and 14.8% for independent retailers.84 
The reduction of margins after 1961 was instrumental in the timing of the conflict that 
emerged over retail trading stamps in 1963 (see below).
Figure 4.3
Price Indices for the Food Industry 1947-69 
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83 In 1959 200 agreements were registered as still operating with the Registrar of 
Restrictive Trading Agreements. See N. Cuthbert and W. Black, ‘Restrictive 
Practices in the Food Trades’, Journal of Industrial Economics Vol.VII, 1958-9, 
p.35.
84 Census of Distribution.. 1966, Vol.l, table 10.
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The development of larger supermarkets as a physical barrier to entry and the 
demise of price maintenance was not as successful in re-establishing the competitive 
advantages the multiples had anticipated. Manufacturers had proved capable of 
limiting the degree to which retailers could determine prices by the early 1960s.
Falling margins also suggests that the efficiency gains of self-service and 
supermarket retailing based upon economies of throughput were also not as 
forthcoming as had been assumed. One, disputed, study by Tulley & Hicks suggested 
that, excluding stockholding, administration and transport costs, larger supermarkets 
(above 4,500 sq.ft.) incorporated diseconomies of scale and smaller supermarkets 
(below 2,500 sq.ft) were the most profitable in terms of net profit per square foot.85 
The fact the methodology and interpretation rather than results of this study were 
disputed highlights the difficulty firms faced in assessing possible efficiency gains 
available through investment in larger supermarkets in the 1960s.86
That supermarket retailing was not an insurmountable physical barrier to
competition, for the independent sector, is also indicated from the fact that similar
scale advantages were available through the creation of voluntary chains of
independent grocers and the use of cash-and-carry wholesaling.
The development of cash-and-carry wholesaling allowed retailers to absorb 
transport costs. Still more importantly, the emergence of voluntary chains, provided the 
independents with the ability to undermine the multiples’ physical barriers to entry. 
Voluntary chains, yet again originating in the United States, first appeared in Britain in 
1954 and were organisations of independent wholesalers linked to groups of
85 R.P.R. Tulley & R. Hicks, ‘Economies of Scale in Supermarkets’. Journal of 
Industrial Economics. Vol.XIX. 1970-1.
86 K.A. Tucker, ‘Economies of Scale in Supermarkets: A Note’, Journal of 
Industrial Economics. Vol. XX, 1971-2.
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independent grocers. In Britain, with the exception of the Londis Grovisions chain, it 
was the wholesaler who initiated the link. The chains encouraged both a loyalty 
between wholesaler and retailer and ensured, through compulsory membership of 
grocers’ associations, that retailers agreed not to compete too vigorously with other
on
members of the chain. The chains also encouraged independent grocers to adopt self- 
service organisation by providing capital for the conversion of stores. Chains linked to 
wholesalers such as Spar had over 3,000 members while the retailer initiated group 
Londis Grovisions were able to achieve a membership of 850 members. The size of 
these groups allowed them to undermine many of the physical barriers to entry 
enjoyed by the multiples such as economies of buying.88 The growth of voluntary 
chains was extremely rapid. By 1963 voluntary groups, either wholesaler or retailer 
inspired, were estimated to be responsible for 28.6% of all grocery sales, 57% of sales 
within the independent sector.89
That retailers, including the multiples, were relatively content with the 
continued existence of RPM into the late 1950s can also be gauged from the 
unwillingness of multiple firms to introduce other competitive practices into the 
trade. Advertising was an area which the food retailing sector studiously failed to 
develop as a method of competition or as a non-physical barrier to entry.
The 1950s has been characterised as the period in which a ‘unification of the 
mass market’ began to develop within the food retailing sector, so that firms were able 
to develop advertising strategies aimed at a homogeneous consumer.90 While
87 C. Fulop, Buying Bv Voluntary Chains. (1962), p.41 and The Grocer. 30th 
October 1965, p.76
88 The Grocer. 30th October 1965, p.76.
89 Pickering , op.cit.. p. 136.
90 L. Sparks, ‘Food Retailing in Great Britain’, The Rise and Fall of Mass 
Marketing, ed. R.S. Tedlow and G. Jones, (1993), p.59.
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manufacturers used extensive advertising to promote branded products, and defend 
RPM, the multiples were slow to utilise advertising to promote a corporate image. The 
available data for total spending on advertising in the retail sector as a whole bears this 
out. Between 1948 and 1960 retail advertising rose from £22.3m to £69.1, although 
as a proportion of total advertising spending this in fact declined over the period from 
18.5% to 15.2%.91
In the food retailing sector this lack of concern amongst multiples for 
advertising was probably at the most extreme with advertising expenditure lagging far 
behind the expenditure of manufacturers on branded products. Food retailers publicly 
took the view that their position within the high street, and their regular contact with 
customers, negated the need for large-scale advertising.92 The widespread use of 
advertising for the food retailing industry therefore did not emerge until the 1970s. 
Instead advertising within the food industry remained the preserve of firms who used 
brand recognition in order to maintain RPM. In 1964 food industry advertising 
amounted to over £54m, with firms such as Lever Brothers and Procter and Gamble 
prepared to spend 18% of the selling price of their washing powder products, some 
£9.25m alone, on brand promotion. Similarly, expenditure on coffee and coffee 
products amounted to over £9. lm .93
Food retailers were not completely averse to using advertising; rather retailers 
consciously refrained from large-scale advertising in order to reduce competitive 
pressures. When retailers used sales promotion techniques, such as during the 
introduction of retail trading stamps (see below), it was not aimed at promoting
91 EIU, Advertising Expenditure 1960. (1962), Table 12, p.39.
92 IGD. op.cit.. 1987, p.23.
93 The Grocer. 22nd May 1965, p.48 and 16th October 1965, p.32.
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competition, rather it was to be used to restrict and regulate the degree to which price 
competition would develop within the trade.
While the suggested freezing of the retailing industry’s industrial structure 
between 1938 and 1954 may understate the degree of continuity with the period before 
1938, the industry’s slow pace of change does, nevertheless, require explanation. The 
answer, in part, lies with supply factors external to the industry itself. The development 
and prolongation of rationing and, with it, an acceptance of price controls ensured that 
little changed before 1954. Other supply factors, such as shortages of capital in the 
form of financial capital or building materials, for companies with access to financial 
markets, were not however constraints. The industry itself, in particular the multiples 
themselves, can be said to have played an important part in maintaining the regulated 
system whereby price competition was prevented, through an unwillingness to develop 
self-service stores prior to the emergence of supermarkets. The fact that the multiple 
stores helped maintain the system of price maintenance can be understood in terms of 
the benefit gained by firms in an environment where risk was minimised through RPM 
and the prevention of price cutting.
Despite this cosy set-up, pressures for change were building up within the 
trade. The multiples faced growing problems associated with the independents’ 
abilities to learn from the American experience of voluntary chains and the need to 
raise capital for the building of supermarkets. The multiples were also keen not to 
lose the advantage they held over the independents in their ability to achieve greater 
discounts from suppliers.94
94 Differential pricing was illegal within the United States, under the Robinson 
Patman Act, and has been held to account for the low levels of concentration within 
the United States retailing industry, see Gardner and Shepherd, op.cit.. p. 157.
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These factors coming together in the space of a few years were such that, when 
a thaw did arrive, changes within the industry caused firms to adjust extremely 
rapidly. To understand the structural change that the grocery retail trade underwent, it 
is necessary to examine the development of these pressures on a company such as 
Sainsbury’s and the impact of the conflict over trading stamps in 1963.
• J. Sainsburv after 1954
Sainsbury’s was in a particularly fortunate position regarding the ending of 
rationing and the need to develop a wider range of products. Its origins as a provision 
merchant and the existence of RPM aided the creation and extension of its own-brand 
range of goods.95 Sainsbury, like other multiple retailers, were rapidly introducing 
wider product ranges from the mid 1950s onwards. Some 1,000 own-brand products 
alone were introduced in the 1960s.96 Thus in the crucial period from 1945 to the early 
1960s Sainsbury’s became transformed from a provision merchant of own-brand 
goods to a mainstream grocery retailer selling both dry packaged groceries and own- 
brand provisions.
As a result of these capabilities, Sainsbury’s established itself as the market 
leader in own-brand products, generating over 50% of turnover from own-brands in 
the 1960s. In the 1970s retailers own-brand labels sales generally accounted for less 
than 25% of multiple retailers’ turnover and even competitors such as Tesco could 
only achieve own-brand sales of between 30-40% of turnover.97 This lead in own-
95 Jones and Morgan, op.cit.. pp 291-307 for a discussion on the link between RPM 
and the development of own-brand products.
96 Williams, op.cit.. p. 145.
97 Ibid.. p. 145 and IGD, op.cit.. 1987, pp. 20-21.
279
brand products still continues and is an essential component of Sainsbury’s continuing
no
competitive advantage. It was these strengths which helped Sainsbury’s establish a 
consistent trend in rising real turnover per store , see Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4
Sainsbury's Real Growth in Turnover per Store 
(1954 Prices)
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In terms of supply constraints, however, Sainsbury’s certainly fared no better 
than other competitors. The effect of the war on staffing levels was that Sainsbury’s 
initially looked to increasing its employment of juniors and the employment of, first, 
single women and, later, married women to maintain its business. As the war 
continued, single women were moved to war industries, so that by the end of the war 
Sainsbury’s staff in the branches overwhelmingly consisted of married women and
99juniors.
Sainsbury’s also significantly lagged behind even competitor multiple chains 
with respect to the move towards self-service and supermarkets. While both
98 Jones and Morgan, op.cit.. p 291 and see M. Cronshaw, E. Davis & J. Kay, ‘On 
Being Stuck in the Middle or Good Food Costs Less at Sainsbury’s’, Centre for 
Business Strategy Working Paper. No.83, (1990).
99 JS Archive, WAR 2, Bulletin, February 1945 and B. Williams, Ibid.. p.l 11.
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Sainsbury’s and Tesco opened their first self-service stores in 1950, Tesco had opened 
or converted four-fifths of its stores by 1955, whereas Sainsbury’s change-over was 
much slower, with only 80 self-service stores operating out of 250 even in 1967.100 
This slowness in moving towards supermarket developments is still more remarkable 
in the light of the fact that of the company’s total turnover of £165.7m in 1969, some 
£105.8m, 64%, came from 82 supermarkets and a further £22.9m, 13.8%, from 40 
other self-service stores.101 Thus 50% of its stores contributed only 22.3% of 
turnover.
While Sainsbury’s profit figures suggest a diversified retail business strategy, 
it could also be suggested that Sainsbury’s provides and excellent example of 
Chandler’s British family capitalism, deficient in managerial hierarchies.102 The 
Sainsbury family were certainly committed to maintaining tight family control over the 
company. The company had to wait until 1941 before a director was appointed that 
was not a family member, and, unlike Tesco, the company did not become a listed 
company on the stock exchange after the war. Sainsbury’s lack of access to stock 
market funds, noted above, may help explain the company’s aversion to growth by 
acquisition. Sainsbury’s slowness in developing self-service might also therefore 
reflect the fact that the company lacked the financial ability to transform its retail 
outlets. Sainsbury’s focus upon family control and evolutionary growth was not 
however a mistaken business strategy. Figure 4.5 shows that, over the period as a 
whole, Sainsbury’s saw its real gross profits per store increasing. This also suggests 
that the company would be unlikely to have had difficulty raising long term capital if
100 Powell, op.cit.. p.78 and JS Journal. ‘Self-Service at Sainsbury's’, July 1967,
p .12.
101 J. Sainsbury, Annual Report and Accounts 1969, p.3.
102 See A.D. Chandler, Scale and Scope. (1990).
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required. Interestingly the key sub-period where this conclusion would not hold is in 
the period from 1960-63, see Figure 4.5. It is precisely these years that saw the 
intensification of the pressures upon the multiples to adopt price competition.
Figure 4.5 
Sainsbury's Real Gross Profit per store
at 1954 Prices1 2  T
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For J. Sainsbury Ltd. and the Sainsbury family, success in the 1950s lay in a 
business strategy of creating economies of scale, through the development of 
centralisation of managerial functions including buying, pricing and capital raising, as 
well as vertical integration into manufacturing, warehousing and distribution. Other 
multiples tended to be less centralised or vertically integrated. Tesco, for example, was 
not as vertically integrated into food manufacturing nor as centralised (allowing, for 
example, branch managers’ control over pricing). In the 1960s the multiples responded 
flexibly to the growth of their distribution network by moving towards de-centralised 
manufacturer originating distribution systems.103 Nevertheless the point remains, the 
multiple form of organisation, in all of its diversity, with a small, centralised family- 
based managerial hierarchy proved highly successful.
103 Jones and Morgan, op.cit.
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As suggested above, the multiples were keen to regulate competition within 
the retail trade. One aspect of this was an acceptance, among firms, on the restriction 
of advertising expenditure.104 Sainsbury’s was typical of the multiple firms in its 
restraint of advertising. Although Sainsbury’s first used television advertising in 1958, 
the company paid little attention to media advertising generally. Sainsbury’s 
advertising expenditure in the first nine months of 1963 totalled under £24,000, with 
Tesco totalling just over £21,000.105 The multiples avoided large-scale advertising 
not only because of their view that it was unnecessary to attract custom but also 
because, until the emergence of price competition they were unwilling to develop new 
areas of competition.
Firms such as Sainsbury were, however, prepared to lead extensive and 
sophisticated advertising campaigns to prevent competitors from altering the balance 
between price and non-price competition, established within the trade after the 
breakdown of RPM. In the last quarter of 1963, Sainsbury’s spent £77,720, three 
times as much as they had in the whole nine months previously. Tesco similarly was 
prepared to spend £40,127, twice as much as over the same nine month period. The 
explanation for these increases does not lie with an emphasis upon seasonal 
advertising, but instead on the outbreak of a conflict between retailers over the issuing 
of retail trading stamps and the emergence of price discounting in 1963.
It was the outbreak of price discounting in 1963 that also helps to provide an 
explanation for Sainsbury’s slow movement into self-service and supermarkets.
104 See McClelland, op.cit.. pp.256-261 on the minimal use of advertising among 
retailers prior to the mid 1960s.
105 The Grocer. 4th April 1964, p.32.
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Williams emphasises Sainsbury’s difficulties in transforming older stores for self- 
service, due to either unsuitable location or size.106 However a closer examination of 
the changes in real gross profit per store also highlights the problems facing 
Sainsbury’s. Real gross profit per store would be expected to increase with the shift 
first to self-service and later to supermarkets, as turnover increases compensate for any 
reduction in margins. However as Figure 4.5 highlights growth in real gross profits per 
store saw a sustained fall between 1960 and 1963. In 1960, approximately 10% of 
Sainsbury’s stores had been converted to self-service with an average sales area of 
4,750 sq.ft., suggesting that Sainsbury’s was only opening, or converting, stores that
1 (Y7were classified as supermarkets. The problem of profitability may have been acute 
for Sainsbury’s from 1960 to 1963 but as Figure 4.6 highlights this was a long term 
trend within food retailing. The fundamental explanation behind Sainsbury’s slow 
development of self-service and supermarkets was not simply a result of poor sites but 
a long term fall in gross profit margins.
Figure 4.6
Sainsbury's Gross Profits as a Percentage of Turnover
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Sources: See figures 4.4 & 4.5
106 Williams, op.cit.. p. 124.
107 Ibid.. pp. 138 & 148.
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If the evidence for Sainsbury’s falling real gross profits as a percentage of 
turnover and the earlier evidence of retained earnings by listed retail companies after 
1959 are indicative for food retailers generally then the crisis of competitiveness facing
10ftmultiple retailers in the late 1950s becomes apparent. While RPM was broken 
competition through service remained, companies were increasing their retained 
earnings and were also experiencing a real fall in their gross profit margins. The 
multiples were keen to maintain a secure environment for investment, but investment 
in new fixed assets and falling real gross profit margins could not be reconciled 
indefinitely. In 1963 the deadlock was broken and price competition, in the form of 
discounting, broke out amongst grocery retailers.
• The Outbreak of Price Competition
The multiple retailers favoured the breakdown of RPM as it enabled them to 
shift the balance over the determination of retail prices in their favour. However, this 
did not mean that multiple retailers favoured price competition. Despite reductions in 
dividend payments after 1959 (Figure 4.2), a reduction in the price differential 
between manufacturing output prices and retail prices after 1960 (Figure 4.3), and a 
sharp fall in profit margins between 1958 and 1963 (Figure 4.6) the multiples 
continued to avoid price discounting. Instead the multiples favoured a continuation of 
controlled competition linked to both service and price. Unfortunately for the multiples 
such a solution was unsustainable once the independent sector had developed
108 Retail Trade Developments in Great Britain 1971-2. (1971), pp 330 & 336, 
suggests that Sainsbury’s profit margin in 1970 was 2.9% against that of Tesco at 
5.3%. Profit margins of below 5% seem at odds with the Census material suggesting 
profit margins of around 16%. It is believed that the difference lies in the methods 
adopted for calculation and therefore they should not be compared directly.
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alternative competitive strategies. As a result, in October 1963, price competition 
emerged and the transformation of the grocery retailing sector began. The issue which 
sparked off price competition was retail trading stamps.
Retail trading stamps, as with so much else originated in the United States, 
were a method of building customer loyalty. Stamps would be given with each 
purchase and could be collected by customers and exchanged for a wide range of 
consumer durables at a later date, from the stamp-issuing company. In Britain the 
largest of the stamp-issuing companies was Green Shield, with over 60% of the market 
in 1963.109
There were two areas of conflict between retailers over the issuing of trading 
stamps. Stamps raised costs for retailers, who had to purchase them from the stamp- 
issuing company at a cost of between 2-2.5% of sales, which would then need to be 
recovered from customers.110 An increase in retailers’ prices could only be overcome if 
the issuing of stamps resulted in higher turnover counteracting the effects of lower 
margins. Thus the debate between retailers centred on whether or not increases in 
aggregate turnover could be generated for the trade, or whether the issuing of stamps 
would simply redistribute trade. In the latter case, stamps would represent an added 
cost, eating into profit margins, if their use spread to all retailers.111 The second area of 
debate arose over the degree to which stamps offered a discount on a wide range of 
consumer goods, and in so doing threatened to undermine RPM on branded products
109 M. Corina, Pile it High Sell it Cheap. (1972), p.24.
110 McClelland, op.cit.. p.270.
111 See Daily Mail 6th November 1963 for debate over the merits of trading stamps 
between Lord Sainsbury for the anti-stamp Distributive trades Alliance and Leslie 
Carter for the stamp issuing company Associated British Foods.
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outside of the grocery trade.112 Manufacturers were concerned that stamp-issuing 
retailers were effectively offering discounts, on their products, and that this would in 
turn lead to pressure, from non-stamp-issuing retailers, to lower wholesale prices in 
order to maintain retail margins.113 The issue became one of which area of the trade 
would be faced with absorbing the cost of trading stamps.
In Britain, trading stamps first appeared in small independent grocers’ stores in 
1958. In 1961 the National Association of Multiple Grocers organised an unwritten 
agreement boycotting the use of stamps amongst the larger multiples.114 The multiples’ 
boycott of stamps held until the middle of 1963, when, in August, the Fine Fare group 
announced that it would be introducing stamps in November. In October 1963 both 
Pricerite and Tesco pre-empted Fine Fare and introduced stamps. From late 1963, 
through to 1965, a veritable war between pro-and anti-stamp supporters raged 
throughout the trade. Sainsbury’s, in particular, was central to the organisation of the 
anti-stamp campaign.115
As early as March 1963, Sainsbury’s had anticipated a breakdown of the anti­
stamp boycott. As a result the company commissioned the advertising agency Mather 
& Crowther to develop an anti-stamp campaign. Their report was to provide the basis 
of the anti-stamp campaign over the next two years. The Mather & Crowther report 
presented two alternatives; either a consortium of ‘virtually all the major retailing 
groups’ should be organised, including grocers, garages, chemists, variety stores etc.,
112 The Co-op’s use of a dividend payment had also been opposed by manufacturers 
although it was eventually accepted that the dividend was more analogous to a share 
dividend on the basis that it was a payment and not a discount on specific goods.
113 Corina, op.cit.. p.27.
114 Powell, op.cit.. pp. 104-111.
115 This conflict is currently being replayed over the use of Discount Cards which are 
indeed a more modem form of trading stamps, although the outcome this time 
appears to favour the card issuing stores.
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or a ‘specifically Sainsbury’s anti-stamp campaign’ should be developed. The report 
recommended that for the ‘opportunistic’ anti-stamp advertising, aimed at the 
housewife, to be effective it should be along ‘emotional (rather) than on rational lines’ 
and economic arguments, for the ‘rational-minded’, should be aimed at the ‘pub- 
economist’ I116
Sainsbury’s considered the emergence of trading stamps such a threat that it 
adopted both options: a collective and an individual approach. Sainsbury’s budgeted 
£80,000 for an initial eight-week campaign against trading stamps, beginning in 
November 1963. The company had originally been considering spending an initial
117£120,000 on the campaign. The expenditure on the anti-stamp campaign was clearly 
far in excess of Sainsbury’s usual advertising expenditure, which further emphasises 
how important the defeat of trading stamps was to the Sainsbury family.
Sainsbury’s, through Lord (Alan) Sainsbury, also developed the alternative 
suggestion of the Mather & Crowther report, forming the Distributive Trades Alliance 
in order to co-ordinate opposition to the emergence of trading stamps amongst all 
sectors of the retail industry. The DTA instigated a boycott of the bakery products of 
Associated British Foods, owner of the stamp-issuing store, Fine Fare. This boycott, 
although eventually condemned by the Restrictive Practices Court in 1965, forced 
Fine Fare to abandon the use of trading of stamps within twelve months of their 
introduction.118 An American-based stamp-issuing company claimed that the DTA’s 
activities were such that, if it operated within the United States, ‘it would have long
116 JS Archive, HIST/7, Preliminary Proposals for an Anti-Stamp Campaign, 4th 
April 1963.
117 JS Archive, HLST/7, Letter from J.D. Sainsbury to A. Tennant of Mather & 
Crowther 20th June 1963.
118 The Grocer. 19th June 1965, p.34 and Financial Times. 26th September 1964.
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since attracted the attention of the Federal Trade Commission1.119 Retailers of 
consumer durables also threatened to break RPM agreements, unless manufacturers 
took action to prevent their branded goods being sold in stamp-issuing stores.120
Manufacturers were particularly concerned over the introduction of trading 
stamps as a way of undermining margins. As early as May 1963, the Food 
Manufacturers’ Federation, (FMF), was in contact with Lord Sainsbury for help in 
putting the manufacturers’ point of view.121 However, manufacturers’ associations 
such as the FMF faced similar problems presenting a united view on trading stamps as 
the National Association of Multiple Grocers, since they recognised that ‘small 
manufacturers might see stamps as a method of achieving free advertising at moderate 
cost.’ In the case of the FMF, they urged larger manufacturers to use ‘consultation and 
persuasion behind the scenes.’ and, as a federation, decided to ‘advise members of the 
inherent dangers of stamp trading and to recommend no participation in stamp 
schemes for manufacturers’.122 Larger manufacturers quickly organised boycotts of 
stamp-issuing retailers. By December 1963, Cadburys (despite court action from Tesco 
and Victor Value), Rowntrees Mackintosh, EMI and Decca, Gillette, Imperial 
Tobacco Co., Distillers Co. and tyre manufacturers' including Dunlop, Firestone, 
Avon, Goodyear and Michelin were all involved in boycotting retailers.123
The significance of the war over retail trading stamps lies with the conflict that 
was emerging between the continuation of a market characterised by competition
119 Financial Times. 15th October 1964.
120 Observer. 15th November 1963 for threats from the John Lewis partnership.
121 FMF, Executive Committee Minutes, Vol.l 1, 63/87 Stamp Trading, 28th May 
1963.
122 FMF Archive, Executive Committee Minutes, Vol.l 1, 63/148 Trading Stamps, 
17th September 1963 and 63/192 Trading Stamps, 26th November 1963.
123 Sunday Telegraph , 8th December 1963.
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based upon a combination of price and levels of service and a market characterised by 
simple price competition. To what extent should price competition be regulated within 
the industry? The Sainsbury family had consistently opposed resale price maintenance, 
yet were prepared to invest considerable amounts of managerial time and money in the 
defence of the status quo in grocery retailing and, even more significantly, resale price 
maintenance outside grocery retailing.
Throughout, Sainsbury’s claimed that opposition to trading stamps lay with the 
increasing costs which consumers would pay as the costs of stamps was passed on, yet 
the evidence for this was weak. Studies in the 1950s within the United States, by the 
Department of Agriculture, across 21 cities showed that wide variations of price 
changes existed between stores that did and did not issue stamps. Nevertheless, the 
study also suggested that, while on average prices in stamp-issuing stores had risen 
faster than in non stamp-issuing stores, the rise had not been enough to counteract the 
discount received when stamps were redeemed. Another US study in the 1960s 
suggested that only in a stamp saturated market could the use of stamps lead to an 
increase in prices124 In Britain the claim that prices would be affected was similarly 
disputed. In 1964 an Institute of Economic Affairs publication argued that 'there is 
little ground for the argument that the cost of trading stamps must ipso facto be 
transferred onto the consumer in the form of higher prices '125 and in 1965 a Consumer 
Association investigation, across 120 stores over four months, concluded that prices 
were not affected.126
124 Quoted in Padberg, op.cit.. p. 157. This is an obvious difference between the 
conflict between retailers over trading stamps in 1963 and over discount cards in 
1995, given the increased levels of concentration within the trade.
125 C. Fulop, The Role of Trading Stamps in Retail Competition. (1964), p.65.
126 See The Grocer. 3rd July 1965 p.34.
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The emergence of trading stamps threatened to intensify price competition in 
the grocery retail trade and it was this that Sainsbury’s and other multiple retailers 
feared. Sainsbury’s recognised that, while, the demise of RPM further weakened 
manufacturers’ ability to determine prices, there was a need for co-operation within the 
industry as a whole to prevent price competition from becoming too intense.
In 1964 the Trading Stamps Act was passed which, although not as far 
reaching as the bill initiated by Lord Alan Sainsbury, regulated the use the trading 
stamps and ensured stamps monetary value was printed on them. That the DTA 
campaign can be considered to have been relatively successful can also be gauged by 
the data collected in the 1971 Census of Distribution. In 1971 only 39 multiple grocery 
organisations with 3,144 stores were issuing stamps. Similarly among independents 
only 5,676 firms with 5,984 stores were providing stamps.127
• Trade Associations and the Grocery Trade
The ability of firms to influence the development of the market is determined 
not simply by their own relationship to suppliers and customers, but also by their 
influence within decision making bodies external to the firm. In the case of the food 
industry the influence of the Sainsbury family within the trade associations was 
unique. The Sainsbury company had a long tradition of support for co-operation 
between companies; its very origins were intimately tied up with the Pact. The 
company was also a central element within the Distributive Traders Alliance.
Still more importantly, the Sainsbury family was at the very heart of policy 
formation within the industry at this key point in time. The family’s strong paternalistic
127 UK Census of Distribution. 1971, Supplement, table 49.
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and philanthropic traditions led the individual family members to actively participate 
in all areas of the trade. Lord Sainsbury held the view that; ‘I do maintain that family 
businesses can, and do, provide in many instances the type of leadership that a large 
community of people engaged in common enterprise require.’128
It was these beliefs that led Lord Sainsbury to become President of both the 
Multiple Shops Federation and the National Grocers’ Federation from 1963 to 1966, 
the Grocers’ Institute in 1964-66, and its predecessor the Institute of Certified Grocers’ 
in 1963-64; he was also President of the international chain store organisation, Comite 
International des Entreprises a Succursales, CIES, in 1965-68.129 He also represented 
the food trades on numerous government bodies including the Food Research and 
Advisory Committee, from 1960 to 1970 (as its Chairman, 1965-70) and the National 
Economic Development Council for the Distributive Trades in 1964-68.130 Similarly 
James Sainsbury, the family member most closely linked to the manufacturing aspects 
of the business, was Chairman of the influential London Provision Exchange in 1957- 
58 and the National Association of Multiple Grocers from 1967 to 1969.131 Family 
members and company representatives also represented the trade on countless other 
government and non-govemment bodies.
128 Lord Sainsbury speaking in 1954 and quoted in Dictionary of Business 
Biography. Vol.5, (1986), p.7. Unifying notions of ‘community’ and ‘service’ are 
regularly occurring themes within the Sainsbury family’s writings. For an instance of 
James Sainsbury’s, for example; ‘I am sure that I speak for our trade as a whole 
when I say that we are at all times at the service of the permanent officials for the 
consultation which we believe is indispensable in the conduct of the affairs of Food, 
as well as of Agriculture.’ JS Journal. No.48, 1958, p.4.
129 Dictionary of Business Biography, p.8 , IGD, Report and Accounts. (1991) and 
The Grocer. 25th June 1966, p.40-1.
130 Dictionary of Business Biography, p.7.
131 JS Journal. December 1984, p.3.
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The atomistic nature of the food industry and the retail trade was reflected in 
the development of trade associations. A myriad of trade associations existed within 
the retailing and food manufacturing trades, many of which failed to last and were 
either absorbed into larger organisations or simply disappeared entirely. Trade 
Associations covered all areas of the trade and provided a wide range of different 
services. The main separation between organisations was between the producers, 
wholesalers and retailers, but within these boundaries various smaller sectional and 
geographical interests were represented by a multitude of associations, some of which 
were linked to one another but many of which remained autonomous. An indication of 
the size and influence of some of the main trade associations within the retail trade 
comes from examining their membership levels and their main roles.
The Food Manufacturers’ Federation was one of the most important and 
coherent of the trade associations within the industry. The FMF, incorporated in 
1925, represented the manufacturing firms across the industry, with 1006 members in 
1956.132 The FMF’s main aim was to provide services for its members and co-ordinate 
the activities of affiliated associations. The FMF’s Articles of Association stated that 
the Federation should 'promote by all lawful means the welfare of the food 
manufacturers' and 'create and maintain a public opinion favourable to the food 
trades'.133 Its Presidents included representatives of all the major food manufacturing 
companies, including Crosse & Blackwell, Dell Foods, Nestle, Unilever, Schweppes, 
Reckitt & Colman, Unigate.134 Companies such as Sainsbury's and Tesco, which also
132 FMF, List of Members. Revised May 1956.
133 FMF, Memorandum and Articles of Association., 22nd December 1925, p.l.
134 FMF, Annual Report & Accounts. 1972, p.24.
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manufactured products, were members, with the directors John D. Sainsbury and 
W.M. Justice acting as council members for Sainsbury's.135 The Sainsbury company 
were also represented on many of the FMF's various committees and sub-committees, 
including Education, Food Additives, Hygiene, Food Machinery and Labour and Plant 
Utilisation.
The Food Manufacturers’ Industrial Group (FMIG), founded in 1946, was also 
affiliated to the FMF. It was the FMIG that appointed the employers’ representatives to 
the food manufacturing Joint Industrial Council, the body which negotiated national 
wage levels. The FMF provided advice for official bodies, providing representatives on 
63 British Standards Institute committees in 1959, but was not directly involved in 
regulating the industry through the enforcement of resale price maintenance or the 
publication of stop lists. The FMF was in actual fact prevented from engaging in
136restrictive trade practices by its articles of association. The FMF did, however, allow 
member firms to form trade groups who were free to promote the use of restrictive 
trade practices. An example of this type of group was the Sausage and Meat Pie 
Manufacturers’ Association.137 The FMF also provided secretarial facilities for trade 
groups in exactly the same way as occurred in the British Electrical Manufacturers’ 
Association.
The trade associations of wholesalers were numerically irrelevant in 
comparison to those of the manufacturers, yet of considerable influence within the 
trade. The most important was the National Committee of the Provision Importing
135 See FMF, Annual Report & Accounts. 1962.
136 FMF, Bulletin. July 1955, p. 160.
137 The Association had 102 members and used RPM until it was removed at James 
Sainsbury’s instigation. See JS Journal. December 1984, p.3 and FMF, Annual Report 
and Accounts. 1972, p.22.
294
Trade, which represented the interests of the provision exchange organisations 
including London, Manchester, Liverpool, North Eastern and Scotland. Below this was 
the Wholesale Grocers’ Federation which faced with a falling membership, from 
nineteen to six and a failure of the organisation to be able to maintain a quorum at its 
annual meeting, moved away from being a federation of wholesale associations 
towards individual membership. By 1965 it claimed 620 members, covering some 
95% of trade in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.138 In grocery retailing trade 
associations represented different sectors. The Retail Distributors’ Association, 
representing the department stores, in 1964 had 420 members.139 Its main function was 
the publication of statistical material for members produced from annual company 
surveys. These surveys highlighted changing trends including average floorspace, 
turnover and rates of return on capital employed.140 The Association also provided 
legal and advisory functions for members and the industry.141 The Multiple Shops’ 
Federation claiming over 400 members and the Supermarkets’ Association (SMA) 
with some 56 members covering 900 supermarket stores, represented half of all 
supermarkets.142 The SMA also had 131 associate members, covering a wide range of 
food manufacturing, equipment and service companies.143 In contrast, at the 
independent end of grocery retailing was the largest of the associations, the National 
Grocers’ Federation, with a membership of between 17-18,000.144 This organisation
138 The Grocer. 2nd October 1965, pp. 21-22.
139 The Grocer. 4th April 1964, p.24.
140 See Retail Distributors’ Association, Annual Statistical Reports. 1959-1970.
141 See H. Levy, Retail Trade Associations. (1942).
142 The Grocer. 21st November 1964, p.28.
143 The Grocer. 30th May 1964, p.32.
144 The Grocer. 12th December 1964, p.30 and 25th June 1966, p.40.
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was created before the First World War and was both hostile to the emergence of 
multiple retailing and closely linked with the regulation of resale price maintenance.
Trade associations were rarely profitable organisations and some made losses. 
The FMF ran an operating deficit throughout the 1960s, with the single exception of 
1961, due to the failure of subscriptions and fees from secretarial services to cover 
operating costs. The FMF was only able to continue due to the cross subsidy derived 
from the annual food manufacturers’ exhibition.145 Similarly, despite the Wholesaler 
Grocers* Federation’s move towards individual membership, the organisation made a 
loss of £35,000 in the four years to 1966, forcing it to sell its offices, its main asset.146
The largely unconnected and highly uncoordinated nature of trade associations 
within the food manufacturing, and particularly within the retailing, industries was to 
some degree counter-acted by the multiple membership of many firms. This was 
especially true for those firms which attempted to influence the development of the 
industry, such as Sainsbury’s. Nevertheless, trade associations in the food 
manufacturing and retailing industry suffered from an inability to develop a coherent 
strategy for dealing with either the problems facing the industry or with negotiations 
with government bodies.
The Food Manufacturers’ Federation’s general view on issues effecting the 
industry was typical of British industry in the period. The 1963 President’s statement 
summed this position up. The Federation would 'try to look at problems in two ways. 
Firstly, what can industry do to help itself; secondly what can it do to resist, quite
145 FMF, Annual Report and Accounts. 1957-71.
146 The Grocer. 25th June 1966, p.42.
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rightly, any action by government or other bodies which will in its view damage the 
industry'.147 As a result the Federation recognised immediately that liaison within the 
industry could prove problematic and could lead to a conflict, with its membership, 
'because it is bound to lead to a natural struggle between the individualists and those 
that feel that some overall agreement on good practice will prejudice no one and can 
be of benefit to both manufacturer and distributor'.148 Throughout 1961 the Executive 
Committee discussed issues relating to Britain’s possible entry into the Common 
Market, ranging from restrictive practices to food additives with associations 
representing biscuit and cocoa manufacturers. The FMF found itself reluctantly being 
pushed into co-operation with other trade associations, despite worries over the 
hostility this could cause amongst member firms.
The strength of atomistic individualism is highlighted by the difficulties faced 
in attempting to establish a co-ordinating body for the industry. The ending of 
rationing in 1954, the slow growth of consumer demand and the collapse of RPM led 
to an increasing awareness across the industry that some level of co-ordination was 
required. Despite this recognition, co-ordination at any level was extremely difficult to 
achieve. No more clearly was this shown than in the creation of a consultative 
committee for the distributive trades by the FMF.
In 1960 the FMF opposed co-operation on the grounds that it believed that 
the ‘attitude and practices of individual manufacturers varied widely and that it 
would not be possible to agree a general line of policy.’149 However the signing of
147 L. Rose, FMF Presidents Statement, Report and Accounts. 1963, p.l.
148 Ibid.. p. 18.
149 FMF, Executive Committee Minutes, Vol. 11, 60/11 Liaison Between 
Manufacturers and Distributors, 21st January 1960.
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the Treaty of Rome led European retailers to begin examining international co­
operative strategies. The FMF, while opposing a conference called by the 
International Association of Chain Stores to examine ‘collaboration between food 
chains and food manufacturers’, reluctantly decided to send an observer.150 By the 
end of 1961, the FMF was beginning to soften its attitude towards co-operation with 
wholesalers’ and grocers’ organisations. The FMF, while still rejecting any proposals 
for permanent liaison, accepted an invitation from the National Federation of 
Wholesale Grocers and Provision Merchants for discussions, on condition that any 
agenda would avoid all discussions of pricing and would remain on an informal 
basis.151
By 1963 the FMF were discussing the creation of a Distribution Committee 
involving the Wholesale Grocers’ Federation, the London Provision Exchange along 
with the Multiple Shops’ Federation and Supermarkets’ Association, whose aim would 
be 'to liaise and consult with all trade associations' in wholesaling and retailing on 
‘problems of common interest, e.g. night deliveries, standardisation of pallets 
etc.’152 Finally, in July 1963, the FMF agreed to the setting up of a permanent liaison 
committee, the Distribution Committee. However, yet again the condition was 
imposed that any liaison between manufacturers, wholesalers and grocers would avoid
1 S3discussion of manufacturers’ pricing and distribution policy.
150 FMF, Executive Committee, Vol.l 1, 60/81 Conference on collaboration between 
food chains and food manufacturers, 28th April 1960.
151 FMF, Executive Committee, Vol.l 1, 61/184 Proposal from Wholesale Grocers 
and Provision Merchants to form a permanent trade relationships committee 2nd 
November 1961 and 61/216 Proposed liaison with Grocers, 7th December 1961.
152 FMF, Executive Committee Minutes,, Vol.l 1, 63/89 Joint Liaison between 
Wholesale Grocers’ Federation and the FMF, 28th May 1963.
153 FMF, Executive Committee, Vol.l 1, 63/107 Grocers’ Federation and FMF Joint 
Liaison Committee, 25th June 1963.
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Even after 1963, it was still felt, within the retailing sector of the trade, that a 
lack of co-ordination existed when it came to discussions with government bodies. The 
main trade paper The Grocer reported, as late as 1965, that the Retail Distributors’ 
Association believed that the 'retail trade has no machinery which offers government a 
single point of contact'154
The lack of concentration and the lack of vertical integration not only made 
attempts at market structuring prone to failure but also ensured that manufacturing 
firms were intent on retaining as much control over the industry as possible. Thus, the 
key reason behind the inability of different sections of the food industry to co-operate 
lies with the resistance of manufacturers to discuss pricing and distribution policies, in 
the aftermath of the collapse of RPM. In June 1959, twelve months after the collapse 
of RPM in grocery retailing, two hundred agreements relating to the food industry had 
been registered as still operating with the Office of the Registrar for Restrictive 
Trading Agreements. Of these 133 related to prices and 65 to collective 
discrimination.155 By 1960 registration had increased to 245 and although the majority 
had been voluntarily altered, to take account of the 1956 Restrictive Trade Practices 
Act, it was still suggested that competition would not automatically ensue.156
Despite the recovery in manufacturing output prices relative to retail prices 
after 1961 (see Figure 4.3) manufacturers’ margins were continually under pressure, 
from the influence of both wholesalers and retailers, as manufacturers were faced with 
abandoning these agreements. The multiple organisations were altering the balance of
154 The Grocer. 8th May 1965, p.55.
155 N. Cuthbert and W. Black, ‘Restrictive Practices in the Food Trades’, Journal of 
Industrial Economics. Vol. VII, 1958-9, p.35.
156 N. Cuthbert and W. Black, ‘Restrictive Practices in the Food Trades, II’, Journal 
of Industrial Economics. Vol. VIX, 1960-61, p.76.
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influence within the trade and the wholesale associations were increasingly reflecting 
the multiples’ view. The forum in which this threat to manufacturers’ control of prices 
emerged was in the provision exchanges, the market place for wholesale produce.
The wholesaling of the food industry became geographically centralised in a 
series of produce exchanges, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, around the 
main British ports including Liverpool, Manchester and London. The London 
exchange formed in 1887, and renamed the London Provision Exchange in 1924, 
became the central organisation for determining prices and levels of competition 
within the grocery market.157 The London Provision Exchange’s origins lay in the 
needs of producers, importers and sellers as opposed to buyers. As a result, although 
buyers, including Sainsbury’s, were members of the exchange, it rapidly became a 
vehicle for the development of price rings and agreements aimed at preventing
158multiple retailers from gaining direct access to produce.
Attempts at establishing price fixing agreements were, however, limited from 
the exchanges inception by the multiples ability to gain direct access to supplies from 
producers. The bacon pricing agreements in the 1890s foundered on Sainsbury’s 
refusal to abide by the restriction of purchasing only through Produce Agents 
Association members. 159
Despite the early difficulties of enforcement the provision exchanges fixed 
both wholesale and retail prices for produce, particularly meat and dairy produce, 
through the weekly meetings of a panel of sellers and buyers. These meetings not only 
decided prices but, also, during the First World War and other crises, including the
157 H. Barty-King, Making Provision. (1986), p.37 & p.97.
158 Ibid., pp. 47-60.
159 Ibid., p.59.
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abandonment of the gold standard, fixed gross profits for importers, wholesalers and 
retailers respectively. The ‘Gentleman’s Agreements’ between the Board of Trade and 
the provision trade restricting imports of food stuffs into Britain, after 1933, was 
highly effective in preventing retailers from developing new supply chains.160 The 
Provision Exchange’s influence over prices became such that the weekly prices, fixed 
in meetings, were quoted in the trade papers and were used both nationally and 
internationally. Butter prices were determined by the Manchester and London 
exchanges, egg prices by Glasgow and London and cheese, bacon and ham by the 
London exchange..161 Thus the Provision Exchanges in the 1930s became formalised 
markets with access controlled by membership, supply by gentleman’s agreements 
and prices determined by the relative strength of the constituent participants within the 
meetings of the panel.
The impact of the Second World War and rationing was to strengthen the 
position of the provision exchanges against the multiple retailers. By 1943 the 
government had ensured that all wholesalers were members of relevant trade 
associations.162 The multiples ability to create direct supply chains with producers was 
strictly limited by the introduction of zoning and pooling arrangements for distribution, 
undertaken by wholesalers, and enforced by the Ministry of Supply and the Ministry of 
Food. These restrictions upon supplies provided the exchanges with the influence 
that they had been unable to achieve in their earlier years.164
160 Between 1932-36 ‘foreign’ food imports fell by half. Ibid.. pp. 108-9.
161 Ibid., pp. 107-8.
162 PRO MAF 99/1847, Draft record of the Wholesale Co-ordination Division.
163 Ibid., p .6 and PRO MAF 85/184 Timetable for Decontrol for explanation of the 
hand over back to private control of wholesaling operations in 1954.
164 Pooling of supplies could even lead to private retailers having to sell Co-op 
branded goods in their stores. See Birchall, op.cit.. p. 139.
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After 1945 as rationing was slowly removed the larger multiple retailers were 
again able to create direct supply chains, with the result that the exchanges were 
increasingly forced to respond to the multiples’ interests. The influence of the 
multiples within the exchanges was to change their character, from being organisations 
whose main function had been to benefit importers and producers, to organisations 
representing the interests of the larger retailers. By 1944 the exchanges recognised 
they would have to accommodate the interests of the multiple retailers and that the 
position of firms such as Sainsbury’s, within the provision trade was ‘no longer a 
matter of dispute’.165 In 1957 James Sainsbury became the Chairman of the London 
Provision Exchange.166 As a result, the ability of the multiple retailers to push down 
prices, at the Exchange’s meetings, increased, highlighted by the conflict over bacon 
prices with the Ulster Bacon Association UBA in 1965.
Bacon entering the British wholesale market was subject to controls laid down
in the International Bacon Sharing Agreement. These controls established market
shares by country of origin, including Britain. Prices were determined at weekly
meetings of selling agents, representing each producer country, after consultation with
multiple retailers and wholesalers.167 In July 1965 bacon producers, through the Ulster
Bacon Agency (UBA), announced their decision to withdraw from the weekly
168exchange’s pricing meetings and to price their own bacon. The UBA objected to the 
fact that ‘neither the Ulster pig producers, the Pigs Marketing Board, nor the curers had 
any direct say in the price at which Ulster bacon was sold.’ The UBA also argued that
165 Barty-King, op.cit.. pp. 123-125.
166 JS Journal. December 1984, p.3.
167 The Grocer. 30th October 1965, pp. 28-29.
168 The Grocer. 10th July 1965.
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the selling agents were failing to represent the producers and that direct pricing would 
create a better return.169
In response to the UBA the London Provision Exchange turned to the 
multiple retailers for support. A Joint Bacon Committee was set up by the National 
Association of Multiple Grocers’ and the National Committee of the London Provision 
Exchange to resist the UBA.170 The Grocer also suggested that some orders for Ulster 
bacon were cancelled.
This conflict, between Ulster bacon producers and the London Provision 
Exchange, proved to be important as it reflected resistance to the multiples and 
wholesalers increasing dominance within markets. The dispute, with the UBA, was 
indicative of a general worry amongst the multiples that as, the Grocer suggested, 'It 
could be that the multiples and the wholesalers feel their grip on the market is slipping. 
If one supplying country goes it alone, the rest might follow.’171 At the heart of the 
issue was the opposition of provision exchanges, and through them multiple retailers, 
to the emergence of centralised selling organisations and marketing boards of 
producers. The move towards marketing boards to restrict supply of produce onto the
market and so influence prices went to the core of the provision exchanges’
110functions. Yet again the issue revolved around the question of which section of the 
trade should wield the influence over price determination. Significantly, this dispute 
occurring twelve months after the resolution of the trading stamps conflict highlights 
the difficulties firms faced in regulating atomistic markets.
169 The Grocer. 30th October 1965, p.28.
170 The Grocer. 6th November 1965, p.31.
171 The Grocer. 30th October 1965, p.28.
172 For James Sainsbury’s speech against Marketing Boards as Chairman of the 
London Provision Exchange to the Annual Dinner See JS Journal. March 1958, 
No.48, pp. 1-5.
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The influence of the multiples within the London Provision Exchange was not 
simply due to the growth of multiple retailing in Britain, but also due to the fact that 
the weakness of trade associations, within the food manufacturing and wholesaling 
sectors of the industry, increased the relative strength of a handful of multiple chains.
That the multiples made an open attack on price maintenance, rather than 
simply push for increases in their own individual discounts also indicates that the 
multiples themselves were not completely free agents in these disputes. Threatening 
the position of the multiples was the emergent voluntary chains of independents 
which, as we have seen, were slowing the multiples domination of markets such as 
London. Only an all out onslaught against RPM and manufacturers control would lead 
to an across the board reduction in producer prices, which the multiples, through their 
domination of supermarket retailing, were able to benefit most from.
Sainsbury’s was well placed in order to take advantage of, and influence these 
changes, given that it had always been both a manufacturer and a retailer and had 
maintained membership of all the important trade associations. The Sainsbury 
company management were astute enough to recognise that the weaknesses of the 
trade associations within the industry allowed Sainsbury’s to become a big fish in a 
small pond. However, as the retail stamps conflict proved altering the balance of 
power within the industry could also lead to a situation where price competition would 
become too intense. Thus, although the Sainsbury family were vocal opponents of 
resale price maintenance, they were nevertheless prepared to defend it and recognised 
that the Sainsbury company benefited from other co-operative strategies within the 
industry.
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• Government and Food Pricing
Apart from the manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers and their respective 
trade associations, the government took an active part in both defining the structure of 
the market and controlling the movement of food prices. The recognition, that co­
operation within the industry was essential for stability and that the different sections 
of the trade were unable to co-operate also ensured that the government continued to 
play a formative role in the development of the industrial structure.
A variety of government departments had an influence on the development of 
the food industry. After the Treasury it was the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food, (MAFF), formed in 1955 out of the Ministry of Food and the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries, that was of greatest importance to the development of 
controls over food prices, after 1945. The MAFF, and its forerunners, were highly 
supportive towards the food industry, pressing for increases in margins and resisting 
Treasury attempts at limiting food subsidies. The extent of government food subsidies, 
to the food industry, was periodically to re-appear as an issue confronting the 
Ministry. The 1947 Lucas Report, into the workings of the agricultural marketing acts, 
questioned the degree to which producer price controls maximised farm output and in 
1948 government expenditure on food subsidies was capped at £465m.173 
Nevertheless, criticisms continued of government subsidies to private industry through 
government bodies such as Meat Importers National Defence Association Ltd., the 
Bacon Importers National Defence Association Ltd., and the Wholesale Meat Supply
173 Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Report of the Committee Appointed to 
Review the Working of the Agricultural Marketing Acts. Economic Series 48, 
(1947), para. 231-33 and A. Caimcross, ‘Reconversion 1945-51’, The British 
Economy Since 1945. ed. N.F.R. Crafts and N. Woodward, (Oxford 1991), p.47.
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Association.174 Food subsidies were reduced through most of the 1950s before 
increasing briefly again in the late 1950s. In response to this rise in food subsidies the 
Treasury was again becoming interested in the degree to which British food costs were 
subsidised. On this occasion the Treasury attempted to examine food subsidies on a 
comparative basis. One study carried out for the Treasury by the Central Statistical 
Office, in 1959, suggested that Britain had the most highly protected agriculture in 
Europe with subsidies amounting to ‘50% of gross agricultural product, or rather 
value added’.175 MAFF was therefore concerned to prevent the Treasury from 
examining too closely government support for the food industry.
MAFF’s attitudes towards the producers and retailers appears to have been 
particularly favourable. In July 1945 the Ministry of Food was prepared to attempt to 
gain an increase in food prices from the Treasury, due to pressure from the multiple 
organisations. The Ministry of Food maintained that ‘we are faced, possibly for the 
first time since the outbreak of war, with the possibility of a serious agitation by the 
retail trade on a united front’. The Ministry was prepared to accept this pressure 
despite the fact that, it privately believed that, ‘margins have been fixed on a basis to 
keep the least efficient businessman in existence’.176 Again, in 1947, when the 
National Committee of the Wholesale Provision Trade, which included the London 
Provision Exchange, pressed for an increase in profit margins, arguing that 
‘Wholesalers are having to subsidise bacon distribution on behalf of the Ministry of 
Food since they are making a loss’, the Ministry secured increases including a 27%
174 See PRO MAF 128/684 Post-War Reconstruction General Policy and Daily 
Worker. ‘We Pay Millions to the Meat Men, 5th October 1949.
175 PRO MAF 333/3, Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries report by J.H.
Kirk 21.1.59 and Memorandum on Agricultural Protection, August 1961.
176 PRO MAF 128/356, Lachlan Maclean to J.R. Murie, Ministry of Food, 2nd July 
1945 and F.N. Tribe 31 October 1945 note to Sir Harry Peat.
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increase in straight wholesale margins and a 33% increase in margins for 
wholesalers delivering to multiple branches.177
The reason for conceding to such requests largely lay with the Ministry’s 
view that any level of bankruptcy within the retail trade would seriously disrupt the 
food distribution system, and that the Ministry could not replace the distribution and 
retailing functions of the industry. That MAFF was supportive to the food industry 
and conceded these demands, as opposed to being a victim of rent-seeking 
organisations, is strengthened by the knowledge that the Ministry of Food and the 
Ministry of Supply, as noted above, had achieved a high level of experience in the 
purchasing and wholesaling of food. This experience ensured that the Ministries were 
efficient information processors and mitigated against private industry simply 
exploiting bureaucracy.178
Still further evidence for this view comes from examining the Ministry’s 
resilience to pressures from those sections of the industry whose role could be 
replaced, such as the importing organisations. In 1950 the National Committee of the 
Provision Importing Trade suggested, prior to de-control, that the importing section 
within the provision exchanges were ‘ready to take over its normal functions’ and 
was ready to be ‘of service to the Ministry of Food’. The attitude of the Ministry of 
Food was less than grateful. The Ministry’s view was that they were already ‘buying 
and shipping goods in the most economical way’ and that the trade were simply 
‘attempt(ing) to insert themselves into a set-up where there is really no room for
177 PRO MAF 85/111, Letter to Sir Percivale Liesching from F.Killick Secretary of 
National Committee of the Wholesalers provision Trade. 16.10.47 and Minutes of 
Margins Committee 18th November 1947.
178 For a similar view on the Ministry of Supply see P. Howlett, ‘New Light Through 
Old Windows’, Journal of Contemporary History. Vol.28, 1993.
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them’.179 Further, it was suggested that, ‘by and large we are at present paying these 
trades more than is justified by the value of the work they do for us, with the object 
of keeping them in being. I should prefer to cut off these payments as quickly as 
possible and to put it vulgarly, to force these trades to scratch for their own 
living.’180 MAFF, and its predecessors, while defending the food industries interests 
were clearly capable of maintaining a level of independence from sections of the 
trade.
MAFF also played a central role in defining the industry’s market structure, 
regulating the degree of competition within the trade, ensuring continuity of supplies 
and preventing competition leading to what would be considered to be ‘damaging’ 
price falls. The transition away from rationing was considered to be fraught with 
dangers. In particular, public and industry disquiet over any return to shortages, were 
considered to be two of the main dangers in the change over to de-controlling food
1 Q 1
supplies. For this reason the Ministry of Food was eager to ensure that wholesale 
prices were fixed in advance by importers.182
The Ministry’s market structuring role also created significant difficulties in 
responding to the development of competition policy, particularly the 1956 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act. The 1956 Act made restrictive practices registerable 
and made collective resale price maintenance illegal. The problem facing the 
Ministry was that confusion reigned over whether or not the Agricultural Boards 
were considered to be trade associations, whether the marketing schemes were
179 PRO MAF 99/1853 A. Warren Wholesale Distribution Division to E.G.
Harwood Ministry of Food 6th February 1950 and 1st February 1950.
180 Ibid., E.G. Harwood to A. Warren 31st January 1950.
181 PRO MAF 85/184 Note on draft version of letter from Gwilym Lloyd-George to 
Sir Bodinnar Ministry of Food 25th May 1954.
182 Ibid., Decontrol Standing Committee Minutes, 22nd May 1954.
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registerable under the 1956 Act and whether or not the boards activities in 
advertising prices, collecting and disseminating statistics could be considered a 
restraint of trade.183
The Registrar of Restrictive Trade Agreements had already notified MAFF 
that agreements in respect of pigs, barley and hops would all fall foul of the Act. In 
the case of pigs the Ministry had expressly considered the Pig Marketing Board to 
be a trade association in 1947, whose role was to bond the producers to the 
manufacturers through the Pig Marketing Scheme and the Bacon Marketing Scheme 
respectively.184 The Board’s individual agreements to purchase pigs from farmers 
were not registerable but the agreement to exclusively supply curers was. The 
complication arose from the fact that the agreements with the producers were 
underwritten and conditional upon the agreement with the curers, which in turn, 
under the Act, also made the individual agreements with producers registerable.185
The Ministry was successful in gaining agreement from the Registrar of 
Restrictive Trade Agreements that Agricultural Boards would not be considered 
trade associations. The Ministry also attempted to, either, alter existing agreements 
or find new methods of restricting competition within the industry, where the 
Registrar would enforce the Act. In the case of hops this involved the introduction of 
import quotas, in 1961, to ensure the Brewer’s import restriction agreement would 
not come before the Restrictive Trades Practices Court. Despite these successes and 
the view that the ‘Registrar will continue to find ways and means of keeping these
183 PRO MAF 333/12 See letter from H Rutter MAFF Legal Dept, to G.V. Rogers 
Office of the Registrar of Restrictive Trade Agreements 18th November 1965.
184 PRO MAF 85/149 Bacon Marketing Board 2nd October 1947.
185 PRO MAF 333/12 National Farmers Union (NFU), memorandum 27th 
September 1964, p.4.
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cases from Court’ it was accepted that the impact, particularly ‘the unsettled and 
perilous state of the bacon pig agreements’, was intolerable.186
The rearguard action against the 1956 Act was a recognition, by the 
Ministry, that the outbreak of price competition could be destructive to the industry 
and only regulation would provide a level of stability within the market for 
producers, wholesalers and retailers. Without doubt the ‘unsettled state’ of the bacon 
pig agreements in 1964 contributed to the conflict between curers and wholesalers 
in 1965. The industry was undergoing structural change which MAFF was unable to 
prevent despite its rearguard action, against the 1956 Act. This change was to 
involve the multiple retailers emerging as the most significant group within the 
industry.
• Conclusion
The chapter has suggested that experience of the British retail trade was 
unusual for British industry, generally, in that the restrictions placed upon the industry 
by post-war reconstruction proved to be more prolonged than for other industries. The 
impact of these restrictions was to solidify the industrial structure for the industry, 
such that the relationships between manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers appeared 
to be artificially frozen in the status quo created in 1938. Underneath the surface, 
however, a series of fissures were being created as the constituent elements within the 
industry adapted to these restrictions. The retailers provided the most dynamic sector 
within this industry, despite the fact that it was the retailers who had been the weakest 
element at the time the restrictions had been imposed. By the ending of war-time
186 Ibid., Comment on NFU memorandum .
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restrictions new methods of operation were being established, by multiple retailers, 
which would fundamentally alter the balance of power within the trade.
As post-war restrictions were withdrawn the fissures within the industrial 
structure came to the surface, resulting in the industry undergoing an extremely rapid 
transformation. The six years between the breakdown of RPM in 1958 and the passing 
of the 1964 Restrictive Trade Practices Act saw the completion of a transfer of 
influence, from the manufacturers and wholesalers towards retailers. This transfer 
required high levels of investment and, as a result, retailers turned first to finance 
capital and later to retained earnings in order to fund both mergers and acquisitions as 
well as new investments.
The multiple retailers, in particular, gained most from these upheavals, yet 
immediately began to face a new threat from within. The multiple retailers were in 
conflict with one another over the terms and conditions within the new market and 
simultaneously faced the threat of independent grocers organised in voluntary groups. 
In order for the multiples to maintain and improve their new-found strength they were 
required to re-define the limits of competition and co-operation.
By the mid 1960s a new balance between price and non-price competition had 
been established. The extension of retail trading stamps across the grocery sector had 
been halted and gross profit margins, highlighted by Figure 4.6, were more stable. This 
new framework for competition also ensured that the advantages of the multiples over 
the voluntary chains was re-established. By 1971 the growth in concentration of the 
multiple firms, by turnover, was returning as the multiples continued to win market 
share. The growth of voluntary chains also appears to have been faltering. The 1971
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the Census of Distribution indicates that voluntary chains membership had fallen to 
20% of the independent sector and only 31% of sales within the independent sector.187
Multiple retailing certainly challenges Lazonick’s view that British business 
was unwilling to enter into innovative business strategies based upon transforming 
high fixed costs into low unit costs. Multiple retailing also challenges the view that 
family control prevents the creation of organisational capabilities.
This strategy of controlled price competition lasted until the mid 1970s when 
stagnant growth in food sales increased pressure on the multiples to adopt alternative 
competitive methods. An intense price war initiated by Tesco in 1977, under their 
‘Check-Out I T  campaign, ushered in a new era of instability in food retailing. 
However, by the mid 1980s the multiples recognised that competitive strategies based 
upon price competition were unsustainable in a highly oligopolistic market. The 
multiples responded by not only moving towards new increases in store size with the 
emergence of hypermarkets but also increased their technological reliance upon their 
food technology departments, as well as by forging closer links with suppliers.188 The 
effects of this strategy were to increase still further the dominance of the multiple
1 RQchains over the development of the food industry.
187 U.K. Census of Distribution. 1971, Supplement, Table 3.
188 Loveridge and Pitt, op.cit., p.86 .
189 Gardner and Shepherd, op.cit.. p. 153.
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• Chapter Five
• Conclusion
• Governing the Market: Towards a Market Governance Theory of the Firm.
In this chapter we return to a formal discussion of transaction cost analysis in 
order to interpret the findings of the case study material. In particular we wish to 
focus upon the way in which the case studies inform our understanding of 
information, opportunism and competition and whether or not a general theory of the 
firm emerges.
The starting point for this study was the recognition that explanations for the 
relative decline of the British economy in the post-war period maintained a static 
deterministic approach in which the key factor(s)- employers’ conservatism, trade 
union obstruction, government interference (or lack of government interference)- all 
remain as monolithic entities whose effects are considered to be uniform over time.1 
It was suggested that the depiction of factors of production or economic institutions 
as both homogenous and unchanging over time created a false interpretation of 
economic development.
Chapter one examined a number of the explanations put forward for British 
relative economic decline and suggested that each one contained a broad range of
1 M. Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations. (New Haven Conn., USA 1982), M.J. 
Wiener, English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit 1850-1980. (Middx 
1985) and W. Hutton, The State We’re In. (1995) being three of the most important 
examples of this point.
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experiences, which, while not preventing generalisations, did prevent one­
dimensional interpretations. In defence of these forms of explanation, it may be 
suggested that understanding long term economic change requires simplification. 
Unfortunately this often results in the failure of institutional explanations due to both 
a lack of detail and a lack of abstraction. Crudely put, institutional explanations too 
often fall between two stools. It was argued that the historical specificity, or 
contextualisation, of institutions required analysis in determining their impact on 
economic development, as much as the institutional forms themselves. In particular, 
the role of trade unions and employers were highlighted as areas in which historical 
contextualisation was essential. These findings led to the view that a firm level 
analysis could be of greater value. In particular the transaction cost analysis approach 
to the firm appeared to offer the most promising area of research, with both a level of 
detail which allowed for motivation as well as a degree of abstraction that allowed 
for generalisable theories to emerge.
It was suggested that Coase’s efficiency based view that firms internalised 
market transactions in order to lower transaction costs, however, was over­
simplified.2 The origins of this over-simplification, it was suggested, lay in the 
treatment of information as readily available and costless to attain. This weakness 
was also highlighted in Stigler’s approach to information as a single commodity 
equally available both to organisations such as firms and single agents such as 
consumers.3 North’s and Williamson’s subsequent developments that institutions, 
contract and governance bodies were required to prevent opportunistic behaviour, it
2 R.H. Coase, 'The Nature of the Firm', Economica N.S. No.4, November (1937), 
p.389.
3 G. Stigler, The Organisation of Industry. (Illinois 1968), p. 172.
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was also suggested, implied a recognition that the minimisation of transaction costs 
alone was not the sole purpose of firms’ internalising of transactions through 
strategies based upon vertical integration.4 As a result, Marglin’s view that firms 
required internalisation in order to enforce supervision and discipline over 
employees, in order to appropriate the benefits derived from the division of labour to 
the resource allocator, was considered to be a preferred view of the development of 
the firm.5 However, this view suffers from a lack of emphasis on the importance that 
the market plays in determining organisational form. Nevertheless, Marglin’s view of 
the firm as a mechanism for centralising power within the entrepreneur’s hands, 
through their control of the mechanisms of supervision and discipline, was to be 
utilised along with a conceptualisation of the market itself as an institution.
Pitelis’s view that markets, particularly the labour market, are, in fact, 
hierarchical and that the firm represents simply one form of hierarchy6 was 
considered to be essentially compatible with the views of Lazonick, who suggests 
that market agreements between firms represent the removal of transactions from the 
market during the lifetime of a contract. Lazonick further concludes that firms 
develop their organisational capabilities, defined as the manifestation of ‘the power 
of planned and co-ordinated specialised divisions of labour to achieve organisational
4 D.C. North, Institutions. Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
(Cambridge 1990), pp. 107-112, P.L. Joskow, ‘Asset Specificity and the Structure of 
Vertical Relationships’, The Nature of the Firm, ed. O.E. Williamson and S.G. 
Winter, (Oxford 1991), p. 126, O.E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of 
Capitalism. (New York 1985), p.41 and O.E. Williamson, Economic Organisation. 
Firms. Markets and Policy Control. (Brighton 1986) p. 187.
5 S. A. Marglin, What Do Bosses Do? The Origins and functions of hierarchy in 
capitalist production, Review of Radical Political Economics. Vol.6 , No.2, 1974.
6 C. Pitelis, Market and Non Market Hierarchies. (Oxford 1991) p.31.
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goals’, with the aim of transforming high fixed costs into low unit costs.7 This view, 
it was suggested, also suffered from the placement of the internal dynamic within the 
firm as the motivating force in business organisation.
As an alternative interpretation the view was presented that the firm does not 
principally act to centralise the power, derived from the division of labour and the 
implementation of supervision and discipline, to ensure the Marglinian appropriation 
of the residual product into the hands of entrepreneurs. Nor do firms principally act 
to centralise power to create a Lazonick-type transformation of high fixed costs into 
low unit costs. Rather it was hypothesised that the centralising of power described by 
Marglin and Lazonick occurs in order to provide the entrepreneur with the ability to 
ensure the market itself can be structurally altered to the benefit of the firm. Power 
within the firm is utilised to redefine the market as an institution through the 
development of governance procedures within the market. The aim of these 
governance procedures is then to ensure that firms maximise the information 
available to them, and hence increase their own opportunities, while minimising the 
extent to which they will be faced with information scarcity and opportunistic 
behaviour by competitor firms.
This interpretation does not exclude, power or efficiency based, models of the 
firm but aims to locate their role firmly within the a wider context of market 
governance. The degree of success which firms achieve in re-structuring markets is 
itself dependent upon the maximisation of the benefits derived through the processes 
of supervision and discipline and the creation of organisational capabilities.
7 W. Lazonick. Business Organisation and the Mvth of the Market Economy. 
(Cambridge, Mass 1991), p.328.
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The market as an institution, the development of governance procedures and 
the firm as a mechanism for the utilisation of power therefore emerged as the key 
areas of interest within this study.
• Results
The examination of these issues will broadly be divided into the periods of; 
the post-war economy (covering the reconversion to peace and the replacement of 
government controls by industry-regulated markets and market mechanisms) and the 
later movement from a sellers’ market towards the development of more competitive 
markets. All of these developments were gradual changes without fixed dates. The 
chronology of this process is further confused by the fact that each of the three case 
studies had very different dynamics, with respect to the ending of government 
controls, the re-introduction of market mechanisms and the emergence of 
competition.
The first factor of importance in defining the pattern of development for the 
market following the end of the war was that of government. The Second World War 
saw the reduction if not removal of the market from the economy in Britain.8 As a 
result government played a central role over decisions on the move towards 
decontrol, the form competition should take and the speed at which de-control 
should progress.
8 P. Howlett, ‘British Business and the State During the Second World War’, World 
War II and the Transformation of Business Systems, eds. J. Sakudo and T. Shiba, 
(Tokoyo 1994) and P. Howlett, ‘The Thin End of the Wedge: Nationalisation and 
Industrial Structure during the Second World War’, The Political Economy of 
Nationalisation in Britain 1920-50. eds. R. Milward and J. Singleton, (Cambridge 
1995).
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The case studies of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., General Electric and of 
Sainsbury’s all highlight the extent of government involvement. The Treasury and 
Ministry of Fuel and Power, in the case of oil, were involved in decisions over 
domestic supplies and the development of domestic refining. The Ministries of 
Supply and Fuel and Power along with the Board of Trade, in the case of electrical 
engineering, stipulated technical limits upon the capacity of generator sets and more 
generally placed limits upon output from the industry, for the domestic consumer 
market. Finally, the Board of Trade, the Ministry of Supply and Ministries of Food 
and of Agriculture and Fisheries oversaw the post-war controls over supply and prices 
within the retailing sector.
Evidence provided from input-output tables further suggests that in the initial 
re-conversion to a peace time economy, government purchasing was essential for the 
continued prosperity of important sections of manufacturing, particularly the 
electrical engineering and military-related industries. We can conclude that 
government policy with regard to competition and public expenditure provides a 
central element in the decisions of firms in the development of governance 
structures.
For resource allocators within private industry the reconversion to peace 
between 1945-51, including the re-introduction of market mechanisms, created 
significant information based difficulties. Continued shortages and the incremental 
introduction of de-control was to re-inforce the difficulty of attaining market 
information. The uneven level of de-control across industries was also to have a 
differential impact across industries, following the re-introduction of the market 
mechanism.
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Since business normally operates under conditions of uncertainty, 
information asymmetry and the risk of opportunism, opportunities for firms to 
indulge in opportunistic behaviour under circumstances where market mechanisms 
were being re-introduced must therefore have been increased.9 These risks from 
opportunism must have been further increased given the lack of long term relational 
contracting arrangements, following the introduction of pooling and rationing by the 
Ministry of Supply at the beginning of the war.
The dollar shortage combined with the risk of rapid price rises leading to 
inflation and profiteering acted to motivate government to continue controls over 
prices and supply for longer than it had after World War One. Hence piecemeal de­
control may also be taken as a recognition of the inherent dangers of opportunism 
due to information asymmetry. Thus the initial period of conversion to peace was a 
period in which market transactions suffered from extreme levels of asymmetric 
information, with high levels of risk from opportunistic behaviour.
Despite government price controls and risks from opportunism firms were 
nevertheless able to achieve notoriously high profits in this period.10 That profits 
were generally considered to be excessive can be gauged from government’s ability 
to increase the burden of company taxation for raising revenue. Company taxation 
had been raised to 10% on undistributed profits and as much as 50% on distributed 
profits by 1951.11
9 Williamson, Economic Institutions, p.41.
10 J. Tomlinson, ‘Productivity Policy’, Labour Governments and Private Industry, 
eds., H. Mercer, N. Rollings and J. Tomlinson, (Edinburgh 1992), p.47 and T. Bama, 
‘Those “Frightfully” High Profits’, Oxford University Bulletin of Statistics. Vol.l 1, 
No.2, 1949
11 A.A. Rogow, The Labour Government and British Industry 1945-51. (Oxford 
1955), p. 120.
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Williamson distinguishes opportunism from abnormally high returns due to
‘pre-existing and fully disclosed productive conditions’ such as unique locational
10and differential skill advantages. The immediate post-war period may then simply 
reflect such pre-existing conditions, however, it is more likely that high profits 
reflected both pre-existing conditions and opportunist behaviour. Certainly, the 
virtual elimination of bankruptcy within the retail trade, until after 1950, suggests 
that the seller’s market provided profits based upon opportunism rather than simply 
pre-existing conditions.
Richardson points out that where risk is high some form of insurance would 
be expected to develop.13 Thus the existence of abnormal rates of profit suggests that 
one form of insurance against opportunism available to firms may in fact have been 
opportunism itself. A risk aversion strategy based upon opportunism may also 
explain the widespread resistance to change from within the business community to 
changes in the market environment. Government proved unable to limit either profits 
and dividend payments or introduce a more competitive market environment.14
Risk aversion could also take other forms. As Richardson points out; 
‘Uncertainty about future receipts and payments will oblige the entrepreneur, bent on 
profit maximising expected income, to take steps to introduce some adaptability into 
his plans.’15 A Coasean view would suggest that firms would be expected to move 
towards the internalisation of transaction costs and/or to rapidly introduce
12 O.E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. 
(New York 1975), p.26.
13 G. B. Richardson, Information and Investment. (Oxford 1990), pp. 174-190.
14 H. Mercer, Constructing a Competitive Order. (Cambridge 1995).
15 Richardson, op.cit.. p. 183.
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Williamson-type governance bodies requiring relational contracts for the restriction 
of opportunistic behaviour, where transaction-specific assets were required.
One method of internalising transaction costs would be through merger 
activity. While official government data covering merger activity does not exist prior 
to 1954, it has been suggested that merger activity was not exceptionally intense in 
the early post-war era. The peak year for mergers prior to the Second World War - 
1929 (when 431 firms disappeared through mergers) - was not equalled until 1959. 
Still more importantly the trends in merger activity discernible from the data show 
that, for the period of reconversion, merger activity was exceptionally low, only 
picking up in the early 1950s. Taking the first decade after 1945 as a whole, merger 
activity led to 1156 firms disappearing through mergers compared to 1414 between 
1930-9 and 3997 disappearing between 1955-64.16
A second method of internalising transaction costs would be through 
increasing investment in strategies based upon integration. Ownership advantages 
encourage managerial economies of scope, derived from the application of 
managerial skills to a wider range of transactions.17 It should be recalled, however, 
that these ownership advantages are suggested to be absent from regressions using 
line of business data (see p.25). Internalisation may create Coasean advantages from 
the replacement of market transactions by firm level co-ordination or by the removal 
of market externalities.18 The advantages gained through ownership and
16 L. Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy. (London, 2nd. ed. 1983), pp. 167- 
178.
17 See J. Dunning, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy. (Reading 
1993), pp.66-68 .
18 M. Casson, The Firm and the Market. (Oxford 1987), pp.36-38 for a critical 
analysis of these points.
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internalisation have been presented as two key determinants for the growth of the 
firm, and still more so the multinational firm.
The immediate post 1945 period does not appear to be one in which firms, as 
a whole, were responding to opportunistic behaviour by re-defining either vertical or 
horizontal relationships. Hannah suggests ‘The 1920s rise in British concentration 
levels was followed by several decades of stagnant, or possibly even declining, 
concentration, so that the level of 1930 was probably not exceeded until the early 
1950s’.19 Thus the period of reconversion, despite high levels of risk, did not lead to 
an internalisation of transaction costs by business, rather (if anything) a reduction of 
concentration and low levels of merger activity suggest business was more than 
willing to allow market transactions to predominate, leading to a definite increase in 
the importance of the market for transactions.
The electrical engineering industry and the grocery retail trade are two cases 
which fit this picture. Concentration levels remained relatively static throughout this 
period for grocery retailing and fell slightly in electrical machinery from 48% to 44%
onbetween 1935 and 1951. The period is one in which the multiple retail stores 
singularly avoided capital investment in the development of self-service stores, 
leaving the Co-operative societies to take up almost all available building licences 
under the government’s special scheme. The only exceptional case in the case 
studies, that appears to contradict this picture, is that of the development of domestic 
refining by the oil industry.
19 Hannah, op.cit.. pp.91-92.
20 R. Evely and I.M.D. Little, Concentration in British Industry. (Cambridge 1960), 
p.336.
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Domestic mineral oil refining saw a significant increase in the concentration 
of gross output from 77% to 85% between 1935 and 1951.21 The extremely rapid 
development of domestic refining within the British oil industry between 1947-52 
was however an example of investment initially motivated by the British 
government’s concern over the dollar shortage, rather than that of the oil companies’ 
concern for transaction costs. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.’s change of view, from 
initial unwillingness to later active participation in the expansion of domestic oil 
refining, was due to the reduction in costs of transportation and the expansion of 
demand for finished products. However, these costs were incurred within the firm 
itself as the industry was already vertically integrated. The move towards domestic 
refining (while admittedly a transaction cost minimisation development) should 
therefore be considered to represent an example of Lazonick’s development of 
organisational capabilities, rather than Williamson’s replacement of market 
transactions by hierarchical organisation.
Support for the view that neither excessive transaction costs nor opportunism 
were considered to be significant drawbacks to the operation of the British oil 
companies can also be gained from the disputes AIOC had over steel allocations with 
the Ministry of Supply, the Treasury and the Ministry of Fuel and Power. 
Government support was forthcoming for the priority allocation of steel supplies and 
the granting of permission for the use of steel reserves for the development of 
domestic refining, but conflict arose from the oil industry’s overseas expansion 
plans. Government suggestions that the oil companies themselves should prioritise 
steel allocations were rejected by the companies. Yet in rejecting this proposed
21 Ibid.. p.335.
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companies increased their own individual risks of gaining supplies. Rival firms 
might prove more successful at influencing government departments over the 
allocation of steel, and in so doing reduce supplies available for the rest of the 
industry. That the oil companies turned down an opportunity to create a governance 
procedure, through agreement on steel allocations, also suggests that governance may 
not have been the prime motivation of the companies themselves; unless alternative 
governance procedures had already been established within the industry.
The apparent absence of a move towards the internalisation of transaction 
costs, through either ownership or internalisation approaches, in the period of 
reconversion, may, perhaps, be considered to be linked to post-war shortages and the 
controls placed on raw materials available for capital investment. However, this 
would not explain the lack of merger activity and it is this fact that lends weight to 
this study’s hypothesis that firms’ activity was motivated by market governance 
issues rather than market transaction costs. British business in the period of 
reconversion from war to peace could and did rely upon market transactions as long 
as these transactions could be controlled through governing contracts and governing 
bodies.
It is these governing bodies that also provide the key to unlocking the 
institutional nature of the market in this early post-war period. Casson notes that 
monitoring the quality and reliability of information is itself information-intensive 
and as a result ‘custom is an economically rational response to high information
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costs’. 22 This use of custom can be most clearly seen in examining the post-war 
contracting mechanisms set up by firms.
There are two important conclusions to be drawn from the early post-war 
introduction of cartels, price fixing and market sharing agreements. First, the timing 
of the introduction of co-operative agreements was extremely rapid once controls 
began to be lifted. The major oil companies were involved in the attempt to introduce 
an As-Is type of agreement before the end of the war. Firms in the electrical 
engineering industry were also keen that the pre-war agreements continue without a 
break. The 1948 Lamp Agreement, covering lamp manufacture and marketing, for 
example (although not signed until 1950) was backdated to cover the period from 1st 
July 1948 and continued the earlier 1941 agreement. The case of food retailing was 
exceptional only in that the return of resale price maintenance was restricted by the 
continuation of rationing until 1954. Nevertheless, as soon as an end to rationing was 
discussed, as the example of the bacon trade highlights, an explicit understanding 
that price fixing should return was sought.
The second important conclusion to emerge from these agreements was the 
fact that all the agreements were virtual carbon copies of those in existence before 
the war. There was no attempt at the outset to redraw the conditions operating within 
the market. Again, in all three industries, firms were explicit in both their aim at a re- 
introduction of agreements and in that no attempt should be made to abandon the 
agreements arrived at prior to 1940. The explanation for the rapid re-introduction of 
co-operative agreements needs to be understood in terms of firms’ use of ‘custom’ as
22 M. Casson, ‘Economic Perspectives on business information’, Information 
Acumen: The Understanding and Use of Knowledge in Modem Business, ed. L. 
Bud-Frierman, (1994), pp. 156-159.
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a risk aversion strategy in attempting to restrict the levels of competition within 
markets. Firms were keen to avoid levels of competition emerging that had been 
considered to be damaging in the inter-war years and had led to the original 
agreements. Entrepreneurs, clearly then, took a pessimistic view of likely post-war 
economic development. As the British Electrical and Allied Manufacturers 
Association, BEAM A, had put it in 1927: the highest form of civilised society could 
only be attained by the ‘co-operation of individuals to ensure the highest common 
level of advancement without strife and without destruction’. Anything else could 
only, in their view, lead to ‘the bitter struggle of individuals in a chaos of 
destruction’.24
Agreements were designed with horizontal restrictions, preventing firms from 
individually competing opportunistically for markets, but were not designed with 
vertical restrictions, preventing firms from acting opportunistically to their suppliers 
and customers. The concentration of agreements was therefore upon prices, market 
sharing, tendering procedures, restrictions upon distribution etc. All of these areas 
restricted information flows, hence increased transaction costs for customers and 
raised returns for manufacturers.
For firms to re-establish market governance procedures required the 
establishment of bodies which could supervise and mediate within the industry. In 
the oil industry firms could develop effective inter-firm agreements. Joint ventures in 
oil concessions ensured that the supply of crude oil could be regulated and inter-firm
23 British Electrical and Allied Manufacturers Association, Combines and Trusts in 
the Electrical Industry. The Position in Europe in 1927. (London 1927), pp.6-7.
24 Ibid.. p.7.
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agreements such as the Aviation Agreement (between AIOC and Shell) regulated 
distribution and marketing.25
In less concentrated industries successful regulation required external bodies 
entirely separate from the firms themselves. Regulation was harder to achieve due to 
the occurrence of free rider problems and an inability to impose decisions upon those
*)f\breaking agreements. The difficulty in monitoring agreements and the prevention 
of free rider problems in industries with high levels of asset specificity required 
agreements to introduce disciplinary clauses including fines, co-ordinated court 
action over patent infringements and the breaking of restrictions on distribution.27
This form of regulation was at its most successful within the electrical 
engineering industry. This is despite the fact that the formalised trade groups linked 
to trade associations required extensive support in order to monitor individual 
company performance. Supervisory and disciplinary control over firms was extensive 
in the case of electrical engineering. BEAMA successfully enforced agreements 
restricting manufacturers from even small-scale advertising in obscure areas such as 
exhibition brochures.
In food retailing the trade associations were at their weakest due to both the 
low levels of concentration within retailing, before the late 1950s, and the differences 
of interests between independent and multiple retailers. As a result, market
25 See M. Casson, Enterprise and Competitiveness. (Oxford 1990), pp.22-25 on joint 
ventures.
26 M. Schneiberg and J. Rogers-Hollingsworth, ‘Can Transaction Cost Economics 
Explain Trade Associations?*, The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties, ed. M. Aoki and O. 
E. Williamson, (1990), p.322.
27 See E. Hexner, International Cartels. (Univ of North Carolina, USA 1946), pp.80- 
81.
28 K.R. Mirow and H. Maurer, Webs of Power. (Boston USA 1982), pp.36-64.
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governance in retailing was imposed from outside the trade by food manufacturers’ 
organisations.
If the justification for firms to be involved in co-operative agreements came 
from concerns over the possibility of a return to the pre-war economic conditions, the 
success of co-operative agreements reflected firms’ contemporary concerns to 
develop effective market governance procedures. The form which co-operation took 
was highly flexible and dependent upon both government anti-monopoly policy and 
changes in the diffusion of market information.
The United States’ tough anti-trust policies prevented US firms from direct 
involvement in formal co-operation with international competitors, but, as the case 
of Standard Oil (New Jersey) highlights, US firms were willing voluntarily to abide 
by agreements. Elsewhere, in the electrical engineering industry, the US firm 
General Electric was able to co-operate directly through its shareholding of the firm 
AEI. Indeed AEI was throughout this period a motivating force in the development 
of co-operative agreements. In Britain hostility to monopoly was far slower in 
emerging, with the first permanent anti-monopoly legislation passed in 1948. 
Government concerns over the restriction of consumer demand aided firms involved 
in co-operative agreements, as there was concern in government of the consequences 
if consumer goods prices were lowered.30 As a result firms adopted formalised, 
horizontally-focused, industry-wide bodies for the restriction of competitive 
pressures.
29 The 1918 Webb-Pomereme Act did allow U.S. firms to engage in international 
export cartels on conditions that they did not apply to the domestic market.
30 A. Caimcross, Years of Recovery British Economic Policy 1945-51. (1985), 
pp.335-6.
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The lack of market information in the period of reconversion was the second 
factor to influence the form of co-operation adopted by firms. As detailed above, the 
rapidity of the re-introduction of agreements reflected business concerns over the 
possibility of a return to pre-war trading conditions. Information scarcity existed in 
two significant forms. Firms faced increasing uncertainty and risk due to the lack of 
market information related to future demand, factor supply and price, which 
prevented accurate forecasting of production and investment. It is the scarcity of 
market information that can be used to explain the interest firms had in the timing of 
introducing agreements. The meetings between AIOC and Standard Oil (New Jersey) 
and those between AIOC and Royal-Dutch Shell indicate that firms had a 
misconceived view of post-war demand. Demand would rapidly outstrip supply in 
the late 1940s, resulting in major changes in investment strategy such as in 
increasing refining capacity. The re-introduction of resale price maintenance (as food 
rationing ended) is a recognition that producers, even as late as 1954, faced a lack of 
market information regarding future developments.
A second significant information scarcity problem arose from firms’ lack of
technical knowledge of the conditions under which competitors were operating.
Lazonick suggests that the creation of a competitive equilibrium represents a
significant problem facing firms that attempt to adopt an innovative competitive
strategy. Adaptive firms can undermine innovative firms’ organisational advantages
if the fixed costs incurred in making organisational changes can be reduced by the 
^ 1
adaptive firm. Thus, for Lazonick, the development of a competitive equilibrium is 
a continual tendency within capitalism and innovative firms’ success becomes
31 Lazonick, op.cit.. pp.213-227.
329
dependent upon the lowering of their own fixed costs while raising those of adaptive 
firms.
The war can be said to have disrupted the competitive equilibrium under 
which firms operate as information scarcity made it difficult if not impossible to 
monitor investment strategies pursued by competitor firms. The investigations into 
developments within the German electrical engineering industry carried out by the 
British and American electrical manufacturers under the auspices of BIOS, CIOS and 
FIAT were therefore of great interest to the British electrical engineering industry. 
However, technical information scarcity related to organisational capabilities was not 
restricted to firms across combative nations but also affected information flows 
between firms within the allied bloc. The Anglo-American Council on Productivity, 
especially, recognised that, between the United States and Britain, a significant gap 
existed in areas such as production techniques, plant layout and the use of labour.
The scarcity of information therefore played a significant role in firms’ 
decisions to re-introduce pre-war agreements in two ways. The scarcity of market 
information can be said to be a motivating factor in firms’ timing in the introduction 
of agreements based upon custom, while scarcity of technical information on the 
organisational capabilities of international rivals reinforced support for the decision 
by firms to re-introduce pre-war custom based agreements.
The emergence of formalised governance bodies, some with supervisory and 
disciplinary powers over members, emerged in the early post-war period due to the 
market governance concerns of firms aiming to prevent competition becoming too 
intense. The organisational form of co-operation adopted reflected, primarily, 
government acceptance of restrictive practices by business, but also inadequacies in
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information, both market and technical, rather than simply transaction cost 
considerations. The functional activities of governance bodies and the definition of 
areas of competition regulated by co-operation, however, reflected firms’ market 
governance concerns and therefore was largely industry-specific.
It can be concluded that the early post-war period was one in which there is 
strong evidence to suggest that market and technical information scarcity played an 
important part in firms’ organisational decision making. Firms responded by 
adopting risk-averse strategies, based upon opportunism and the regulation of 
competition, rather than a transaction cost minimising approach, based upon 
economies of internalisation and ownership. The early post-war period can then be 
characterised as one in which power, not efficiency, considerations dominated 
entrepreneurial thinking. The power considerations that were of importance were 
those of influencing market structure and not those of supervision and discipline or 
the creation of organisational capabilities.
A final finding which emerges in this period of re-construction is that, a 
profit maximising strategy appears synonymous with opportunism. Was this a result 
of the unique pre-existing conditions of reconstruction period and/or dangers of 
risk?, or is opportunism related more generally to profit maximising?
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• The Emergence of Competitive Markets
From 1950 there initially appears to be strong evidence contradicting the 
view that firms act as governance bodies whose aim is to structure markets.
Government took an increasingly hostile attitude to restrictive practices by 
business with effective legislation in 1956, 1964 and 1965.32 By the mid-1960s there 
had been a convergence of anti-trust policies between the US and Britain and as a 
result ‘business self-regulation had given way to public control’.33 In fact in some 
areas anti-trust in Britain was considered harsher than in the US. In 1962, after the 
collapse of resale price maintenance (RPM) in the food trades and the abolition of 
collectively enforced RPM, one private Co-operative Society study into American 
retailing could suggest that; ‘Broadly speaking, the position at the moment appears to 
be that in 29 out of 50 States the law relating to resale price maintenance permits a 
manufacturer to enforce his prices on all retailers provided that he can show that one 
retailer has contracted to observe his retail prices. This appears to us be more 
strongly favourable to the maintenance of prices than the British law’.34
The period from 1952 also saw a significant rise in the development of 
merger activity within the British economy. From a post-war low point of 49 firms 
disappearing by merger in 1950 mergers increased 160% in 1951 and by a further 
240% in 1952. Despite a falling off of the rate of growth in merger activity in the 
mid 1950s, by the end of the 1950s merger activity was again increasing. By 1959
32 J.G. Walshe, ‘Industrial Organisation’, The British Economy Since 1945. eds. 
N.F.R. Crafts and N. Woodward, (Oxford 1991), p.363.
33 T. Freyer, Regulating Big Business: Antitrust in Great Britain and America 1880- 
1990. (Cambridge 1992), p.298.
34 Co-operative Wholesale Society, Discount Houses in the USA. A Survey based on 
the Report of a Deputation from the CWS. (Manchester 1962), p. 12.
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the number of firms merged was almost eight times the 1950 figure. Similarly, with 
regard to concentration there was a continual growth in the share of total net output 
accounted for by the largest 100 firms, from 22% in 1948 to 26% in 1953 and to 33% 
by 1958.35
There therefore appears to be a strong prima facie case in favour of the view 
that firms acted to gain internalisation and ownership advantages. Efficiency criteria 
and transaction cost minimisation may well have played a significant role in the 
development of the firm from the mid-1950s onwards. Similarly, profit margins in 
all the case studies were falling leading to a suggestion that, with reductions in 
information asymmetry, firms abandoned (either willingly or forcibly) a strategy 
based upon high risk and high levels of opportunism for a profit maximisation 
strategy based upon competition.
A more detailed examination of the period, however, again highlights the 
importance of market governance issues for firms’ organisational developments as 
opposed to transaction cost minimisation.
The changing relationship between government and business and the effect of 
this relationship on the market certainly was important. However, the view that 
government is inherently a trust buster and was gradually becoming awakened to 
restrictive practices has been seriously challenged. Mercer suggests ‘The history of 
competition policy has little to do with the gradual enlightenment...about the virtues 
of competition’. For Mercer ‘business views reigned supreme’ and government 
responded to rather than challenged these views, in particular the needs of
35 Hannah, op.cit.. p. 177 for data on mergers and p. 180 for concentration data. 
Hannah points out that concentration differences may be ‘accounted for entirely by 
errors in the data or by faulty assumptions in the interpolations’.
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transnational companies, in creating a less restricted domestic market.36 Mercer also 
suggests that domestically the labour movement and the international influence of 
the United States both acted as counter-weights to the sections of business which
' j 'y
remained intent on the continuation of highly formalised restrictive practices.
The evidence, of government as a major purchaser by the early 1960s leads us 
to qualify Mercer’s emphasis. Given that government orders accounted for at least 
25% of all domestic sales of plant and machinery and almost 40% of all transport 
equipment by the early 1960s, it would be surprising that such a shift did not have an 
input into the development of more stringent competition policy. Certainly, 
government purchasing policy became closely linked to the boosting of efficiency 
and (as was seen in electrical engineering) commissioning bodies by the mid-1950s 
were no longer prepared to accept tenders without competition.
Thus it could be concluded that government by the late 1950s was becoming 
more, not less, interested in competition in order to promote lower prices and 
efficiency. By the late 1960s government was certainly strategically involved in these 
questions through bodies such as the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation. Yet even 
on this point firms’ control over markets seems the most important criterion.
The existence of large, protected government markets meant that for 
domestic firms many of the restrictive agreements were no longer necessary. 
Politically government found it extremely difficult to award large orders to non- 
British firms. In the defence sector alone employment in 1961 was estimated at
36 Mercer, Constructing, p. 170-3.
37 Ibid.. p.84 and p. 146.
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363,000, 4% of the employed workforce.38 As a result agreements restricting the 
entry of international competitors were less necessary and the boundaries between 
private and public industry became increasingly blurred.39
It appears then that government’s interest in competition policy does not 
simply reflect, either government’s or firms’, interest in efficiency. It is just as likely, 
as Mercer maintains, that larger, multinational firms wished to develop a competitive 
framework more conducive to the exploitation of their organisational capabilities. It 
was also these firms which were most closely linked to government orders and had 
least to lose by the entry of international competitors into the domestic market.
This leaves us with the question of whether or not increases in merger 
activity, concentration and the movement away from formalised agreements needs to 
be understood in terms of firms’ efficiency advantages, or in their changing approach 
to market governance.
The first point to make here is that the chronology of the efficiency models is 
simply wrong. Efficiency models assume internalisation takes place when 
information and transaction costs are high. Yet information costs were falling after 
1950 and still more so by the 1960s. The timing of merger activity and increases in 
concentration generally post-dates the challenge to restrictive practices, the 
liberalisation of the international economy (through GATT and the Common Market) 
and the fall in the cost of information. The most important study of the possible gains 
derived from post-war merger activity has noted that ‘the significant finding was that
38 Economist intelligence Unit, The Economic Effects of Disarmament. (1963), table 
7.
39 See N. Harris. Competition and the Corporate State: British Conservatives, the 
State and Industry. (1972), p.66  and p. 149.
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in all the seven post-merger years...on average profitability showed a decline from 
the pre-merger level.’40 The merger boom of the late 1960s was also a mechanism 
for retaining the restrictions which had been abolished through legislation on 
competition policy 41
The only efficiency-based explanation for this discrepancy in the chronology 
of internalisation that can be sustained is that firms efficiency gains were rising faster 
than the falls in market transaction costs over the period. Here we need to turn to our 
case studies.
Alterations to governance procedures within the oil industry developed from 
the late 1940s. By 1947, oil companies recognised that a significant rise in demand 
for oil products was underway: the fears of over-capacity within the market now 
gave way to frantic moves to keep pace with demand. The problems posed by 
satisfying demand brought the major oil companies into direct conflict with 
government in both Britain and the United States. The British government was 
pressing AIOC to divert supplies destined for other countries to Britain, while in the 
United States the Federal Trade Commission began an investigation into the price- 
fixing of oil companies operating within the US
By 1947 oil companies began to develop alternative forms of co-operation in 
order to maintain control over the direction in which the market for oil products 
would develop. The central consideration, for all the major companies, related to 
upstream operations in the maintenance of a system of oil concessions. All the
40 G. Meeks, ‘Disappointing Marriage: A Study of the Gains from Merger’, 
University of Cambridge. Department of Applied Economics. Occasional Paper. 51, 
(1977), p.33.
41 Walshe, op.cit.. p.351.
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majors wished to see the continuation of the system whereby oil exploration and 
extraction was to be completely controlled by co-operative joint ventures, made up of 
the companies and explicitly excluding the government of the oil producing country. 
Only under these conditions could control over the lifting and supply to markets of 
crude oil be controlled. It was the governance of supply that led the oil majors to 
adopt this method of contract; it was also why opposition to nationalisation or true 
open door policy, allowing the independent oil companies access to concession 
negotiations, was so strong. However, in order to maintain this form of governance, 
the majors were required to increase concession payments, leading to the 50:50 
agreements reached first with the Venezulean Government in 1933 and adopted 
within the Middle East from 1950. The second alteration to the pre-war contracting 
was the abandonment of the Red Line agreement in 1947, which, while retaining the 
oil majors’ control over exploration and extraction, spread the control across all the 
major companies. Significantly, the success of this new strategy can be gauged from 
the fact that the consortium joint venture was used for the return of the oil companies 
to Iran after the coup in 1954.
Elsewhere the abandonment, with particular exceptions, of the ‘Marriage 
Letters’ in 1949 between AIOC and Shell highlights the recognition between 
individual oil companies that a return to pre-war conditions was no longer a 
possibility and that a more flexible approach was required in order to maintain a 
reduced hold over the developments within the industry.
Flexibility took the form of detailed meetings to co-ordinate investment 
strategies in midstream operations from 1951, but the need for a more flexible 
approach was most apparent within the downstream operations of distribution and
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marketing. Increasing levels of price competition from the newly emergent 
independents and Russian oil exporters from the early 1950s could be prevented in 
some markets such as Britain, where Russian oil imports were banned, but elsewhere 
companies such as AIOC responded by attempting to co-opt independent firms into 
existing market arrangements. So the AIOC subsidiary, Commonwealth Oil 
Refineries, attempted to make agreements with the American independent oil 
company Caltex and the French national oil company, CFP, in the Australian market. 
The Aviation Agreement, by contrast, represented the adoption of pre-war co­
operation based upon the monopolistic control of markets, which had been used for 
the creation of the consolidated companies. The fact that AIOC and Shell simply 
attempted a redistribution of existing market shares, as opposed to adapting a model 
incorporating a flexible approach, recognising the growth in demand and rising 
competition, was certainly one element in the agreement’s failure.
Finally, the moves first towards Solus agreements in 1950 and then to direct 
ownership of petrol stations from 1953 can be understood as a classic example of 
transaction cost minimisation. However, as the move towards direct ownership 
began in the United States after exclusive dealing agreements were ruled illegal and 
competition policy was becoming a significant issue for government in Britain, 
governance issues again appear to provide a stronger explanation for this 
development of vertical integration.
AIOC and the major oil companies in general proved successful in 
developing adaptive and innovative procedures for governance in the era after 
reconversion from the late 1940s to the late 1950s. Faced with significant threats to 
the structure of the market, the major oil companies were able to either prevent
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change or adopt new methods of governance to circumvent change. The high levels 
of concentration and extensive vertical integration within the industry were two 
factors which enabled major oil companies to adopt successful and flexible co­
operative strategies aimed at structurally influencing the development of the market 
for oil products.
It should be pointed out however that this success proved to be only 
temporary. The success of the joint venture agreement in securing control over 
access to oil reserves at the same time necessitated that oil majors expand sales of 
crude oil on the market. By the late 1950s, an excess of crude oil enabled the 
independents and national companies to develop, bringing new challenges in 
distribution and marketing. By 1960 the emergence of OPEC was also to present a 
new challenge to the institutional framework developed by the majors.
Importantly then, it was reductions in asymmetry of information that acted to 
undermine the position of the majors. Governments of oil producer nations and oil 
importing nations, in different ways, wished to establish their own influence within 
the oil market and increasingly threatened the majors control of information. If 
information asymmetry led to the opportunist business strategies in the late 1940s, 
then it was the reduction in information asymmetry that led to the external challenges 
that prevented the continuation of opportunism into the 1950s.
The success of AIOC and the oil majors is in marked contrast to the 
experience of the General Electric Co. and the other major British electrical 
engineering companies in the control of the market for electrical manufactures in this 
period. Electrical manufacturing was one of the most successful areas of British 
manufacturing in the period, yet in an international perspective the industry was
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losing the competitive advantage it had acquired as a result of the allies’ victory in 
1945. The explanation for this was the lack of flexibility within the governance 
bodies introduced after 1945.
Not until the late 1950s did firms begin to examine alternative methods of co­
operation in an attempt to continue to influence the development of the market. It 
could be suggested that the period 1953-7 represents the turning point in this process. 
In 1953 General Electric (US) finally disposed of its major share-holding in AEI and 
the anti-trust case in the United States finally came to an end. By 1956 GEC, AEI 
and English Electric faced changes, due to British government action preventing 
collectively enforced restrictive practices, including resale price maintenance on 
domestic appliances. Finally, in the following year the Monopolies Commission 
ruled the contract price system effecting the supply of capital goods operated against 
the public interest.42
The co-operative methods adopted as a result by electrical manufacturers 
further indicate the importance of technical information regarding competitors’ 
organisational capabilities. Technology-sharing agreements became increasingly 
important as research and development expenditure became concentrated within the 
industry. The increase in research and development, driven by the growing 
technological complexity of products and the demands of defence projects, provided 
the industry with an alternative to rings as a mechanism for ensuring co-operation 
and monitoring between firms. Under conditions where research is an expensive and 
complex activity, technical information scarcity problems become acute. Patenting
42 Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission, Report on the Supply and 
Exports of Electrical and Allied Machinery and Plant. (1957), para 775.
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and technology sharing thus took on an increasingly supervisory role for the industry, 
with firms trading technological developments. The introduction of licensing 
agreements, including patented knowledge covering geographically distinct areas, 
ensured firms were able to use the property rights associated with technological 
development as a mechanism of ensuring disciplinary control over licensees.43
Market information gave way to technical information as a market 
governance mechanism. Did this change also see an abandonment of the opportunist 
business strategies of the early post war period? Certainly, many of the price 
restrictions were removed although as Mirow and Maurer make clear the tendering 
agreements in international markets, administered by the International Electrical 
Association, continued.44 More importantly, perhaps, is a recognition that technical 
information is a unique commodity of unknown future value which is difficult, if not 
impossible, to substitute. We would also wish to highlight the restrictions which were 
used to regulate the exports of goods based upon technology-sharing agreements. 
Therefore, on balance, it could be suggested that while the opportunity to develop 
opportunist business strategies existed, these may not always have been taken.
A major explanation highlighted for the relatively poor performance of 
governance procedures within the British electrical manufacturing industry was the 
ownership patterns developed within the industry45 The case study suggests 
ownership issues were significant in terms of British firms’ ability to act
43 M. Wilkins, The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad 
1914-70. (Harvard 1974), p541, footnote 29.
44 K.R. Mirow and H. Maurer, Webs of Power. (Boston USA 1982), p.254.
45 See L. S. Reich, ‘General Electric and the World Cartelisation of Electric Lamps’, 
International Cartels in Business History, eds. A. Kudo and T. Hara, (Tokoyo 1992), 
for development before 1945.
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independently and therefore in the governance procedures and bodies selected by the 
industry. The weakness of British firms’ governance procedures and inability to 
respond to changes in market information arose from the subsuming of British firms’ 
governance requirements to those of the larger United States firms, particularly 
General Electric and Westinghouse.
Foreign direct investment in Britain in the electrical engineering industry had 
had a positive effect in relation to technology transfer in the late 1920s but FDI can 
be considered to have contributed to the failure to develop organisational capabilities 
after 1950. The industry became increasingly reliant upon government expenditure 
and complained of suffering from periodic bouts of feast or famine. Under these 
circumstances, governance issues became still more important but attempts at a 
resolution of the industry’s difficulties were not made until the late 1960s.
The development of change in the retailing sector, and in the grocery retail 
trade in particular, was again very different from that of either the oil or electrical 
engineering industries. As discussed above Resale Price Maintenance represents a 
market governance as opposed to a transaction cost minimisation process. Retailers’ 
margins are dependent upon the price differential between purchase and sales prices 
so they would normally be considered to be natural transaction cost minimisers. Yet 
RPM, rather than harming multiple stores such as Sainsbury’s, provided them with 
the reduction of competitive pressures necessary to enable them to make the 
organisational investment in stores, training and centralised distribution that was 
central to their later challenge to the market structure. Thus, although the Sainsbury 
family and company maintained a philosophy opposed to RPM, its existence far from 
hindered the development of the company. However, the reintroduction of RPM in
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grocery retailing was not as successful for manufacturers as the re-introduction of 
restrictive practices had been in other industries.
Prolonged rationing, continuing up to 1954, meant that market information 
regarding trends in food production and consumption was more available and 
reliable than had been the case in other industries. Similarly technical information on 
competitors’ and suppliers’ organisational capabilities was also well established. In 
particular, detailed knowledge of US practice had been available for some time and 
retailers’ were increasingly concerned with adapting American methods to British 
circumstances. Market and technical information was of greater use to the multiple 
retailers who were able to incorporate new developments in self-service with 
supermarket-sized stores than to the myriad of small scale food producers.
The fact that information scarcity was not a significant difficulty facing 
grocery retailers resulted in an almost immediate attempt by the multiples to alter the 
conditions of governance within the trade, including manufacturer-imposed 
individual RPM agreements. The multiples were successful in creating a new 
competitive framework between 1958 and 1965. However, the creation of a new 
competitive framework also necessitated the limitation of price competition. Here 
again the multiple retailers were instrumental in defining the limits of this framework 
through the initial boycott of trading stamps and later the campaign against their 
issue, once the boycott failed. The success of this campaign resulted in legislation in 
1964. That multiple retailers such as Tesco’s and Sainsbury’s were on opposite sides 
over the retail trading stamps war rather than disproving the market governance 
considerations simply highlights both the difficulty and urgency firms faced in 
developing limitations upon price competition.
The resolution of the trading stamps conflict also highlights the role of 
opportunism. Manufacturers’ early post-war power was challenged by the emerging 
power of multiple retailing. However, the result was not simple price competition but 
a form of regulated price competition. This suggests that after 1964 the food retailing 
market was not characterised by simple self-interest with honest disclosure but by 
attempts to maintain a level of non-disclosure, or opportunism. Undoubtedly 
opportunism was not the same after 1964 as it had been before 1958 but nevertheless 
elements of it remained.
The institutional market structure established by the multiples by the mid- 
1960s was to last until Tesco’s introduced the ‘Check-Out 77’ campaign in 1977. 
After the late 1970s the multiple retailers were to become involved in a new series of 
institutional changes which was to lead to large-scale investment in hypermarkets 
and new increases in the levels of concentration in food retailing.
In conclusion, it can be suggested that, while there is a great divergence of 
experience between firms in the movement away from government-controlled 
markets in the late 1940s to industry-regulated markets in the 1950s and on to freer 
markets by the early 1960s, it is still the case that there is strong evidence to support 
positively the hypothesis that firms act as governance bodies, whose aim is to 
structure markets. This finding is backed up by the still stronger evidence that the 
motivation and, even more importantly, the timing behind firms’ organisational 
development is determined by their need to control information flows within the 
market. All three case studies highlight firms’ differing responses to the changes 
brought about by the growth of the world economy in the period from 1945 - c.1965. 
This fact further highlights our starting point that institutions cannot be assumed to
be homogenous. The contextualisation and specificity of historical development 
needs to be considered when assessing the impact of institutions on economic 
development.
• Further hypothesis
Some of the wider findings of this study have thrown up surprising 
conclusions which require further research. In particular the role of information, 
opportunism, competition and the nature of the invisible hand are all areas of 
interest.
The study can be said to stand or fall on the question of information. 
Objections to this approach might be raised in two areas. Empirically it might be 
suggested that the post-war period was not one in which information scarcity 
predominated. During the war government ministries acted as efficient information 
processors.46 After the war government controls and rationing could be suggested to 
have counter-acted any information scarcity. However, if this was the case then the 
movement towards de-control needs an explanation; why should de-control have 
taken place at all? Were there any economic arguments for de-control at all?
More theoretically it could be objected that information is, as Stigler 
maintains, simply a flag (price) and available to all actors without restriction. Such 
an approach would mean rejecting Casson’s wider interpretation of information. For 
Casson information on one level is ‘just a commodity that can be traded like any 
other’ but on another distinguishing between good and bad information is extremely
46 P. Howlett, 'New Light through Old Windows: A New Perspective on the British 
Economy in the Second World War', Journal of Contemporary History. Vol.28,1993
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difficult.47 Thus Casson maintains information is a heterogeneous series of 
commodities distinguished by their market and technical mix, quality, specification, 
reliability, etc. It is these difficulties of monitoring and contracting that lead to 
market failure. As Casson puts it ‘it is because information about information is so 
costly to obtain that markets for information tend to break down.’48
If Stigler is correct institutional issues are of little concern since ‘price 
dispersion is a manifestation - and, indeed, it is the measure - of ignorance in the 
market’.49 Information then does not reflect questions of context, institutional 
capture, rent-seeking, opportunism etc. However, such an abstract view would face 
significant criticism from many involved in areas ranging from mainstream history to 
applied or industrial economics. Such a view would also suggest a very literal 
reading of Coase’s theory of the firm. Firms internalise transactions on the basis that 
market prices are higher than internalised transactions. There are no advantages from 
ownership, internalisation economies derived from the removal of market 
externalities or control advantages over factor inputs to be gained. We would thus 
have a very static and singular view of the firm and perhaps economic development.
The view that information is diverse and open to institutional questions of 
control seems to be relatively secure. However, the view that firms should be 
considered as governance bodies before efficiency organisations may be less 
accepted. Casson, himself, accepts a view that the firm should be placed within an 
efficiency model. This implies that firms are the recipients and processors of 
information, as intermediators, but play little role in its development and diffusion.
47 Casson, op.cit.. ed., Bud-Frierman, p. 138.
48 Ibid.. original emphasis
49 G. Stigler, The Organisation of Industry. (Dlinois 1968), p. 172 (emphasis added).
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Casson recognises that false information may be deliberately traded if a market 
exists, but argues that custom, in societies with high information costs, and contracts, 
in societies with low information costs, provide mechanisms for the monitoring of 
the reliability of information.50 Casson then maintains information is subject to 
institutional constraints but rejects the Williamson approach that trade will be 
deliberately characterised by opportunism where possible. Bounded rationality is 
rejected in favour of the entrepreneur’s differential efficiency in processing market 
information.51
This thesis wishes to defend opportunism as a mechanism by which markets 
operate. The thrust of the argument suggests that successful entrepreneurs are not 
simply efficient information synthesisers but are able to reduce their exposure to risk 
through institutional measures. It was also maintained that the case study material 
lent towards the view that each firms’ profit maximisation approach also involved 
opportunism. Under post-war reconstruction firms proved successful in developing 
opportunist strategies but these were limited, though not removed, as the seller’s 
market declined.
A hypothesis emerging here then is that all transactions by definition are 
opportunistic. It will be recalled from McNulty that all competition is by definition 
competition for monopoly power but that "To compete for monopoly power is 
not...necessarily to realise it".52 We could paraphrase this by suggesting that, all
50 Casson, op.cit.. ed., Bud-Frierman, p i59-166.
51 See M. Casson, ‘Information and Economic Organisation*. Discussion Papers in 
Economics. No.317, (Reading 1995), p. 10 and M. Casson, The Nature of the Firm 
Reconsidered: Information Synthesis and Entrepreneurial Organisation,
(Unpublished Paper, Reading 1996), p.43.
52 P J . McNulty, 'Economic Theory and the Meaning of Competition', Quarterly 
Journal of Economics. (1970), p.639-657.
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transactions are attempts to achieve opportunist advantage but that not all 
opportunism is successful.
Directly relating to opportunism then is the view to be taken of competition. 
This study has accounted for the changing competitive environment within business 
by way of interest groups, namely firms and governments. The view that increases in 
competition emerged from an awakening of policy makers, and business leaders, to 
the dangers of restrictive practices has been rejected. The study shows support for 
both McNulty’s view of competition and also re-affirms a Schumpeterian view of the 
temporary nature of the advantages achieved. Western capitalism after the war 
regularly faced the ‘perennial gale of creative destruction’,53 leaving even the most 
successful firms struggling to cope in what, Bamberg has suggested for AIOC, was 
an unstable and uncertain environment.54 One key question deriving from this view 
is; did this pattern of instability continue after the early 1960s? in what ways did 
firms respond to the problems posed by the changing business environment of the 
1970s and 1980s? Clearly, this form of study could be extended well beyond the 
early 1960s.
The final area of interest which this study has highlighted is the role of the 
invisible hand itself. Can a view that the invisible hand of market forces, however 
defined, be put forward if the market is understood as an institutional product of the 
visible hand?
53 J.A. Schumpeter, Capitalism. Socialism and Democracy. (1965), p.84.
54 J. Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum Company: The Anglo-Iranian 
Years 1928-54. Vol.2, (Cambridge 1994), p.517.
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This study started with an interest in economic development and human 
agency. It has attempted to unravel the linkages between individual action, business 
organisation wider economic development. The study, surprisingly, has found little 
or no role for the invisible hand. Prices, competition and markets are all found to be 
the products of firms and governments in the creation of a regulated framework. The 
methods of regulation have changed, as has the framework, but these are suggested 
to be the products of national development, international economic integration and 
business needs; not the products of the invisible hand of the market. The hypothesis 
flowing from these findings is does the invisible hand exist?
If the market mechanism itself is found to be the product of market 
governance then the invisible hand is removed. Invisible market forces have been 
replaced by the regulation, control and structuring of participants - visible hands. 
Precisely, where can the invisible hand be located? Rather interestingly, the answer 
from Hannah and Casson is in business culture.55 The ability to remove the need for 
particular types of monitoring information, e.g. due to high levels of trust, honesty 
etc., from transactions lowers the costs of information acquisition. Hence firms 
which are able to operate with lower levels of supervisory control may gain 
efficiency advantages over other firms and over using markets for the same 
transactions. One problem for this approach is the implicit acceptance that 
information leading to supervisory control is the key factor. We have returned full 
circle to Marglin.
55 L. Hannah, ‘Delusions of Durable Dominance or the Invisible Hand Strikes Back’, 
paper presented at the International Economic History Congress, session A2, (Milan 
1994), pp. 113-128 and Casson, Enterprise, pp.86-104.
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Finally the research has deliberately emphasised the diversity not the 
typicality of the firms involved. It is in this area that further research is clearly 
required. Which, if any, of the three institutional patterns of development of the 
market and firms’ organisational capabilities best reflects the British experience after 
1945? Indeed how typical is the British experience? Only a much wider study of 
business co-operation would begin to resolve these questions.
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• Appendix One
A Sectoral analysis of government expenditure using Input-Output tables
This appendix details the construction of the tables 1.1 & 1.2 in chapter one. 
The concern is to examine the degree to which public sector (government and public 
corporations) orders altered in the period from 1948-63.
Input-Output tables describe the flow of goods and services between industrial 
sectors within an economy. Their initial development assumed a closed economy in 
which all goods and services were purchased and consumed within a given time span. 
Input-Output tables aim was to develop input coefficients relating increases in input in 
one sector to total output within the economy as a whole.1 As a result a series of linear 
equations could be built up generating a structural matrix for the whole economy, 
which could then be used to develop planning mechanism for future economic 
growth.2
In reality production is not a static process. Economies are not closed, goods 
and services are internationally traded, and output is not always used within a given 
time span, instead output can lead to increases in domestic fixed capital formation or 
increases in stocks and work in progress. As a result Input-Output tables in practice 
measure the flow of intermediary products between industries. Final output is simply 
presented in aggregate form with the only distinction made between exports, 
consumption by consumers and government and output leading to increases in gross
1 See W. Leontief, Input-Output Economics. (New York 1966), especially pp. 134- 
154.
2 Input-Output tables were pioneered within the US during the war, where by 1943 a 
95 sector table for 1939 had been produced. By 1961 attempts were also being made 
to consider the impact of reductions in arms spending upon the economy as a whole. 
See M. Offenburg and W. Leontief, ‘The economic effects of disarmament’, 
Scientific America. 204-4, (1961). Reprinted in ibid. pp. 167-183.
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domestic capital formation (fixed and stocks). Most importantly then, input-output 
tables do not tell us which industries are making the capital investment and what the 
inter-relationships are.
To analysise increases in capital formation it is necessary to rely upon the 
broad categorisation of capital investment made in National Income and Expenditure 
tables, between vehicles, ships and aircraft, plant and machinery and construction 
(dwellings and other new buildings and works combined).
Input-Output tables on Britain in the two decades after 1945 exist for the years 
1948, 1954 and 1963.3 The 1948 tables were published by researchers at the 
Department of Applied Economics, Cambridge in 1958 while those covering 1954 and 
1963 were published by the Board of Trade in 1961 and 1970 respectively.4 The Input- 
Output tables for 1948 provide information based upon 47 commodity groups based 
upon the 1950 Census of Production, while the Input-Output tables for 1963 provide 
disaggregated data within 70 industry classifications using the 1963 Census of 
Production.5 The first government published Input-Output tables for 1954 classified 
the purchases of intermediate goods and services under 45 industry headings. 
Unfortunately, the 1954 tables only disaggregate public authorities (national and local 
government) expenditure into eleven categories, making them of little use for this 
study.6
3 There is also one set of tables for 1935. See T. Bama, ‘The Interdependence of the 
British Economy’, Royal Journal of the Statistical Society. Series. A. Vol.CXV, Part 
1, (1952), pp.29-81
4 LG. Stewart, Input-Output Table for the United Kingdom, The Times Review of 
Industry. December 1958, pp.vii-ix, Board of Trade, ‘Input-Output Tables for the 
United Kingdom 1954’, Studies in Official Statistics. No.8 , (1961) and Input-Output 
Tables for the United Kingdom. 1963. (1970).
5 Board of Trade, Input-Output 1963. Table A make-matrix and Table D and I.G. 
Stewart, op.cit.. pp.vii-ix
6 Board of Trade, Input-Output 1954. Table 1, pp.4-5
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By calculating the total purchases of intermediary products by the public 
corporations from each industry group and final product purchases by central and local 
government, and then measuring this against the total output of each industry, it is 
possible to ascertain how important public sector orders were for each industry (see 
Tables A l.l andA1.2)
Total domestic output of private industry is used (rather than total output), as 
this study is concerned with the effects of the public sector within the domestic market, 
hence exports were removed from the output total. Unfortunately, imports of goods are 
treated differently in the 1948 and 1963 tables. In the 1948 tables imports are, where 
possible, incorporated into their respective commodity sectors, as an addition to 
domestic output, but in the 1963 tables they are presented separately from domestic 
output.7 It is not possible to standardise imports between the two data sets. This study’s 
concern leads us to exclude imports. This introduces an upward bias in the 1948 
results, however, this is not considered to be of significance for two reasons: imports in 
1948 were still highly constrained by dollar shortages and government controls and 
any upward bias acts against the point this study is trying to make, namely, that the 
public sector was of increasing importance as a factor in sales for private firms.
A minimum of 10% of total domestic output was taken as the level at which 
public sector consumption was considered to be of importance. The coal, gas, water 
and electricity supply industries and are covered within these classifications for both 
the 1948 and 1963 tables. The communications industry, principally the post office, is 
shown separately within the 1963 tables.
7 LG. Stewart, op.cit.. p.viii
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The road and railway industries present some problems. In the 1948 tables they 
are treated separately but in the 1963 tables they are combined. In 1948 both industries 
were the subject of nationalisation measures but it should be recalled the road haulage 
industry was subsequently privatised in the 1950s. Therefore the 1963 combined 
category for road and rail transport includes a significant level of private industry. As a 
result the calculations have been run both with and without the road and railway 
industry data. Excluding the road and rail transport category from the 1963 results 
entirely makes an impact in four areas: rubber purchases are reduced by 80%, other 
vehicles (mainly locomotives) by 90%, other electrical goods and mineral oils both by 
40%.
The 1963 tables also includes a separate category for ‘other transport’ which 
includes the public sector airlines BEA and BOAC and shipping expenditure included 
in the British Rail accounts.8 On the basis that the public sector in this category may 
represent below half of the purchases made, this category has been excluded. Including 
this category would only make a significant impact on purchases from the mineral oil 
refining industry, which would be increased by a further 25%. Interestingly, including 
this category does not make any impact on purchases of from the aircraft industry. No 
explanation is presented here for this anomaly, except to re-state that these findings 
should be interpreted as orders of magnitude.
8 Board of Trade, Input-Output 1963. p. 18
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Table A l.l  Input-Output representation of Public Sector Purchases from Private Industry in 1948.
Coal Gas
and
Water
Electricity Rail Road Public
Authority
Total (ex.
capital
formation)
Total
Domestic
Output
Public Sector 
Purchases as 
% of Domestic 
Output
Public Sector 
Capital 
formation11
Total Public Sector 
as % of Domestic 
Output inc. 
capital formation)
Building materials 0.9 0.2 0.7 0.1 19.2 21.1 203 10.39
Chemicals and Co. 9.6 2.5 1 2.5 20.6 36.2 218.2 16.59
Soaps and polishes 1 4.4 5.4 103.7 5.21
Oils and Greases 2.4 5.6 0.7 2.4 88.4 39.6 139.1 255.7 54.40
Motor and cycles 0.3 68.5 15 83.8 340.9 24.58
Aircraft 80 80 104.2 76.78
Rail locomotives & rolling stock 19.5 2.8 22.3 128.6 17.34
Shipbuilding & marine engineering 30 30 231.5 12.96
Vehicles, ships and aircraft 216.1 805.2 55 33.67
Machine tools 10.3 10.3 105 9.81
Constructional engineering 3 0.2 0.3 0.1 3.6 161.6 2.23
Mechanical Engineering 0.3 0.1 7.2 6 13 26.6 419.5 6.34
Electrical Engineering 0.3 0.1 19.8 1 3.5 5 29.7 353.3 8.41
Radio & Telecommunications. 1 1.5 1.2 0.5 4.8 9 151.2 5.95
Tools, wire and Co. 1.5 1 1 3 0.3 11.5 18.3 215.2 8.50
Hardware and holloware 2.5 1.2 1 3 0.2 8.1 16 216.1 7.40
Instruments and Co. 0.1 14.6 14.7 121.3 12.12
Other plant and machinery111 16 6.7 1. 3.1 26.8 991 3.12
Plant and Machinery 155 2603.2 137 11.22
Wood and Cork 20.8 4.2 0.8 2.7 1.9 15.1 45.5 341.5 13.32
Paper and Board 2.5 1.1 6.6 10.2 201.5 5.06
Printing & Publishing 3.5 0.5 19 23 304.2 7.56
Rubber 2 1 0.1 25 2.7 30.8 141.2 21.81
Building and Contracting 2 1 1 1 4.5 80 89.5 1158 7.73 478 49.01
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Table A1.2 Input-Output representation of Public Sector Purchases from Private Industry in 1963IV
Communication Coal Gas Electric Water Road
and
Rail
Public
Authority
Total
Purchases
(excl.
capital
formation)
Total
Domestic
Output
Total Public 
Sector s 
Purchases as 
% of Domestic 
Output
Public Total Public 
Sector Sector as a % of 
Capital Domestic Output 
formationv incl. fixed capital 
formation
Mineral oil refining 1.4 1.9 19.7 19.6 0.8 41.3 19.1 103.8 406.8 25.52
Pharmaceutical & toilet preps. 0.2 0.1 0.3 56.6 57.2 222.1 25.75
Other chemical and allied ind. 0.1 5.5 1 1.5 1 6.1 64.1 79.3 772.5 10.27
Agricultural machinery 0.1 0.4 0.5 43.3 1.15
Machine tools 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.9 3 107.9 2.78
Engineers' small tools 4 1.1 1.7 0.2 0.7 1.2 8.9 82.5 10.79
Industrial engines 0.5 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.5 8 10 82.2 12.17
Textile machinery 0.2 0.1 0.8 1.1 50.3 2.19
Contractors' plant & equipment. 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.5 10 11.5 156.1 7.37
Office machinery 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.6 1 38 2.63
Other non-electrical machinery 0.1 18 0.4 1.2 1.4 1.1 16.8 39 462.2 8.44
Industrial plant & steel work 1 1.5 1.3 0.2 0.3 11.8 16.1 304.4 5.29
Other mechanical engineering 6.2 2.3 4.2 0.6 0.6 53.7 67.6 404.1 16.73
Scientific instruments 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.9 54.4 56.4 156.8 35.97
Electrical machinery 0.7 1.6 0.6 20.2 0.1 5.6 16.2 45 318.5 14.13
Insulated wires & cables 1 8.6 0.1 25.1 0.8 10.3 45.9 182.1 25.21
Radio and telecommunications 11.7 1.6 0.5 3 0.1 2.1 177.4 196.4 500.4 39.25
Other electrical goods 1.5 2.2 0.4 6.5 0.2 21.2 19.6 51.6 361.3 14.28
Other manufactured goods'1 1.4 1.9 19.7 19.6 6.8 36.9 19.1 105.4 2669.5 3.95
Plant and Machinery 659.4 5919.6 771 24.16
Shipbuilding & marine eng. 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 133 133.9 313 42.78
Motor vehicles 0.7 2.5 0.4 1.4 0.2 26.8 42.4 74.4 950.7 7.83
Aircraft 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 298.2 298.8 375 79.68
Other vehicles 0.8 0.7 1 0.4 60.3 4.7 67.9 161.2 42.12
Vehicles, ships and aircraft 575 1799.9 110 38.06
Printing & Publishing 9.5 1.3 0.1 8.5 55.1 74.5 713.2 10.45
Rubber 0.5 6.2 0.2 0.5 0.1 45 5 57.5 285.8 20.12
Construction 5 18 1.6 2.3 0.5 13 291 331.4 3231.1 10.26 1251 48.97
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1 LG. Stewart, Input-Output Table for the United Kingdom, The Times Review of Industry. December 1958, pp.vii-ix. 
u National Income and Expenditure Tables. 1955, table 5.
111 Including, Iron and steel smelting, iron and steel, tin and tube making, non-ferrous metals and leather and fur. 
lv Sources: Board of Trade, Input-Output 1963. table D
v National Income and Expenditure Tables for the United Kingdom. (1969), table 51 for gross fixed capital formation 
V1 Including Iron and steel, light metals, other non-ferrous metals, cans and metal boxes and other metal goods.
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• Appendix Two
Alternative Estimates of Real Gross Profits for the Anglo Iranian Oil Co.
Below are two further alternative analyses of Anglo Iranian Oil Co’s real gross 
profits. Whether price indices for plant and machinery, gross domestic product or 
retail prices are used a similar picture emerges for the years 1946-55. The main 
difference occurs after 1956 when using a retail prices index gross profits are seen to 
decline rapidly. If a RPI index was considered a more reliable method of analysing 
real gross profits then this would reinforce the chapter’s central finding, that the 
period from 1945 to the mid-1950s represents the high point for the oil majors’ 
success in market governance.
Figure A2.1
AIOC Real Gross Profit £m (using GDP prices index 1952=100)___________
1946 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958
Sources: Gross profits derived from Bamberg, op.cit.. table 20.1, p.515, B.P., 
Annual Reports & Accounts. 1946-58 and price index from C.H. Feinstein, 
National Income. Expenditure and Output in the United Kingdom. 1855-1965. 
(Cambridge 1972), Tables T19-20 GDP at constant prices. ____________
30
■ Gross trading 
profit after 
depreciation 
(1951-4)
Gross trading 
profit before 
depreciation 
(1951-4)
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1946
Figure A2.2
AIOC Real Gross Profits £m (using Retail Price Index 
1952=100)110 T
100 -
1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958
■Gross trading 
profit before 
depreciation 
(1951-4)
■ Gross trading 
profit after 
depreciation 
(1951-4)
Sources: As Figure A1.1 and B.R. Mitchell and H.G. Jones, Second Abstract of 
British Historical Statistics. (Cambridge 1971), Tables 4a-c for retail price index.
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Appendix Three
Text of letter from Geoffrey Lloyd, Minister for Fuel and Power to Boards of all 
US owned oil companies operating in Britain.1
4th December 1952
Dear Gentlemen,
Her Majesty's Government understands that in connection with 
proceedings under the Anti-Trust laws in the United States of America (which raise 
important questions relating to international comity you have been required by your 
holding company in pursuance of subpoenas issued to them to produce documents 
relating to your company’s business.
Her Majesty's Government understands that this requirement relates to 
documents which effect a wide range of your company's activities and Her Majesty's 
Government consider that the disclosure of some of these documents relating to 
business outside the United States may prejudice or endanger the economic, strategic 
and political interests of Her Majesty's Government and Western Powers.
Her Majesty's Government therefore require you not to produce any documents 
which are not in the United States of America and which do not relate to business in 
the United States of America without the authority of Her Majesty's Government.
1 PRO. POWE 33/1857, Geoffrey Lloyd, Minister for Fuel and Power to Boards of 
all US owned oil companies operating in Britain, 4th December 1952.
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• Appendix Four
Alternative Estimates of Real Gross Profits for AEI, English Electric and GEC
Below are two further estimates of real gross profits for the electrical 
engineering industry. Using a manufacturing output or GDP price index only alters 
the trend in real gross profits for English Electric. Whereas, using a retail price index 
gross profits peak in 1956 using GDP or wholesale output prices the peak occurs in 
1960. The explanation for this may lie in English Electric’s greater degree of 
specialisation in the capital goods sector, since its output was less influenced by 
changes within retail prices.
Figure A4.1
Real Gross Profits (using GDP index 1952=100)
16 T
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Sources: Annual Reports 1955-65 and C.H. Feinstein, National Income. 
Expenditure and Output Tables of the United Kingdom. 1855-1965. 
(Cambridge 1972), Tables 19-20 for GDP price index.
Figure A4.2
Real Gross Profits £m (Manufacturing Output prices 1954
=100)
■GEC
■AEI
■ English 
Electric
Sources: Annual Reports. 1955-65 and B.R. Mitchell and H.G. Jones, Second 
Abstract of British Historical Statistics. (Cambridge 1971), Tables A-C for 
manufacturing price index
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• Appendix Five
Reports from British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee, the Combined 
Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee and the Field Intelligence Agency 
Technical. US Group. Classified List No.18.1
Accumulators 16
Alternators, Generators and Rotary Converters 13
Cables and Cable Making Machinery 27
Condensers, Capacitors and Resisters 18
Dry Batteries 1
Electric Lamps and Radio Valves 26
Electric Meters, Measuring Testing and Research Apparatus 71
Electric Traction 3
Electric Welding 11
Frictional H.P. Motors 5
Industrial Research laboratories 14
Infra-Red Heating Apparatus 8
Insulating Material and Insulators 31
Lighting Electrical Equipment 11
Magnets and Magnetic Material 26
Motors (except Frictional H.P. Motors) 11
Radar 24
Radio Transmitters and Receivers 30
Rectifiers and Invertors 16
Switchgear 13
Telephone and Telegraph Apparatus 19
Television 10
Thermostats 3
Transformers 7
X-Ray Apparatus 16
Total 430
from British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee, the Combined Intelligence 
Objectives Sub-Committee and the Field Intelligence Agency Technical, US Group,
Classified List No.18, (March 1948)
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